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 Why do we observe such widely differing patterns of repression and state violence under 
authoritarian rule?  Despite a wave of recent interest in authoritarian politics, the origins, design and behavior 
of the coercive institutions that embody the state’s monopoly on violence remain relatively unexamined.  
This project draws on new statistical and geographic data, elite interviews, and archival evidence from 
the U.S. and Asia to chronicle the origins and operation of the internal security apparatus in three Cold War 
anti-communist authoritarian regimes – Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea – and compares them to 
similar processes in Communist authoritarian regimes in North Korea and China.  Its findings challenge 
dominant narratives about contentious politics and state-society conflict in Asia; offer an unprecedented view 
inside ‘secret police’ use of surveillance, coercion, and violence; and provide a new understanding of the 
institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.  
I argue that autocrats face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security apparatus 
to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals.  Coup-proofing requires an 
internally fragmented security force drawn from narrow segments of society; managing popular unrest 
requires a unitary apparatus with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks.  Autocrats 
construct coercive institutions based on the dominant perceived threat when they come to power, but these 
organizational tradeoffs, exacerbated by institutional stickiness, blunt their ability to adapt as new threats arise.  
Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence.  A more fragmented, 
exclusive security apparatus – associated with a high initial threat from fellow elites – is likely to be more 
violent, both because it has stronger incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence 
capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression.  In contrast to existing threat-based explanations 
of repression, I demonstrate that autocrats who are deeply concerned about popular threats use less violence 
rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose.  In 
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these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute for violence, and citizens relinquish their privacy, but 
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“Cruelty badly used is that which, although infrequent to start with, 
as time goes on, rather than disappearing, grows in intensity.” 




“His Majesty Haile Selassie opposed impious and noisy violence, 
preferring an exchange in careful doses, thought out.” 






“Cutting off heads isn’t like growing chives.   
Chives regrow.  Heads don’t.”  

































I. Introduction  
 
Compared to the voluminous studies on international and civil conflict, abuses committed 
by states against their citizens are a relatively overlooked yet important source of political violence in 
the world today.  Autocracies comprise a significant fraction of the world’s countries, both in 
historical terms and at present; Freedom House listed forty-eight “not free” and sixty only “partially 
free” countries at the end of 2011, comprising almost sixty percent of the world’s population.1  Non-
democratic regimes dominate critical regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and lead several 
of the world’s great powers, including China and Russia.  From Stalin’s ‘Gulag archipelago’ to 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 to the 2011 crackdowns in Bahrain and Syria, our mental images of 
authoritarianism depict these regimes as overwhelmingly repressive and dependent on coercion.  
Where that coercion is unopposed, some of the world’s worst human rights abuses can come to 
pass.  Where it is resisted, the struggle can metastasize into insurgency or even civil war.    
The conceptualization of authoritarian regimes as monolithically repressive, however, 
ignores a critical element of variation: the different levels and types of violence that they use to 
                                                 
1 Throughout this manuscript, I use autocratic, authoritarian, and dictatorial interchangeably. Freedom in the 
World 2012 (Freedom House, 2012), pp. 3-4, online at www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2012   
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maintain power.  In reality, the level and kind of force employed by autocrats varies dramatically 
across countries. Eighteen people per year died under Brazil’s military junta; the annual death rate in 
Argentina was a staggering 1,280.2  State violence also varies within countries across space and time.  
In Asia, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces killed thousands in the early years of Taiwan’s “White Terror,” but 
executed almost no-one in the last two decades of authoritarian rule; in neighboring South Korea, 
state violence and executions oscillated over time and by region; in the Philippines, violence rose 
steadily under Marcos – despite U.S. pressure to lower human rights violations in all three cases.  
The events of the Arab Spring provided yet another indication that authoritarian security services 
display wide variation in whether and how they use force against the population, with profound 
consequences for a range of outcomes including regime stability, civil conflict, and foreign policy.  
In some places and at some times, regimes rely on low-intensity forms of repression like surveillance 
and intimidation, while at other times they turn to high-intensity violence like mass killing.  What 
explains this variation? Why do we observe such different patterns of repression and state violence 
under authoritarian rule?    
In recent years, the field of political science has experienced a resurgence of interest in 
authoritarian political systems, spanning a range of methodological approaches and theoretical 
perspectives.3  Much of this work has specifically focused on authoritarian political institutions, 
                                                 
2 Alfred McCoy, Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009), pp. 192-93.   
3 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. 
Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under 
Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, 
“Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 11 
(November 2007), pp. 1279-1301; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation, and 
Rebellion Under Dictatorships,” Economics & Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2006): pp. 1–26; Barbara Geddes, “What 
Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 (June 
1999), pp. 115-144; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of 
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dan Slater, “Iron Cage 
in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia,” Comparative Politics, 
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especially those with quasi-democratic features, such as courts, parties, legislatures and elections.4  
Some studies even examine mechanisms such as delegate responsiveness, accountability, and 
credible commitment.5   
Despite this focus, however, and despite the centrality of coercion in works on the nation-
state and its stability,6 the origins and behavior of coercive institutions – the organizations that 
embody an authoritarian regime’s monopoly on violence – remain strikingly under-examined.7 
Intelligence organizations receive similarly scant theoretical treatment.8 The handful of works that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 2003), pp. 81-101; Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian 
Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, 2010); Milan Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in 
Authoritarian Politics,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April 2009): pp. 477–494; Milan 
Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeffrey A. Winters, 
Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
4 Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); 
Jason Brownlee, Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Gandhi 2008; Barbara Geddes, “Why Elections and Parties in Authoritarian Regimes,” paper 
presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference (2005); Tom Ginsburg and Tamir 
Moustafa, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan,” 
Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006): pp. 456–71; Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party 
Survival and its Demise in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Benjamin Smith, “Life of the 
Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule,” World Politics, Vol. 57, 
No. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 421-451; Slater 2003.  
5 Jessica Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization, 
Vol. 62, No. 1 (2007), pp 35-64; Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Nodding or Needling?  Analyzing 
Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 104, No. 3 
(2010), pp. 482-502; Geddes 2006; Philip Keefer, “Why Follow the Leader?  Collective Action, credible 
commitment, and conflict,” draft paper prepared for Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, eds., Oxford 
Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (July 2010).   
6 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1978); Max Weber, Economy and Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative 
Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).  
7 David Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After 10 Years?” Comparative Politics, Vol. 44, No. 
3 (April 2012). For a partial exception, see Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of 
the Secret Police in Communist States (Boulder: Westview, 1984).  
8 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 1; Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations, 
and ‘Under-theorization’,” in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, eds., Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First 
Century: Journeys in the Shadows (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 32.  
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do examine the coercive apparatus – all single-case analyses – do not examine variations in the 
design of these institutions, nor do they attempt to explain variations in these institutions’ behavior.9  
Despite acute contemporary relevance, theoretical significance, and a burgeoning literature on 
authoritarianism, we lack a nuanced understanding of the micro-foundations of authoritarian rule, 
especially a clear theory of the organization and use of violence.  
 This gap seems all the more surprising when we consider that history and literature have 
provided us with profoundly moving accounts of the human effects of institutionalized terror.10  
This is especially true in the cases of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, about which historians, 
biographers, and novelists have produced enough volumes to fill library shelf upon library shelf.11  
                                                 
9 Xuezhi Guo, China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013); Pablo Policzer, The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2009); Paul R. Gregory, Terror By Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study) (New Haven and 
Stanford: Yale University Press and the Hoover Institution, 2009); Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th 
Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Michael Schoenhals, Spying 
for the People: Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949-67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
One exception to the single-case approach is Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2: 139-57. Bellin notes 
that the strength of the coercive apparatus is important, but treats these institutions’ strength as proceeding 
from structural factors – resource endowments, either material (oil wealth) or social (patrimonialism) – that 
remain roughly constant in a society or in a regime across time.  This argument leaves unexplained both the 
reorganizations that take place without shifts in these underlying structural factors, and the trends of 
repression which also vary more quickly than structural factors evolve.  
10 On Russia, see Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007); on 
China, Gao Xingjian, Soul Mountain and One Man’s Bible (New York: Harper Collins 2000, 2002); on Trujillo in 
the Dominican Republic, Mario Vargas Llosa, The Feast of the Goat (New York: Picador, 2000); on Chile, 
Roberto Bolano’s By Night in Chile (New York: New Directions, 2003); on post-apartheid South Africa, J.M. 
Coetzee, Disgrace (New York: Penguin, 1999).  For a set of interviews with seven deposed dictators and/or 
their spouses, see Riccardo Orizio, Talk of the Devil: Encounters with Seven Dictators (New York: Walker and 
Company, 2002).   
11 For a sample that does not even scratch the surface of this extensive literature, see Christopher Browning, 
Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992); William 
Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: a history of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); 
Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-45 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Vintage 1997); Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2004); Adrian Weale, Army of Evil: A History of the SS (New York: NAL Caliber/Penguin, 2010); Amir Weiner 
and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, “Getting to Know you: The Soviet Surveillance System, 1939-57,” Kritika: Explorations 
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There is, however, little work by political scientists that either examines whether the coercive 
dynamics of the Nazi and Soviet regimes replicated themselves in the scores of authoritarian regimes 
that populated the world in the seven subsequent decades.  There is also little work that has sought 
to discern an underlying pattern in their organization and use of violence.12  As early as 1970, Dallin 
and Breslauer’s work on political terror noted the “paucity of discussion about its functions and 
dynamics.”13  Over thirty years later, in 2003, Charles Tilly called for more scrutiny of how different 
regimes managed their ‘specialists in violence,’ and as late as 2007 Christian Davenport echoed 
Dallin and Breslauer’s observation, remarking that academic literature still pays more attention to the 
“evils done against governments” than the evils done by them.14  
This oversight may be rooted in the perceived difficulty of accessing sources on the sensitive 
decision-making processes of closed regimes. It may have originated in the perception that 
authoritarian repression was fast becoming a topic of dwindling real-world relevance. As the number 
of democracies multiplied at the end of the Cold War, and civil conflict accumulated in weak states 
across the globe, it may have seemed logical for scholars to focus more on political transition, 
democratization, and civil conflict than on state terror, which likely appeared almost old-fashioned, 
limited to a handful of bizarre Cold War holdouts like North Korea whose time would surely run 
out soon. It may also have originated in what Holocaust scholars have called the “moral sensitivity 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 2012), pp. 5-45; David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: 
Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-53 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Paul 
Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-41 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009).  
12 A partial exception to this is Gregory, Terror By Quota.  Gregory examines the state security apparatus and 
proposes explanations for the “stylized facts” of Soviet repression, but does not compare these stylized facts 
or the motivations for them to other systems.    
13 Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1970). I thank David Art for bringing this quotation to my attention. 
14 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 10 (2007), 
pp. 1-23.  
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exclusion,” in which scholars avoid examining the motivations of perpetrators of evil because it 
seems uncomfortably close to justifying their behavior.15  Whatever the reason, today’s literature on 
political violence focuses more on periods of transition than on the conditions that precede them, 
and more on the organization of violence by non-state actors than by states.16  As a result, we do not 
know how dictators manage their coercive agents, what tradeoffs they confront as they do so, why 
their institutional choices vary, or what the consequences of those choices are – for them or for the 
people they rule.  We also do not know what drives temporal, cross-national, and sub-national 
variation in the patterns of state violence, or why – given the significant costs of indiscriminate 
violence – regimes use it at some times, but avoid it at others.  
 Repression in authoritarian political systems, in short, is something that is assumed far more 
than it is analyzed.  Coupled with the field’s current focus on the role played by other political 
institutions, this oversight could be fundamentally misleading.  As David Art has noted, “In the rush 
to analyze the quasi-democratic institutions of closed autocracies or competitive authoritarian 
regimes, there is the risk of neglecting their defining feature: the use of coercion, and sometimes 
terror.”17  Moreover, when scholars omit coercive institutions, they risk overstating the contribution 
of these other institutions to outcomes such as regime stability or longevity.  
In the following pages, I argue that the design of coercive institutions fundamentally shapes 
patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarianism.  Autocrats who want to stay in 
                                                 
15 Inga Clendinnen, Reading the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge, 1998).  
16 For problems with the assumptions of the transitology literature, see Thomas Carrothers, “The End of the 
Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 5-21.  The literature on terrorist 
and non-state armed groups is too large to review comprehensively here, but for two examples of an 
organizational approach to violence by non-state actors, see Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Challenge: Security, Efficiency, Control, PhD 
dissertation, Stanford University (October 2007).    
17 David Art, “Coercive Institutions under Authoritarian Regimes: A Research Agenda,” paper presented at 
the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, (September 2011), 
p. 2; see also Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism”; Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Ch. 1.   
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power must defend themselves from a number of different threats: external threats, internal mass-
based threats, and internal elite-based threats.  However, they face a fundamental tradeoff between 
designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to 
defend against rival elites.  As a result, they construct coercive institutions based on the primary 
perceived threat at the time they come to power, but these organizational tradeoffs, coupled with the 
stickiness of the coercive apparatus once established, blunt the regime’s ability to adapt as new 
threats arise.  Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A 
more fragmented, socially isolated security apparatus – typically associated with a high initial threat 
from elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has higher incentives to engage in violence 
and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression.  By 
contrast, autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, 
and do so because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose.   
Section Two of this chapter explains how autocrats construct and manage their internal 
security apparatus.  It introduces the fundamental organizational challenge of an autocrat, outlines 
the process by which regimes construct their security apparatus (including how they deal with 
organizational tradeoffs), and establishes the independent effect of coercive institutions. This section 
focuses particularly on explaining choices about the degree of fragmentation (organizational structure) 
and the exclusivity of the coercive apparatus (social composition). Section Three shifts from using 
organizational outcomes as a dependent variable to using them as an independent variable that 
explains variations in the patterns of state violence.  I explain two mechanisms by which coercive 
institutional structure and composition are likely to affect the scope and intensity of state violence: a 
pathway based on the incentives provided to agents within the coercive apparatus, and a pathway 
based on the intelligence capacity that the apparatus possesses.  Sections Two and Three also discuss 
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the alternative explanations against which I test my theory.  Section Four concludes by providing an 
overview of the research design and empirical strategy used in this project.    
  
 
II. The Origins of Coercive Institutions  
Autocrats seeking to organize violence face a fundamental dilemma: how should they 
construct and manage their internal security apparatus – what Charles Tilly called their “specialists in 
violence” – so that these forces are an asset to their survival and not a threat?  It is a paradox of 
empowerment versus control: how can they establish security forces capable of conducting violence 
against their enemies, while simultaneously preventing that capacity for violence from being directed 
at themselves?   
 
A. The Fundamental Problem of Autocratic Self-Preservation and the Paradox of 
Organizing Violence  
To a dictator seeking to ensure his survival, the world presents a number of potential threats.  
Existing political science literature, however, commonly treats autocrats as if they focus on only one 
of these problems at a time.  The literature on totalitarian government, for example, deals primarily 
with the threat of mass mobilization and popular revolt,18 as does some of the recent work on social 
movements and repression,19 autocratic institution-building,20 and democratic transition.21  There is 
                                                 
18 Dallin and Breslauer, Political Terror; Karl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).  
19 See, for example, Sidney Tarrow Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1988); Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, eds., 
Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005); Davenport, “State Repression and 
Political Order”; Mark Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression 
and Dissent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1987): pp. 266-297); Will H. Moore, 
“Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,” American Journal of Political Science, VoI. 42, No.3 
(July 1998): pp. 851-873; Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: Toward a 
Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Pamela Oliver, “Bringing the Crowd Back 
In: The Non-Organizational Elements of Social Movements,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change, 
Vol. 14 (1989), pp. 1-30.    
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also an extensive literature on coup-proofing (sometimes referred to as political intervention) that 
spans comparative politics and international security studies.22  More recent work focuses on the task 
of elite management, examining how autocrats create and sustain the coalitions necessary to stay in 
power.23   
Some of this work has attempted to address tradeoffs.  The coup-proofing literature, for 
example, commonly uses the threat posed by military elites to explain why autocrats pursue forms of 
political intervention that are sub-optimal from an external security standpoint.  Stephen David’s 
omnibalancing theory looks at how states assess internal versus external threats when making 
alliance choices.24 Internally, Milan Svolik explains outcomes related to political institutions and 
leadership change by focusing on what he calls the twin problems of dictatorship: the problem of 
authoritarian control over the masses, and the problem of authoritarian power-sharing to counter 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Gandhi, Political Institutions; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion”; Gandhi 
and Przeworski,, “Authoritarian Institutions”; Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism.”    
21 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review, 
Vol. 91 (2001): pp. 938–963; Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003).  
22 Edward Luttwak, Coup d’ Etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Knopf, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers 
in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1977); John B. Londregan and Keith 
T. Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power,” World Politics, Vol. 42 (1990): pp. 
151–83. On coup-proofing and military effectiveness, see Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, “Technology, 
Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 
(1996): pp. 171-212; Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); James 
Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security, Vol. 24, 
No. 2 (1999): pp. 131-165; Caitlin Talmadge, ““Explaining Military Effectiveness: Political Intervention and 
Battlefield Performance,” PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute for Technology (Cambridge, 2011).  
23 Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics”; Bueno de Mesquita et al, The Logic of Political Survival; 
Brownlee, Durable Authoritarianism.   
24 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 
233-256. See also Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).  
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the threat from fellow elites.25 None of these works, however, addresses all three types of threats 
(external, elite, and popular), nor do they directly address the consequences of this multidimensional 
threat balancing for patterns of authoritarian state violence against civilians.  
This project seeks to extend the existing body of knowledge, incorporating all three types of 
threat into a comprehensive explanation of the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions, and 
then using those institutions to explain patterns of violence by the state against its people.  
Addressing only one type of threat is a luxury that dictators simply do not have – at least not if they 
want to stick around for long. Figure 1.1 illustrates the set of threats that populate an autocrat’s 












Figure 1.1: Threat Landscape for Authoritarian Regimes  
A dictator may face secessionist movements whose independence would dismember his territory, as 
in contemporary China, Sudan, Burma, or parts of the former Soviet Union. He may be conquered 
by another country’s military, as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003. He can be deposed 
by a mass movement or revolution, such as the ones that have overturned Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, anti-Communist regimes in Asia, or recent incumbents in the Middle East.  Finally, 
                                                 
25 Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule.   
Threat to Regime 
External Internal 
Central Secessionist  
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he could be overthrown or assassinated by fellow elites in a coup.  Any of these threats are ignored 
at the dictator’s peril.  
To defend himself, an autocrat creates coercive institutions: a cluster of organizations 
collectively responsible for intelligence and internal security.26 In creating these institutions, however, 
the autocrat encounters his particular variant of a universal problem of political order, one shared with 
any regime that creates forces to hold a monopoly on violence within its territory.  Who guards the 
Guardians? How do rulers both give the armed forces the capacity for violence, and ensure that that 
capacity will be directed toward its intended end rather than at them?   
Most of us have encountered this problem through the lens of democratic political theory and 
civil-military relations.  James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers that “In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”27 Even for 
democracies, the ability of a government to enforce order is not just a necessary evil, but a 
fundamental reason justifying government’s existence. The first obligation and raison d’etre of any 
government is to eliminate the dangers of anarchy; the additional obligation of a democracy is to then 
check itself so that it does not become a tyrannical Leviathan.   
Contemporary theorists have extended these arguments to explicitly examine the problems of 
achieving civilian control over the military, the actor with the most obvious capacity for unchecked 
tyranny.  Feaver summarizes the observation that “the very institution created to protect the polity is 
given sufficient power to become a threat” to it, and elaborates:  
                                                 
26 Ronald Weitzer calls this the “internal security sector”; the most common lay term is “internal security 
apparatus.”  I use these terms interchangeably.  Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism.” Ronald 
Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Violence and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
27 James Madison, “Federalist No. 51,” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers (New York: Penguin, 1987).   
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The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital 
and potentially conflicting societal desiderata.  On the one hand, the military must be 
strong enough to prevail in war…. On the other hand, just as the military must 
protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to 
destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect.  Because the military must 
face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others.  But 
coercive power gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that 
created it.28  
To those who seek to ensure self-government, these dual requirements of power and self-control pose 
a fundamental challenge.  The armed forces must be strong enough to maintain order – the purpose 
for which they are created – but not so strong that they become abusive and pervert the ends for 
which they were brought into existence.   
Autocrats face the same dilemma, but to a different end.  An autocratic ruler seeks not to 
preserve the polity’s or society’s ability to govern, but his own. And although contemporary 
scholarship on civil-military relations most often frames the issue as a tradeoff between external 
defense and internal freedom, Madison’s observation reminds us that the tradeoff can be purely 
internal, balancing the capacity to enforce order with control over the order-enforcers. Dictators do 
not worry about the security services destroying democracy; they worry about the security services 
destroying them. Machiavelli identified this risk in the fifteenth century, warning that there are two 
faults in a general that can pose a danger to the ruler: technical incompetence, and disloyal ambition. 
“Commanders are either skilled in warfare, or they are not,” he writes, and “if they are, you cannot 
trust them, because they are anxious to advance their own greatness… If, however, the commander 
is lacking in prowess, in the normal way he brings about your ruin.”29  A commander who is not 
strong enough will bring about disaster through defeat on the battlefield, while a commander who is 
too strong can usurp power.  
                                                 
28 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Political Science Review, Vol. 2 (1999), p. 214.   
29 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 39.  
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The threat of usurpation by fellow members of the ruling elite – typically, the military or 
security forces – is, statistically speaking, the most common way for a twentieth-century autocrat to be 
deposed.30  In Milan Svolik’s analysis of 316 authoritarian leaders who held power between 1946 and 
2008 and exited office extra-constitutionally, he finds that 68% lost power through a coup d’etat, 
compared to 11% by popular uprising, and only 5% by foreign intervention.31  When it comes to the 
security forces, autocrats face a real and acute dilemma between empowerment and control.  
Organized violence requires collective action.32  Autocrats must therefore empower the 
security forces for enough collective action to enforce order and conduct external defense missions, 
but limit or control the capacity for collective action so that it is not turned against the autocrat and 
used to replace him.  To obtain control, they use a range of techniques, usually grouped under the 
heading “coup-proofing.”  The following section explains what these management efforts look like, 
before turning to the question of when they are most prevalent.     
 
B. Controlling the Coercive Apparatus: An Overview of Coup-Proofing Techniques  
To manage their internal security apparatus, autocrats use a range of techniques designed to 
ensure loyalty and limit the security forces’ ability to plan and stage a successful coup.  These 
methods of political intervention lead autocratic coercive institutions toward two organizational 
characteristics: coup-proofed security services tend to have a high degree of fragmentation, and are more 
exclusive in terms of their social composition. Optimizing an organization against coup-proofing creates 
                                                 
30 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule ; Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. 
Goemans, “International Conflict and Leader Tenure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2003), pp. 
443-67. 
31 Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 5-6.  
32 Keefer, “Why Follow the Leader?”  
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tradeoffs in terms of institutional design that make that institution suboptimal for popular policing 
and external defense – costs that will be explored further in the next section.   
On balance, attempts at coup-proofing are likely to increase the degree of fragmentation within the 
internal security apparatus.  Authoritarian security forces are commonly divided into multiple 
organizations with overlapping or competing responsibilities. This prevents collusion, and keeps any 
one organization from amassing enough political power to carry out a coup.  Journalistic accounts 
and historical case studies of autocratic security services are rife with observations about 
competition and hostility between rival organizations.  During the reign of the Dominican 
Republic’s infamous dictator, Rafael Trujillo, “high command was always diluted among several 
contenders.”33 North Korea’s Kim Jong Il created intelligence and internal security services with 
“deliberately blurred and overlapping” lines of responsibility to ensure that none could gather 
enough power to stage a challenge.34 Saddam Hussein created a network of Iraqi civilian and military 
security organizations with “overlapping and redundant functions,” designed to impede collusion 
and foster competition.35  In later years, Indonesia’s Suharto created a divide-and-rule strategy 
among powerful generals, creating “multiple informal chains of command that led only to 
Suharto.”36   
Two things are worth noting about this definition of fragmentation.  First, its form varies. 
Power may be divided between internal security forces and the military (as in North Korea), or 
between different branches of the armed forces (such as the Army-Navy rivalry under the Argentine 
                                                 
33 Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: Macmillan, 1966).   
34 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 7.  
35 U.S. Institute of Peace, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” Special Report No. 104 (April 2003), p. 4.  
36 Mary P. Callahan, “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond,” Occasional Paper No. 4 
(Monterey: Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1999), p. 13.     
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junta), or among different domestic organizations (police, interior ministry, paramilitaries, 
presidential or royal guard, etc), as in Iraq and the Philippines.37  Second, as this handful of examples 
readily shows, fragmentation is not obviously correlated with regime type; it appears to be an 
independently varying attribute of authoritarian coercive institutions.38  
Fragmentation is often reinforced by the doctrines and practices that deliberately impede 
coordination and cooperation between forces. In many non-democratic countries in the Middle 
East, joint commands and exercises are rare, and require presidential approval.  In Saudi Arabia, for 
example, even relatively simple and routine activities like assembling road convoys require 
authorization from multiple command channels.  Information sharing across military units is 
severely restricted, and authority is not delegated to ground-level commanders.39  
Autocratic security services that have been coup-proofed also tend to be socially exclusive.  
Autocrats manipulate the social composition of their security forces in ways that they believe will 
make those forces more loyal – or at least, less likely to rebel.  This can be either because autocrats 
are actually trying to lower the social representativeness or embeddedness of the security forces in 
order to prevent defection, or because it happens as a byproduct of other mechanisms designed to 
induce loyalty.  Stephen Rosen notes that militaries that reflect the society from which they are 
drawn are likely to engender higher trust among democratic leaders,40 but in autocratic regimes, the 
converse is more likely to be true – isolated insiders are perceived to be most trustworthy. Security 
                                                 
37 A quick examination of data indicates wide variation in the ratio of military to internal security personnel in 
authoritarian regimes, ranging from very small internal security forces to countries in which the internal 
security forces outnumber the regular military.  See the compendium The Military Balance, issued annually by 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.   
38
 If for some reason certain regime types were likely to perceive different dominant threats, then one would 
expect more correlation with regime type.  This is a question that should be explored using a wider sample of 
authoritarian regimes.  
39 Norvell B. DeAtkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly (December 1999).   
40 Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).  
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forces composed of the same ethnic group are thought to be more reliable because they share regime 
interests, defined by common identity.  By not reflecting the fissures of a multiethnic society, 
moreover, they are expected to operate more cohesively.41  
Examples abound of autocratic security forces staffed with favored ethnic groups or tribes 
and led by the dictator’s family members.  In Libya, Muammar Qadhafi’s son Khamis ran the elite 
“Khamis brigade” designated for regime protection, his brother-in-law Abdullah Senussi ran the 
intelligence services, and organizations such as the Republican Guard were predominantly drawn 
from Qadhafi’s own tribe.42 Brett Carter documents how Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of 
Congo (Brazzaville) has used intermarriage and other techniques to stitch together an elite based on 
family and social networks.43  In Asia, Chiang Ching-kuo managed Taiwan’s secret police for decades 
on his father’s behalf before assuming power himself; Kim Jong Un reportedly ran North Korea’s 
State Security Department before succeeding his father in a regime where he is surrounded by 
relatives.44   
Beyond family, the leadership and even the rank-and-file of the intelligence and security 
forces are often drawn from favored social or ethnic groups. After 1968, Saddam Hussein replaced 
the ethnically and religiously representative Iraqi National Police with the Special Security 
Directorate (SSD, al-Amn al-Khas) run by his youngest son Qusay and composed of 5,000 members 
                                                 
41 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1960). 
42 John Hamilton, “Libya Protests: the tangled web keeping Gaddafi in power,” The Telegraph, 23 February 
2011; Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “Inside a Flawed Spy Machine as Libya’s Regime Crumbled,” 
The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2011, p. 1.   
43 Brett L. Carter, “Unite and Rule: a Theory of Compulsory Elite Social Networks in Autocracies,” paper 
presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (New Orleans, 2012).   
44 Author’s conversations with two Korean defense analysts, September 2011 and January 2012.  At the time, 
however, personnel appointment power was still thought to rest with the KWP’s Organization and Guidance 
Department, believed to be run by Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyung Hee. See also Andrei Lankov, From Stalin 
to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945-60 (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 2002), pp. 72-73.  
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of his Tikrit clan.45 Alawite and Druze minorities make up most of the officer corps in Syria, and 
pro-regime Alawite militias (shahiba) from the Assad family stronghold of Latakia were blamed for 
some of the worst abuses during the conflict that began in 2011.46 In Iran, the government has 
employed basij, volunteer forces from the impoverished areas in the countryside who lack “social 
bonds to the city dwellers… and are expected to be capable of violently suppressing urban, middle-
class uprisings.”47 In South Korea, Chun Doo Hwan preferentially appointed military officials from his 
own region – Kyongsang, the southeast – to key posts, particularly those in charge of units in Seoul 
and those that held responsibility for enforcing martial law.48 Chad’s President Habre created a state 
security force (the Documentation and Security Directorate/Direction de la Documentation et de la 
Securite, DDS) composed entirely of his own ethnic group, the Gorane, and purged security officials 
of rival ethnicities.49 John Doe in Libera replaced most of the government and army with the Krahn 
tribe from which he came – an estimated 4% of the country’s population.50  As with fragmentation, the 
exact form of social exclusion from the coercive apparatus varies based on the country in question’s 
particular social cleavages.  
                                                 
45 U.S. Institute of Peace, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” pp. 3-5. 
46 Keefer, p. 7; Christian Caryl, “Plague of Thugs,” Foreign Policy, 18 July 2012; Bill Spindle, “Assad Draws 
Shock Troops from Elite Sect in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, 29 August 2012, p. 1.  
47 Ali Alfoneh, cited in Caryl, “Plague of Thugs.”  
48 Byungkook Kim and Ezra Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: the Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011).    
49 Reed Brody, “Inside a Dictator’s Secret Police,” Foreign Policy, 9 March 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/08/inside_a_dictators_secret_police; Romesh Silva, Jeff 
Klingner and Scott Weikart, “State Coordinated Violence in Chad under Hissene Habre,” report by 
Benetech’s Human Rights Data Analysis Group to Human Rights Watch and the Chadian Association of 
Victims of Political Repression and Crimes, 3 February 2010, www.hrdag.org/about/chad.shtml 
50 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always 
Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs/Persus, 2011), p. 22.  
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Use of the autocrat’s own social group is not the only technique that predisposes autocratic 
security services toward exclusivity, though it does seem to be most common. Another common 
technique is the use of mercenaries imported across international borders. The Ottoman rulers drew 
their Janissaries – palace guard units – from Christian areas in the Balkans;51 and Gadhafi gained 
notoriety before his demise in 2011 for having imported foreign fighters from countries including 
Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger to counter the escalating rebellion.52 Autocrats can also employ 
minorities from within the country who are too small in number and influence to have a hope of 
seizing power themselves.  Stalin deliberately promoted minorities whose lack of a power base 
neutralized them as a threat,53 and members of Saddam Hussein’s palace staff were almost entirely 
Christian speakers of Assyrian and Chaldean.54 A similar logic may inform the use of child soldiers 
among armed groups in Africa; younger fighters are believed to be more likely to follow orders and 
less likely to defect or stage a coup.55  
As with management techniques that heighten the structural tendency toward fragmentation, 
social exclusiveness is often paired with practices that lower the security forces’ ability to represent, 
participate in, and penetrate society. Autocratic militaries and paramilitary organizations commonly 
employ a system of rotation designed to ensure that no one person can accumulate too much power 
in a single base: Selassie’s Ethiopia, Hussein’s Iraq, and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea all operated 
                                                 
51 Patrick Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (London: Perennial Press, 
1977).   
52 Scott Baldauf, “Qaddafi’s Ties to Rebel Groups Scrutinized as ‘African Mercenaries’ Patrol Libya,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 23 February 2011.  On the wider issue of mercenaries in Africa, see Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. 
Kayode Fayemi, eds., Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto Press, 2000).  
53 Gregory, Terror by Quota.  
54 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party.   
55 Keefer, p. 16; Berndt Beber and Christopher Blattman, “The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion,” 
International Organization, forthcoming.    
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systems in which the top leaders directly controlled personnel appointments, and commanders were 
transferred frequently, sometimes without warning.56 Police officers who returned to Latin America 
from training in the United States with knowledge that would make their units more effective at 
domestic policing were also frequently assigned to new commands or positions with different 
responsibilities, based on the fear that their training would increase their ability to use their forces to 
aggrandize power.57   
Additionally, coercive institutions can be exclusive as a byproduct of other ways of 
weakening the security forces to protect against a coup.  Autocrats can, for example, simply reduce 
the number of internal security personnel or the resources allotted to them to ensure that their 
power does not grow too strong.  Although the East German Stasi are famous for the high degree 
of social penetration that they achieved and their use of technology to create a massive surveillance 
state, I find that they are a rarity among authoritarian internal security services; the level of 
surveillance used on East German citizens was, in fact, almost unparalleled.  As Table 1.1 shows, 
most autocratic internal security services employ far fewer personnel per capita.  
                                                 
56 Ryszard Kapucinski, The Emperor (London: Penguin, 2006); Bermudez, Armed Forces of North Korea; Ahmed 
Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: the quest for legitimacy and power,” Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 9-41. On direct control of appointments, see Geddes 1999.  
57 Thomas Lobe, “The Rise and Demise of the Ofﬁce of Public Safety,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 9, no. 2 
(Winter 1983), p. 197.  
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Table 1.1: Ratio of Internal Security Personnel to Population58  
Country Ratio  
Chad (Habre, 1982-1990)  1: 10,000 
Soviet Union  1: 5830 
Iraq (Saddam Hussein) 1: 5090 
Nazi Gestapo  (c. 1940) 1: 2000 
Philippines (Marcos, 1980s)  1: 1120  
Philippines (Marcos, 1976) 1: 492 
Islamic Republic of Iran  1: 400 
E. Germany  (officers only) 1: 166  
Republic of China (Taiwan)  1: 132  
North Korea  
   (w/informants, 2012)  
1: 124  
1: 40  
E. Germany (w/informants) 1: 67 
 
Dictators can also deprive coercive institutions of funding, either because they have fiscal constraints 
on the amount of resources available, or as a deliberate method of keeping these forces weak and 
dependent on the leader’s patronage. Smaller numbers and lower resources make it harder to be or 
even come into contact with a representative sample of the population, and also decrease the internal 
security sector’s capacity for social penetration, whether achieved by human or technical means.   
 
C.  Creating Coercive Institutions: Organizational Tradeoffs  
If dictators have to defend themselves from multiple threats, and have access to the techniques 
described above, then how do they organize the institutions of coercion?  If all autocrats were chiefly 
concerned with coup-proofing, then we should see a single optimal model of organization for internal 
security along the lines described above – but this is not the case.  How, then, does variation arise?  
                                                 
58 Author’s dataset on coercive institutions, under development.   Note that the number of internal security 
personnel, or even their per capita numbers, cannot be taken as a face value metric of societal penetration. 
The percentage of workers assigned to administrative rather than operational roles, and the 
deployment/assignments of the operational personnel (for example, whether they engage in presidential 
security duties rather than on-the-ground intelligence gathering) will also affect how these numbers translate 
into societal penetration.  They are nevertheless a useful illustration of variation. 
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I argue that it arises because autocrats configure their internal security apparatus based on 
whatever they perceive to be the dominant threat at the time they come to power. Decisions about both the 
structure and social composition of that apparatus are made based on the desire to optimize coercive 
institutions to deal with that threat.  Table 1.2 shows what we would expect the security apparatus to 
look like if this was the case:  
Table 1.2: Predicted Institutional Configuration Based on Threat Type  
THREAT FRAGMENTATION EXCLUSION  
External Low 
  (battlefield effectiveness)   
High  
  (draft, unity)  
Popular Low  
  (coordinated operations) 
High  
  (intelligence, support)  
Elite High  
  (prevent collusion)  
Low  
(trusted insider/Janissary)  
 
 
Coercive institutions that are designed to deal primarily with an elite threat will tend toward high 
fragmentation and social exclusivity, for the reasons discussed above. This places the elite-oriented 
institutional design at odds with the institutional designs that optimize for defense against both 
popular and external threats.   
The optimal institutional designs to deal with external and popular threats overlap quite a bit, 
though the mechanisms leading to institutional similarity (indicated shorthand in parentheses above) 
are different in each of the two cases. The presence of an existentially high external threat is likely to 
suppress fragmentation that would hamper effective warfighting capabilities.  Countries with high 
external threats are also more likely to have mechanisms, like a draft, that widen the social base of 
the military and make it inclusive. Coercive institutions designed to deal with a severe popular threat 
must also be able to engage in coordinated operations like multi-city riot control or counter-
insurgency work, and so are also less likely to be fragmented (though the lead institution is more 
likely to be the police or gendarmerie than the military).  Moreover, the intelligence demands of a 
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popular threat and the goal of winning “hearts and minds” make it more likely that coercive 
institutions will be inclusive, to draw information and support from as broad a swathe of society as 
possible.   
Several points related to organizational design are worth emphasizing here. First, what 
matters is the dominant threat: the one that is perceived to be most acute at the time the autocrat 
assumes power. Although the intensity of each individual threat may rise or fall over time, what 
matters is which threat the autocrat perceives to take priority, relative to others.  Because an autocrat 
must decide whether his security apparatus will be representative or not, and because he must decide 
whether the apparatus will be fragmented or not, he cannot simultaneously hedge against all threats 
at once.  Organizationally speaking, he has to prioritize which threat is dominant.  
Second, the theory is based on dominant perceived threat.  Threat perception is notoriously 
difficult to define ex ante.59  In the cases that follow, I reference objective indicators of threat – the 
level of popular protest, balance of military forces, etc. – but it is clear that, in at least some of the 
cases in question, a dictator’s subjective perception of threat does not correlate perfectly with reality.  
I have therefore opted to assess threat perceptions on a case-by-case basis, using as wide a range of 
materials as possible to consider both objective threat and subjective perception: official historical 
documents from the regime, threat analyses conducted by the various security organizations, archival 
records containing American assessments of the threat in each of these countries, newspaper 
accounts and commentaries, diaries and private papers, speeches, and personal conversations with 
the autocrat (then recounted to me in interviews).  This approach is certainly imperfect, but the 
available alternatives all posed even bigger problems for drawing inferences on the questions 
considered here.       
                                                 
59
 For the classic argument that states balance against threats in international politics rather than against 
power, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).   
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Third, because fragmentation and representation are organizational attributes driven by a 
common imperative, these attributes usually co-vary.  In other words, if you set up fragmentation 
and representation as a 2x2 matrix, cases would only tend to fall into two quadrants: high 
fragmentation/high exclusion, and low fragmentation/low exclusion.  (For ease of reference, I refer 
to the former as “elite-oriented” coercive institutions, and the latter as “mass-oriented” coercive 
institutions.)  Variation exists on a spectrum within each of these “types,” but the types are 
nonetheless conceptually distinct and identifiable.  
Fourth and last, viewed through this lens, organizational design poses fundamental tradeoffs 
for regime security.  It is theoretically impossible to create an internal security apparatus that is truly 
optimized to defend against both a popular threat and an elite one. Organizations that are set up to 
pre-empt popular threats short of violence get the intelligence that they need to do so by being 
inclusive, representative, and embedded in society.  This makes violence harder to use when they are 
called upon to repress.  By contrast, organizations that are set up to capably use violence against 
threats when they do emerge have a harder time getting the information to pre-empt those threats in 
the first place.  Similarly, lack of fragmentation enables coordinated action against either an external 
or popular threat, but heightens the risk that the security apparatus will unite to remove the autocrat.  
Finally, resource constraints heighten the tradeoff between external and popular threats if it is 
difficult to fund both a large military and a large police force.  No theory currently addresses the 
tradeoffs that come from all three of these threats, nor do existing theories link those tradeoffs to 
the consequences for state violence against the civilian population.  If correct, the theory advanced 
here should successfully explain the origins of coercive institutions and the level of violence these 




D. Independent Effects  
If autocrats are optimizing their coercive institutions to deal with the dominant threat at the 
time they come to power, can we simply use threats to explain the patterns of violence that these 
institutions engage in?  Are institutions superfluous?  
The dominant argument in the literature on repression suggests that they are.  Christian 
Davenport’s “Law of Coercive Response” argues that autocrats respond to rising threats with rising 
violence intended to stamp out that threat.60  If this is true, we should not need to know anything 
about the organizations that engage in violence in order to predict their patterns of behavior.  
Structure would be simply responding to threat, in which case threat is the actual driver of patterns 
of violence.  For organizational characteristics to have an independent causal effect on the patterns of 
violence, they must vary in some way that is not correlated with the incentives for violence in the first 
place.  So can threats directly explain the pattern of violence?   
I argue that they cannot, for several reasons.  First, dictators do not perceive threats perfectly.   
Threats are notoriously difficult to identify and measure, and there is good reason to think that it is as 
hard or harder for dictators to do this ex ante as it is for political scientists to do it ex post.  Second, even 
if an autocrat feels a sense of threat, violence/not is not the only choice available to address it. 
Autocrats do not just decide whether to respond to threats with direct violence; they respond by 
creating institutions to administer that violence, especially if they expect to be in power for some time.  
Staying in power requires violence at scale, and at a sustained level of organization over time. In other 
                                                 
60 Christian Davenport, ed., Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Ted Gurr, “The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: a Theoretical 
Analysis,” in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for 
Research (Westport: Greenwood, 1986); Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, “Repression of Human Rights to 
Personal Integrity in the 1980’s: A Global Analysis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1994), pp. 
853-872; Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest Under Fire: Explaining the Policing 
of Protest,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 68 (August 2003), pp. 581-606.  For a skeptical view of this 
argument, see Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, “Political Repression: Threat Perception and Transnational 
Solidarity Groups,” in Christian Davenport, ed., Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious 
Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); pp. 71-108. 
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words, it requires an institution. And because violence has costs, a smart dictator will want his 
organization to have as broad a range of tools as possible, including both violent and non-violent 
means. A smart dictator will also try to have his organization pre-empt threats before they emerge and 
escalate, rather than choosing to repress a protest that has already blossomed. Given even minimal 
costs to using violence, he has strong incentives to try to deal with that threat by other methods.  
Organizational dynamics therefore matter in the process of repression.  Third, institutions are sticky.  
Once they are created, internal interests exert countervailing logics upon their behavior, and so 
institutions evolve more slowly than threats do.  In short, coercive institutions exert powerful and 
independent effects.  The patterns of violence that they create are not simply linear responses to 
changes in threat.  
The argument that autocrats create coercive institutions to deal with the dominant threat at the 
time they come to power is broadly consistent with what Paul Pierson calls “actor-centered 
functionalism,” in which a particular institution comes into existence “because it is expected to serve 
the interests of those who created it.”61 Political scientists have long argued the common-sense case 
that organizations are created for rational reasons, to serve specific actors’ needs;62 like Pierson, 
Robert Keohane notes that “institutions exist because they could have reasonably been expected to 
increase the welfare of their creators.”63 The explanation advanced here offers no disagreement with 
the claim that dictators are generally rational actors whose behavior is motivated by the desire to 
                                                 
61 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), p. 105.  
62 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990); Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
63 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 80.   
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preserve their own power, or with the contention that this desire is the primary motivating force 
behind their creation of coercive institutions.  
Arguing that actors create institutions for certain purposes, however, is not the same as arguing 
that the actors then employ those institutions perfectly. Theorists working from formal bargaining 
models often offer this kind of rational and frictionless story. By and large, these works have adopted 
a choice theoretic framework, in which protestors use government behavior to determine their optimal 
tactic,64 or the government chooses an optimal repressive strategy based on protestors’ behavior.65  
Drawn from micro-economic producer theory, this framework suggests that the overall goal of 
protestors and governments alike is to optimize the production of a good (some policy demand for the 
protestors; cessation of protest or maintenance of public order for the government) at minimal cost.  
This framework thereby suggests that “all observed incidents of peaceful compromise, deterrence, or 
escalation to violence are then actually a product of the optimal choices of the government” – and 
those choices should never backfire.66  Autocrats calculate the costs and benefits of violence, the 
argument goes, and so if autocrats use violence, it must be because violence is useful to them.67 The 
institutions of violence exist to make violence most efficient for their creators.68  
                                                 
64 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation.”  
65 Moore, “Repression and Dissent”; Vahe Lskavyan, “A Rational Choice Explanation for Stalin’s ‘Great 
Terror’,” Economics & Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2007), pp. 259-87; Francisco Herrero, “The Full Weight of the 
State: The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned Violence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 6 (2006), pp. 
671-89.   
66 Jan Henryk Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government 
Repression,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2010), pp. 117-145.  
67 For a recent notable example, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook.   
68 See Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); Douglass C. 
North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December 1989), 
pp. 803-832; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).  
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Unlike the argument that violence is a direct response to threat, this line of argument does 
take into account the costs of violence and the incentives that an autocrat has to find solutions that 
eschew violence in excess.  It is, however, still incomplete.  Even if they recognize and factor into 
their behavior the costs of violence, autocrats still do not live in a frictionless world of perfect 
optimization. (If they did, one might imagine that their efforts would be more successful.)  As Kiren 
Aziz Chaudhry writes when discussing authoritarian economic institutions in the Middle East, 
institutions do not “flow effortlessly from the design table of omniscient rulers.”69 Several factors 
can interfere with the attempt to optimize, and optimization is especially hard to achieve perfectly 
over an extended period of time.  
First, dictators may see threats imperfectly.70  Stalin engaged in extensive purges in order to 
coup-proof his officer corps at a time when the Soviet Union was facing a clear external threat but 
there appears to have been no credible threat of a coup;71 similarly, Mao Zedong prioritized internal 
enemies at the expense of external efficacy.72 Conversely, both Hitler and Mussolini emphasized 
external threats, even though history documents that both leaders faced real – and in Mussolini’s 
                                                 
69 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997).   
70 Talmadge, ““Explaining Military Effectiveness,” p. 41.  
71 Donald Cameron Watt, “The High Command: Who Plotted Against Whom? Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet 
High Command Revisited,” Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1990), p. 46-65; David Glantz, 
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Earl F. 
Ziemke, “The Soviet Armed Forces in the Interwar Period,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, 
Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2: The Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2010), pp. 1-
38. 
72 Ellis Joffe, “Military as a Political Actor in China,” in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., 
Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1982); Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006); Andrew Scobell, “Military Coups in the People’s Republic of China: Failure, 
Fabrication, or Fancy?” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1995).   
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case, eventually fatal – threats from within their own officer corps.73 Misperception and 
miscalculation are the first possible sources of failure to optimize autocratic institutions to threat.   
It may also be difficult to optimize coercive institutions because these institutions are sticky. 
Institutional development is path-dependent, and the people who drive that development process 
are concerned not only with efficiency, but with preservation of “the power, prestige, privileges, and 
importantly, distributional advantages of the dominant elite and its allies.”74  This is especially true of 
coercive institutions, which are often among the most powerfully entrenched players, and whose 
desire and ability to preserve their advantageous place in the power structure can override rational 
incentives for redesign if that redesign would occur at their expense. Thus among government 
bureaucracies, the security sector is relatively likely to possess not only an organizational interest in 
defending the status quo, but also sufficient organizational power to do so successfully; it is 
therefore among the actors that are most likely to successfully resist change. As Kenneth Grundy 
writes, “Institutions instinctively behave in ways designed to solidify or enhance their power.  The 
security institution is a model example.”75 This does not mean that institutional change is non-
existent, but it does mean that entrenched interests place non-trivial constraints on the process of 
change, and that optimization will be sticky and slow – if it happens at all.   
 
                                                 
73 MacGregor Knox, “The Italian Armed Forces 1940-43,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military 
Effectiveness, Vol. 3: The Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2010), pp. 126-79; 
MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 5; Albert Seaton, The German Army 1933-45 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1985).   
74 Stephen A. Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), especially pp. 5-6.   
75 Kenneth Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 
109.   
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E.  A Note on Alternative Explanations  
Note that while institutional path dependence and external influence are both factors that 
can and do interfere with a continuous process of optimizing institutions to threat, neither suffices 
as a stand-alone alternative explanation for the creation and design of coercive institutions.76   
The literature on path-dependence has primarily focused on institutional continuity across 
regimes, rather than over time within them.77  Path-dependent dynamics have been highlighted in 
work on post-Soviet Russia, where scholars argue that the transition toward democracy has been 
stalled largely by successful resistance to reform by the intelligence and security agencies.78 Mary 
Callahan suggests that an institutional legacy of strong British control facilitated the implementation 
of authoritarianism in contemporary Burma;79 Elizabeth Perry notes the continuity of militias in the 
People’s Republic of China;80 Reo Matsuzaki attributes the divergent outcomes of Taiwan and the 
Philippines to the different institutions bequeathed by Japanese and American statebuilding efforts;81 
Stephen Cook traces the path dependence of military involvement in politics in Egypt, Algeria, and 
Turkey; and Ronald Weitzer outlines the effects of an institutional heritage of “settler rule” in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.82  
                                                 
76 “There is a vast literature on institutions, but relatively little on how institutions are created.” Joseph 
Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 8; 
Pierson, Politics in Time, p. 103.  
77 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p. 3.  
78 Julie Anderson, “Intelligence and democracy: A Russian case study of secret police transformation in the 
post-Soviet context,” PhD dissertation, City University of New York, 2008.  
79 Mary Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State-Building in Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
80 Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: worker militias, citizenship, and the modern Chinese state (Lanham: 
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I find, however, that the moment at which an autocrat ascends to power represents a critical 
juncture, one that empowers him to engage in a significant degree of institutional reconstruction.  It 
seems logical that a dictator strong enough to seize power would also be strong enough to remake 
institutions.  Indeed, purges and reorganizations within the coercive apparatus commonly 
accompany the first year or two of an autocrat’s ascent to power.  Even in the cases of path 
dependence cited above, institutional continuity is not absolute.  Elizabeth Perry finds that 
“institutional inversion” in the early years of the People’s Republic of China maintained the 
institutions of “militia,” but transformed them from institutions of state-breaking to institutions of 
state-making,83 and Ronald Weitzer notes that similar repressive organizations inherited by successor 
regimes in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe were constrained in Ireland but fortified and further 
mobilized in Zimbabwe.84  
This is not to say that institutions are wholly remade, or that no continuity exists.  To argue 
for strict path dependence, however, neglects the dynamics of power that pervade institutional 
creation, and particularly the dynamics of power that surround the seizure of power by a new 
autocrat.85 I find that what determines the degree of continuity between past coercive institutions 
and those put into place by a new autocrat is the degree to which the threat environment is similar 
to that facing the past regime: in other words, the degree to which past dominant threats correlate 
with present ones.86  (The idea that threats at the moment of state formation lock in certain patterns 
                                                 
83 Perry, Patrolling the Revolution.   
84 Weitzer, Transforming Settler States.  
85 Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: the rise of the rational state  in France, Japan, the United States, and Great 
Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993); Terry M. Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” in Ian 
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86 This raises two additional questions: do the regime’s path to power and the direction of transition influence 
the degree of continuity?  On the first point, there may be a greater difference between pre- and post-
transition interests (and threats) in a revolutionary ascent to power than a coup, which could explain why 
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of domestic institutions is not new; external threats have long been posited to have this effect.87 
What is relatively new is applying the same logic to internal threats,88 and then using it to explain 
variations in the degree of path dependence.) Where threats change with the rise of a new regime, 
institutions are likely to change also.  Only after those institutions are created and put into place does 
path dependence start to exert a drag on the process of optimization.   
In some cases, we do observe evolution in coercive institutions even after the initial 
configuration has been established.  Where we do, however, there is a clear trend, logically consistent 
with the overall argument advanced here: evolution is almost uniformly in the direction of 
fragmentation and exclusivity.  It is easier to fragment coercive institutions than to un-fragment them, 
for two reasons. First, an autocrat who has fragmented his security apparatus and set pieces of it in 
competition will always be able to see that competition as evidence of ambition and aggrandizement 
on the part of elite rivals, further heightening his belief in the need to coup-proof by fragmenting even 
more: a negative feedback loop that propels the system ever further toward the extreme.  Second, the 
two types of coercive institutions differ in terms of their ability to collect and process the feedback that 
would enable successful adaptation.  Even if a fragmented system should face a serious and rising 
                                                                                                                                                             
coups seem to contain more baseline institutional continuity. On the second, we would expect a new 
democrat to have less freedom to remake the security apparatus than a new autocrat, especially if the new 
democrat comes to power through a typical “pact.” This would explain why, for example, Mohamed 
Nasheed, the democratically elected president of the Maldives ousted in a coup on 7 February 2012, credits 
his overthrow to the entrenchment of old military and police institutions, writing, “long after the revolutions, 
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democracies.” Mohamed Nasheed, “The Dregs of Dictatorship,” The New York Times, 8 February 2012. 
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popular threat, the system will not collect and process information so that the autocrat could reliably 
identify new threats and adjust his strategy and institutional design accordingly.   
For this reason, an elite-oriented system may become more and more fragmented and 
exclusive, but will rarely reverse type, absent a major shock to the system. A unified, inclusive system, 
on the other hand, may develop fragmentation over time, but it also may not, and is more likely to 
preserve its ability to adapt.89  (If deterioration toward the elite orientation occurs, it can create the rare 
cases in which the two attributes of coercive institutions do not co-vary; Patrick McEachern finds, for 
example, that North Korea under Kim Il Sung fit the classic totalitarian model in which the party-state 
achieved high penetration and low fragmentation, but that his son and successor Kim Jong Il ruled in a 
“post-totalitarian” system that maintained high penetration and inclusivity but also increasingly 
exhibited fragmentation and competition within its coercive apparatus.90)  Both systems have some 
stickiness built in, but it is easier to move toward fragmented and elite-oriented coercive institutions 
than it is to get away from them.        
External influence is also sometimes posited as a source of coercive institutional design, 
especially given its prevalence on both sides of the Cold War.  The United States began training and 
providing aid to foreign police forces in the 1950’s, and the Kennedy administration expanded the 
“internal defense” program under the auspices of the Office for Public Safety (OPS) in the Agency 
for International Development. Their stated goal was to “deal with and eliminate the causes of 
dissidence and violence,” and their efforts focused on local police, who American government 
                                                 
89 This raises an interesting question: how does a mass-oriented coercive apparatus deal with coup-proofing?  
In Chapter 5, I explore the idea that a specific process of coming to power, as in Communist revolutionary 
regimes, leads to a mass orientation and a temporary lull in elite threat, thereby enabling these regimes to bypass 
the organizational tradeoff outlined above – until a succession is necessary.   
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officials believed were “the first line of defense” against Communist proto-insurgency.91 Starting in 
1963, Georgetown’s International Police Academy – the “West Point” for international police forces 
– provided equipment and advice to 52 countries’ police departments. After the Academy had 
hosted trainees from 77 countries in what one scholar characterized as direct attempt to disseminate 
American models of social control,92 Congress terminated the program in 1974 due to mounting 
concern about its support for repressive regimes.93 Under Mielke, the East German Stasi trained 
foreign police and intelligence forces across the Third World, educating African insurgents at the 
Department for International Relations from 1971 onward, and sending advisors to Allende’s Chile, 
Cuba, Nicaragua, Ghana, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Zanzibar, among others.94 North Korea 
trained foreign security forces as well, including those of Robert Mugabe.95 External assistance often 
transmitted norms about models of policing whose influence seemed to run counter to what threat-
based explanations should predict – as, for example, when Chiang Kai-shek adopted Western 
policing models that crippled his intelligence on local populations in mainland China in the 1920s 
and 1930’s (see Chapter Two).  
Upon closer examination, however, this interpretation is flawed.  History does not bear out 
the claim that external influence is a determinate alternative explanation, for two reasons.  First, 
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external influence correlates strongly with the presence of an external threat, and pushes institutional 
outcomes in the same direction that the presence of an external threat would be expected to.  
Security aid transmitted through American military alliances, for example, usually reinforced the 
orientation of allied forces to deal with the external threats they faced.   
Second, the reception and use of that aid depended on what the regime perceived to be its 
dominant threat rather than on what the external patron thought best. Where the autocrat shared 
American officials’ perception that the dominant threat was external – as in Korea, and sometimes 
in Taiwan – the United States’ influence was strong. Ultimately, Chiang Kai-shek favored a 
professionalized and socially isolated police force on the Chinese mainland because of his desire to 
keep police loyal to him rather than local warlords, not because he believed in American ideals of 
policing.  Where perceptions of threat conflict, however – as they did in the early years of the KMT 
on Taiwan, when Chiang Kai-shek violated U.S. military advice by using political commissars in the 
Nationalist military, or in the Philippines where American efforts at police reform were stymied by 
Marcos’ manipulation of police institutions to outmaneuver elite rivals – the threat perceptions of 
the autocrat clearly triumph.   
In sum, though both institutional path dependence and external influence are clearly present, 
and do exert an influence on the process of coercive institution-building, neither provides a 
satisfactory alternative explanation for the origins of coercive institutions under authoritarian 
government.  A reasonable case can be made that exogenous variation exists in the internal security 
apparatus, especially after an autocrat has been in power for a long time.  The next section examines 




III. The Effect of Coercive Institutions on Violence  
The section above established that, the more threatened they feel by fellow elites, the more 
incentives autocrats will have to create coercive institutions that are fractured, internally competitive, 
socially exclusive, and isolated from the population.  The detrimental effect of these “coup-
proofing” techniques on autocratic military performance during interstate war is well-documented.96  
But these techniques also negatively impact patterns of internal violence carried out by autocratic 
regimes against the civilian population.  Their presence is likely to increase both the scope and 
intensity of state violence.97  
There are two chief pathways by which the structure and social composition of coercive 
institutions affect patterns of state violence.  There is one pathway based on the incentives provided to 
agents within the coercive apparatus, and another pathway based on the intelligence capacity that the 







Figure 1.2:  How Coercive Institutions Affect Violence    
                                                 
96 See Talmadge, “Explaining Military Effectiveness”; Hashim, “Sadam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in 
Iraq”; Pollack, Arabs at War; Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing”; Brooks, Political Military Relations; Biddle and Zirkle, 
“Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare.”    
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 For a fuller discussion of the operationalization and measurement of state violence, please see Chapter 
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targeted by it.  Intensity has more to do with the severity of violence levied; it increases, for example, from 
arrest to torture to execution.  
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Regimes that are oriented around an elite threat – that are internally fragmented and socially 
exclusive – are more likely to engage in high-intensity, indiscriminate violence for reasons that 
involve both of these mechanisms:  
 Fragmentation creates incentives for violence because it creates competition between 
different coercive agencies, which often takes the form of “who arrests the most “enemies 
of the state”?” – giving those units motivations to escalate violence rather than minimize it.   
H1: Fragmentation leads to increased violence because it increases 
               incentives for violence.   
 Exclusivity also creates incentives for violence because an exclusive security apparatus – one 
that is very small, for example, or composed of a favored tribe – will have fewer incentives 
to minimize civilian violence, since that violence lacks the relatively higher social or 
psychological costs associated with killing or torturing friends, neighbors, or co-ethnics.   
H2: Exclusivity leads to increased violence because it increases  
               incentives for violence.   
 An apparatus that is exclusive is also likely to have weaker intelligence capacity, because it 
will lack the local social knowledge to uncover plots in advance and engage in discriminate, 
targeted arrests.   
H3: Social exclusivity leads to increased violence because it decreases the  
               intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.  
 Coercive institutions that are fragmented will also have weaker intelligence capability, 
because fragmentation hampers the sharing of information and analysis.  
H4: Higher fragmentation leads to increased violence because it decreases the 
               intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.  
For these reasons, we should see the most intense and indiscriminate violence against civilians in 
regimes for whom these autocratic coup-proofing incentives are most intense.  The following sub-
sections will explain each of these pathways in greater detail.   
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A.  The Intelligence Pathway  
Autocrats are most likely to be able to rule civilian populations with minimal violence when 
their domestic intelligence and security agencies effectively collect, analyze, and communicate 
information on emerging threats. This is not a new idea. At a fundamental theoretical level, some of 
the classic texts on the causes of violence suggest that we observe violence even when it is inefficient 
because of a lack of information (among other reasons).98 As applied to various conflict 
environments, the argument that close relationships with local actors create good intelligence, and 
that good intelligence is necessary to sustain discriminate levels of violence, appears in 
counterinsurgency doctrine,99 studies of colonial history,100 and democratic ideas about ‘community-
based policing.’101   
In all three of the above branches of literature, discriminate violence is critically important: 
the minimization of violence against the population, and the minimization of the cost associated 
                                                 
98 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995): pp. 379-
414.  
99 Michael Gallagher, “Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies of the Collector-
Consumer Relationship,” Small Wars Journal, 5 June 2011; Jason Lyall, “Are Co-ethnics Better 
Counterinsurgents?  Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” American Political Science Review (February 
2010), pp. 1-20; Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from 
Chechnya.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June 2009), pp. 331-362; Jason Lyall, and Isaiah 
Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International 
Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1(2009). 
100 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780-1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Studies in Indian History and Society, 1996); Martin Thomas, 
Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2008); Martin Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States: Security Policing and the Limits of Colonial 
Rule in France’s Muslim Territories, 1920–40,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 2005), 
pp. 1033 – 1060. 
101 David Sklansky, Democracy and the Police (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); David Bayley, Patterns of 
Policing (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985); William Ker Muir, Police: Streetcorner Politicians 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).   
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with that violence, is the regime’s chief goal.102  Intelligence is the key factor that enables regimes to 
use violence only when necessary.  Information is expensive, and obtaining it poses difficulties for 
those who must gather it from the bottom up, but doing so is critical to achieving the appropriately 
calibrated use of force.103  John Ferris calls intelligence “not a form of power, but a means to guide its 
use, whether as a combat multiplier or by helping one to understand one’s environment and 
options.”104 Martin Thomas notes in his study of British and French colonial government that it was 
the intelligence relayed from the periphery to central administration that acted as a force multiplier and 
“enabled colonial governments, garrison commanders, and police inspectors to deploy limited 
resources to maximum effect at minimum cost.”
105
 The Army’s counterinsurgency field manual 
argues that good intelligence enables the precise use of force, enabling security forces to operate 
“like surgeons cutting out the cancerous tissue while leaving the vital organs intact.”106  A regime 
with better intelligence collection, analysis, and transmission will be able to identify the leaders of a 
protest or attack, track their movements, and arrest them quietly the night before their action would 
have taken place.  They will be less likely to feel compelled to engage in mass arrest and torture, less 
likely to execute fifty people for fear of letting one conspirator go, and less likely to be surprised by 
                                                 
102 There are times in which a regime may find it useful to engage in a burst of high-intensity violence as a 
deterrent.  Generally, however, this means that the regime has already failed at the low-cost strategy of 
deterring or pre-empting collective action short of mass violence.  The costs of violence also mean that it is 
not an optimal long-term strategy.   
103 Colonel David J. Clark, “The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations,” (Army War 
College, 2006). 
104 Cited in Peter Jackson, “Historical Reflections on the Use and Limits of Intelligence,” in Peter Jackson and 
Jennifer Siegel, eds., Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, (Westport: 
Praeger, 2005), p. 12; see also Michael I. Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations (New York: Routledge, 
1996).    
105 Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States.”   
106 U.S. Army, Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgent Field Manual (FM 3-24), p. 41. Available online at  
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/ army/fm3-24.pdf   
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large public protests that cannot be dispersed without mass public violence. Intelligence enables 
selective and lower-intensity violence.  
The bottom-up expensiveness of information suggests that all incumbents, independent of 
regime type, confront informational difficulties in identifying and neutralizing threats from within 
the population. Han Fei Tzu, the Chinese legalist political philosopher who has been compared to 
Machiavelli, stresses nothing as strongly as the need for a dictator to obtain complete and accurate 
information from his ministers; his treatise is largely a study of strategies that can be used to achieve 
this outcome.107 Autocracies, however, confront an even more acute version of the informational 
problem, because they impose barriers that make information expensive from the top down as well. 
At least four mechanisms have been proposed for why dictators have a worse “information 
problem” than autocracies. Victor Shih focuses on an autocrat’s need to present a façade of strength 
to avoid challenges from within.108 Stephen Rosen discusses the fact that a tyrant’s mid-level underlings 
face strong incentives to avoid being the bearers of bad news.109 Pablo Policzer notes that the lack of 
monitoring by civil society and alternative centers of power cuts off mechanisms to monitor and 
                                                 
107 Burton Watson, trans., Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), especially 
page 87.   
108 Victor Shih, “The Autocratic Difference: Information Paucity,” working paper (2010).  
109 Stephen P. Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Ch. 4; Kevin 
Woods, James Lacey, and William Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: the View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs 
(May/June 2006), online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-
williamson-murray/saddams-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside. On intelligence politicization in 
democracies, see Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Richard K. Betts 
and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel (New York: 
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obtain feedback on agents’ performance.110 Timur Kuran explores the ways in which citizens under 
autocratic rule live lives characterized by “private truths and public lies.”111   
Without contesting these statements, I suggest an additional explanation rooted in the 
organizational dynamics of authoritarian coercive institutions. The defining characteristics of elite-
oriented coercive institutions – high fragmentation and social exclusivity – hamper two steps in the 
intelligence process that are critical to producing targeted and discriminate repression: 1) collection and 





Figure 1.3a: Steps in the Intelligence Process  
Each of the above arguments about autocratic systems can be fit into one of these steps.  Public lies 
make it harder for the intelligence services to collect accurate information from the population.  
Shutting down civil society removes a potential alternative source from which that information could 
be collected. The need to present a façade of strength hampers or biases the analytic process.  And 
disincentives to bear bad news can either prevent subordinates from conducting analysis that will lead 
to pessimistic conclusions, or prevent them from delivering the correct but negative analytic judgment 
to those who could act on it.   
This figure also helps to elucidate why and how the organizational pathologies outlined in 
the preceding sections are likely to weaken an autocratic coercive apparatus’ intelligence capability. 
Building on Figure 1.3a, Figure 1.3b provides a structured view of these arguments.  
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Figure 1.3b: The Intelligence Process & Organizational Requirements 
The following subsections explain how exclusiveness and the level of fragmentation affect the 
intelligence capacity of an authoritarian regime’s coercive apparatus.    
 
 
Exclusivity and Intelligence  
Because social penetration is a critical requirement for intelligence collection, each of the 
autocratic habits that make the social composition of the coercive apparatus more exclusive also 
hampers the collection of accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. As in counterinsurgency and 
imperial policing, authoritarian security forces face the challenge of identifying and pre-empting threats 
to established authorities in a potentially hostile environment, and the key task of separating the 
minority of hostile or threatening actors from the majority of non-hostile civilians who pose no threat.  
Shared ethnicity carries with it demonstrated informational advantages in these environments,112 
because co-ethnics are “enmeshed in dense intraethnic networks, [and] are better positioned to 
identify insurgents within the population and to issue credible threats against civilians for non-
cooperation.”113  Jason Lyall finds that, partly for intelligence reasons, the participation of co-ethnics 
in security operations has led to greater counterinsurgency success in Chechnya; Janet Lewis argues 
                                                 
112 Thomas, Empires of Intelligence; Bayly, Empire and Information; Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The 
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that the development of a civil intelligence system with broad-based ethnic participation has 
improved the Ugandan government’s ability to identify and pre-empt the launch of internal rebel 
groups, particularly in difficult-to-penetrate ethnically homogeneous areas of the country.114  Shared 
ethnic or social identification provides a deep foundation of local social knowledge, understanding 
of networks, and an intuitive grasp of local norms. It also builds trust among the population and 
makes them more likely to share sensitive information.  For this reason, an inclusive security force is 
likely to have an easier time obtaining timely and relevant intelligence; an exclusive intelligence and 
security apparatus composed only of a small segment of society will have more difficulty.   
Rotation can also create social distance between police and society and makes it harder for the 
police to include society in their information-gathering.  As mentioned previously, moving officers or 
units through different locations prevents them from building vertical bonds within the military that 
can evolve into factions, as well as an independent social or geographic power base from which they 
could challenge central authority.  However, a police officer who has worked in an area for a long 
period of time will have a network of contacts, knowledge of local history and potential flashpoints, 
and an understanding of local norms. He or she will be more trusted by local residents and is 
therefore more likely to be given access to sensitive information.  (Democracies complain that short 
rotations during attempted state-building projects are a handicap for the same reasons: the need for 
familiarity with local governmental structures, social institutions, logistics, and language, built over a 
lifetime of living in a country and society.115) Rotation hampers the accumulation of individual and 
                                                 
114 Janet I. Lewis, “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda,” PhD 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2012, especially Chapter 6 on the development of the Ugandan civil 
intelligence system.  
115 Rory Stewart, “What Can Afghanistan and Bosnia Teach Us About Libya?” The Guardian, 7 October 2011, 
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/08/libya-intervention-rory-stewart 
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organizational memory about a place, and therefore makes the collection, recognition, and analysis 
of key pieces of information much more difficult to achieve.   
Exclusivity achieved by reducing the number of intelligence and security personnel available to 
patrol and collect information likewise reduce these forces’ ability to obtain intelligence on popular 
threats. In some cases, technical capabilities (surveillance and monitoring technology, such as that used 
by the Stasi and in Libya116) can offset low personnel numbers.  However, this strategy is likely to be 
both infrequently employed and ineffective. It is a resource-intensive strategy in places that often have 
resource constraints, or where those resources could as/more effectively be allocated to patronage.  
Studies also suggest that for threats such as terrorism and insurgency, technical intelligence collection 
devices deliver inferior results when compared to human intelligence.117 Even the Stasi, famous for 
their use of surveillance technology – as dramatized in the Oscar-winning movie The Lives of Others – 
complemented that technical capability with an extraordinary number of unofficial informants 
(Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, IM’s), illustrated in Table 1.1.118  Reducing personnel and budget numbers is also 
a form of exclusivity that damages intelligence collection.   
 
Fragmentation and Intelligence  
Fragmentation within the internal security apparatus, on the other hand, predominantly 
damages the analytic component of a regime’s intelligence capability.  It does this by constricting or 
cutting off the vertical and horizontal flow of information among the various organizations that 
make up the internal security apparatus. The multiplication of organizations or growth of 
                                                 
116 Levinson and Coker, “Inside a Flawed Spy Machine,” p. 1; Koehler, Stasi.   
117 Gallagher, “Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” p 1.  
118 Jens Gieseke, Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt 1950 - 1989/90 
(Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2000); Helmut Mueller-Enbergs, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums fuer 
Staatssicherheit - Band 3: Statistiken mit CD-ROM (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2008).  For an (abridged) English 
version, see Jens Gieseke, The GDR State Security: Shield and Sword of the Party (Berlin: Federal Commissioner 
for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic, 2006).  
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bureaucracy in any political system can lead to a proliferation of agencies with partially overlapping 
responsibilities but different missions and clearance procedures.  Stovepiping leads to a failure to 
share relevant information with the agencies that need it, and a lack of information coordination.  
Poor interservice communication after the 1973 coup against Allende, for example, rendered 
coordination “haphazard and without established procedure” and the “consistency of reporting 
problematic at best.” As a result, “no information was collected on those who were ‘disappeared’ or 
executed.119   
Fragmentation can also create mixed messages in the information that is transmitted 
vertically.  For reasons that have to do with organizational mission, bureaucratic culture, or 
leadership style, different organizations are likely to gather, emphasize, and transmit different 
information upward to their superiors.120 As a result, fragmentation among multiple agencies can 
increase confusion over the nature and breadth of threat, as well as increasing the likelihood of 
conflicting estimates of success or failure. Coupled with incentives against providing negative 
feedback, this can lead to an underestimation of threats – leaving them to grow until it’s too late – 
and an overestimation of the efficacy of violent solutions.  
The idea that fragmentation creates barriers to information sharing and coordination is not 
exclusive to autocracies, as evidenced by widespread acceptance of the claim that failure to share 
intelligence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency 
                                                 
119 Policzer, Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile, pp. 18, 58. 
120 Conflicted reporting may be deliberate – having organizations report on each other gives the autocrat 
more information on potential elite threats – but can also happen for reasons unrelated to threat 
management. For example, Scott Gartner writes about “dominant indicators,” in which military organizations 
pick certain metrics by which to assess success and collect information at the expense or exclusion of others. 
Scott Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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contributed to the United States’ pre-September 11th security failures.121  Regardless of regime type, 
fragmentation creates an information and coordination problem and increases the transaction costs 
that make timely and complete provision of information unlikely. In authoritarian regimes, however, 
these pathologies are more likely, and the incentives provided to the different security organizations 
and agents heighten the problem – an effect that will be discussed in more detail in the next section.    
In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity in coercive institutions damage these institutions’ 






Figure 1.4:  The Intelligence Pathway    
Ceteris paribus, when intelligence does not provide the ability to engage in selective and targeted 
repression, autocratic security forces are more likely to engage in intense and indiscriminate violence.   
 
B.  The Incentives Pathway  
Coercive institutions that are fragmented and exclusive will not only lack the intelligence 
capacity to police using discriminate and low-intensity violence, but will also have incentives to use 
force in more intense and indiscriminate ways.  
 
Fragmentation and Incentives for Violence  
Fragmentation creates incentives for violence among the organizations and agents of the 
internal security apparatus. One direct way in which it does so is by creating competition that 
rewards agents for acts of violence.  One frequent metric for success for an internal security agency, 
                                                 










for example, is the number of ‘enemies of the state’ that it has identified or neutralized, and 
‘performance-based rewards systems’ therefore reward agents for arresting these enemies. A 
democratic variant of this incentive structure was uncovered – and rescinded after public outcry – 
when in 2007 the Los Angeles Times discovered that the L.A. County Sheriff’s Department was 
holding competitions between stations to see who could arrest the most people in a given twenty-
four hour period (Operation Any Booking).  A similar exercise (Operation Vehicle Impound) led to 
spike in the number of vehicles seized, and a competition to see how many suspected gang members 
could be stopped for questioning boosted those statistics as well.122 Other, less sensational studies 
corroborate the argument that organizational characteristics of police departments provide 
incentives that influence arrest rates.123 These professional incentive structures operate worldwide; 
Lauren McCarthy has shown that the absence of career incentives leads Russian law enforcement 
personnel to avoid prosecutions under the new human trafficking legislation,124 while James Kai-sing 
Kung and Shuo Chen find that opportunities for professional advancement motivated excess grain 
procurement during China’s Great Leap Forward and may explain almost 17% of the excess deaths 
in China during this time.125  The problem is exacerbated if performance and rewards are allocated to 
the best-performing agency, rather than to all of those who meet a certain standard.  Doing so 
incentivizes agencies and individuals to compete on the grounds of violence to secure or further 
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their bureaucratic interests and individual professional standing. It encourages fabrication of cases 
and the use of extreme measures, including additional violence and torture, to elicit confessions. It 
also incentivizes organizations to accuse each other of being the “enemies” they seek, creating the 
possibility of intra-organizational violence and vendetta-settling.  There is seldom a penalty exacted 
for excessive zeal in the pursuit of duty.   
In addition to creating incentives for violence, fragmentation can also create incentives against 
other factors that might limit or restrain violence. Chief among these is the damage that 
fragmentation and inter-agency competition can do to a coercive institution’s intelligence capability. 
There are at least two ways in which this can happen.  First, when different agencies are incentivized 
to compete for power by making arrests and claiming credit for security “victories,” their 
competition is more likely to become zero sum, and they are less likely to share information that 
would negate their inter-agency competitive advantage. Policzer documents the detrimental effect of 
competition between branches of the armed service on information collection and intelligence 
coordination in Chile during the worst of the post-coup violence in 1973 and 1974.126  Second, when 
competing security agencies monitor and report on each other, it directs attention away from 
obtaining intelligence on the domestic population, and detracts resources and manpower from that 
task. The incentives to avoid sharing information and to waste resources on inter-agency monitoring 
hamper the development of intelligence that could be used to make violence more discriminate.  
Finally, fragmentation and competition create obstacles to vertical transmission of 
information.  This is a likely outcome in two specific circumstances: 1) if subordinates have an 
incentive to conceal accurate but negative information from the autocrat (the “shoot the messenger” 
problem that plagued Hussein’s Iraq), or 2) if subordinates have incentives to provide 
misinformation on their rivals in order to eliminate competitors and accumulate personal or 
                                                 
126 Policzer, Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile, p. 58.     
 48 
 
organizational power.127  Currying favor and casting aspersions on one’s rivals distort the content 
and provision of intelligence assessments.  Kapucinski suggests, for example, that the competition 
for power between the police and the army was a major factor that prevented officials from 
delivering accurate information about unrest in provincial army garrisons to Ethiopian ruler Haile 
Selassie before these problems escalated into full-blown revolt.128 Structure skews incentives, which 
then affect the quality of intelligence, which in turn drives violence.   The overarching point is that 
fragmented systems are likely to offer more positive incentives to state actors for engaging in 
violence and fewer negative incentives for avoiding it, thereby widening the probable scope and 
intensity of that violence.   
 
Exclusivity and Incentives for Violence  
Exclusivity also creates incentives for violence.  The policies outlined – composing the 
security forces of a narrow social or ethnic base, instituting a system of geographic and functional 
rotation, etc – make members of the internal security apparatus into social outsiders.  Studies in 
social psychology strongly suggest that engaging in violence against fellow human beings, a difficult 
task for ordinary people in ordinary circumstances, becomes easier when the objects of violence are 
removed from the perpetrator both physically and socially.129 In an interview on the fortieth 
anniversary of the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment, the experiment’s most abusive guard, 
Dave Eshelman, explained, “The only person I knew going in was John Mark. He was another guard 
and wasn't even on my shift. That was critical. If there were prisoners in there who knew me before 
                                                 
127 Shih, “The Autocratic Difference.”  
128 Kapucinski, The Emperor.  
129 Dave Grossman, On Killing: the psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society (Boston: Back Bay Books, 
1996); Barry P.C. Malloy and Dave Grossman, “Why Can’t Johnny Kill? The Psychology and Physiology of 
Interpersonal Combat,” in Barry P.C. Malloy, ed., The Cutting Edge: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Combat 
(Tempus Press, 2007). 
 49 
 
they encountered me, then I never would have been able to pull off anything I did.”130 Members of 
the security apparatus who do not have regular interaction or social identification with the people 
around them will perceive a lower social and psychological cost to violence than they would if they 
were being asked to commit it against friends, neighbors, and co-ethnics.  Exclusivity does not so 
much provide positive incentives to commit violence as it does lessen the negative sanction against 
it.  In a study of protest violence in Ethiopia, Leonardo Arriola finds that protests were more likely 
to spiral into violence when multiethnic federal police confronted ethnic Oromo protestors than 
when local, ethnically Oromo police handled the protest.131  
In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity create incentives for coercive institutions that 






Figure 1.5:  The Incentives Pathway    
Ceteris paribus, authoritarian regimes with more fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions should 
exhibit higher levels of state violence.   
 
C. Alternative Explanations for Violence  
The argument advanced here diverges significantly from existing explanations for state 
violence and repression, including those that are threat-based.  Each chapter tests the argument 
proposed above against several alternatives, each outlined briefly below.   
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One of the most prominent arguments about state violence suggests that states use repressive or 
violent measures as a response to rising domestic challenges or threats.  This “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” 
is, along with the argument that democratic regimes use less repression, one of only two relatively 
uncontested findings in the literature.132  An assortment of studies have corroborated this 
proposition,133 though others, attempting to make it ex ante falsifiable, have struggled to find 
empirical support.134  
My explanation departs from existing threat-based explanations in several ways.  First, a 
dictator cannot personally use violence against everyone that threatens him. Staying in power over 
time requires violence to be organized and deployed at scale, which is best accomplished through an 
institution.  Second, these arguments usually suggest that autocrats make calculations about violence 
based only on the threat from the population, whereas successfully staying in power requires 
managing multiple threats at once – threats that pose fundamental institutional design tradeoffs.  
Third, violence has costs, whether in the form of domestic backlash or international opprobrium; a 
smart dictator will presumably respond to incentives to minimize costly violence whenever possible.   
Thus, in contrast to commonly proposed threat-based explanations, I argue here that 
autocrats who are worried about popular threats will create organizations that are designed to 
counter that threat, and in doing so, will use less violence rather than more.  In the empirical 
chapters that follow here, strict and falsifiable definitions of threat – such as the number or size of 
protests – lack predictive power.   
                                                 
132 Davenport, Paths to State Repression.   
133 Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, “Protest Under Fire,” p. 581; Gurr, “Political Origins of State Violence and 
Terror”; Poe and Tate, “Repression of Human Rights”; Paul Y. Chang and Alex S. Vitale, “Repressive 
Coverage in an Authoritarian Context: Threat, Weakness, and Legitimacy in South Korea’s Democracy 
Movement,” Mobilization, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013), pp. 19-39.  
134 Mahoney-Norris, “Political Repression.”   
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Another school of thought seeks to explain the outbreak of violence between the state and 
protestors by using formal bargaining models.  By and large, these works have adopted a choice theoretic 
framework, in which protestors use government behavior to determine their optimal tactic,135 or the 
government chooses an optimal repressive strategy based on protestors’ behavior.136  Drawn from 
micro-economic producer theory, this framework suggests that the overall goal of protestors and 
governments alike is to optimize the production of a good (a policy demand for the protestors; 
cessation of protest or maintenance of public order for the government) at minimal cost.  Violence, 
then, emerges as the logical and even optimal ex post response to the failure of less violent ex ante 
measures;137 the framework suggests that “all observed incidents of peaceful compromise, deterrence, 
or escalation to violence are then actually a product of the optimal choices of the government.”138  
This framework is not so much wrong as it is incomplete.  First, it cannot explain the vast 
amount of state violence that takes place outside the context of protest.  Second, it risks 
mischaracterizing the goals of an autocrat vis-a-vis the population. Governments who have any cost-
sensitivity at all should not simply make choices about whether to violently repress a protest once it 
has erupted; instead, they should think with a longer-term strategic perspective about how to prevent 
protest and collective action from coalescing in the first place – and as mentioned above, to do that, 
they create coercive institutions capable of a broader range of actions than a “repress/not” binary. 
Third, an autocrat who faces thousands of angry protestors in the street has already experienced some 
kind of failure, so focusing only on protest response introduces selection bias into the cases that we 
                                                 
135 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation.”  
136 Moore, “Repression and Dissent”; Lskavyan, “Rational Choice Explanation for Stalin’s ‘Great Terror’”; 
Herrero, “The Full Weight of the State.”    
137 O’Brien and Stern distinguish between ex ante suppression (measures such surveillance, censorship, etc) and 
ex post repression (violent crackdowns on protest, etc).  Kevin O’Brien, ed., Popular Protest in China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2008).   
138 Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation.”   
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examine as “repression.”  Rather than asking, “When are regimes willing to pay the cost of intense 
public repression?” we should consider why the choice between resigning power and paying that cost 
became necessary in the first place. Doing so requires that we consider the broader context of 
repression, which is the object of this study.    
Third, the framework I propose explains why violence is not always used optimally – why it 
sometimes works, and sometimes simply inflames further resistance. Studies on the effect of 
government action on protest and collective action (much of it stemming from literature on political 
opportunity structures139) have identified nearly every possible relationship between state repression 
and protest: positive,140 negative,141 inverted U-shaped,142 mixed,143 and relationships that are driven by 
substitution effects.144  If regimes were actually perfectly calibrating their levels of violence, as 
bargaining models suggest, we should expect their efforts to produce more consistent success.  
Instead, however, I argue that violence is used in sub-optimal ways because of the fundamental 
tradeoffs involved in organizing to counter multiple different threats, and because of the failure of 
coercive institutions to adapt as threats evolve.   
                                                 
139 Tarrow, Power in Movement; Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Vincent Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
140 Edward Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (1986), pp. 471-88; Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and 
Revolutionary Movements 1945-1991 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).   
141 D.A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: a cross-national causal analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1973).   
142 Edward D. Muller and Erich Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 34 (1990), pp. 624-51.  
143 Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No 1 (1996), pp. 132-52.  
144 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Will H. Moore, “Repression and Dissent.”   
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A third set of alternative explanations argues that the use of violence depends on state capacity.  
Using a strategic interaction framework, Pierskalla finds that strong governments deter protests, 
whereas weak governments will be forced to compromise, and that third parties who may be interested 
in seizing power from the government (i.e., through a coup) can use protests as a screening device to 
test incumbent strength.  (A strong government or incumbent, in this case, is one that has control of a 
“strong” military or police force.145)  The “Murder in the Middle” hypothesis similarly suggests that 
weak state institutions coupled with expansion of democracy will be associated with increased 
repression.146  This, however, begs the question of what exactly makes for a state with high capacity (or 
strong coercive institutions) in the first place; the term “state capacity” has been used to denote an 
almost dizzying array of functions.147 It also suggests that a government would be strong vis-à-vis 
protestors in the same way that it is strong against potential coup-plotters, whereas I find that strength 
against one of these opponents creates weakness or vulnerability against the other.  State capacity, 
therefore, is a quality manipulated by the autocrat based on what he thinks will maximize his chances 
of staying in power, and is almost by definition uneven against different types of threats.   
A more specific variant of this alternative is that the organizational cohesion of the security forces 
affects state violence, and that more cohesive militaries will follow orders to crack down.148  As with 
the bargaining model approach, I find that this frames the question of violence and repression too 
narrowly, and that it leaves a good deal of reality unexplained. First, organizational cohesion can 
                                                 
145 Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation,” p. 136.  
146 Helen Fein, “More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World,” Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1995), pp. 170-91.  
147 Cullen Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil 
Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 273-285.  
148 For arguments about cohesion, see Kurt Dassel, “Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of 
International Aggression,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 107-140; Terence Lee, 
“Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1989 
Indonesia,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2005), pp. 80-104.  
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explain the implementation of the decision to crack down, but it cannot explain the decision itself, nor 
why the regime allowed protests to blossom to the point of a military crackdown in the first place.  In 
reality, we sometimes see that regimes decide not to deploy cohesive coercive institutions against 
popular protest, as happened in both South Korea and Taiwan. Second, this explanation conflates 
multiple sources of organizational cohesion, combining social uniformity, a lack of institutional 
fragmentation, and political control, when in fact those explanations need to be disentangled.  Third, 
an opposing body of literature has suggested precisely the opposite relationship between cohesion and 
violence: that weak cohesion and control lead to increased abuse by armed groups.149  In the chapters 
that follow, I find that in the broader context of repression, institutional fragmentation rather than 
cohesion facilitates state violence; my findings also suggest that whether coercive institutions are 
willing to engage in repression depends not just on the social uniformity of the institution (an intra-
organizational characteristic), but on the institution’s inclusiveness (a characteristic of the relationship 
between the organization and society at large).  
The final set of alternative explanations posits that international factors play a decisive role in 
shaping patterns of state violence.  International influence is operationalized in a myriad of ways – 
from transnational solidarity groups to trade agreements to direct pressure to the density of cross-
border activity – but it is generally thought to correlate with reduced violence.150 I find, however, that 
international factors are generally a better predictor of political liberalization or of democratization 
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than they are of state violence during the authoritarian period.151  South Korea, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines all experienced American pressure to improve their human rights record, and all 
democratized at around the same time, yet their authoritarian periods were marked by very different 
patterns of state violence.  Moreover, the in-case evidence does not support the argument that 
American or international factors were decisive; violence in Taiwan declined before the peak period of 
American interest in human rights, and in the Philippines, American pressure to lower visible signs of 
repression actually appear to have worsened violence by driving it underground and into the hands of 
less accountable actors.  Organizational factors, rather than international or American influence, drove 
variations in violence.   
 
IV. Empirical Approach    
The central argument to be tested is as follows: autocrats who want to stay in power must 
defend themselves from a number of different threats: external threats, internal mass-based threats, 
and internal elite-based threats.  In constructing their internal security apparatus, however, they face 
fundamental organizational tradeoffs – most starkly, the choice between optimizing to deal with a 
popular threat, or coup-proofing against an elite one.  Autocrats respond by creating coercive 
institutions based on the threat that they perceive to be dominant at the time they come to power, 
but these tradeoffs and the sticky nature of coercive institutions once established prevents them 
from responding effectively as threats evolve and new ones materialize. Variations in institutional 
structure and social composition then give rise to predictable patterns in the scope and intensity of 
state violence. A high initial threat from fellow elites is typically associated with a more fragmented, 
exclusive security apparatus, which has higher incentives to engage in violence and lacks the 
                                                 
151 This is consistent with observations that Western pressure has tended to prioritize visibly “democratic” 
practices like elections over liberal ones like the rule of law. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal 
Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).  
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intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate and pre-emptive repression.  Autocrats who are 
particularly concerned about popular threats, by contrast, use less violence rather than more, in large 
part because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose.   
This section briefly outlines the research design and empirical strategy used to test this 
argument.  First, I explain how I measure state violence and outline why comparative case studies 
are the optimal empirical strategy.  I then outline the scope of the study and possible universe of 
cases, and discuss the logic behind my case selection.   
 
A.  Measuring State Violence    
The project purports to explain variations in the pattern of state violence under 
authoritarianism.  But how does one measure state violence?  Donna Della Porta’s work on police 
response to protest in Italy and Germany explores five attributes of state response, each binary: the 
range of behaviors prohibited (repressive versus tolerant); the groups subject to repression (selective 
versus diffuse); the timing of intervention (preventive versus reactive); the degree of force involved 
(hard versus soft); and “the degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is 
emphasized” (dirty versus lawful).152   
From these, I chose to focus on two attributes, which I refer to as the scope and intensity of 
state violence.  Although I refer to the other attributes outlined by Della Porta, I chose to focus my 
data collection efforts most intensively on these two dimensions because they seemed the most 
essential qualities – without which one could not plausibly hope to understand why violence was 
generated and employed – and because they displayed clear-cut variation across time and space.  
Along the way, I paid attention to and collected more qualitative information about the range of 
                                                 
152 Donna Della Porta, “Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest,” in Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 66.    
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proscribed behaviors, the legal framework for violence, the timing of violence, and other attributes 
that would help me test my theory about the causes of state violence against the alternatives.  
Scope has to do with the breadth of violence employed, though scholars more commonly 
refer to this characteristic in its negative form, indiscriminacy. It asks, “How narrowly is violence 
against the population applied?  Does the regime use force against the people it wants to use force 
against, and avoid using force against those it does not want to?”  By contrast, intensity refers to the 
depth or height of violence, rather than breadth; it encapsulates the aggregate level of force levied 
against the population.  Extrajudicial killings are thus a more “intense” form of violence than arrest, 
while torture falls in between.   
In each case, I sought to collect data using a standard set of indicators that addressed both 
scope and intensity.  I collected statistics on the number of people arrested; the number of people 
tortured; the number of people who were tried; the number of people who were imprisoned; and the 
number of people who were executed and/or who disappeared.  In the Philippines, I also collected 
data on the number of people who were “salvaged” – that is, whose executed bodies were mutilated 
and publicly disposed of along a roadside, field, or other public area.  The number of people was an 
attempt to measure scope, while the different forms of violence allowed me to get at the question of 
intensity.  Complete data on all of these indicators was not always available, but I collected data at 
the most granular level – by month or year, as well as by geographic location – whenever possible.  
The major quantitative datasets on repression proved to be unsuited for answering this 
particular research question. The Political Terror Scale goes back only to 1976,153 while the CIRI 
Human Rights dataset begins in 1981.154 It was immediately clear that this limited timeframe would 
                                                 
153 Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale: A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to 
CIRI,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 32 (2010), pp. 367-400. 
154 David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government 
Respect for Physical Integrity Rights," International Studies Quarterly, Vol 43. No. 2 (1999): pp. 407-18.  
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censor the data on state violence in ways that could easily produce misleading conclusions. A scholar 
who examined Taiwan’s authoritarianism from 1976 or 1981 onward, for example, especially within 
a cross-national comparative context, would come to very different conclusions than one who began 
his or her analysis in 1945. Moreover, existing quantitative datasets sometimes combined violent 
forms of repression with non-violent ones (such as restrictions of civil liberties like free speech and 
assembly), and made it difficult to distinguish scope from intensity.  Finally, digging into the cases 
even at a preliminary level revealed serious questions about the accuracy and completeness of the 
existing quantitative data. In a few weeks of fieldwork in Taiwan, for example, I discovered that the 
statistics commonly used in Western scholarship on executions during the martial law period were 
probably an order of magnitude off: 3-4,000 executed rather than the commonly used figure of 
45,000.155  
Qualitative analysis, by contrast, provided several advantages.  First, it provided additional 
leverage for an argument that is as much about causal processes and causal mechanisms as it is about 
causal effects.156  Second, key independent variables in the argument were operationalized differently 
in different countries (for example, social cleavages and exclusion were defined in terms of ethnicity 
in Taiwan, region in Korea, and clan in the Philippines); qualitative analysis allowed me to minimize 
the risk of measurement error while retaining conceptual rigor and coherence.  At the same time, a 
qualitative approach allowed me to test my hypothesis using the widest range of empirical 
implications – an important consideration given relative data paucity – and to explicitly assess the 
strength of my argument relative to alternatives by using the Bayesian logic of process tracing 
                                                 
155 See Chapter Two.     
156 Henry Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, 
MD:Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).  
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outlined by Andrew Bennett.157 Where quantitative methods might have been handicapped by 
missing data in attempting to generate estimates of causal effect, sufficient qualitative data existed to 
make rigorous arguments about causal processes.   
As a result, I focused my research efforts on collecting as much finely grained data as 
possible within a few central case studies that form the backbone of the dissertation. The following 
section discusses how I selected those cases.    
 
B.  Case Studies and the Comparative Historical Method  
Before selecting cases, it was necessary to define the scope of the project.  This project 
focuses on explaining patterns of state violence under authoritarianism since 1945.  I have chosen to 
limit the scope of the present study to authoritarian regimes because multiple bodies of theory and 
empirics, including the theory and evidence proffered here, suggest that the patterns of state 
violence differ systematically with regime type.158  This is not to suggest that only authoritarian 
political systems use excessive or indiscriminate force against their citizens; all states use force or the 
threat of force to maintain political order, and coercive power is not limited to non-democracies.159  
And it is also not the case that the organizational dynamics driving state violence are completely absent 
from autocracies, or that autocratic coercion somehow operates according to a separate logic.  I expect 
many of the mechanisms I highlight to explain patterns of violence in democratic political systems as 
                                                 
157 Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Approach,” in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry Brady, and 
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158 See, for example, Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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well.  The difference, however, is that we should expect the organizational dynamics that produce 
violence to be present much less frequently under democratic government, and where they are present, 
we should expect them to be checked and constrained in different ways.  In other words, the 
incentives and threats facing autocratic leaders prompt them to engage in a systematically different 
degree of organizational manipulation, which then changes patterns of violence.    
I selected cases according to several criteria. First, I wanted them to have both within-case 
variation and cross-national variation.  Second, I wanted system-level attributes to be as constant as 
possible across cases.  Third, I sought regimes with a certain longevity, both so that I could hold 
constant national-level factors in explaining variation over time, and in order to have the most data to 
work with.  Finally, I sought regimes that had sufficient amounts of information available on the 
independent and dependent variables in question, so that I could test both the hypothesized 
correlations and the processes proposed by my argument.   
Taken together, these criteria argued strongly for choosing a single region, and East Asia 
offered particular theoretical and practical advantages.  In the pages that follow, I test my argument 
using a controlled comparison of three historical case studies: Taiwan, South Korea, and the 
Philippines, with a final chapter that addresses China and North Korea.   
This approach had several theoretical advantages. Each of the three main case countries had 
within-case variations in violence across space and time, which held constant national factors such as 
regime type and the personality of the autocrat. Choosing more than one case allowed me to 
complement subnational and longitudinal variation with an examination of cross-national variation, 
and to speak to, though not resolve, questions about the external validity of any single case.160  In 
selecting cases for cross-national comparison, I sought to hold constant – insofar as was possible – 
                                                 
160 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 99 (2005), pp. 435-452. 
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the other variables that might be driving patterns of violence (outlined in the section on alternative 
explanations, above). These alternative explanations discussed previously should have predicted very 
little variation in the pattern of state violence across these three countries.  The three regimes all 
espoused an anticommunist ideology, were all allied with the United States within the overall 
framework of international politics defined by the Cold War, and all faced popular threats that 
increased over time. Holding roughly constant major alternative explanations like international 
influence or rising popular threat allowed me to get the cleanest test of my theory possible.  
Originally selected because they appeared to display exogenous variation on the independent 
variable of interest – the configuration of the internal security apparatus – these cases therefore 
offered a clear empirical puzzle, the ability to control for potentially confounding factors, the 
opportunity for multiple tests of the theory’s predictions, and rich data from which to craft a 
compelling explanation.  And finally, although Eastern European communism, Latin American 
military rule, Middle Eastern petro-states, and African personalist dictatorships have become 
templates for our understanding of non-democracies, Asian authoritarianism – either communist or 
anti-communist – remains relatively understudied, especially from a comparative perspective, 
allowing me to fill a geographic gap in the study of autocracy.161  
Focusing on East Asia had practical advantages as well. This project faced non-trivial 
constraints on the availability of data for both the independent and dependent variables of interest – 
organizational characteristics of the internal security apparatus, and patterns of state violence. 
Because of this, it was important to go to where the data was, and where my language skills would 
allow me to access that data.  The democratization of Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines in 
the late 1980’s has resulted in the recent publication of archival material and other documentation 
related to the political history of the authoritarian period – among them new documents from the 
                                                 
161 For an important exception focused on Southeast Asia, see Slater, Ordering Power.  
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internal security and intelligence agencies themselves – sufficient to enable a comparative research 
project.162  Having access to these documents allowed me to assess not just the correlation between 
independent and dependent variables, but the processes that linked them.163  The length of time that 
has elapsed since democratization, and the conclusion of formal transitional justice processes, has 
also increased the willingness of former officials to speak candidly.  Finally, studying the internal 
security apparatus of three countries that democratized should not have introduced selection bias, 
since it did not happen as a result of failure or defection by that apparatus; however, the choice to 
examine China and North Korea in the final chapter was intended to address that question, as well 
as to maximize the variation that could be obtained given my language skills in the region.  The 
result is that East Asia offered an extraordinarily valuable type and volume of accurate micro-
empirical data on the organization, processes, and logic of violence within a theoretically justified 
comparative framework.    
Data for this project was collected over the course of a year of fieldwork in Asia, plus several 
months of research in the U.S. National Archives and university or private library collections within 
the United States.  Working with academic centers, libraries, and truth commissions in each of the 
three primary case-countries, I obtained an array of in-country scholarship; news reports from local 
periodicals; and personal recollections such as memoirs and oral histories, in both published form 
and from private papers.  I gathered official documentation from party and government archives, 
including material on the surveillance, trial, and sentencing of political prisoners, and compared this 
to the data collected by prominent dissident or human rights organizations present on the ground at 
                                                 
162 The assumption that these organizations do not generate paperwork appears to be simply incorrect.  
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the time. I acquired statistical data on the internal security apparatus’ personnel and deployment, as 
well as on the different forms of state violence discussed above: arrests, trials, imprisonments, 
executions, and salvagings. I also conducted a series of over one hundred and thirty semi-structured 
interviews with former police, military, and intelligence officials, as well as with former political 
prisoners and human rights activists who were targets of state social control techniques, repressive 
mechanisms, and violence. Much of this information has only become available in recent years or 
months, and has yet to appear in English-language scholarship.  I complemented the data gathered 
in Asia with several months of research in American archives, particularly military and State 
Department records in the National Archives and documents from the presidential libraries.  
Extensive U.S. government reporting and analysis on American allies in Asia – over eighty boxes of 
correspondence and reporting on Taiwan alone – provided a way to corroborate and verify 
information contained in source materials from Asia.  A fuller discussion of the sources consulted 
for each chapter can be found in Appendix A.   
 
C. The Plan of the Study  
This chapter presented the project’s central argument about coercive institutions and state 
violence under authoritarianism, differentiated it from alternative explanations, and explained the 
research design and empirical strategy used to test it.  Chapters Two, Three, and Four examine how 
the argument works in each of three case studies: Taiwan (Ch. 2); the Philippines (Ch. 3); and South 
Korea (Ch. 4). Chapter Five turns to China and North Korea, examining how this argument travels 

















I. Introduction  
 
This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation through an examination of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) party’s rule on Taiwan during what is now called the martial law era (jieyan shiqi, 
戒嚴時期, 1947-87).1  The island of Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, came under the 
administration of the Republic of China’s Kuomintang (Nationalist) government at the end of the 
Second World War.2  Shortly after the end of the Second World War in Asia, fighting re-emerged 
between Nationalist and Communist forces on the Chinese mainland.  By 1949, the collapsed 
Nationalist Government had been forced to retreat to Taiwan, where the KMT – under the 
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek until 1975 and his son Chiang Ching-kuo thereafter – ruled under 
martial law until July 1987: at the time the longest unbroken stretch of martial law in the world.3   
                                                 
1 In Taiwan, the martial law era (jieyan shiqi, 戒嚴時期) refers to a formal period of history; martial law was 
first imposed in 1947 and lifted in July 1987.  The term “White Terror” (baise kongbu, 白色恐怖) is both more 
politically charged and more varied in its use.  It is sometimes used to refer to state violence occurring across 
the whole period of martial law, but sometimes only to refer to the period of particularly high violence in the 
late 1940’s and 1950’s.  
2 Following an agreement made at the Cairo Conference in 1943. Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-
Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), Ch. 2.  
3 Subsequently overtaken by Syria, where martial law and rule by emergency decree began in 1963.   
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In the sections below, I trace the origins of Taiwan’s martial law-era coercive apparatus to 
dramatic changes in Chiang Kai-shek’s threat environment after he arrived on Taiwan, and link 
those changes in Taiwan’s coercive institutions to the patterns of state violence that it experienced. 
When he came to power, Chiang Kai-shek focused principally on managing the threat from fellow 
elites, rival warlords and military commanders.  Accordingly, the Nationalist security apparatus that 
took over Taiwan in 1945 was fragmented and exclusive. The exclusivity of the KMT’s early 
coercive institutions isolated them from Taiwan’s society and made it harder for the security forces 
to identify and deal with popular threats without resort to public, indiscriminate violence. 
Fragmentation of the coercive apparatus also fostered violence both against civilians and between 
rival security organizations.  After being forced to retreat to Taiwan, however, Chiang decided that a 
lack of focus on the population, and on the rise of the peasant-based Red Army, had cost the KMT 
their hold on the Chinese mainland.  Many of his elite rivals had also been eliminated by the civil 
war and flight to Taiwan.  As a result, the dominant perceived threat shifted to that of an internal 
popular uprising. As a result, in the early 1950s, Chiang Kai-shek launched a set of extensive reforms 
that included the internal security apparatus. By 1955, Taiwan’s coercive institutions had become not 
only much less fragmented, but much more inclusive of society, particularly in terms of intelligence-
gathering. These organizational changes shaped the scope and intensity of subsequent state violence. 
After Chiang created a unitary, inclusive, and socially embedded coercive apparatus, violence 
declined markedly and remained low for the rest of the martial law period.   
This chapter proceeds in six sections.  Section II provides an overview of the pattern of state 
violence, identifying key trends and suggesting corrections to current Western scholarship on 
Taiwan’s political history.  Section III traces the origins of the internal security apparatus on Taiwan, 
examining the Japanese institutional legacy and the operation of Nationalist policing and intelligence 
efforts on the Chinese mainland.  Section IV uses the organizational characteristics of the initial 
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coercive apparatus to explain the period of high violence that characterized the KMT’s first decade 
of rule. Section V discusses the drop in violence produced by institutional reforms that occurred in 
the first half of the 1950s and remained in place for the rest of the martial law period.  Section VI 
weighs the above argument against alternative explanations, and concludes.    
 
II. Overview of the Pattern of State Violence  
 
Changing patterns of state violence in Taiwan were driven largely by reforms made to the 
coercive apparatus under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo in the early 





Figure 2.1: Individuals Sentenced for Political Crimes (Annual Average)  
 
                                                 
4 Data provided by the Foundation for Compensation for Improper Trials during the Martial Law Era (財團
法人戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償基金會), www.cf.org.tw/data.php.  Following Foundation 
precedent, these figures omit casualties from the 2-28 Incident, which are recorded separately for reasons 
attributable to the Foundation’s legal mandate. Separating them is also helpful because if included, the 
magnitude of casualties from that single incident would overwhelm the pattern otherwise revealed.  However, 
I do discuss 2-28 below, because omitting the largest incident of political violence in Taiwan would be a fairly 






Figure 2.2: Annual Number of Executions for Political Crimes   
Three points are worth highlighting.  First, the aggregate numbers on state violence – the latest 
statistics extracted from Taiwan’s archives – are much different than the figures cited in Western 
scholarship. The estimate most frequently mentioned is Douglas Mendel’s claim that 90,000 people 
were arrested in Taiwan between 1949 and 1955, and that over half of these were executed.5  As of 
October 2010, however, the Compensation Foundation had only confirmed around 7,000 political 
cases and 786 executions. 6   Even the official investigations – which were mandated by the 
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) when it first assumed power, and led by former 
political prisoner, then-Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) – arrived at the much lower figure of 
                                                 
5 Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley: UC Press, 1970), p. 120. Re-cited in Sylvia Li-
Chun Lin, Representing Atrocity in Taiwan: the 2/28 Incident and White Terror in Fiction and Film (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 12, fn. 31; Tien Hung-mao, “Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-
political Change,” The China Quarterly, No. 64 (Dec 1975), p. 629; Denny Roy, Taiwan: a Political History 
(Cornell: Ithaca University Press, 2003), p. 90.  
6 Foundation for Compensation; see also Loa Lok-Sin, “Former Premier’s Praise of Martial Law Draws Fire,” 
Taipei Times, 1 November 2011.  
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10,000 trials and 2-3,000 executions. 7   If anything, opposition-led investigations run by former 
political prisoners should exhibit a bias toward overestimating state violence – yet these numbers are 
far lower than those used by Western scholars. What explains this discrepancy?  
The simplest answer is that Mendel’s estimates are likely inaccurate.  They come from a 
single unverifiable anonymous source, are internally inconsistent, and assume a constant level of 
violence throughout the period of martial law – an assumption not supported by any existing 
historical evidence.8  A more thorough answer requires some explanation of how these statistics 
relate to the process of state violence as it was implemented by the authorities in Taiwan at the time.  
Statistical data exist on three forms of state violence, at increasing levels of intensity.  These are: 1) 
the number of individuals who were arrested or detained for political crimes; 2) the number who 
actually went to trial and were sentenced (given the military court system in place at the time, the 
difference between trials and sentencings is almost zero); and 3) the number of people executed.  A 
significant percentage of those detained or arrested were let go without proceeding to the stage of a 
formal trial and sentencing. Because the records became more extensive the further a case 
proceeded, confidence in the estimates of these different forms of state violence increases with the 
intensity of violence.  The police may not have filed a report for every person they investigated or 
even detained, but by the time someone was executed, an extensive paper trail had been created, 
                                                 
7 Taiwan has not had a formal transitional justice process, and investigations of this period of history remain 
controversial.  For a summary of the findings of the Presidential Office investigations led by then-opposition 
party Vice President Annette Lu, former democratic activist and political prisoner, see Tai-lin Huang, “White 
Terror Exhibit Reveals Part of Truth,” Taipei Times, 20 May 2005; see also Tien, “Taiwan in Transition,” p. 
629.  For a summary of political issues around historical research see Amber Parcher, “Remembering the 
White Terror,” Foreign Policy, 12 October 2012.  
On the DPP, see Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001); Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); 
Teresa Wright, The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii, 2001).  
8 Mendel cites Anonymous, “A Report on Formosan Political Prisoners,” Formosan Readers Association Report, 1 
(November 1966), p. 11, reprinted as “Tyranny in Free Formosa,” The Progressive (December 1967).  
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often numbering in the hundreds of pages and including, in most cases, a before-death and after-
death photo of the accused to verify that the sentence had been correctly carried out.  Mendel 
appears to have underestimated the scope of violence at low intensity, but overstated it at high 
intensity – in other words, he overstated the number of executions, but may actually have 
understated the number arrested.  
Estimates of the number of people who stood trial, based on records from Taiwan’s military 
courts, generally converge at around 10,000 people.  The number of death sentences is estimated to 
be between 2,000 and 3,000 people.9  Court records represent the best estimates currently available, 
more apt to be accurate than either the claims filed for compensation (which likely underestimate, 
since victims or their families may no longer be around or motivated to file), or more speculative 
guesswork such as that which led to Mendel’s figure.  A report by former political prisoner and DPP 
legislator Hsieh (Xie) Cong-min (謝聰敏), in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, estimated 
that there were 29,000 total cases of political persecution investigated (the step prior to arrest) during 
the martial law era, involving a total of 140,000 people, and that these cases resulted in 3-4,000 
executions.10 Western scholarship on Taiwan’s political history should therefore be revised to reflect 
this new understanding: political violence in Taiwan was broader in scope in the earlier periods, and 
lower in intensity in the later periods, than previously understood. Corroboration and further 
investigation await the full opening of Taiwan’s archives to researchers and scholars, as well as to 
victims and their families.11  
                                                 
9 If one recalculates using Mendel’s original source and an internally consistent method, the resulting figure is 
closer to this evolving consensus: 10,000 trials and 5,000 executions, though only for the period 1949-55.  
10 Author’s conversation with former DPP legislator and political prisoner Xie Cong-min (謝聰敏), Taipei, 
December 2010. See also Wei Tingchao, Report on Human Rights in Taiwan, 1949-1995 (Taipei: Wenyangdang 
Chubanshe, 1997)/ 魏廷朝.  <台灣人權報告書 一九四九-一九九五> (臺北市 : 文英堂出版社, 1997); 
Hsieh Tsung-min, “From a Taiwan Prison,” The New York Times, 24 April 1972.   
11 Wu Nai-teh, “Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan,” Taiwan 
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The second important point about these statistics has to do with temporal variation, another 
point commonly overlooked by scholars currently writing in English.  State violence in Taiwan was 
not constant over time, in terms of either the numbers of people who experienced violence or the 
intensity of the violence to which they were subject.  Both the scope and intensity of violence in 
Taiwan dropped precipitously in the mid-1950’s.  Figure 2.1, for example, shows the decrease in the 
number of individuals who stood trial for political crimes. Although martial law lasted another 
twenty-seven years, three-quarters of documented political cases had already occurred by 1960, even if 
2-28 is not included.12 (Put another way, three-quarters of the cases took place in the first one-third of 
the martial law period.) The number of individuals arrested, another measure of the scope of state 
violence, dropped at a similar rate.  In the first eight months of 1950, a reported 23,000 people were 
arrested, but fourteen years later, in the first ten months of 1964, the Provincial Police 
Commissioner reported only 1,345 arrests.13  Figure 2.2 shows that the intensity of violence declined 
as well.  Sentences issued by martial law courts decreased in severity, moving away from executions 
toward lower-intensity forms of punishment, mostly incarceration. After Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 
1975, almost all of the prisoners waiting for death sentences had their terms commuted to life 
imprisonment.14  This temporal variation is largely overlooked in existing English-language literature.   
Third, the targets of state violence changed over time: from Mainlanders accused of 
Communist activity to native Taiwanese accused of pursuing Taiwan independence. The home 
                                                                                                                                                             
Journal of Democracy 1, 1(July 2005), pp. 77-102.  
12 The casualty figures for 2-28 have been the subject of intense political debate.  One central government 
report lists casualties (dead and wounded) at 6,317. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou, A Tragic 
Beginning: the Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 160.   
13 U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 1 November 1950, National Archives Record Group 59, 
794A.00/11-150. 
14 Clemency was also granted to criminals convicted of non-violent offenses. “Taiwan reducing prisoners’ 
terms: clemency will cover many held on political charges,” New York Times, 1 June 1975, p. 11.  
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province of each person under trial for political offenses was recorded in their case files; summary 
lists have been published by the Compensation Foundation and Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.  Based on these sources, at least one-third of the total victims of state violence during 
the martial law era appear to have been Mainlanders, who make up only fifteen percent of the 
population.  Moreover, in the early years of KMT rule on Taiwan, Mainlanders were more likely to 
be arrested, and if they were arrested, could expect to receive harsher sentences.15  Not only were a 
surprising proportion of those targeted of Mainland origin, but many of them were members of the 
Nationalist government, military, and intelligence agencies.16 This finding should call into question, 
or at least significantly complicate, the impulse to conceptualize the White Terror as a quasi-imperial 
enterprise wherein Mainlander arrivistes crushed native Taiwanese resistance.17   
Correcting our current histories of the White Terror and martial law era is the first step 
toward a better understanding of the dynamics of state violence.  The trends outlined above 
challenge the dominant historical narrative of Taiwan’s White Terror.  The sections that follow 
provide an alternative explanatory account.    
 
                                                 
15 Data provided to the author by the Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation (台灣民間真相與和
解促進會 ), www.taiwantrc.org, and by the Foundation for Compensation (see note 4 above). For 
corroboration, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ 
Democracies,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (December 2007), p. 36.   
16 Author’s interview with a retired Admiral, Republic of China Navy, Taipei, November 2010.   
17 Popular representations of the White Terror sometimes use the 2-28 incident to symbolize the state’s 
violence, and depict it as primarily a clash between Mainlanders and Taiwanese; other sources link the 
targeting of Taiwanese elites during 2-28 and the Formosa Incident of 1979.  For a discussion of various 
representations of 2-28 and the White Terror, including ethnic dimensions, see Lin, Representing Atrocity in 
Taiwan, especially Ch. 1; for links between 2-28 and the Formosa Incident, see Stephen Kosack, The Education 
of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 133.  See also Roy, Taiwan, pp. 77-78.  
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III. Origins of the Internal Security Apparatus on Taiwan 
 
In 1945, the KMT on Taiwan inherited from the Japanese a centralized, internally 
coordinated, inclusive, and socially penetrative internal security apparatus that relied on the baojia 
system of communal responsibility to create strong local networks of monitoring and surveillance.  
Rather than continuing to use that system, however, they dismantled it, grafting onto the island 
instead a very different set of coercive institutions: those then in use on the Chinese mainland.  In 
contrast to the Japanese system, KMT internal security was fragmented and internally competitive, 
particularly in terms of the rivalry between the Military Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the 
Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (MBIS and CBIS, Juntong and Zhongtong, 軍統 and中統
). Nationalist officials also adhered to a model of police professionalism, then internationally 
acclaimed, that isolated the police force from society; social penetration and participation in society 
were actively discouraged.  The exclusivity and fragmentation of the KMT coercive apparatus were 
deliberately cultivated by Chiang Kai-shek, because he believed it necessary to keep rival warlords 
and military commanders from betraying him and aggrandizing power.  This was a strategy geared 
toward the dominant threat during the earlier years of Chiang’s rule – the factionalism of the warlord 
era and the Nanjing decade – but which worked less well after 1937, once the Chinese Communist 
Party had established their wartime bases.   
 
Japanese Colonial Policing and the Baojia System in Taiwan  
 
After the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the island of Taiwan to Japan in April 1895, the 
Japanese pursued a variety of strategies against a restive colonial population. The early Japanese 
policing apparatus was poorly coordinated and socially isolated, but its evolution over the course of 
fifty years of colonial rule was dramatic, and by 1945, Japanese authorities bequeathed to the new 
rulers of the island a strong and internally coordinated policing system that was heavily enmeshed with 
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and inclusive of local society.  Though the KMT initially disregarded the Japanese system, they 
eventually made effective use of it; for that reason, its development merits attention here.    
Japan’s early efforts at establishing a secure colonial order were a far cry from the success 
eventually achieved. Disorder consumed the island during the first two decades of Japanese rule, as the 
colonial government faced opposition first from bands of “bandit-rebels” and partisans, and then 
from a series of local uprisings.  The Japanese initially employed a military-dominated strategy: the civil 
police operated under military command and were outnumbered 3,100 to 3,400 by military police.18  In 
1897, the third Governor-General employed a “triple-guard” system, which relied on army units 
assisted by military police in the highlands; military and civil police forces in the resistant mid-lowlands; 
and civil police alone in the more settled plains locations. 19  According to the accounts of two key 
officials, however – Chief Civil Administrator Goto Shimpei and Japanese Diet Member Yosaburo 
Takekoshi – poor coordination between the different units and heavy-handedness rendered the 
campaign ineffective.20  Takekoshi also lamented that the interference of the gendarmes and army 
made it impossible for the police to achieve the necessary “opportunity of coming into contact with 
the people.”21  In contrast to the later periods of Japanese administration, newly arriving policemen did 
not know native Taiwanese customs, language, and local dialects, nor were they provided incentives to 
                                                 
18 Caroline Hui-yu Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control: the Hoko System in Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-
1945” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1990), p. 30. See also Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, Taiwan in Japan’s 
Empire Building: an institutional approach to colonial development (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009), 
especially chapter 3.  
19 Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Murray A. 
Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007 (expanded ed.)), pp. 201-260; Yosaburo 
Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa (London: Longmans, 1907; reprinted by Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1996), p. 
145; James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa Past and Present (London and New York: Macmillan, 1907).   
20 Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 21; Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, pp. 144-5. 
21 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 145.  
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do so.  Locally organized self-defense associations also remained outside the police hierarchy.22  The 
early Japanese policing system, therefore, was fragmented and not inclusive.  Not surprisingly, it was 
more violent than the later periods of Japanese rule.  
Both of these attributes of Japanese coercive institutions soon changed.  Although some 
heavy-handed tactics to subjugate resistance continued through 1915, Japanese authorities gradually 
shifted to a system of civil administration not unlike that of the British empire, which included 
extensive organizational reform.23  They began to quickly enlarge the island’s civil police force, from 
726 in 1895, to 3,270 by late 1897, to 4,061 by the end of 1899.24  Moreover, as early as 1901, the 
Governor-General’s office began to give the police rather than the gendarmes primary responsibility 
for maintaining order against domestic unrest.  The military police was then held in reserve for 
emergencies; by 1905, only one company of 230 men remained in Taiwan.25  Over 900 police stations 
were established across the island, each with 4-5 officers and responsible for up to five hoko (see 
below). By 1945, there were over one thousand police stations.26  
Japanese colonial administration also sought to enmesh the police into native Taiwanese 
society. As part of an expanded training program, the colonial police received Taiwanese language 
                                                 
22 Reo Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition: Colonial Lessons for Contemporary State-building,” (PhD 
Dissertation, MIT, 2011), p. 176.   
23 Early coercive tactics included aerial and naval bombardment of previously protected mountainous aboriginal 
areas to open them for timber, minerals, and hydropower. The Japanese debated whether to adopt a more 
French assimilationist model or the British model of cultural autonomy, separate governance, and indirect 
rule.  George Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii, 1974), pp. 100-105; Edward I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” in 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press: 1984), pp. 248-50;  
24 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 175, 180.   
25 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 180.   
26 Tsai, p. 46; Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in Ramon H. 
Myers and Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 
1984), p. 215. 
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instruction – and bonuses for those who also learned to speak one of the various local dialects.27  The 
Japanese also aggressively recruited Taiwanese to fill the shortfall in police forces.  Within two or three 
years, they had a force of 1,500, and after 1910, this number increased to 5,000.  After 1901, native 
Taiwanese comprised between 20 and 30% of the police force.  Although observers commonly note 
that the Taiwanese held primarily junior grade (junsaho) positions, never exceeding the rank of captain, 
what is interesting is how the Taiwanese were employed: they were hired to concentrate particularly on 
investigative work.28 An official observer commented in 1907 on the usefulness of employing some 
1,398 Formosans as sub-policemen: “they are well-acquainted with the circumstances and condition of 
their fellow-countrymen.”29 At each police branch station, one Taiwanese was stationed with two 
Japanese policemen – a clear advantage in penetrating a society where, in 1920, only around 10% of 
the town and village heads spoke Japanese. These stations and substations were integrated into 
colonial administration at the district and sub-district level; police officers became sub-district heads, 
making them, as Matsuzaki writes, not just “a powerful branch of the local administration, but the 
local administration itself.” 30  Below that, patrolmen integrated closely with villages through local 
headmen or section chiefs.   
In his post-surrender study of Japanese police organizations on Taiwan, U.S. State Department 
official George Kerr observed, “In dealing with all matters the police are thoroughly indoctrinated 
with the official philosophy of minute control of private and public life.” Japanese policing was 
founded on the principle that it was the policeman’s “’quality of omniscience’” that would “enable him 
                                                 
27 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 181.   
28 Chengtian Kuo, “The Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan: A New Institutionalist Perspective,” 
Issues & Studies, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 36; Edward I-te Chen,“Japanese colonialism 
in Korea and Formosa: a comparison of the systems of political control,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, No. 
30 (1970), pp. 126-58; Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems,” p. 215. 
29 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 150.  
30 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 182, 185.   
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to appraise correctly the importance of all happenings, large and small,” and identify potential 
problems before they escalated. Accordingly, the “Peace Preservation” category of police duties 
outlines the following responsibilities:  
 
[S]upervision of publications; supervision of all public meetings and private 
organizations (the detection of any group or society that might endanger the existing 
form of government or the system of private property is chief purpose); supervision of 
religion; control of situation in case of accident, flood, earthquake (fire departments 
and auxiliaries such as youth groups are under police control); and maintenance of 
public morals (contact with schools and social-educational bodies to insure “correct 
thinking” on political and economic questions).31 
 
Policemen were explicitly instructed to obtain “minute and detailed knowledge of a multitudinous state 
of affairs” within their jurisdiction. In order to collect that information, bicycles were explicitly 
forbidden and the number of steps per minute that a policeman should walk to have time for proper 
observation was specified in the training manual (“on foot at a speed of about 60 steps a minute.”) 
Policemen collected regular reports from taxi drivers, rail and bus line workers, prostitutes, waitresses, 
and managers of hotels and boarding houses – as well as the reliable leaders of the ho and ko, whose 
offices the police inspected and supervised regularly.32  Every time a former rebel surrendered, a 
commemorative photograph was taken and filed in the police station “as a means of identifying past 
troublemakers”; a raft of household and personal information was also recorded to enable the police 
to keep a close eye on ex-insurgents.33 Ching-chih Chen’s verdict seems justified: “Until 1945, the 
                                                 
31 “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” MG-8, Lecture 28, George H. Kerr papers, Hoover 
Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 3, Folder 8 (3.8), “Administration – Police system (Japanese 
period),” n.d., (Accession No. xx381-8M.38).  
32 Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” pp. 14-16.  
33 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 187.  
77 
police system remained highly centralized and widely dispersed in the countryside, with awesome 
authority to manage and to intervene in the life of the Chinese [on Taiwan].”34 
It is critically important that Taiwan’s hoko system came under direct police authority in May 
1903, with the passage of the Working Rules for the Implementation of the Hoko Bylaw.35  Called pao-
chia or baojia (保甲）in Chinese and extended to Taiwan under the Qing dynasty, the hoko system was 
a collective responsibility system that functioned as a form of local, community-based governance and 
law enforcement, relying on local leaders and civil society to maintain control.36  Goto Shimpei, the 
Japanese administrator largely responsible for the expansion and strengthening of the hoko system, was 
enthusiastic about the system’s potential to enhance self-rule, and to co-opt local forms of governance 
to the Japanese advantage.37  Even before the Japanese arrival, baojia units had formed local militias 
(called soteidan in Japanese, or chuangtingtuan in Chinese) among Taiwan’s Han population, while groups 
of Taiwanese and aboriginals, called aiyung, were organized to act as local self-defense forces against 
aboriginal attack.38  Under the Japanese, however, the baojia system assumed the duties of collective 
                                                 
34 Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems,” pp. 217-218.  
35 Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-building, Regime 
Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (2001), pp. 102-
129. Prior to that, from August 1898 until the system was standardized in May 1903, hoko served as an 
auxiliary to the police and was not fully integrated into local administration and governance structures. For 
clarification of the timeline, see Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 191.   
36 According to Han Fei, a Chinese philosopher perhaps most closely aligned with Machiavelli, “Lord Shang 
taught Duke Hsiao [r. 361-338 b.c.] of Ch’in how to organize the people into groups of five and ten families 
that would spy on each other and be corporately responsible for crimes committed by their members.”  
Burton Watson, trans., Han Fei Tsu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 82.  See 
also The Book of Lord Shang, another early Legalist work in Chinese political philosophy.   
37 Goto asserted that this system drew on the “organic politics” of Taiwan: communal obligations, kinship 
relations, and tradition.  To be fair, it is also probable that the exodus of 2,000 elites at the beginning of the 
Japanese takeover made it easier to restructure local forms of governance to the Japanese advantage.  Goto, 
“The Administration of Formosa,” pp. 536-7.  
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responsibility and punishment, of internal social control as well as external self-defense. Ten 
households comprised one ko (led by a kocho), and ten ko formed a ho (led by a hosei), though variance 
in community sizes meant that in actual fact the size of hoko units varied between 50 and 300 
households.39  In both cases, the police supervised the hosei and kocho directly.  
Although the hoko system was nominally one of communitarian self-governance – with elected 
hosei, mutually agreed upon fees, and compacts decided annually by community assemblies – the reality 
was less democratic. Each hoko unit served three primary functions: it assigned collective responsibility 
(renza) among the Taiwanese; it was responsible for recruiting men to fill the soteidan militias; and it 
assisted police officers with duties such as monitoring population movements, labor conscription, and 
public health works.40  Hosei selection and hoko fees were controlled in practice by local police; their 
offices were often co-located with local police stations, and hoko meetings typically occurred inside the 
stations themselves. A Taiwanese corps chief ran each soteidan under the supervision of a Japanese 
officer, and kocho officials could only command the unit to engage in these activities with the 
permission of police officials, which was granted during the meetings held at their police stations.41 
Japanese officials approvingly noted that the practice of collective responsibility encouraged Taiwanese 
to monitor and spy on each other on behalf of the police; villages were fined for offenses such as 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 The baojia system in China dates to the Song dynasty. Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems,” p. 
218; see also Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 
1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North 
China, 1945-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).  
39 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 191.   
40 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 194.   
41 Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” pp. 87-102, 150-152; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 198-99.  
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failing to prevent unrest from escalating into a riot, and for failure to report information on insurgent 
attacks.42 
By 1905, Taiwan had fifty-eight thousand hosei, kocho, and soteidan leaders – five percent of 
Taiwan’s population, more people than the Japanese civilian presence.43 Prior to 1925, each official 
policeman supervised approximately 500 people; by the end of World War II, George Kerr had 
calculated that “The government had about one armed Japanese in service for every one hundred 
Formosans.”44  If one includes the hoko leaders, the ratio of surveillance personnel to citizens during 
the Japanese colonial period reached approximately 1:47.45   Scholars thus credit the close integration 
of police and hoko as the “key factor” enabling Japan’s colonial administration to exercise effective 
control over Taiwan’s population. The Japanese used this system to mobilize labor for public works, to 
monitor the declining insurgency, to report deaths and other demographic changes, to monitor and 
contain the use of opium, and to improve public health – all through an intensive penetration of the 
island down to the household level.  (In 1901, for example, the government launched an effort to 
catch rats to eradicate the plague and administrated rewards on a household basis; in Tainan, a 
household earned 5 sen (1/20th of a yen) for every rat, and in central Taiwan, households that failed to 
meet a 10-rat monthly quota were fined 5 sen – which resulted in an estimated 4-5 million rats 
eradicated from 1901-1904.46)  Reo Matsuzaki terms this process the “hybridization” of institutions of 
                                                 
42Goto, “The Administration of Formosa,” pp. 536-7; Tsai, “One Kind of Control”; Matsuzaki, “Institutions 
by Imposition,” pp. 194-5.   
43 Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule,” p. 215.   
44 Kerr, Formosa, p. 57-58.  
45 Taiwan’s population in 1895 was approximately 3 million. Tsai, “One Kind of Control.”   
46 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,”  p. 196; see also Joseph Wicentowski, Policing Health in Modern 
Taiwan, 1898-1949 (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2007), pp. 60-74; Hsien-yu Chin, “Colonial 
Medical Police and Post-colonial Medical Surveillance Systems in Taiwan, 1898-1950’s,” Osiris, Vol. 13 (1998), 
pp. 326-38.   
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Japanese colonial rule on the one hand, and native Taiwanese local governance structures on the other.  
American analyst George Kerr referred to the system less charitably as a “community straitjacket.”47 
The entire system fell under the highly centralized control of the Japanese Governor-General. 
The Governor General’s Police Affairs Bureau controlled the operations of the civil police in all 
branches, which meant that police chiefs at intermediate levels took orders directly from the 
governors, and mayors had no ‘horizontal’ control over local public safety. Direct lines of reporting 
from the civil police to the Governor-General made centralized control “the essence of the 
organization.” 48  Within that system, “intelligence [was] transmitted freely from one part to another, 
and the relations between the rural officers and the central government resemble those existing 
between the hands and the brain.”49 The pyramidal structure was especially useful for the swift and 
complete transmission of information between the Japanese authorities and Taiwan’s society.  Kerr’s 
report observes:  
 
Announcements and police directives handed to a senior hoko member were 
transmitted promptly down the lime, each representative at the next lower level 
acknowledging receipt until it became a matter of record that all concerned were 
properly informed. No one could plead ignorance of the government’s wishes.  
Conversely, each individual and household was expected to volunteer information and 
to report to the police the overnight absence of a family member or the presence of 
visitors staying under the family roof.  It was extremely difficult for a stranger to pass 
through the countryside unnoticed and unreported.50 
 
                                                 
47 Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control,”; Tsai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building; Kerr, Formosa, p. 58.  
48 Kerr noted that in the cases where fragmentation did occur, violence otherwise unusual to the system was the 
result.  Although Goto was, for the most part, able to harness the gendarmes and civil police in a single system, 
Kerr writes, “in later years an intense rivalry sprang up between the gendarmes and the civil police, each driving 
to outdo the other in demonstrating superiority in detection and punishment of alleged subversion.” See Kerr, 
“Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” p. 3; Kerr, Formosa, p. 58. 
49 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 148.  
50 Kerr, Formosa, pp. 60-61.  
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The tightly woven social penetration achieved by the hoko system, therefore, enabled it to function as 
an auxiliary arm of the civil police in Japanese colonial authorities’ efforts to maintain domestic order.  
The internal security system as a whole was remarkably successful in atomizing potential collective 
resistance to Japanese rule. Official visitors remarked on the effectiveness of the system in “preventing 
offences, detecting crime, collecting taxes, and even assisting greatly in putting down the brigands.”51  
Ching-chih Chen credits the informant network nature of the pao-chia system with “making almost 
impossible any attempt at armed opposition”; reports provided by citizens through the pao-chia system 
did lead in several important cases to the discovery and arrest of anti-Japanese plans and conspirators 
and the prevention of armed attack.52   
The Japanese maintained this system until two months before the end of World War II (until 
June 17, 1945), though it became less important after 1936 when the policy of imperialization 
(kominka) undercut the Japanese rationale for and interest in fostering locally-originated systems of 
governance.53  By 1945, then, the Japanese colonial policing apparatus on the ground in Taiwan was an 
unfragmented, inclusive internal security force that had replaced “repressive mechanisms” with 
“information superiority.”54  
 
                                                 
51 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 151.  
52 These cases are referenced in more detail in Ching-chih Chen, “The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia 
System in Taiwan, 1895-1945,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 402-3.  
53 Kuo, “Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan,” p. 37; Matsuzaki, “Instituions by Imposition,” p. 192.  
Administrative reforms in 1920 changed the reporting lines to make provincial governors the supervisory 
agents over local policing, but the fusion of police with local administration was maintained at the county 
level and actually accelerated by the extension of zones (ku) within villages, typically headed by the hosei.   
54 Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” p. 111.   
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Nationalist Rule and Internal Security in Mainland China  
At the end of the Second World War in the Pacific, the Nationalist Government of China 
replaced Japan as the sovereign authority on the island of Taiwan.  After retrocession – the official end 
of Japanese rule in Taiwan, on 25 October 1945 – the island was administered as a re-acquired 
province while the Nationalist government negotiated with and then engaged in civil war against 
Communist forces on the Chinese mainland. During this time, the KMT transplanted to Taiwan the 
organs of government used on the mainland, including intelligence and coercive agencies.  Internal 
security in the first decade of KMT rule on Taiwan, therefore, was influenced far more by Nationalist 
coercive institutions on the mainland than by the institutions built under the Japanese – and the fact 
that the Nationalist coercive apparatus achieved neither internal coordination nor inclusiveness of 
society largely explains the decade of high violence that marked early KMT rule on Taiwan.  
In 1928, the Nationalist government began its efforts to create a modern national police 
system for China.  Drawing on international models (Germany, Japan, and the United States in 
particular), it established a commission of police experts and, over the succeeding decade, set up police 
academies in multiple provinces, as well as a Central Police Academy (Zhongyang Jingguan Xuexiao) in 
Nanjing in 1935.  Academy instructors began to apply and teach some of the newest scientific 
techniques used in police work, including finger-printing and forensics. This commission also began 
the arduous process of trying to vertically integrate local militia under local authorities, who would 
report in turn to the Ministry of the Interior. 55 A nucleus of core officials had been trained at Japanese 
academies, while German advisors shaped Chinese perceptions of the appropriate structure and 
deployment patterns. Shanghai police chief Colonel Yuan Liang modeled his plans for organization 
and training after American models, particularly those of August Vollmer: Berkeley town marshal, 
                                                 
55  Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
especially pp. 244-247. On this period, see also Terry Bodenhorn, ed., Defining Modernity: Guomindang Rhetorics 
of a New China, 1929-70 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002).  
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head of the International Association of Police Chiefs, and the University of California’s first 
Criminology Professor.  At the national level, Vollmer’s deputy served as an advisor to the Ministry of 
the Interior in Nanjing, while two of his students taught at Zhejiang Police Academy and one, Feng 
Yukun, became director of the Department of Police Administration.56  In a detailed study of the 
attempt to reform Shanghai’s police to make them China’s flagship force, Frederic Wakeman notes the 
irony of the Nationalist effort: an anti-imperialist drive to reclaim sovereignty resulted in reliance on 
Western models and advisors, because successful performance would justify the reclamation of 
policing authority from the foreign concessions.   
Nationalist attempts at police professionalization resulted in a police force that was, by design, 
exclusive of society rather than inclusive of it.  Wakeman refers to it as “more like an army of 
occupation than a domestically recruited constabulary.” 57  The first problem was one of low numbers; 
in 1929 Colonel Yuan Liang complained that Shanghai’s ratio of one uniformed officer for every 425 
inhabitants of the Chinese-administered section of Shanghai was too low; in 1935, the ratio appeared 
to be closer to 1:300.58   
In hindsight, however, the more important issue appears to have been who composed the 
police force, rather than how many they numbered.  The KMT simply believed that outsiders were 
better policemen.  Throughout the period 1927-37, southern police officials actively recruited 
policemen from the north, on the grounds that they had superior physical attributes for policing, that 
they would be better able to man the new Japanese police-box system of law enforcement, and 
                                                 
56 There is debate over how much Vollmer’s work emphasized closer community involvement on the part of 
the police, leading to some argument that the Nationalists misinterpreted his advice.  William C. Kirby, Germany 
and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 55-56; Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 245.  
57 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 49-50.   
58 Beijing had 2-3 times as many officers for the same population in about one-third the area, with none of 
the jurisdictional issues that accompanied Shanghai’s foreign concessions.  Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 
165-66.  
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particularly on the basis that their “linguistic incompetence” in the Shanghai dialect made them less 
susceptible to corruption.  After 1927, only 18% of the Shanghai PSB’s agents were local. The police 
chiefs came from Guangdong and Hainan.59    
Moreover, the uniforms worn by the new police force were designed to give them a visibly 
military appearance, in the style of Japanese gendarmerie.  This detail clearly and intentionally set them 
apart not only from society, but from the detective force, whose plainclothes attire symbolized that 
they were “immersed in, similar to, and contaminated by ordinary Shanghai society.” Not until 1930 
did Colonel Yuan Liang, the Japanese-trained Shanghai police chief, propose drawing up separate 
uniforms for the army and the police.60  
In the 1930’s, as policing became more political, officials became aware of the intelligence 
handicap that came from excluding the locals. They lamented that physically imposing northern 
patrolmen might be good for deterring crime on the beat, but that their inability to understand the 
Shanghai dialect made them “unfit for assignments at rallies, during demonstration, or around railroad 
stations, where travelers’ stray conversations would provide clues about the enemy’s political 
conspiracies.”61  Although efforts to ease out locally embedded experts declined temporarily as a result, 
the trend was short-lived, and there appears to have been no fundamental rethinking of the ideal social 
composition of a police force. Shanghai continued to import outsiders; 500 from Beijing in 1932 
(including the commander of the reclaimed Zhabei PSB post), and more in 1934. 62  Given the 
intelligence costs – which were apparent to authorities at the time – the insistent drive to set 
Nationalist policemen as a profession apart from society is understandable only in light of higher 
                                                 
59 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 229, 231.    
60 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 54, 75.  
61 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 137.   
62 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 49-50, 137, 207, 230.  
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authorities’ belief that the loyalty and deterrent power achieved by outsider policing were more 
important than the information that socially embedded policemen could obtain. 
In addition to the composition of the official police force, the Nationalist model of 
‘professional’ policing also eschewed the informal mechanisms of societal inclusion and penetration 
utilized by the Japanese in Taiwan.  KMT attempts to employ the baojia system were much less 
thoroughly implemented, and continually subject to political contestation and renegotiation.  The 
Nationalist government initially moved to reinstate the system in 1929; in 1931, while fighting the 
Communists in Jiangxi, Chiang Kai-shek issued the “Rules for Organizing Households into Pao-Chia 
in Bandit-Suppression Areas.”  The guidelines were implemented in forty-three counties that year and 
expanded by decree to all provinces in 1934.  Like many Nationalist decrees, however, the baojia rules 
were adopted unevenly.  By 1937, only sixteen of China’s (thirty five) provinces had fully implemented 
them.63  The Nationalist baojia system also placed local elites in the position of enforcing unpopular 
central directives – most notably conscription, for which the heads of the system have been 
thoroughly vilified.64  Only under the extreme pressure and partial collapse of wartime did officials 
allow the organization of militia units (fanghutuan and tewutuan) that used local recruits.65  In the eyes of 
Nationalist authorities, who sought to hold together a country under tremendous centrifugal pressure, 
                                                 
63 Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 559.  The number of provinces is according to the Republic of China in 
1946; today, Beijing administers 33 province-level sub-divisions and claims Taiwan as the 34th.  The 33 
administrative regions consist of 22 provinces; 5 autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, Inner 
Mongolia, and Ningxia); 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing); and 2 Special 
Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau).   
64 Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-49 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1984), p. 147.  In Taiwan, on the other hand, local elites could choose to leave after the 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki; 2,000 chose to do so. Those that remained were seen as 
collaborationist, but did not become primary targets of dissidence.   
65 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 277-291. See also Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: worker militias, 
citizenship, and the modern Chinese state (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), Ch. 3.  
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local self-government was a threat to central control rather than a tool of it. 66  As a result of the fear of 
local collusion against central authority, the Nationalist baojia system, which executed administrative 
functions, was separate from the policing system designed to enforce social control.  This reinforced 
the existing exclusivity and isolation that characterized KMT policing on the mainland.   
The coercive apparatus was also riven by fragmentation.  In the 1930’s, Chiang Kai-shek 
established two competing intelligence and security organizations: the Kuomintang’s Central Bureau 
for Intelligence and Statistics (Zhongtong, 中統), and the Military Bureau for Intelligence and Statistics 
(Juntong, 軍統) under the Nationalist Government’s Military Affairs Committee.  Headed by Xu En-
zeng and Dai Li, respectively, these two organizations had somewhat separate responsibilities on 
paper, but in practice competed bitterly for power throughout the Sino-Japanese and Chinese Civil 
War.67  Chiang also created a military police in 1931 to offset and undercut the Public Security Bureau, 
which he perceived as ineffective and untrustworthy; this further stoked inter-agency competition.68 
Horizontal communication and transmission of information across agencies was limited, ostensibly to 
                                                 
66 Social disorder and natural disaster produced population movements that complicated these efforts in the 
cities, where they might have otherwise been most feasible.  For example, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau’s 
1928 reorganization plan called for much tighter population control through the household registration (hukou) 
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entering the city.  Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 85-6; Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 574.  
67 Chen, Tsui-lien. “Intelligence Agencies’ Internal Competition Giving Rise to White Terror Political Cases,” 
in Martial Law Era: White Terror and Transitional Justice – Collected Writings (Taipei: Wu Sanyun Taiwan Historical 
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Enzeng, see Xu Enzeng, A Detailed Account of the Central Bureau and Military Bureau (Taipei: Biographical 
Publishing House, 1992) / 徐恩曾等著, <細說中統軍統>, (臺北市 : 傳記文學出版社, 1992). For Dai 
Li’s biography, see Frederic Wakeman, Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003). See also Wang Yu-ting’s chapter in Guo Xuyin, ed. History of the Kuomintang’s Factional 
Struggles (Taipei: Guiguan Tushu, 1993, 2 vols.) / 郭緖印, 主編. <國民黨派系鬥爭史> (臺北市: 桂冠圖書, 
1993), p. 613.   
68 A rising focus on anti-communism as the primary police mission (under Chiang’s annei rangwai policy – first 
subjugate the internal enemy, then expel the external) also resulted in the police force’s gradual militarization.  
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limit damage from Communist infiltration.  Even within any single organization, information-sharing 
and coordination across bureaus was poor.  Public Security Bureau offices relied on a stovepiped flow 
of case documents, while bureau chiefs operated fiefdoms that exercised exclusive control over 
personnel and resources.69  
Competition between agencies swirled together with tension between the central and local 
levels.  Coordination between city and national authorities was almost utterly lacking.  At times like the 
“Kiangan incident” of November 1927 – in which the Public Security Bureau intercepted a shipment 
of opium entering Shanghai under Garrison Command guard and each subsequently accused the other 
of involvement in the trade while claiming their own prerogative of enforcement – the dysfunction 
reached almost comical levels.70  After 1934, MBIS agents began to assume positions in the local PSBs 
and police academies, and in 1935, Chiang authorized them to take over the duties of detective and 
transport police units in Shanghai, thereby endowing them with direct police authority for the first 
time.  Unsurprisingly, the MBIS takeover encountered resistance from Shanghai’s deputy brigade 
commander and regular detectives (jichayuan).  The end result was friction in Shanghai among multiple 
groups who together were responsible for public security: the PSB “locals”; the Beijing-imported 
officers and Beijinger-led paramilitary Peace Preservation Corps (baoandui or baoantuan); Chiang’s 
expanding military police; and military intelligence.71  This tension was echoed across China, as central 
leaders pushed for new police forces trained and directed by the center – but financed locally.  
Provincial officials, unsurprisingly, balked; they preferred to maintain control of their own local 
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militias, especially if they were footing the bill.  Chiang ruled in favor of nationalization, and the 
baoandui began to fold into county police departments in 1936, but the process was never completed; 
authority over each local police station remained divided between the local magistrate and the 
provincial government.72  
Other organizational features of Nationalist policing contributed to official incentive and 
latitude to exercise harsh and arbitrary control. A range of administrative laws and regulations allowed 
the police to prosecute and sentence offenders, including assigning short jail sentences or fines for 
misdemeanors.  These fines funded police budgets, which were already an issue of political contention 
between the fragmented centers of power.  The ability to augment local budgets by sentencing 
offenders gave police forces added incentives for excessive enforcement of misdemeanors – especially 
relative to the more serious criminal charges, which had to be processed by the courts.73  Though the 
Nationalists would do away with on-the-spot police sentencing on Taiwan, they maintained for some 
time the habit of allowing the informants and arresting officers to share the confiscated property of 
the accused, thereby incentivizing false or unjust accusation and imprisonment.  
China during this period did not lack for social and political fragmentation, but Chiang Kai-
shek deliberately aggravated what fragmentation did exist in order to increase his political power vis-à-
vis potential elite rivals. Descriptions of Chiang written during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and 
Chinese Civil War (1927-49)74 portray him as a typical strongman in a weakly institutionalized polity, 
playing rival factions off one another to secure his own precarious position and failing in the process 
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to build the social base that might have ensured popular support, or at least compliance.75  He tried to 
monopolize power and fragment it at the same time, monitoring and interfering with subordinates 
while stoking competition between them.76  This was particularly true of the rivalry between MBIS and 
CBIS, organizations that were both loyal to Chiang but bitterly opposed to each other.77  As Lloyd 
Eastman summarizes, “Like an emperor of the Ch’ing dynasty, politics for [Chiang] was a matter of 
competition among elites.  To maximize his power, therefore, he manipulated and combined the 
support of one group of elites against rival elites…. He never comprehended – as Mao Tse-tung did – 
that it was possible to generate new sources of power by mobilizing support from outside the elite 
structure.” 78  Claire Chennault, though sympathetic to Chiang’s difficulties in finding competent 
subordinates, also noted his tendency to “[play] one off against the other, getting what he could from 
them, and every now and then lopping off a few heads as a warning that there was a limit to his 
patience.”79   
Firsthand accounts from this period chronicle fissure after fissure within what General 
Wedemeyer termed the “loose coalition” that was called the Nationalist regime: faction versus faction 
within the party, center versus provincial level of government, clique versus clique in the army.  
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Chiang’s distrust for his commanders was extreme; he claimed they exaggerated their successes and 
could not be trusted to follow orders.  He once complained to American General Joe Stilwell:  
 
I have to lie awake nights thinking what fool things my commanders may do.  Then I 
write and tell them not to do these things.  But they are so dumb, they will do a lot 
of foolishness unless you anticipate them.  That is the secret of handling them - you 
must imagine everything that they can do that would be wrong, and warn them 
against it.80 
 
This distrust was not entirely unwarranted: in 1936 in Xi’an, Chiang was kidnapped by generals 
ostensibly under his command, and the unwillingness of Nationalist units to follow central 
government orders and help each other on the battlefield led on more than one occasion to the near-
complete elimination of entire units in combat.  Chiang’s answer, however, was equally dangerous.  He 
blocked units from sharing information from each other when he thought doing so might lead to 
collusion.  Moreover, he restricted the latitude of field officers to make independent decisions and 
interfered in field operations down to the regimental level, worsening confusion, slowing response 
time, and increasing the incidence of military failure.81  Disastrous losses on the battlefield in late 1948 
and 1949 culminated in the Nationalists’ eventual retreat to Taiwan, the proclamation of the People’s 
Republic of China in Beijing in October 1949, and the establishment of the RoC’s temporary capital in 
Taipei in December of that year.     
The KMT coercive apparatus that took over Taiwan in 1945, and which moved there en masse 
in 1949, was designed primarily to deal with Chiang’s fears of elite and military disloyalty.  As a result, 
it was both fragmented and exclusive by design.  Rather than maintaining the Japanese colonial police 
system that had achieved both internal cohesion and societal penetration, Chiang initially opted to 
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import the coercive apparatus that on the mainland had achieved neither.  That decision largely 
explains the violence of 1945-55.   
 
 
IV. Retrocession and the White Terror  
 
During the early years of their rule on Taiwan, the Nationalist regime – simultaneously 
engaged in civil war with the Communists on the mainland – took over administration of the island 
from the Japanese.  As a response to the deterioration of their rule in both Taiwan and on the 
mainland, where the tide of civil war was turning against them, they instituted the martial law 
framework that would undergird the public security system on Taiwan for the next four decades, and 
engaged in violence against the native population, as well as against the Mainlanders who moved to the 
island with them in 1949.  This section attempts to explain the patterns of high violence that occurred 
during the decade of reoccupation, civil conflict, and state (re-)consolidation, in which Taiwan shifted 
from a reclaimed backwater province to the sole remaining bastion of Nationalist power.   
In 1945, when Taiwan returned to Chinese sovereignty, the KMT transplanted its coercive 
institutions to the island, with negative consequences.  Fragmentation was high; multiple security 
organizations competed to make arrests and eliminate opponents, with no clear coordinating 
authority.  Inclusivity was low.  As the KMT’s military and financial woes mounted, they drained 
men from the island to fight in the civil war and fired former Japanese police, replacing them with 
newly imported and often unqualified Mainlanders. This lowered the overall numerical strength of 
the police force and reduced its representativeness of Taiwanese society, isolating the security forces 
and reducing their ability to communicate with local residents.   
Unsurprisingly, the coercive apparatus struggled to anticipate unrest and handle it without 
recourse to overt, indiscriminate violence.  Readers are likely most familiar with the consequences of 
these policies through the 2-28 Incident – in which the KMT’s crackdown on island-wide unrest 
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resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6-10,000 people, mostly native Taiwanese.82 The contemporary 
scholarly focus on 2-28, however, obscures the disproportionately high rate at which Mainlanders 
became targets of state violence after 1947, especially once the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949.  In 
contrast to native Taiwanese who were individually monitored and disciplined by the baojia system, 
the two million refugees who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek came from a military that had been badly 
infiltrated, which had had whole divisions defect en masse, and whose claims to past loyalty were 
often unverifiable.  Much of the state violence between 1949 and 1955, when the White Terror was 
at its highest, was actually among the Nationalist’s own officials and military, where the KMT’s 
intelligence weakness was greatest.   
 
The Violence of Reoccupation: 1945-47   
   
Anyone reading accounts – foreign or otherwise – of Taiwan in the late 1940’s cannot help but 
be struck by the vast problems of public order that followed the island’s retrocession.  While the 
crowds who greeted the thirty thousand Nationalist troops that first arrived in Taipei were initially 
enthusiastic about rejoining China, subsequent events led to swift disillusionment, and a combination 
of factors heightened tensions between the newly arrived Mainlanders and the Taiwanese.  Taiwan was 
put under military rather than civilian rule by the Nationalists, more akin to conquered enemy territory 
than long-lost brethren. Arriving Mainland officials were both suspicious of their Taiwanese 
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counterparts’ potentially collaborationist histories and contemptuous of the administrative competence 
instilled in them by Japanese colonialism.  Already severe economic problems from the war were 
exacerbated by KMT actions – both a clumsily-executed official policy of extracting resources from 
Taiwan to prosecute the war on the worn-out Mainland, and the uncontrolled looting and theft on the 
part of KMT soldiers, who were not paid enough to keep up with inflation and so followed standard 
Mainland army practice of ‘living off’ local communities.  Governor Chen Yi placed a huge number of 
enterprises under state control and declared retroactively invalid the sale of property from departing 
Japanese to the Taiwanese who remained – thereby confiscating what many Taiwanese believed was 
legitimately-purchased property.  Inattention and conflicts of interest by newly appointed public 
officials led to the breakdown of the Japanese-maintained public health system and outbreaks of 
various illnesses. Disease, crime and unemployment soared.   
The fragmented and exclusive security sector that had been operating on the mainland 
became even more pronounced in Taiwan after 1945.  Before 1947-48. this was due to the relative 
inattention of the Nationalist government to conditions on the ground; after 1949, it was 
attributable to the crowding of enough security officials for the entire mainland into a much smaller 
territory.  According to reports obtained from the police authorities and transmitted by the 
American consulate in Taipei to Washington, as many as thirteen different security organizations 
operated in each city.83  Each security office “administered its own affairs without coordination and 
at times competed for power with others.”84 Factionalism and unchecked competition ran rampant, 
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Sharpe, 2007), p. 323. 
94 
and “abuses of the regular police system were felt in every town and village across the island.”85   
Open competition for power and resources between internal security and police agencies, 
compounded by the less-than-impressive quality of personnel sent to Taiwan (a low priority on the 
KMT’s long list of priorities) resulted in indiscriminate looting and violent abuse.  
The Nationalists also lacked the organizational capacity, manpower, and social knowledge to 
administer the society over which they had assumed power.  Over the course of their first year, the 
KMT managed to destroy the capillary system by which their predecessors had penetrated local 
communities.86  First, there was an acute shortage of security personnel to monitor and police the 
population.  Over the course of 1946, the number of soldiers and police on Taiwan decreased from 
48,000 to 11,000, and many of the individuals that remained were of poor quality.  By February 
1947, the month of the infamous 2-28 incident, “troop transfers back to the Mainland in 1946 [had] 
reduced the total police-troop presence to 6 percent of the Japanese level.”87  
Consistent with the professional model of police administration applied on the Mainland, 
KMT authorities in Taiwan were also unconcerned about decreasing the inclusiveness of Taiwan’s civil 
police.  In October 1945, 5,600 of the 13,000-strong police force (43%) had been Formosan, as were 
46,955 of the 84,559 civil service positions (55%).  Under budgetary pressure, however, the KMT 
shrank the total number of civil servants to half the Japanese level, and replaced the Formosans who 
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did remain with inexperienced but politically connected Mainlanders in need of jobs. American 
observer George Kerr describes the period after the handover:  
 
[Governor] Chen Yi did not promote experienced Formosans and recruit others for 
“freshman” jobs.  Thousands of newcomers were placed on the rolls, inexperienced 
relatives and friends of mainland Chinese already established in the Administration.  
Many policemen could speak neither Japanese [then the official lingua franca] nor the 
local Chinese dialects… When all the police jobs vacated by the Japanese had been 
filled, the Government began to discharge Formosans to make room for more 
newcomers.88 
 
Though local elections in April 1946 did lead to an increase in the participation of Taiwanese in local 
elected government, an estimated 36,000 Taiwanese civil servants lost their jobs, and the ones that 
remained were paid less than the Mainlanders in equivalent positions. By 1946, only 9,951 of the 
44,451 government positions were occupied by Taiwanese (22%, compared to 55% at the time of 
handover).89  As had happened during the early days of Japanese colonial rule, many of the new KMT-
appointed Mainlander policemen spoke neither Japanese nor any local dialect. 90   
In the inaugural issue of Taiwan Police, Chen Yi proclaimed, somewhat paradoxically, “From 
now on in Taiwan, although our policies will be completely different from those of the Japanese, the 
things that the police had to do should continue to be done as before.”91  Whatever Chen Yi’s intent, 
differences between the old and new police system were far more pronounced than similarities.  
Experienced Taiwanese police officers and patrolmen were fired, and the baojia system essentially 
broke down as changes in police location severed the remaining police relationships with local hoko 
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heads.92  The hoko system itself, when the authorities attempted to use it, was employed only as an 
enforcement mechanism for unpopular orders, not for building relationships within or obtaining 
information from the local population.93  Although the Taiwan People’s Political Council convocation 
in late 1946 had acknowledged the need to build an “information network” among the population, the 
lack of language skills among the official police and the breakdown of the baojia system that could have 
supplemented it led to inefficiency, misunderstanding, and conflict.94  At the same time as it did away 
with the old Japanese system’s informational advantages, the KMT retained its coercive features, such 
as the use of (potentially arbitrary) police judgments.95  In actuality, though the KMT authorities 
thought that they were keeping much of the Japanese colonial police structure, they (initially) failed to 
maintain the very features of the system that had led the Japanese to adopt it in the first place: its unity 
and its ability to create ties with the local population.    
Probably the most prominent and egregious example of the failure of early KMT internal 
security policies is the 2-28 incident, in which the KMT’s crackdown in response to island-wide 
unrest (provoked by authorities confiscating cigarettes from a woman illegally selling them on the 
street) resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6-10,000 people, most of whom were native Taiwanese.  
The Nationalist government claimed that 2-28 was caused by a trifecta of Communist instigation, 
Japanese training, and misplaced Formosan ambition, but U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer, tasked to 
report on the incident and the state of affairs on the island of Taiwan, lay blame squarely with the 
poor discipline, internal feuding, and social incompetence of Nationalist security forces on the island 
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– in other words, with its fragmentation and exclusivity.96 Among the critical requirements in the 
“Thirty-Two Demands” presented to Governor Chen Yi by the 2-28 Settlement Committee – a 
committee formed by local elites to restore order after the incident escalated and before forces arrived 
from the mainland to crack down – were the disbanding of independent police forces to reduce 
competition between units, filling police leadership posts with Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, 
outlawing politically-based detention, and eventually, to abolish Garrison Command and restrict 
soldiers’ power.97   
Internal competition, the shortage of troop/police manpower on Taiwan, and the language 
difference that exacerbated the gap between the population and police force – these factors not only 
triggered high levels of popular dissatisfaction and created potential for civil unrest on the island, but 
also intensified violence when troops from the Mainland arrived to quell the island population.  
Some of the officials responsible for commanding the suppression forces gave orders based on 
factional guidance and interest; they failed to help rival units under pressure, and attempted to outbid 
them in forcible suppression, rather than implementing a coordinated strategy to quiet the protests 
with minimal violence.  Lack of coordination and competition between the arriving forces and the  
Nationalist organizations that were already operating on Taiwan also contributed to civilian 
casualties.98   
Mainlander lack of understanding of local dialects and customs worsened violence by 
handicapping the intelligence capacity of the KMT forces.  One army colonel recounted:  
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 Some young and middle-aged Taiwanese did not understand these wartime 
regulations or did not understand Mandarin.  Our soldiers also did not understand the 
Minnan dialect… [W]hen our troops questioned the Taiwanese, they simply did not 
understand, and continued walking.  Our troops had no recourse but to shoot.99 
In an implicit acknowledgement that local administrative problems had contributed to the 2-28 
violence, Chen Yi attempted to revive the baojia system in the census that followed the quelling of 
unrest.  He declared in Procedure 7: 
 
The household head must guarantee a survey and exposure of any traitors in the 
neighborhood association and in the unit to which the household belongs….. When 
a traitor is found in that household or within that neighborhood association, it will 
be the responsibility of the household head and the neighborhood association head 
to report to the officials of the township or the district police, who will investigate 
this matter.  At such time, the chief official organs or the household and neighboring 
association head will share equally the responsibility for that crime [harboring 
traitors] and will be dealt with according to the law.100   
 
These efforts, however, carried the flavor of retroactive desperation rather than forethought; the baojia 
system was being used for retroactive punishment rather than pre-emptive information collection and 
conflict prevention.  A series of cables from American officials on Taiwan noted that indiscriminate 
violence by the police and Taiwan Garrison Headquarters continued throughout 1947 and 1948.101  It 
would not be until the early 1950’s that Chiang Ching-kuo took hold of this fragmented apparatus and 
converted it into a unified system of monitoring and control.  
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Constructing the Martial Law Framework, 1948-49   
 
After the violence of 2-28, and as Kuomintang forces suffered successive setbacks in the civil 
war on the mainland, the task of consolidating control on Taiwan became more urgent and more 
important. Deterioration in Nationalist military fortunes – the Communist approach to Changchun in 
March 1947, and the KMT’s disastrous defeat at Huaihai in late 1948 – heightened fears of a potential 
insurgent threat in KMT-controlled areas like Taiwan.102   This shift in threat perceptions contributed 
to initial attempts at consolidation and repression on the island.   
In December 1948, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen Cheng to replace the reviled Chen Yi as 
Taiwan’s new governor.  Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had earned a reputation as 
a(n unusually) capable administrator on the mainland, took over the Taiwan provincial party 
organization, and was tasked with reorganizing the “overlapping, often incompetent faction-based 
spy organs” on the island, though the process would not be completed for several years.103  In 
August 1949, Ching-kuo assumed leadership of the Political Action Committee (政治行動委員會), 
a secret organization run under the president’s office. Created to manage the reorganization, it 
registered all personnel in the security system from its second year on,104 and was the precursor to 
the National Security Bureau (NSB, Guojia Anquanbu, 國家安全部), which Thomas Gold described 
as “a new super-spy organ charged with coordinating and overseeing security work throughout the 
party, army, state, and society.”105  
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This period also laid the legal foundation for what would be nearly forty years of authoritarian 
rule by the KMT.  The framework was composed of two primary, interlocking pieces: 1) the 
Temporary Provisions, and 2) Martial Law. 106  The Nationalist government promulgated the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion (動員戡亂時期臨時條
款) on the Chinese mainland in late spring of 1948.107  The four articles of the Temporary Provisions, 
as they were known, suspended many of the provisions of the 1946 Republic of China constitution.  
Amended in March 1960, February-March 1966, and March 1972, these extra-constitutional 
arrangements also “suspended the re-election of the three national representative bodies – the 
National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan – extended the tenure of their 
incumbent members for life, and deferred the election of provincial and municipal heads 
indefinitely,” vitiating electoral procedure at the national level while maintaining it at the grass-roots 
level.108  The Temporary Provisions also heightened the emergency powers given to the president, 
waiving his two-term limit (and that of the vice president), and empowering him “to make changes in 
the organization and personnel of the central government.” 109  Most broadly, Article 1 allowed the 
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President and Executive Yuan “to take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the 
security of the state or of the people – without being subject to the procedural restrictions prescribed 
in Article 39 or Article 43.”  Article 1 thereby conferred “practically unlimited authority” on the 
president.110  Archival records of the National Security Council in the Presidential Office show that, 
despite the Executive Yuan’s constitutionally given status as the highest administrative organ of the 
state, it in practice reported directly to Chiang Kai-shek – rendering Taiwan’s separation of powers 
even more limited in practice than in theory.111  
The second component of the KMT’s authoritarian legal framework was martial law.  On May 
19, 1949, Chen Cheng, then Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government and head of Taiwan 
Garrison Command, declared martial law on Taiwan.  It was to last for 38 years and 56 days: until July 
15, 1987.112  Under martial law, political offenses were tried in military courts according to military 
tribunal law.  Article 8 also specified ten categories of criminal offenses for which civilians could be 
tried in military tribunals rather than the constitutionally mandated civilian courts. 113  The heads of the 
tribunals – for the appellate court, the head was the President himself – had to approve any and all 
decisions made by the court. The Council of Grand Justices, the only body in Taiwan with the 
hypothetical power of judicial review, was composed mostly of Mainlander KMT members, and 
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functioned to “legitimatize rather than supervise government action.”114   As with the Temporary 
Provisions, therefore, the substantive effect of martial law was an expansion of presidential authority: 
in essence, a concentration of power in the person of Chiang Kai-shek.115  
The Temporary Provisions and declaration of Martial Law jointly led to creation of two 
additional, powerful institutions that would become critical to the organization and implementation of 
violence in the latter part of the martial law era – the National Security Bureau and Taiwan Garrison 
Command. Eventually, the result would be a powerful, unified coercive apparatus – but not 
immediately.   
Rather, the 1948-50 period of consolidation was violent. Media reported on mass arrests 
numbering in the tens of thousands, and evidence from American archives confirms the accuracy of 
these accounts.  Under Chiang Ching-kuo’s new leadership of the security apparatus, the U.S. State 
Department reported, 10,000 people were interrogated and over 1,000 reportedly executed.116  A 
series of over twenty cables transmitted to Washington by Consul-General Robert Strong and his 
staff in 1950 itemize meeting after meeting with citizens on Taiwan that testify to heightened 
repression.117 One summary report, sent from the U.S. State Department’s post in Taipei back to 
Washington on August 19, 1950, noted:  
 
During recent Executive Yuan meeting Premier admitted that in 1949 some 15,000 
persons were arrested by secret police for political reasons, and in 1950 alone total so 
far is 23,000.  He admitted there may have been other arrests of which he ignorant 
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[sic]. Also could not state how many of those arrested had been released or executed.  
Thus in past 19 months about 1 of every 200 persons arrested on political grounds.118 
 
A subsequent political report written on the period from June 25 to October 10 of 1950 repeated these 
arrest numbers: 15,000 in 1949 and 23,000 for the “first eight months of 1950.” The otherwise liberal 
politician K.C. Wu insisted to his U.S. interlocutors that Taiwan needed to be severe with “Communist 
instigators…whose many plots and tricks could easily defeat the law if we showed too much leniency 
toward them.”119  In March 1951, General Tang Zong, director of one of the internal security 
agencies, told the new American consul and his staff that the problem of Communist subversion 
was coming under control.  He acknowledged that complaints had surfaced about lengthy delays and 
long detainments before political trials and the use of torture to force confessions, but chided the 
Americans that to “to do away with such methods in this area of the world was perhaps too much to 
expect, especially in such critical times.”120   
When British diplomat Bevin raised concerns that the charges of Communist infiltration in 
Taiwan might be accurate, the Taipei consulate responded tersely that they found “no merit” in his 
concern.121  As General Wedemeyer had concluded with regard to 2-28, American diplomats believed 
emphatically that the popular unrest threatening the KMT had arisen due to factors other than 
Communist subversion.122   
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In August 1950, as the Kuomintang party prepared itself for reform, the Executive Yuan 
issued a new ruling to limit ‘illegal’ arrests, after which the U.S. Consulate noted that most agencies 
seemed to stop making arrests “without warrants and at least a semblance of evidence.”123  This 
represented the beginnings of a shift that would accelerate in the coming years: from a fragmented 
collection of ‘outsider’ internal security organs engaged in chaotic, extrajudicial, and intense violence 
against society, to a unified system of internal security that had deep roots into Taiwan’s population 
and depended on targeted surveillance to administer atomized, bureaucratized, and judicially 
sanctioned repression.  At the time, however, American observers did not view these developments 
positively.  When Consul General Strong departed in August 1950, he warned that Taiwan was 
descending into “a reign of terror, more silken than in other countries or in other times, but 
nevertheless in progress.”124   
KMT coercive institutions in Taiwan were especially violent from 1945 to the early 1950’s.  
Much of this violence stemmed from the fact that the coercive apparatus was designed to protect 
Chiang Kai-shek from elite rivals and warlords who could challenge him for power on the Mainland.  
Unsurprisingly, that elite-oriented apparatus – fragmented, exclusive, and socially isolated – 
performed poorly when it was suddenly required to manage the completely different threat of an 
unhappy and unfamiliar population.  Accustomed to competing for power and lacking local social 
knowledge, its organizations possessed incentives for violence and lacked the intelligence capacity to 
do anything else.   
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VI. Coercive Institutional Reform and Institutionalization of Repression    
 
As political scientist Wu Yu-Shan succinctly states, “At the beginning of the 1950’s, an 
exhausted KMT state was surrounded by an alienated population, overwhelmed by an external security 
threat, and abandoned by its most important ally.”125  The disastrous losses of the KMT forced upon 
Chiang the realization that his principal threat now came not from fellow elites, but from the hostile 
occupants of the island from which he clung to power.126 The Communist military massed across the 
Strait represented a sizeable external threat, but absent an impending invasion, which was deemed 
unlikely, the threat posed by CCP forces on the mainland took second place to the urgency of 
retaining Chiang’s last territorial foothold on Taiwan.127  This shift in the dominant threat prompted 
Chiang to rethink his approach to internal security, and to make the most of an institutional legacy 
that the KMT had this far neglected.  
During the Reform (Gaizao, 改造) Period from August 1950 to October 1952, the KMT 
analyzed its past failures and developed plans for reform.128  Chiang Kai-shek saw the organizational 
weakness of the KMT as the chief cause of their defeat in the Civil War against the Communists.  In 
January 1949, he wrote, “The biggest reason for our defeat was that we never have been able to 
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establish a new, solid, organizational system… we have lost the basic means to rebuild and save our 
country.  This is why we have been defeated.”129  In 1950, therefore, he handpicked sixteen younger, 
well-educated, trusted cadres to convene the Central Reform Committee (CRC): a new core 
leadership team for planning and implementing party reform. Over the course of two years and over 
four hundred working meetings, the CRC drafted and implemented extensive reforms of the 
Kuomintang, including the establishment of party branches throughout society, re-registration of 
party members, and purges and/or re-education of remaining cadres.130  The CRC marginalized 
factions by assigning their leaders to honorary but powerless positions, and consolidated the power 
of Chiang and premier Chen Cheng.131  They coupled martial law with a program of land reform 
designed to deflect popular discontent.   
The regime also allowed electoral participation at the local level, adopting a deliberate 
strategy of using local elections to pressure cadres to keep up the pace of reform and work diligently 
to expand the party’s social base. Chiang suggested that having local elections in which party cadres 
stood a chance of losing would “provide the party with a good opportunity to be introspective. This 
time, two of our nominees lost in their campaigns. But without this failure, our fellow comrades 
probably would still retain their old conceited attitudes, as was the case in the mainland. They may 
still believe that, having the party’s usual organization and propaganda support, our party’s social 
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base will be easily consolidated.”132  By the time the Central Executive Committee resumed power in 
1952, the Nationalist party had become a political force to be reckoned with.  It combined “strong 
leadership, concrete structure, tight discipline, high morale, common faith in shared doctrine, greater 
efficiency, and less corruption.”133  
One major consequence was a new approach to internal security, one that responded to the 
new threat environment by creating a coercive apparatus that was unitary and inclusive.  The 
principal driver (and beneficiary) of this process was Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo.134 
Ching-kuo had spent a decade in the Soviet Union and witnessed firsthand the political persecution 
that accompanied the Stalinist purges of the 1930’s; his instructor in strategy in Leningrad was 
Marshal Tukashevsky, a high-ranking general executed in the purges.135  One observer of Chiang 
Ching-kuo wrote of him, “Sons who succeed to the positions of forceful fathers often turn out to be 
weak and disappointing. Chiang Ching-kuo does not fit this pattern,” and later described him as 
“strong-willed, decisive, and effective.... [with a] man-of-the-masses approach… [and] the outward 
geniality suited to his rotund appearance.”136  After Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Ching-kuo would set 
the country on a course toward a liberal democracy.   
In the meantime, however, he took over his father’s internal security apparatus and remade 
it, turning it into a feared and effective secret police organization. Hard-working and organized – 
unlike many dictators, Ching-kuo had an unusual tolerance for paperwork – he assumed directorship 
of the Ministry of Defense’s General Political Department in 1950. Within the KMT party, he held 
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positions on the Central Reform Committee (1950-52) and Central Standing Committee (1952 and 
after), and he subsequently directed the China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps. 
His reforms focused on three elements: political control of the military, creating a unified, 
coordinated bureaucracy for internal security; and increasing the capacity of the intelligence and 
police agencies to penetrate and gather intelligence on Taiwan’s society.   
 
Strengthening Political Control of the Republic of China Military  
 
One of Chiang Ching-kuo’s first priorities was to establish a political commissar program 
within the military.137  He believed that the lack of political commissar system within the Republic of 
China military had been an organizational weakness from an intelligence standpoint; the absence of 
political reporting on officers’ loyalties and activities, and inadequate surveillance of them, had 
prevented Chiang Kai-shek from discovering and punishing those who sent him misleading reports.138   
In 1950, as the new head of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) within the 
armed forces, Chiang Ching-kuo reshuffled military units and reassigned or removed potentially 
troublesome personnel.139  He established a Leninist-style political commissar program within the 
military to supervise and politically educate the armed forces and ensure their loyalty.  Political 
officers were assigned to all units at and below the regimental unit, and had their own independent 
chain of upward reporting through Party channels.  By 1957, there were 17,000 political staff within 
the Republic of China’s military: one for every 35 members of the armed forces. 140  American 
military observers reported that the system was widely unpopular among both officers and men, 
                                                 
137 Cheng Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press, 1990). 
138 Eastman, Seeds of Destruction, p. 210.   
139 U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cable on 29 June 1951.  
140 Joseph Heinlein, Political Warfare: the Chinese Nationalist Model (PhD dissertation, American University, 
1974).   
109 
who saw these steps as ones deliberately designed to tighten Chiang Ching-kuo’s control.  
Disapproving reports from the early 1950s repeated the following (unconfirmed) story about 
initiation rites forced on Republic of China soldiers by political officers:  
 
Pledges of loyalty to Generalissimo required of all members military and police forces 
take form of drop of blood from each person of group into glass of water from which 
each member of group then sips, plus verbal pledge and in some cases written…141 
 
While the story may be apocryphal, it is worth noting that the Shanghai Green Gang (青幫) – which 
Chiang Kai-shek participated in and then used against Shanghai’s striking workers in 1927 – 
traditionally used these blood sharing rites, as did the Triads and other secret society brotherhoods, 
though typically they mixed the blood with wine rather than water.142   
To further political control of the military, Chiang set up a “rotation system of military 
command” for officers. Designed to limit regional and factional splits, the rotation system 
prohibited any general from serving in a single post for longer than two years.143  Tun-jen Cheng 
credits this system with eliminating “military paternalism based on personal and regional ties,” but it 
also prevented officers from building a power base among their men and limited their abilities for 
operational collusion with each other.144  Ching-kuo recruited native Taiwanese to augment and 
further mix up military personnel, though he and Chiang Kai-shek insisted that there would be “no 
purely Formosan units.”145 He also protected the prerogatives of the military, particularly its political 
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officers, vis-à-vis other security agencies that had not yet come under his control.  For example, 
when Governor K.C. Wu sought to “give civilian law enforcement officials exclusive jurisdiction to 
make arrests for non-military crimes,” Ching-kuo blocked him, keeping arrest authority and power 
concentrated not just in the military’s hands, but in the hands of the political units most trusted to 
be loyal to him and to his father.146  Finally, in his capacity as head of the GWPD, Chiang Ching-kuo 
set up and supervised a training center for intelligence agents at Shihpai.147 
To accomplish this, Chiang got rid of military officers that he distrusted or disliked, 
particularly ones that could be plausible rivals to his power or that of Chiang Kai-shek. Beginning in 
early 1950, the GPWD under Chiang Ching-kuo purged and executed officers ostensibly suspected 
of Communist sympathies. These included the Vice Minister of National Defense, the Chief of 
Military Conscription, the Chief of Army Supply Services, and the Commander of the 70th 
Division.148  The last and perhaps most important of these was Army commander-in-chief General 
Sun Li-jen, an American-educated officer who had close ties to the United States and reportedly 
opposed Chiang’s plans to insert Soviet-style commissars in the Republic of China military.  A State 
Department cable from 7 March 1950, notes the arrest of 36 generals in the Nationalist military for 
their connections with Chiang’s rival Sun Li-jen; 149 other spy ring cases within the security apparatus 
were uncovered in June and July 1951.150  (From 1950-1954, Chiang Ching-kuo claimed to have 
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broken up an average of thirteen Communist conspiracies per month, a total of 550 in all.151)  In 
1954, Sun was removed from operational command and assigned an honorary role within the 
military. In 1955, he was accused of plotting a coup with the CIA, court-martialed, and placed under 
house arrest in Taichung, where he remained until his exoneration in the late 1980’s – shortly after 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s death.152   
Chiang’s purges within the security apparatus led to a short-term increase in violence; the 
only detailed English-language analysis of this process refers to it as an internal campaign of 
“indiscriminate ferocity.”153  Indeed, much of the state violence visible in Figure 1 between 1949 and 
1955, typically thought of as the peak of the White Terror, was actually concentrated among the 
Nationalist’s own officials and military.154  In contrast to native Taiwanese who were individually 
monitored and disciplined by the baojia system (see below), the two million Mainlander refugees who 
arrived with Chiang Kai-shek presented a much more difficult intelligence and counter-intelligence 
problem.  They came from a military that had been badly infiltrated by Communist operatives and 
that had had whole divisions defect en masse; claims to loyal behavior during the Civil War were 
often unverifiable. Chiang believed – and some reports corroborated – that Communist spies had 
attempted to infiltrate the flotilla of refugees who accompanied him to Taiwan.155  Lacking the 
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intelligence capacity to separate real from imagined threats, and believing that the exigencies of the 
situation left no margin for error, any suspicious activity became grounds for violence.  American 
officials at the time explicitly noted the inward turn to the island’s repressive operations, as the 
Nationalists sought to purge their security forces of any potential disloyalty and establish methods to 
prevent future contamination.  The contemporary scholarly focus on 2-28 as the principal 
manifestation of state violence in Taiwan has somewhat obscured the disproportionately high rate at 
which Mainlanders became targets of their own coercive apparatus during this period, and the extent 
to which the ferocity of the early 1950’s was directed not outward at the Taiwanese population (who 
had indeed borne the brunt of violence in the late 1940’s), but inward, at the KMT’s own personnel.   
 
Reducing Fragmentation within the Coercive Apparatus  
 
Chiang Ching-kuo also took steps to reduce the fragmentation of the coercive apparatus.  As 
with his efforts to establish political control over the military, the desire to improve Nationalist 
intelligence capability was a chief driver of his actions.  Despite the perception today that Chinese 
military culture strongly emphasizes the role of intelligence, KMT military officers writing after the war 
drew particular attention to the weakness of the Nationalist intelligence system relative to that of their 
Communist adversaries. 156  Nationalist intelligence reports were formal, bureaucratized, and not 
particularly useful in understanding the local population and countering insurgency – in clear contrast 
to the Communists, who drew on a network throughout the whole population to supply their 
intelligence. Moreover, infiltration gave the Communists advance notice of Nationalist plans, while the 
flow of information inside the Nationalist military was restricted due to suspicion and distrust.157   
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Accordingly, plans to reform the intelligence apparatus actually preceded those of the overall 
party reform effort.  One month after arriving in Taipei, in July 1949, Chiang Kai-shek gathered 
together a group of trusted young aides in Kaohsiung: Chiang Ching-kuo, Tang Zong, Zheng 
Jiemin, Mao Renfeng, Ye Xiufeng, Zhang Zhen, Mao Lin, Tao Yishan, Peng Mengji, and Wei 
Daming.  On August 15th, they formally became known as the Political Action Committee (PAC), 
led by the former Director of the 7th organization of the “President’s Office” Tang Zong.158 The 
Committee’s express purpose was to unify and streamline the intelligence organizations to improve 
their (currently catastrophic) performance. By December 1949, the PAC had about 100 personnel 
detailed to it, with plans to select another fifty.159 When Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated to the 
presidency in March 1950, the President’s Office was broken up and incorporated into the formal 
Office of the President and KMT party headquarters, and the Political Action Committee 
transformed into the Confidential Office Data Group of the Office of the President.  Tang Zong 
moved over to head party intelligence work under the 6th Division of the KMT’s Central Reform 
Committee, and Chiang Ching-kuo took over the Confidential Office Data Group.160  According to 
Chen Tsui-lien, by 1953, the Confidential Office Data Group exercised either a supervisory role or 
had “guidance and coordination” authority over nearly all of the government’s security agencies.161    
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Chiang Ching-kuo eliminated and merged overlapping agencies, reducing their total number, 
and reassigned responsibilities among the organizations that remained in order to minimize 
institutional conflict.162 In 1952, the National Defense Council formed, with Chiang Ching-kuo as 
Deputy Secretary-General, and under its auspices the National Security Bureau was established in 
1955.  Though Zhou Zhirou was named formal director, vice-director Chiang Ching-kuo was 
unquestionably the figure in charge.163  The NSB was in charge of coordinating the activities of all 
police, security, and intelligence agencies, and because it coordinated not only government but also 
party intelligence work, it held even broader jurisdiction than that of the Confidential Office Data 
Group.164 The agencies that it oversaw included the various organs of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan Garrison Command, 
military intelligence, and local police forces.165  Among the NSB’s new and augmented responsibilities 
were: synchronizing each agency’s policies, approving the allocation and use of their funding, 
reviewing their investigation data and reports, planning staff training and research, and monitoring 
all agencies’ recordkeeping and human resources practices.166   
The result was a centralized and internally coordinated security apparatus.  Internal security 
policies were managed from the top by the NSB, and their implementation was directed and overseen 
by Taiwan’s Garrison Command (TGC). At the local level, the four regional garrison commanders 
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directed “Party, Government, and Military Joint Warfare Meetings,” which were attended by all of the 
KMT party chairmen in the region, leaders of local legislative and government offices, county and city 
police chiefs, leaders of military and military police units, Investigation Bureau groups, and personnel 
in charge of telecommunications monitoring.  The reports that were compiled from these meetings 
were then forwarded to Garrison Command Headquarters for review.167  
Among the chief effects of this reform was the reduction and eventually the elimination of 
the decades-long rivalry between the MBIS (Juntong) and CBIS (Zhongtong). As with the process of 
producing a politically loyal military, this led in the short-term to higher violence within the security 
apparatus, and relatively less violence once consolidation had been achieved. CBIS had long been 
affiliated with the Central Club (“CC”) clique: the faction based around brothers Chen Guofu and 
Chen Lifu, whose uncle Chen Qimei had been an early mentor to Chiang Kai-shek. Despite these 
close personal ties – or perhaps because of them – the Chen brothers became rivals to Chiang 
Ching-kuo when the Nationalists were still administering the Chinese mainland.168  Most of the 
cadres that drove the reforms of the security apparatus – namely, members of the Political Action 
Committee and then the Confidential Data Group of the Office of the President – came from the 
Whampoa military academy and the Zhejiang school, both affiliated with CBIS’ rival organization, 
MBIS.  The fact that members of the CC Clique-affiliated CBIS were under-represented in the 
reform process was identified by Tang Zong as one of the early obstacles to reform (in 1949).169   
From 1949-1956, both agencies went through several name changes and were located in 
different places in the organizational structure.  Eventually, the Central Bureau became the Ministry 
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of the Interior/Ministry of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation (Diaochaju, led by Li Yuanpu and often 
abbreviated MJIB in English), and the Military Bureau became the Ministry of National Defense’s 
Intelligence Bureau (Qingbaoju, led by Mao Renfeng).170 More importantly, however, the portfolios of 
work were clearly divided; the Investigative Bureau concentrated on domestic intelligence work in 
Taiwan, and the Intelligence Bureau directed its operations toward mainland China and other 
external areas.   
Chiang Ching-kuo attempted to water down the MBIS-CBIS rivalry by transferring 
personnel across the two departments under a slogan that roughly translates to “communication 
between bureau personnel.” 171 This policy was less successful at completely eliminating tension than 
in it was at simply consolidating the intelligence apparatus in favor of the MBIS at the expense of 
the CBIS (and its CC clique backers). It did, however, have a limiting effect on violence, which 
afterward mainly took the form of agencies accusing each other’s personnel of being spies, and 
rarely went beyond the boundaries of the coercive apparatus itself. In 1964, Shen Zhiyue became the 
first person from the old Military Bureau to assume the Directorship of the Investigative Bureau, 
and after that, no Central Bureau person held the Directorship of the MJIB again.172   
Shen Zhiyue became the Investigative Bureau’s longest-tenured Director (1964-78); though 
he earned the nickname of “Taiwan’s Heinrich Himmler” for his aggressive prosecution of spies and 
political criminals, many of them appear to have been his own employees.  Under his tenure, an 
astonishing number of intelligence and security agency officials, many from the former Central 
Bureau staff, were themselves accused of spying for the Communists.  Chen Tsui-lien documents a 
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set of interconnected cases that implicated at least sixty high-ranking individuals from the 
Investigative Bureau: First Division vice director Li Shijie, former Third Division director Jiang 
Hairong, Fourth Division director Fan Ziwen, his wife and Training Council assistant director Man 
Suyu, assistant director Shi Yuwei, section chief Zhu Weiru, Sixth Division assistant director Yu 
Zhenbang, First Division assistant director Deng Qichang, Sixth Division vice director Chen 
Zhengmin.173  Shen also used his position within the Investigative Bureau to target officials from a 
rival faction that remained behind in the Intelligence Bureau (the Ye clique around Ye Xiangzhi).174 
Regional rivalries were another factor that contributed to lingering violence within the 
security apparatus against members of the Investigative Bureau (the old CBIS).  Many of the early 
Mainlander arrivals to Taiwan – some immediately after the Second World War – were from Fujian 
province; they took over Japanese properties and occupied preferential positions, including in the 
security apparatus, particularly in the Investigative Bureau.  For example, Jiang Hairong, director of 
the MJIB’s Third Division, hailed from Fuzhou in Fujian; he appointed numerous officials from his 
hometown, including Sixth Division Vice Director Chen Zhengmin, Fourth Division Section Chief 
Huang Xiang, and the Third Division’s Dai Guangwu, as well as appointing Fujianese First Division 
Vice Director Li Shijie, who subsequently promoted numerous other Fujianese: the so-called “Fujian 
Gang.” When the Investigative Bureau was targeted for housecleaning, the Fujianese were among 
the most prominent targets; after the native Taiwanese, Fujian province had the largest number of 
cases processed by Garrison Command’s military tribunals.  Even those in the Intelligence Bureau 
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were not safe; over 130 of them were arrested as well.  Only the intervention of a senior NSB 
official – Yan Lingfeng, himself from Fujian – halted the attacks.175   
This history is complicated, but it underscores several points that are consistent with the 
overall argument of the dissertation.  First, the authorities in Taiwan recognized fragmentation as a 
cause of political violence, and sought to minimize it through various institutional reforms. Second, 
their efforts to limit it were partly successful; the competition between bureaus was limited first, 
while informal factional and regional competition persisted until the mid-1960s. Third, where 
fragmentation, social difference, and organizational rivalry remained, they continued to cause 
violence – primarily within the coercive apparatus, but occasionally pulling in citizens from outside.  
The KMT also achieved only partial success in limiting direct incentives for violence. In June 
of 1950, they established the Regulations for the Inspection and Elimination of Spies During the 
Period of Rebellion, which offered financial rewards to those who reported a spy.  According to 
Article 14 of the regulations, informants were given 30% of a convicted spy’s confiscated property, 
and another 35% was allocated either as a reward or payment to those who prosecuted the 
investigation and case. (The government Treasury took the remainder.)  Former members of the 
Investigative Bureau later explained that this system led the intelligence agencies to compete over 
performance levels by exaggerating both the capabilities of the enemy spies and the numbers caught.  
In order to impress their superiors and to claim the rewards that came with confiscated property, 
intelligence personnel fabricated cases and accused people falsely.176   
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By November 1953, the KMT’s Sixth Division (responsible for intelligence matters) 
complained that high rewards were leading to efforts to trap people into crimes, collusion with 
undercover agents to forge documentation, and other problems, all of which were being exacerbated 
by the lack of punishment for false accusations.177  The regulations were revised so that all of the 
confiscated property and money went to the Treasury, which then was responsible for paying a 
smaller, unspecified reward to informers and helpers on the case. 178  This policy change limited – 
though it did not eliminate – the financial and material incentives for violence.   
 
Decreasing Social Exclusivity and Increasing Social Penetration  
 
Finally, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s reforms to the security apparatus were 
designed to reverse that apparatus’ isolation from society and instead embed it into every corner of 
Taiwan.  This took several forms: the recruitment of native Taiwanese into the party and 
government, including the military and police; the use of party organizations to monitor workplaces, 
schools, and other parts of society; the reactivation of the baojia system and its linkage into 
government and party networks; and the development of an extensive network of informants.   
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo recognized early on – as early as Chiang’s directive 
to Chen Cheng in January 1949, if not before – that exclusion and under-representation of native 
Taiwanese were problematic, and that they needed to recruit native Taiwanese into local and 
provincial political roles.  The Republic of China army – starting from basically 100% Mainlander 
when Taiwan returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1945 – attempted to ameliorate the problem of 
native Taiwanese under-representation through recruitment and promotion, but given the time 
required for advancement in any military, these were slow mechanisms of change even if promotions 
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were accelerated. Chiang Kai-shek also so strongly feared the defection or collusion of units 
composed entirely of native Taiwanese that he issued an order in 1951 forbidding their creation and 
forcing Taiwanese to intermix with Mainlanders – a policy that was not popular among the native 
Taiwanese.179   As a result, Taiwanese were under-represented in the government of Taiwan in 
general, but the trend was “even more pronounced at the top levels of the military and security 
forces.”180  As also happened on the KMT Central Committee and in other government posts, 
Chiang Ching-kuo did his best to accelerate Taiwanization, as is shown in Table 3.1 below:181    
Table 3.1: Level of Native Taiwanese Representation in the RoC Military  
 
Decade/Rank General  Col, Lt. Col, Major Lowest 3 ranks  
1960’s  1.3%  9.6% 52.8%  
1970’s  7.4% 18.8%  68.4%  
1980’s  15.8%  32.6%  78.7%  
 
 
By the 1980’s, therefore, the number of Taiwanese in the lowest levels of the military had almost 
become equivalent to their proportion of the population, though under-representation persisted at 
higher levels. Native Taiwanese also remained under-represented in the police, consisting of around 
twelve percent of the top officers and a third of the city or county police station chiefs.182  
Party reform coupled with local administrative reform probably played a greater role than 
military reform in KMT efforts both to involve native Taiwanese and to penetrate the broader 
                                                 
179 U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 28 July 1951.  
180 Wu Nai-teh, “Convergence or Polarization?  Ethnic Political Support in the Post-Liberalization State,” in 
Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, and Huang Shu-min, Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural 
Perspectives (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), pp. 156-157.  
181 On Chiang’s policy of “indigenization” of the KMT, see Chu and Lin, “Political Developments,” pp. 118-
19; Tien Hung-mao, “Chapter 1: Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” and Huang Teh-fu, 
“Chapter 5: Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang,” both in Tien Hung-mao, ed., Taiwan’s Electoral 
Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe,1996), pp. 3-26 and 
pp. 105-136.   
182 Wu, “Convergence or Polarization,” p. 156; Mendel, Politics of Formosan Nationalism, p. 100. 
121 
society of the island.  Chiang Kai-shek identified the organizational weakness of the KMT as the 
chief cause of their defeat, and laid blame for organizational weakness on factionalism and the fact 
that the KMT was out of touch with society. Both the Central Reform Committee and the reforms 
that were specific to the intelligence and security apparatus aimed to fix this problem. As early as 
January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had telegraphed Chen Cheng, then the head of the Taiwan Provincial 
Government, to order him to recruit more native Taiwanese.183  Chiang Ching-kuo subsequently 
increased this recruitment island-wide; the Party’s re-registration campaign increased membership 
from 50,000 members who crossed the Straits from the Mainland to an estimated 280,000 by the 
Seventh Party Congress in October 1952 -- as many as 57% of them Taiwanese.184 By summer 1952, 
the KMT had at least thirty thousand work teams – nine or more members, the lowest level of party 
organization – who worked across Taiwan’s geographical, occupational, and societal areas.  These 
were augmented by KMT cells in workplaces and throughout organizations: for example, the Anti-
Communist Youth Corps established in 1952 and headed by Chiang Ching-kuo, was the only 
intercollegiate organization allowed by law, and was designed to entertain, monitor, and recruit 
students, especially Taiwanese. 185  Eventually, almost 20% of the population were KMT party 
members – higher than average for a Leninist party.186  
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Figure 2.3: Intelligence Agencies’ Network for Social Monitoring187 
The net effect of this reform process was that each part of society fell under multiple organs and 
organizations.  It also meant that their reports were not stovepiped or compartmentalized, but 
shared across the coercive apparatus in a coordinated fashion.  All reporting was done upward to the 
KMT and to Taiwan Garrison Command, who then in turn reported in a coordinated fashion to the 
National Security Bureau and the President.  
The clear purpose of these teams and organizations – along with political education and 
recruitment – was, in fact, to monitor and investigate Taiwan society (shehui diaocha). Party members 
were instructed to carry out social investigation at least once a month, and to become “the eyes and 
ears” of the party.  These reports included lists of local notables, statistical information and analyses 
of social trends, and evidence of illegal and communist-sympathizing activity.  Lin and Myers 
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conclude that this information was then used to identify people for more targeted surveillance.188 
The public service stations set up by the KMT in 1953-54 in every town and village were also 
ordered to gather investigative statistics on local organizations, agencies, schools, religions, factions, 
gangs, criminals, influential citizens, and leaders.189  Societal investigation work was coordinated at 
the top by the Sixth Division of the KMT Central Committee, responsible for intelligence gathering 
and prevention work.  These tasks were not secret; Douglas Mendel, a critical American observer 
teaching in Taiwan during martial law, wrote that his students “abbreviated my lectures on the 
Communist Party of the USSR, explaining it was very similar to their own KMT in its organization and 
its use of secret police, political commissars, youth corps, labor indoctrination, and dogmatic slogans. 
KMT party spies appear to infest every local government office, private organization, school campus, 
and community organization.” He also recounted being warned by a local official not to trust even 
low-level native bureaucrats, because they “would sell their own brothers to the security police.”190   
  Chiang also drew on old Japanese legacies to reinforce the security apparatus’ penetration of 
and control over society.  The baojia system was reactivated and subsumed into the party and local 
government monitoring network, so that it was once again closely linked to the deployment of 
coercive power.191 The bao and jia were merged into local governments; jia become lin of 6-15 
families, and bao became li of 150-300 families. The secretaries of the bao and jia (baojia shuji), who 
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had assisted the baojia heads during the Japanese colonial era, subsequently became the employees of 
KMT local governments.192  This system was, as under the Japanese, coupled with a clear system of 
collective responsibility.  Regulations established in June of 1950 required mutual monitoring: 
according to Article 5, each person in society had to ‘associate’ with at least two other people, and if 
it was discovered that the individual in question was a spy, his two associates as well as his 
supervisor would be held responsible, with a penalty of jail time ranging from one to seven years 
(the charge: failing to report a spy).193  Sanctions could also be issued to the entire neighborhood or 
organization.  In general, the local neighborhood leaders (the old baojia heads) were responsible for 
maintaining a spy-free area.194 
Finally, Taiwan’s coercive institutions plugged into an extraordinarily large network of 
unofficial informers, who were used to monitor and keep track of potentially subversive activity.  A 
1964 manuscript prepared by Tillman Durdin for the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that 
“Ching-kuo had 50,000 regular policing agents in the many organization under his control, and that 
the number of paid informants active on Formosa might be ten times that figure.”195  This seems to 
be something of an overstatement, but according to the former Vice Minister of the Investigative 
Bureau (Diaochaju, 調查局), his organization alone in 1979 had two thousand investigators, each of 
whom were in turn responsible for thirty to forty informants (xianmin, 線民), each assigned either to 
a particular community, or to an organization.  This totals 80,000 xianmin for a population of 17.5 
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million (10.6 adults) – a ratio of one informant for every 219 citizens, and a ratio of 1:132 if one 
excludes children.196  And this does not count the informants working for other agencies, or the 
information provided by KMT offices located in schools, large companies, and civic associations.197 
Even if one only counts the informants employed by the Ministry of Justice’s Investigative Bureau, 
one informant for every 132 adults is a level of societal penetration historically matched by very few 
– among them contemporary North Korea and the East German Stasi.198 A popular expression 
throughout the martial law era was that “everyone has a police headquarters in their hearts.”199   
The system used for processing the information once it was collected was also impressive, 
both on a local and a central level. As Matsuzaki notes, at the local level, “the police continued to 
regulate inter-personal relations not just by enforcing laws, but by relying on detailed household 
records to understand how people were connected and who should be contacted were some incident 
to occur.”200  At the central level, the National Security Bureau established a Data Center, in keeping 
with its charge to provide the data necessary to set internal security policy.  By 1967, the Data Center 
held a total of nearly 140,000 case files on suspected spies, Taiwan independence activists, and other 
persons of concern: 26,000 individual case files, some of which dated back to 1950, plus another 
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110,000 files or pieces of data provided by the Office of the President.201  This was in addition to the 
separate files kept by each intelligence agency, nicknamed AB files since the A files held basic data, 
and the B files held secret information.202 
 
Intelligence: the Substitute for Violence  
 
In the early 1960’s, American officials conducted a review, mandated by the National 
Security Council, of the internal security threats facing America’s allies and the capabilities of each 
country to deal with the threats it faced. The six-part report on Taiwan, which spanned several 
hundred pages, recommended against offering assistance to Taiwan.  Its authors noted that Taiwan’s 
security agencies had been successful in neutralizing any hint of movement toward armed 
opposition.  In fact, one of the six sections complained about the method by which Taiwan’s 
authorities had achieved this competence, describing it as “saturation to the point of inefficiency.”203   
 As the system described above took hold, intelligence became a substitute for violence. What 
replaced the previous high-intensity, indiscriminate violence was a more targeted, selective, 
preventative, and bureaucratic approach to repression.  The number of people arrested declined 
sharply, and individual arrests took the place of mass arrests.  Internal meeting notes from the 
Presidential Office and Taiwan Garrison Command also reveal that as the regime grew more 
confident of its ability to uncover and pre-empt threats, it adopted a less lethal approach to the 
dissidents it did arrest. Instead of firing squads, political criminals faced incarceration in a set of 
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newly constructed prisons, including places like the infamous Green Island – Taiwan’s Alcatraz, 
thirty miles off the southeastern coast.204  
 The process worked as follows. Based on the various lines of surveillance and reporting, 
investigators prepared dossiers, typically numbering in the hundreds to thousands of pages. 205 
Garrison Command’s Martial Law Section would then prepare a draft sentencing document and 
forward it to the Martial Law Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn sent its 
findings and recommendations to the Office of the President. There, the files were personally 
approved or revised by Chiang Kai-shek, whose seal appears on nearly every sentencing document 
and is often accompanied by handwritten revisions to the sentence recommended. A death sentence 
required – among other things – Chiang’s personal seal of approval, marked in red on the pages, and 
before-death and after-death photographs to document that the sentence had been correctly carried 
out.206  Executions, usually by firing squad, were carried out on a racetrack in southern Taipei.  
Extrajudicial disappearances were almost unheard of; the names of those executed by the regime 
were publicly posted at Taipei Main Station.207   
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 Lesser offenders were arrested, processed through Garrison Command’s military tribunal 
system, and kept in confinement in one of the island’s various prisons until their sentence expired.  
Upon release, the name and recorded data of each offender was forwarded to their district police 
headquarters, as well as placed on a list kept by the National Security Bureau of individuals who 
required special observation.  Released individuals were then subject to regular interrogations.  Two 
neighbors also had to sign each prisoner’s release paperwork, vouching for them and agreeing to 
submit weekly reports on their activity to the local security officials. The former Vice-Director of the 
Investigative Bureau, Gao Minghui, estimates that this watch-list was approximately 15,000 people 
in 1969-70.208   
 The example of Lei Chen, a pro-democracy figure who helped found and run the Free China 
periodical and was arrested in 1960, is instructive.209  Lei Chen founded Free China in 1949 (with 
initial support from a KMT seeking to differentiate itself from the Chinese Communist Party), but a 
series of more critical articles in the mid-to-late 1950s began to arouse the enmity of authorities.  By 
1958, Garrison Command had begun investigating Free China, highlighting it as a major object of 
investigation in the Second Division’s annual report issued in November 1958.  In January 1959, the 
periodical published a reader’s letter titled “Why the Military Should Consider Themselves Dogs,” 
prompting an investigation on the grounds of having revealed military secrets (the case was 
eventually settled). That same month, according to the office diary of the Taiwan Garrison 
Commander Huang Chieh, Chiang grew angry after Lei’s name came up at a meeting of security 
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officials. After complaining about Lei’s “bad influence” and the disrespect that proved “his illegal 
connection with the Communists,” Chiang ordered several security organs – including the GPWD 
and Garrison Command – to figure out how to deal with the case such that the publication of 
content violating national policy would not be allowed to continue. 210  Extensive surveillance 
followed; among the files are photographs of the two security agents sitting with their bicycles on a 
wall outside the Free China offices, watching them and reporting on Lei’s activities.211  
 After articles in 1960 criticized Chiang’s consecutive terms as president, and as reports 
indicated that Lei Chen was apparently participating in movements to develop an opposition party, 
surveillance increased.  From May to September, Garrison Vice Commander Li Libai, General Bao 
Lie, and representatives from at least seven other intelligence agencies gathered to make “regular and 
speedy reports” on the movement and activities of Lei Chen and others involved in the opposition 
party movement.212  By June 1960, Garrison Command’s Political Department, Security Department, 
and Military Law Department had prepared plans for “Operation Tianyu,” to arrest Lei Chen, 
indicating what he would be charged with and calling on the Security Department to swiftly collect 
the evidence required for prosecution. For the next two months, members of the KMT Sixth 
Division, General Political Department, Investigation Bureau, Garrison Command, and National 
Security Bureau met as a working group to further develop the plans, with occasional input from 
Taiwan Police Headquarters and the Military Police.  Chiang Kai-shek’s orders were transmitted to 
the working group by the Secretary General of the Office of the President or by KMT General 
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Secretary Tang Zong.  In mid-August, Chiang met personally with Garrison Commander Huang 
Chieh to inquire about the plans and issue instructions on the general timing of the operation.  His 
questions and instructions were specific, down to which jail Lei Chen would be taken to, and which 
military judge had been selected for his tribunal.   
 In early September, Chiang reviewed an “Operation Tianyu Action Plan” and ordered 
Garrison Command to execute the operation on September 4. That day, the Garrison Commander 
received multiple phonecalls from Chiang Kai-shek, who wanted personally to confirm that the arrest 
had gone according to plan and to check on the development of the case. Afterward, Huang Chieh 
sent regular reports to his superiors on how the case and interrogation were progressing.  When 
Chiang read the confession of one of the men arrested with Lei Chen, Liu Ziying, he told Huang 
Chieh that it lacked punch, and ordered him to ask several additional, specific questions. He also 
ordered the authorities to treat this as a spying case (rather than something to do with the 
development of an opposition party). The trial took place on 3 October 1960.  Chiang had given 
guidance on how to prepare Lei Chen’s sentencing document, and in a meeting in the Office of the 
President on October 8th, he reviewed the three options that had been submitted to him, each listing 
the pros and cons of that course of action.  He then directed the length, wording, and appeal process 
of Lei Chen’s sentence, as well as the deregistering and dissolution of Free China.  The Chief of the 
Appellate Military Court also guaranteed to Chiang and the other officials in attendance that Lei’s 
appeal would be rejected.213  After the verdict was announced, various security departments sent 
regular reports to Chiang on domestic and international reactions to Lei’s imprisonment, which they 
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had been monitoring since before his arrest.214  Lei Chen’s appeal, filed on New Year’s Eve 1960, was 
rejected as planned on 11th January 1961, and he served out the full duration of his ten-year sentence.   
 What is important to note about Lei Chen’s case is the entire system, documented above, that 
made it possible: a massive bureaucracy with an impressive capacity for surveillance, a controlled and 
unitary process of top-level deliberation about how to handle political opposition, and the confidence 
that targeted surveillance and imprisonment would be sufficient to achieve the state’s ends.  
Researchers at Taiwan’s Academia Historica have called the Lei Chen case a classic example of the 
KMT’s top-down “capacity of organizational control and mobilization” and bottom-up “capacity of 
information collection and feedback.”215  By 1960, the smooth internal coordination of the KMT’s 
coercive apparatus was complemented by the information-gathering advantages provided by increased 
social inclusiveness.  This system was then brought to bear on Lei Chen and other dissidents.    
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has advanced two primary arguments: first, that the change in design of 
Taiwan’s coercive institutions can be attributed to a change in the dominant threat facing Chiang 
Kai-shek around 1950, and second, that the replacement of a fragmented and socially isolated set of 
coercive institutions with ones that were unified and deeply embedded in society is responsible for 
the drop in state violence that occurred in the mid-1950s.    
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Alternative explanations do not perform as well as the two arguments above in explaining 
either the origins of Taiwan’s coercive institutions, or their consequences for state violence. In terms 
of origins, arguments about institutional path dependence help us identify two conflicting 
institutional legacies that the Nationalist government had to work with (one from the Japanese, and 
one from their own Mainland experience), but do not tell us which of these legacies would ultimately 
dominate, or why.  International influence does not explain the design of Taiwan’s coercive 
institutions either, since Chiang Kai-shek rejected the international models favored by his allies – 
both of policing and of political intervention in the military – when he reconfigured his security 
apparatus in the early 1950s.  The shift from elite to popular threat, however, explains not only the 
timing and direction of reforms to the internal security apparatus, but the process by which they 
were carried out.    
Similarly, alternative explanations do not satisfactorily explain the observed patterns of state 
violence.  The high violence from 1945-55 may look like a response to the rising popular threat, but 
the fact that much of this violence was directed within the security apparatus rather than at the 
population suggests that other factors must be at work. Moreover, we see Chiang Kai-shek 
responding to the conditions of the late 1940’s not merely by ordering violence – though that was 
indeed his short-term response to the crisis of early 1947 – but by concentrating his attention, and 
that of some of his most trusted advisors, on institutional reform. The fact that the coercive 
apparatus did not respond to increasing popular protest with increased violence in the 1970’s and 
1980’s also suggests that an increase in threat is not sufficient to explain patterns of violence.216 
In addition to confirming the shortcomings of the threat model, this emphasis on 
developing the capacity for intelligence collection and prevention of collective action also suggests 
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that the bargaining model literature’s focus on response to protest, rather than pre-emption of it, 
misses important aspects of the drivers of repression. Similarly, explanations rooted in state capacity 
and organizational cohesion cannot explain why Chiang put so much effort into strengthening the 
state’s capacity and the organizational cohesion of the security apparatus in the early 1950s, when he 
had previously found it advantageous to weaken them with various coup-proofing devices.  The 
Taiwan case also shows that a more cohesive set of institutions used less violence rather than more, 
which confirms the prediction of half of those who study organizational cohesion but contradicts 
the other half.  Finally, international explanations are poor predictors,217 especially those that focus 
on American influence. If American dislike of KMT repression on Taiwan had led to decreased 
repression, then repression would have been lower under Consul-General Strong in the late 1940’s 
and risen under his more permissive successor Rankin in the early 1950s. Exactly the opposite 
happened. High-level American pressure on Taiwan to improve its human rights record did not 
begin again until the 1970s, which means that it could help explain overall political liberalization, but 
not a drop in violence that occurred fifteen years earlier.   
Instead, changes in the KMT approach to internal security can be attributed to the fact that 
Chiang’s perceptions of threat evolved dramatically at the end of the 1940s.  Having lost the 
mainland, and especially after eliminating elite rivals in the first half of the 1950’s, Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chiang Ching-kuo shifted their focus, and set about constructing a security apparatus that was 
more focused on managing popular unrest and defending against external attack than it was on out-
maneuvering other elites. The resulting shift in the coercive institutions’ structure and social 
composition – from a fragmented, internally competitive, and socially isolated security apparatus in 
the early years of KMT rule to a unified and internally coordinated apparatus built on an inclusive 
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capillary network of local information provision – made it possible for the KMT to rely on targeted, 








Chapter Three   
 







I. Introduction  
 
This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation by examining the period after 
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines until his removal from office by military 
coup-defection and the People’s Power movement in 1986.  A Spanish colony since the mid-1500’s, 
the Philippine Islands at the turn of the twentieth century experienced in swift succession the 
Philippine Revolution against Spanish rule (1896-98); the Spanish-American War which ceded the 
Philippines to the Americans (1898); and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902).  After that, the 
Philippines remained an American colony throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 
achieving Commonwealth status and limited domestic autonomy in 1935.  Occupied by the Japanese 
in 1941, the archipelago returned to American hands after brutal fighting in 1944-45, and became 
independent in July 1946.  From the mid-1940’s to the mid-1950’s, the central government sought to 
suppress a rebellion by the Communist Hukbalahap (Huk) insurgency. During that time and after, 
the island was governed by a series of democratically elected presidents: Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay 
(who, as Defense Secretary under Quirino and then as President prosecuted and won the Huk 
campaign), Garcia, Macapagal, and then Marcos, who was elected in 1965 and re-elected in 1969.  
Unable to run for a third term, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, and remained in 
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office until deposed by a combination of military coup-defection and mass uprising – the so-called 
“People’s Power” revolution – in 1986.   
In the sections below, I trace the development of the Philippine internal security apparatus 
from the American colonial period through Marcos’ time, and link the development of coercive 
institutions to patterns of violence. I argue that Marcos, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, had the 
opportunity to engage in extensive reorganization of the Philippines’ coercive apparatus, and did so 
when he assumed dictatorial power in 1972.  Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, however, after declaring 
martial law, Marcos’ primary fears were of a coup and his elite rivals. This prompted him to create a 
security apparatus that was the opposite of the one created during the Reform Period in Taiwan: 
both internally fragmented and socially exclusive.  Marcos’ manipulation of the coercive apparatus 
gave these institutions both material and social incentives to engage in violence, and prevented them 
from developing the intelligence capacity necessary to deal with threats that emanated from the 
population -- organizational dynamics which explain the escalating intensity of state violence against 
civilians over the course of the Marcos dictatorship.  
This chapter proceeds in five sections.  Section II provides an overview of the pattern of 
state violence under Marcos, identifying key trends to be explained by the theory.  Section III traces 
the origins of the Philippine internal security apparatus.  It examines the legacy of American 
colonialism in terms of both the structure and social composition of the country’s coercive 
institutions, and discusses their development between independence in 1945 and Marcos’ election in 
1965. Section IV examines the policies that Marcos implemented with regard to coercive institutions 
around the time of the inauguration of martial law in September 1972.  It analyzes the way in which 
Marcos exacerbated existing institutional and social rivalries to create fragmentation and 
competition, as well as the ways in which his coercive apparatus became increasingly exclusive and 
socially isolated.  The section discusses how these institutional characteristics affected the incentives 
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and intelligence capacity of the Philippines’ coercive institutions, and links these factors to the 
escalation in state violence over time between 1972 and 1986.  Section V weighs this argument 
against alternative explanations, and then concludes.   
 
II. Overview of the Pattern of State Violence  
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, below, show the trend of increasing state violence in the Philippines 
over the period from 1975 to 1986 – a striking contrast to the decrease in the scope and intensity of 




Figure 3.1: Annual Number of Political Arrests, 1975-861 
                                                 
1 Note that Marcos was deposed in late February 1986, explaining the drop in that year.  Data provided to the 
author by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, December 2011.  For qualitative and case study reporting 
on violence against civilians, see Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Salvaging Democracy: Human Rights in 
the Philippines (New York: December 1985); Commission of the Churches on International Affairs/World 
Council of Churches, Philippines: Testimonies on Human Rights Violations (Geneva, 1986); Bishop Francisco F. 
Claver, The Stones Will Cry Out: Grassroots Pastorals (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1978); Task Force Detainees of the 
Philippines, Political Prisoners of Our Time (Quezon City, 1989); Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the 








Figure 3.2: Annual Number of Disappearances and Extrajudicial Killings 
The figures above are the most reliable statistics existing to date on state violence in the Philippines. 
They were generated by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), which was organized 
in 1974 by the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP).  In a country 
whose population is 90% Catholic, the Church possessed a uniquely broad geographic reach, with 
networks down to the local level in nearly every province and barangay.  Thompson refers to it as the 
only institution outside of government capable of serving as a bridge between elites and masses.  
The Church’s geographic and social reach, plus its semi-protected status under martial law, allowed 
Church personnel to conduct surveys that generated the best non-governmental information found 
on these events in the Philippines.2 In the absence of records and statistics generated by a 
                                                 
2 On the church’s status, see Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political 
Repression in the Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos 
Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day, 1996); Patricio N. 
Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
“Semi” is an important qualification.  Marcos refrained from direct attack on the Catholic Church to exploit 
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transitional justice process, and without complete declassification of government records, these are 
likely to remain the authoritative figures on state violence during the Marcos period for the 
indefinite future.  Regrettably, no systematic records of state violence prior to 1975 are currently 
available.  
Indeed, the Philippines’ lack of transitional justice mechanisms, which have characterized 
other countries’ transitions away from periods of state terror and violence, hampers researchers’ 
attempt to obtain a full picture of the Marcos era.  The pact between Corazon Aquino and the 
military that cemented the 1986 revolution, and the subsequent ascension to the Presidency of Fidel 
Ramos, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, resulted not only in limited security sector 
reform, but the promotion of key officers of the repressive apparatus – including alleged torturers – 
to positions of political and police power under the Philippines’ democratic government.3  
Investigations into the violence committed by military and security forces prior to 1986 have, 
unsurprisingly, stalled, limiting the amount of information available.   
During the research for this project, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (ISAFP) agreed to release a large quantity of records to the Commission on Human 
Rights – a move that, when fully implemented, has the potential to provide a critically important 
source of information to complement NGO documentation and the author’s interviews.4  These 
documents include intelligence estimates, reports on the difficulties of obtaining good intelligence 
                                                                                                                                                             
internal divisions within the Church and avoid united open antagonism, but his regime detained priests and 
nuns and targeted them for violence.   
3 For example, the deputy of one of the notorious “anti-subversion” squads became the national police chief 
in 1999.  Lack of security sector reform, I hypothesize, is one reason human rights violations by the 
Philippine security agencies continued after the transition to democracy: a topic for future research. See 
Jefferson Plantilla, “Elusive Promise: Transitional Justice in the Philippines,” Human Rights Dialogue, Vol. 1, 
No. 8 (Spring 1997).  
4 T.J. Burgonio, “Military Declassifies Marcos-Era Documents,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 December 2011, 
online at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/108867/military-declassifies-marcos-era-documents 
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on supposed subversive activities, and individual surveillance files and surveillance photographs.  
Selections from these archival materials are included in the final section of this chapter, their first 
appearance in Western scholarship.  They have already begun to improve our understanding of the 
operations during this period by ISAFP and the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and undoubtedly, 
much more remains to be discovered in the yet-to-be-transferred files.   
Even if these sources are fully released, omissions will likely remain. For example, ISAFP 
documents obtained for this project were sanitized; information that could be used to identify 
individuals involved, such as the name of the report author or even its originating unit, had been 
blacked out. Reports in Manila that ISAFP was combing through files before releasing them to CHR 
also raise concerns about what is and is not being preserved in the historical record.5  And including 
the ISAFP files will still leave gaps in our knowledge about the behavior of non-military units such 
as the Integrated National Police (INP) and the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF) – 
organizations whose role, while less central, is nonetheless important to a complete historical 
narrative and analysis of state violence under Marcos.   
The dominance of accounts and statistics collected by non-governmental organizations in 
existing source materials also means that the data omit the first three years of martial law, before 
these organizations had organized their data collection effort.  Both government records and my 
interviews suggest that this period was characterized by a somewhat different pattern of state 
violence than the years that followed: wider in scope, but lower in intensity. By the government’s 
own estimate, 60,000 people were arrested in the first few years of martial law.  These arrests were 
short-lived: the majority of the detainees apprehended in the first flush of martial law were released 
                                                 
5 Author’s interview with an individual involved in the transfer process, Quezon City, November 2011. This 
individual assured me that nothing important was being shredded: “only lists of who was invited to what 
meetings, and so on.”  
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anywhere from a few months to a year later.6  By 1977, somewhere between 563 and 4,000 detainees 
remained in prison.7  Torture during detention, however, not a common practice in pre-martial law 
Philippines, became widespread after 1972: in 1986, an association of former political detainees 
named SELDA estimated that 35,000 political prisoners had suffered “some form of torture” during 
their confinement.8 All of interviewees to whom I spoke had experienced what ISAFP documents 
understatedly refer to as “the physical extraction of information.”9  
Not all of these early detainees, however, appear to have filed formal claims or to have been 
represented in the documentation upon which the above figures are based, meaning that these 
estimates likely significantly understate the scope of violence. Historian Al McCoy uses a figure of 
3,257 deaths;10 the claim filed against Marcos in a class-action suit in U.S. federal court – which in 
September 1992 found Marcos guilty and held his estate liable for damages that eventually totaled 
almost $2 billion – included 9541 claimants.11 All of the former detainees I met in Manila had been 
detained during this 1972-75 period, and their past detentions were common social knowledge, but 
                                                 
6 Author’s interviews with four former political detainees, Quezon City, November 2011.  
7 This was the military and presidential office’s own estimate.  See, for example, David Briscoe, “Martial Law 
may be lifted, but Marcos remains secure,” Associated Press, 25 December 1980.  See also a report by the 
International Commission of Jurists, “The Decline of Democracy in the Philippines,” (Geneva, Switzerland: 
August 1977).  Marcos’ own statements were inconsistent; in a national radio address in December 1974, 
Marcos said that 5,234 people were under detention as a result of the declaration of martial law (1,165 
political detainees, 4,069 criminal offenders).  In a June 1977 speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club, 
however, he denied that the Philippines had any political prisoners.  In February of that year, the government 
had said that of approximately 60,000 arrested, 4,000 remained in detention (1500 “subversive” detainees, and 
2500 criminal offenders).  See Jesus Castila et al, “State of Political Detainees: the Philippine Setting,” 
Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1979), pp. 497-549. 
8 Alfred W. McCoy, Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999), p. 205.  
9 “Institution of Safehouses,” Top Secret agent’s report, ISAFP files, 2 January 1973; author’s interviews.     
10 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 192.  




they had neither joined the class-action suit nor reported their detention to an NGO. Their names 
do not appear in TFDP or SELDA files.12 This leads me to believe that both the NGO reporting 
and class-action suit understate both the number of arrests and the number of tortures, and that a 
correct estimate would likely be nearer to the numbers estimated by SELDA and the Marcos 
government itself.  
Despite these gaps and problems, the statistics illustrated above do reveal a clear pattern, 
corroborated by qualitative research.  This pattern is the primary object of explanation tackled in 
subsequent sections.  After the early wave of indiscriminate arrests and ‘short-term’ detentions, the 
level of state violence in the Philippines rose steadily over time.  The breadth of arrests dropped 
after the 1972-74 period, but from 1972 to 1986, the number of killings increased.  Despite Marcos’ 
lawyerly claims to “constitutional authoritarianism” (a term coined by a president who passed the 
1939 bar exam while awaiting trial for the murder of his father’s political rival), many of these 
killings were extrajudicial in nature – meaning that they took place outside a legal framework but 
were executed by individuals who were identifiable, even uniformed members of the security 
apparatus.  Some of the targets of state violence simply disappeared (an estimated 737 individuals 
between 1975 and 1985).13  Many more of the killings, however, especially the later ones, were 
“salvagings” – a term peculiar to Filipino-English that denotes the public disposal of a mutilated 
corpse in a field, along a roadside, or in another location where it would be found by the public.14  
According to Amnesty International, of the 2,540 people killed, 77% were salvaged in the process.15  
                                                 
12 Author’s interviews with former political detainees, Quezon City, November 2011.  
13 TFDP data provided to author; also cited in McCoy, Closer Than Brothers.  
14 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 June 1996.   
15 Amnesty International, Report on the Philippines – 1981 (New York, 1981), p. 7.  
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Whereas violence in Taiwan declined over time regardless of form, under Marcos arrests declined 
but killings increased – and those killings were increasingly done in a brutal, highly visible way.    
The following sections chronicle the origins and institutional evolution of the agencies 
responsible for internal security in the Philippine archipelago.    
 
III. Origins of the Security Apparatus in the Philippines  
 
No modern work on the Philippine military or police forces begins without referencing the 
legacy bequeathed by Spanish and American colonial institutions.  The institutions inherited by 
Filipino leaders in 1945 – and by Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 – were fragmented, most notably 
between the military, a paramilitary constabulary, and a scattered array of local security actors 
(primarily municipal police, supplemented by rural police whose role was essentially one of private 
security forces for prominent local officials).  The colonial legacy was, however, one of relative social 
inclusion, in that it relied on Filipino officers and men, and emphasized the development of broad 
social networks to provide intelligence.  As a democratically elected leader elected on a platform that 
promised to reduce violence (primarily criminal violence) against civilians, Marcos initially sought to 
improve the centralization and coordination of the internal security apparatus – a course of action 
that he would reverse after seizing power through martial law.  Thus the origins of the Philippine 
coercive apparatus as it existed during the martial law period should be attributed to Marcos’ desire 
to protect himself from threats to his power, rather than to the institutions he inherited or American 
influence.   
 
Colonial Rule: Local Police and the Philippine Constabulary  
 
Spanish colonial authorities set an institutional tradition within Philippine policing that was 
to persist throughout subsequent history: a tripartite division between 1) the army, with primary 
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responsibility for external defense, 2) a paramilitary constabulary to enforce internal order, and 3) 
scattered municipal forces that operated at the behest of local officials.  
At the local level, Filipino villages traditionally relied for law and order on a militia called the 
cuerpo de cuadrilleros, raised from men who had been conscripted for military service.  It was typically 
led by a local official and staffed by men selected by and loyal to the gobernadorcillo, the municipality’s 
most senior civil official.  The gobernadorcillo held both civil and criminal jurisdiction, an overlap that 
provided multiple opportunities for self-enrichment and limited the recourse of local citizens who, if 
they objected to extortion or corruption, had to accuse a defendant who was also both the local 
police chief and presiding judge.  The gobernadorcillo’s primary accountability was either to provincial 
officials, who were most likely to intervene if his actions were at the expense of the central 
government, or to the parish priest, who held an expansive set of social responsibilities (including 
the power to recommend citizens for banishment), and an independent line of reporting to the 
provincial governor.16  
In 1868, however, Spanish authorities also formed the Guardia Civil, a paramilitary police 
designed to suppress warlords and bandits (ladrones) and to insure social order.17  The Philippine 
Guardia Civil (GC) emerged in response two trends: demand for better control of the countryside, 
and the rising dominance of the Spanish Army in Spain itself by the middle of the nineteenth 
century.  The combination of these two factors created the belief that militarizing internal security 
                                                 
16 Under Spanish rule, Philippine local priests were usually Spanish friars.  In this capacity, they were religious 
figures but also agents of the Crown; in the latter role, their duties included monitoring elections, supervising 
the election of the police force specifically, and ordering corporal punishment for moral transgressions, 
among a range of other obligations.  Greg Bankoff, “Big Fish in Small Ponds: The Exercise of Power in a 
Nineteenth-Century Philippine Municipality,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1992), pp. 684-87.   
17 The Guardia Civil was created in Spain itself after the Duke of Valencia (Narvaez) assumed power in 1844. 
For a (non-neutral) chronology of police forces in the Philippines under Spanish rule by the National 
Historical Commission of the Philippines, see Quennie Ann J. Palafox, “The Dreaded Guardia Civil and 




was the answer to Spain’s problems of colonial order.18 According to the Guardia Civil’s organizing 
regulations, “municipal officials were expressly denied any authority to interfere with the personnel, 
administration, discipline, or military movements of the force.”19 The GC comprised 3,500 men (two 
tercios, or regiments, in Luzon, and one in the Visayas after 1880), organized into companies of 20 to 
35 men.  It was militaristic in organization and accoutrement; men could only join after having 
served in other branches of the army, and after doing so, they lived in barracks and wore military-
style uniforms.  
Under the Spanish, the social composition of the Guardia Civil was exclusive, and isolated 
the institution from Filipino society.  Many of the guards were Filipinos, but only Spaniards could 
serve as commissioned officers – an arrangement whose defects became evident when Filipino 
guards mutinied and deserted during the Filipino Revolution.20 In order to achieve its mission of 
“determining the loyalty and disloyalty of individuals” to Church and Crown, the Guardia Civil 
operated separately from the Spanish military, and was allowed broad powers of search and arrest.21  
It was not expressly authorized to torture, but accounts published at the time noted that the force 
was “not scrupulous in the matter of accepting confessions so obtained,” and guards were seldom 
punished for mistreatment of those in their custody.22 Moreover, both in Spain and in the 
Philippines, the Spanish authorities “deliberately recruited its members not from their own locality, 
but from the areas of their traditional enemies” – one reason why the reputation of the Guardia 
                                                 
18 Theodore Grossman, “The Guardia Civil and Its Influence on Philippine Society,” Archiviniana (December 
1972), p. 3.  
19 Bankoff, “Big Fish in Small Ponds,” pp. 697-700.  
20 Spaniards, mestizos and indios served as non-commissioned officers.  Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” p. 4; 
Palafox “The Dreaded Guardia Civil”; Reo Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition: Colonial Lessons for 
Contemporary State-building,” PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011, p. 215.   
21 Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” pp. 4-7; McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 15.   
22 See quote by Worcester in Bankoff, “Big Fish in Small Ponds,” p. 700.   
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Civil to this day is that of “a savage and brutal police force something along the lines of Hitler’s 
Gestapo.”23 Their arrests were indiscriminate; after their formation, “the number of apprehensions 
for the most trivial crimes rose.”24  
In short succession at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the 
archipelago experienced the Philippine Revolution against Spanish rule (1896-98); the Spanish-
American War which ceded the Philippines to the U.S. in the Treaty of Paris (1898); and the 
Philippine-American War (1899-1902). The United States, after winning the war against Spain and 
crushing Philippine resistance, followed Spanish tradition with regard to internal security and 
policing.  As the Army “pacified” various areas, American officials made the village-level cuerpo de 
cuadrilleros into municipal police organizations. The first of these was organized before the war’s end, 
in March 1899, by U.S. Army Major William Kobbe, in the areas north of Manila around Malolos; 
under General Order 43, Kobbe’s template was then applied to create other municipal governments 
(and their police forces).25 Following Spanish precedent, the U.S. Army retained oversight of local 
police; though they had powers of arrest, municipal police could only detain suspects for a day 
before transferring them to the custody of the U.S. Army’s provost court.26 Authority to hire and 
dismiss policemen rested with the presidente of the local municipal council.27  
                                                 
23 “During the Revolution, the Guardia Civil detained and imprisoned so many people that they even lacked 
place to put them,” and the force became known for torture and extrajudicial execution.  Quotes from 
George Yarrington Coats, The Philippine Constabulary 1901-1917 (PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, 
1968), p. 15; Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” p. 6.     
24 Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” p. 6.  
25 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 212.  
26 Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2009), p. 75.   
27 From 1912-1924, this authority rested with the provincial governor, subject to the presidente’s 
recommendation.  Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 233-34; Emanuel Agrava Baja, The Philippine 
Police System and its Problems (Manila, Pobre’s Press, 1933), pp. 182-83.   
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In practice, the unchecked command of the local presidente meant that unless it somehow 
directly contravened American interests, municipal police functioned as personal or private security 
for local notables. Often this led to unchecked corruption between police and local prominent 
families, as strict laws on “vice trades” like gambling provided ample opportunities for collusion, 
graft, and racketeering.28 American officials describe policemen doing things like supplying childcare 
and running errands for prominent local officials, and one official, Harry Bandholtz – who later 
went on to be Chief of the Constabulary – reported that fourteen of the sixteen Filipino officials 
within his Constabulary district judged the municipal police incapable of maintaining public order.29 
Additionally, American colonial authorities sanctioned “rural police” in some areas; in essence, 
provincial governors were allowed to maintain private forces that they then tasked to guard roads 
from highway thievery – and to protect haciendas from angry peasants.  The governor of 
Pangasinan fielded a private militia from 1918 to 1926, and the governor of Pampanga led the 
“Knights of Peace” in promoting landlord-tenant ‘harmony’.30  The result was a fragmented mosaic 
of private security forces operating at the local level, often on behalf of private more than public 
interest, with little centralization or coordination.    
Critical to the fragmented security apparatus bequeathed to post-independence Philippine 
leaders was the fact that American colonial authorities consistently chose not to bring municipal and 
semi-private police forces into the national police structure: the Philippine Constabulary.31  This was 
                                                 
28 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, pp. 349-356.  
29 Matsuzaki,”Institutions by Imposition,”  p. 234; W. Cameron Forbes, “Report of the Department of 
Commerce and Policing,” Records of the Philippine Commission 1905, p. 10; J. Warren Swann, “Report of the 
Officer Commanding the Second District,” ibid, p. 74.   
30 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 236-237; Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 532-
540; David R. Sturtevant, Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 
pp. 249-51.   
31 Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 169.   
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not because the security situation on the ground demanded it; in fact, colonial police officials 
repeatedly proposed hybridizing local and national police forces. In 1905, David Prescott Barrows 
suggested replacing the Constabulary system with a system like that of the U.S. Marshals;32 Taft’s 
private security chief James LeRoy recommended disbanding the Constabulary in favor of local 
police in 1906;33 and Constabulary officer Harry Bandholtz recommended bringing municipal police 
under the control of the Constabulary in reports submitted every year from 1905 to 1913.34 The 
Constabulary was given limited inspection prerogatives over the municipal police in 1912, but this 
cosmetic revision was unaccompanied by disciplinary or command power.35   
Instead, the apparatus of American colonial security was based on normative beliefs that 
underpinned the colonial project, which envisioned Philippine institutions as reproductions of 
American ones.  The two major consequences of this normative template were 1) the emphasis on 
local autonomy rather than centralized control, and 2) a push to civilianize the American occupation 
in order to declare the Philippine War over.  At the turn of the century, America had no national 
police force; the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Justice Department was not founded until 
1908.  Moreover, an emphasis on local autonomy and control was central to the McKinley 
administration’s vision of democracy-building.36 Like American states and cities, then, Philippine 
                                                 
32 Matsuzaki,”Institutions by Imposition,” p. 211, fn. 83.   
33 He wrote, “It is a great waste to have both the Constabulary and the useless municipal police.”  Quote 
from Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 224.  
34 Bandholtz’s reports suggest that he might have favored dismissing the municipal police entirely had he not 
judged that this would completely antagonize local elites and disrupt the collaborative arrangements he was 
then trying to forge.  Matsuzaki, p. 235; see also Records of the Philippine Constabulary (1905-1908) and Philippine 
Constabulary, Annual Report of the Director of Constabulary (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1909-1912).    
35 Matsuzaki,”Institutions by Imposition,” p. 236; Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems,  pp. 182-83.   
36 [Secretary of War] Elihu Root, “Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission,” in Charles B. 
Elliott, The Philippines to the end of the Commission Government: a Study in Tropical Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1917).  These instructions do not specifically mention policing.   
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municipalities would field and fund their own police forces, and they would remain locally rather 
than centrally controlled. When American officials – for reasons outlined in the next paragraph – 
eventually did opt for a small national police force to replace the U.S. Army, Civil Governor Taft 
described the policy to Secretary of War Elihu Root as “a departure from the ordinary methods 
pursued in America, but … a departure rendered necessary only by the difference in condition.”37 
In terms of civilianization of American rule, increasing domestic backlash against U.S. 
occupation of the Philippines -- in particular, the Army’s “military rule” and the violent counter-
insurgency war being waged in America’s name – prompted colonial officials in the McKinley and 
Roosevelt cabinets to seek a less militant face of American presence. In March 1900, President 
McKinley formed the Second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft, which in 
turn established a civil government in July 1901.38 The Philippine Constabulary (PC), established in 
July and August of 1901, was therefore born out of Civil Governor William Howard Taft and 
Philippine Secretary of Commerce and Police Luke Wright’s attempts to remove provincial and 
municipal administration from the U.S. Army, which objected vociferously and repeatedly to the 
transfer of authority.39  Policing was supposed to become more civilianized and also more 
indigenized; according to the diary of Mrs. Taft, Wright drew the idea of a native force led by 
                                                 
37 Quote in Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 216; Taft’s papers are in the Library of Congress in 
Washington, DC.   
38 Margarita Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” in Margarita Cojuangco, ed., Konstable: The Story of the Philippine 
Constabulary 1901-1991 (Manila, ABoCan, 1991), p. 5.  
39 First called the Insular Constabulary.  For the order to establish the Philippine Constabulary, see Act 175: 
Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission (Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), pp. 
369-74; for colonial officials’ thinking, see Luke E. Wright, “Report of the Secretary of Commerce and 
Police,” in the Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission for 1903, part III (Washington, DC: GPO, 1904), 
pp. 3-4; for additional political context, see Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 213; Coats, The 
Philippine Constabulary, pp. 1-27.   
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colonial officers from the success of “the British in the Indian and Straits settlements, by the Dutch 
in Java, and by our own General Davis in Puerto Rico.”40   
The PC, responsible for administering colonial order, thus replaced the U.S. Army’s 70,000 
forces with a total of approximately 5,000 men. Though the initial intent was to have “not exceeding 
150 men for each province, selected from the natives thereof”, in practice the number of companies 
assigned to each province varied by size and the local security situation.41 Subsequent American 
efforts to train and improve Philippine police forces would focus on the Constabulary, and the PC’s 
writ would increase as colonial officials sought to avoid reintroducing the Army in rebellious 
provinces.42 But budget constraints handicapped investment in the Constabulary. The administration 
could not ask the American public – then clamoring against a mounting deficit – to support an 
expensive Constabulary for a war it had declared over, and the U.S. Army’s dislike of the 
Constabulary meant that no support was forthcoming from those quarters (at one point, the Army 
blocked the Commission’s order of rifles for new Constabulary troops, while lavishly supporting and 
paying its own Philippine Scouts). Instead, local revenues funded the PC, limiting its size, 
equipment, and salary.43  This meant that the PC never achieved a monopoly on the use of force at 
the local level. Instead, security in the villages and municipalities was left to the untrained, 
fragmented municipal forces, which numbered between seven and eight thousand.  In Manila in 
1934, the police-citizen ratio was 1:407, but the national average was 1:1,525.44  
                                                 
40 Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” pp. 8, 12.  The British, however, believed reliance on natives to be an 
error; one Hong Kong newspaper suggested that imported Chinese troops would be more reliable.  
41 Taft’s instructions to Root, quoted in Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” p. 13.  
42 Matsuzaki,”Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 209, 215.     
43 Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” p. 14.   
44 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 357.   
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Tensions also existed not just between the PC and the various municipal police agencies, but 
between the PC and the Philippine Scouts.  The Scouts were an organization within the U.S. Army, 
incorporated in the second half of 1901. They functioned as regular infantry and were envisioned as 
an auxiliary force for external defense. Both the Scouts and the PC relied on native enlisted men, but 
the Scouts’ placement under the U.S. Army resulted in clear differences between the two forces. 
Unlike the Scouts, which sent a handful of its officers to West Point, the constabulary trained its 
forces at a domestic academy – which became especially important after the outbreak of World War 
One drained away the remaining American officers to fight in Europe.45 Moreover, because the 
Scouts were under the aegis of the Army, they were generally well-fed, well-paid, and well-equipped; 
observers at the time noted the obvious contrast to the locally raised and locally funded 
Constabulary forces. Perhaps unsurprisingly, news reports from an English paper in Hong Kong at 
the time reported that the ragged Constabulary members, deployed alongside the Scouts, regarded 
“the well-dressed, overfed Scout with bitter hatred.”46 
Despite the initial intent that the PC should represent civilianization of the American 
presence, the Constabulary was in practice organized and administered like a military organization, 
after the Guardia Civil it was modeled on.47  It was organized into companies, in which two or three 
officers oversaw 40-60 constables; it operated from barracks, albeit in smaller detachments than a 
typical military arrangement; its companies were assigned across five districts: three in Luzon, two in 
the Visayas, and one in Mindanao (the last of which operated alongside the U.S. Army).  A 
company’s jurisdiction generally ranged from a population of 10,000 to several hundred thousand, 
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and across a territory that spanned anywhere from a few square miles to a few hundred.  Secretary of 
the Interior and Philippine Commission member Dean Worcester described the PC as: “A body of 
armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the islands, officered in 
part by Americans and in part by Filipinos and employed primarily for police duty in connection 
with the establishment and maintenance of public order.”48  
Worcester’s description highlights two notable characteristics of the envisioned and actual 
composition of the Philippine Constabulary.  First, its officers were largely men trained by the U.S. 
Army, who instructed their companies on the basis of Army Manuals – reinforcing the strong 
military character of the initial Constabulary. As the counter-insurgency continued through 1905, the 
PC gained authority to command native military divisions, including the Scouts, along with volunteer 
deployments. After 1905, however, Taft ordered Allen to restore the civil policing focus of the 
Constabulary and purge the military mindset, with the result that American officials serving in the 
Constabulary for the next ten years collaborated more closely with local elites. From the 
correspondence of American officials serving in the Philippines, these changes and the ones 
described in the following paragraphs were generally successful; the Philippine Commission noted 
appreciatively the improved discipline and cessation of abuses by PC forces, but then proceeded to 
worry that the PC had actually made itself too popular with the locals.49 
Second, in contrast to the Spanish colonial period, the men of the PC under American rule – 
including the officer corps – were mainly Filipinos.  For the first decade, PC officers were generally 
U.S. Army officers on detail (70% of officers before 1917); but a change in regulations in 1913 and 
the exodus of American officers to fight in World War I prompted “Filipinization,” such that by 
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1933 only 3% of Constabulary officers were American.50 Perhaps most importantly, each province 
of the archipelago furnished its own quota of men, and they were assigned within their home 
province – an important difference from the Spanish system.  The Philippine Commission explicitly 
reasoned that the risk of corruption and defection would be offset by an intelligence advantage: 
“their familiarity with local dialects, geography, and political conditions was seen as an important 
asset in combating outlaws and insurgents.” Ex-revolutionaries, they thought, would know “the 
locations of the safehouses and the meeting places of the outlaws.”51 Relatedly, in-group policing 
was also seen as a way to reduce the brutality for which the Guardia Civil had been known, for 
which the American occupation had been criticized, and which had also been recently employed by 
Filipino soldiers in the Philippine Scouts against other ethnic groups.52  
Early efforts at establishing the Constabulary also aimed to foster an intelligence system that 
was deeply embedded in Philippine society, and that would give the Americans and their Filipino 
allies an informational advantage.  The first Chief of Constabulary, Brigadier General Henry Allen, 
had served in the Information Division of the United States Army and as a military attaché in tsarist 
Russia, and established an Information Division within the Philippine Constabulary.53 An early and 
strident critic of using torture to obtain information, Allen instead sought to establish a wide 
network of paid and voluntary informants throughout the island chain. Colonial officials give several 
examples in memoirs of local intelligence forestalling insurrections:  
 
“When General Harbord was acting chief, an organization which had been working for 
months planned an insurrection.  The night before the outbreak was to occur, six Filipinos 
were invited to assemble in Gen. Harbord’s office, where they found six chairs placed in a 
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row and upon which they were told to sit.  He then informed them that an insurrection 
was planned to break out at ten-thirty the following morning, and that it would be the duty 
of the Constabulary to put it down; that there would be some loss of life attached to the 
process, and that probably a good many innocent lives would be lost because the real 
culprits in these movements usually acted under cover. He informed them that in this case, 
however, the real instigators of the insurrection were known to the police, and that they 
would be the first men shot. With this information he opened the door and told them they 
could go out and start their insurrection if they wished. Six badly frightened conspirators 
spent the next ten and a half hours in suppressing a movement they had spent as many 
months in fomenting. No blood was spilt, no arrests made, no harm ensued.”54 
 
In 1904, the Constabulary had 118 paid informants and an unknown number of volunteers, and had 
investigated 1598 cases (information on the activities of the Information Division, and assessments 
of its efficacy, are not available after that year).55  Metropolitan Manila’s police force, which 
benefited more than any other from the transmission of state-of-the-art intelligence techniques and 
technologies, also amassed an alphabetized file card index of two hundred thousand Filipinos: 70% 
of the population of Manila.56  Perhaps as a result, the period from 1905 to World War II was 
relatively peaceful in the Philippines; the major insurgencies were defeated by around 1905 (all by 
1911, with the partial exception of Mindanao), and the PC quickly and effectively suppressed rural 
unrest related to rising inequality and land tenancy that began in the 1920’s.57   
The colonial period, in short, bequeathed to the archipelago an internal security apparatus 
that was tripartite and fragmented, but socially inclusive – one that sought to rely on Filipinos’ own 
local social knowledge to provide the intelligence fundamental to effective policing.   
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After Independence: The Philippine Military and Philippine Constabulary  
 
In the years between 1935 – when Philippine leaders began preparing for the independence 
promised in 1945 – and 1965, when Ferdinand Marcos assumed the presidency, the Philippine 
coercive apparatus underwent multiple changes and reorganizations. These were oriented first 
around preparing the country to defend itself against external threats – namely, the threat of 
Japanese invasion – and second around establishing domestic order and combating insurgency after 
the war ended in the Pacific.   
After the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1935, U.S. colonial officials took a 
more hands-off role in domestic issues, though the High Commissioner retained the right of veto.58 
In place of the Governor-General, the Philippine Constitution drafted in July 1934 empowered the 
President as commander-in-chief of both the Constabulary and any new external defense force; 
Article VII also provided him the constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus or place the 
Philippines under martial law “in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger 
thereof, when the public safety requires it.”59 These broad executive powers – not granted to 
American presidents – were assumed by President Manuel Quezon in 1935.   
Before his election to the presidency, Quezon had fostered a close relationship with the 
Philippine Constabulary.60  As early as the mid-1920’s, he had championed greater pay and pensions 
for the PC, advocated for the promotion of Filipino officers, and tried to influence the choice of a 
new PC chief in 1932.  He also argued that the PC should become the foundation of a new national 
army responsible for external defense, a belief shared by the Governor-General and the legislature 
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(though how the PC would act as both national army and national police was never entirely 
clarified).61 Correctly anticipating that Quezon and his Nacionalista Party would be the next 
inhabitants of Malacanang, PC officials responded by courting Quezon’s patronage, offering him 
political intelligence during the election and physical protection before and after, against 
assassination and mobilization threats made by his primary opponent, ex-General Emilio Aguinaldo.  
Thus, historian Alfred McCoy notes, while the PC avoided compromising itself at the local level, like 
the municipal forces often did during the colonial era, it remained subject to political influence at the 
national level. The Constabulary became a tool of central state power and executive authority, and 
some classic tools of autocratic control began to appear: in 1936, in the name of restraining 
clientalism, Quezon promulgated a “fixed policy not to permit the retention of Constabulary officers 
in the same province for too long a time, especially when they have relatives in that province,” with 
the goal of persuading people that kinship was no longer “a consideration which influences public 
officials in their official acts.”62  
With independence a promised ten years away, Quezon faced a serious external security 
challenge, and responded by reorganizing the Philippines’ security forces to address this threat – 
particularly by attempting to make them a truly national military force representative of all of 
Philippine society.  As historian Alfred McCoy explains, “The United States had decided to give up 
its bases.  Japan was on the march in China.  The threat of invasion was very real.”63 His first 
Executive Order, therefore, was the National Defense Act, which began mobilizing an army of 
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10,000 regular soldiers and 400,000 reservists (a goal to be achieved by 1945).  The Philippine 
Constabulary became the Army’s First Regular Division, and its veterans assumed leadership 
positions throughout the new army.64 This, however, created two problems: how to construct the 
officer corps of the new Army, and how to fill the domestic policing vacuum left by the withdrawal 
of the 8,700-strong Philippine Constabulary.  
Attempts to fill the domestic vacuum were inconsistent, chaotic, and ineffective.65  Quezon 
did succeed in creating a nonpartisan professionalized investigative agency: the Justice Department’s 
Division of Investigation, eventually called the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).  In October 
1936, he unsuccessfully attempted to integrate city, municipal, and provincial police under a 
Department of Interior State Police.  As this program faltered, blocked by unhappy legislators and 
provincial authorities who stood to lose control over their forces under Quezon’s plan, the 
Constabulary was pulled back into domestic policing; in June 1938, it was partially re-detached from 
the Army and placed under direct presidential control. But Quezon’s Executive Order 153 placed 
the Constabulary in a supervisory role over local police, while the legislature’s Commonwealth Act 
343 did exactly the opposite. After a tense standoff, Quezon caved; November’s Executive Order 
175 made governors and mayors responsible for their jurisdiction’s police forces, and removed the 
constabulary from presidential control. The exceptions were a handful of new cities chartered by 
Quezon himself – including the new capital, Quezon City, on Manila’s northern border – where 
Constabulary officials still headed the police force and answered directly to Quezon.66 Near the end 
of the Commonwealth period, the municipal police remained “political henchmen” at the behest of 
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local officials, and “instruments of oppression rather than of law.”67 And after all that shuffling, by 
January 1939, the Army was under the Department of Defense, the Constabulary was under the 
Department of the Interior, and local police forces were back under the control of local politicians – 
a tripartite structure not so different from that of the pre-Commonwealth era.   
In order to combat the looming external threat, Quezon wanted a united officer corps and a 
national military whose effectiveness would not be compromised by local politicians (who were also, 
sometimes, his legislative opponents at the central level).  He rejected the option of composing his 
officer corps solely from graduates of ROTC programs at the country’s elite universities – a move 
that would have drawn the country’s military elite from the same ranks as its economic elite, and 
bound them together through shared class ties. Instead, he followed a “professionalized” military 
model along Western (and especially American) lines, which sought to make the military more 
broadly inclusive of all of Philippine society.  In 1936, the National Defense Act / Commonwealth 
Order No. 1 established the Philippine Military Academy (PMA, formerly the Philippine 
Constabulary Academy).  The PMA admitted many officer candidates from a broad swathe of the 
lower middle class, while families from the upper tiers of society could join the military after 
participating in a university ROTC program – an attempt to make the military a representative and 
truly national institution.  
Creation of this system was quickly overtaken by the widening of the Second World War in 
the Pacific.68 On 26 July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the Philippine Army to the 
service of the United States, and American forces in the Philippines came under attack ten hours 
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after the Japanese attack on U.S. forces stationed at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.69 General Douglas 
MacArthur’s air forces were destroyed, and the navy was ordered to withdraw; MacArthur himself 
escaped to Australia, and Quezon and Sergio Osmena left to form a government-in-exile in the 
United States. The remaining American and Filipino troops withdrew to the Bataan peninsula and 
Manila Bay’s Corregidor Island, without the possibility of reinforcement or resupply. Manila was 
occupied in January 1942, and in April and May the forces at Bataan and Corregidor surrendered, 
leading to the infamous Bataan death march and paving the way for a harsh occupation that 
provoked resistance from an estimated quarter-million guerillas.70 In October 1944, American forces 
fighting their way back northward landed in the Philippines.  MacArthur brought with him President 
Sergio Osmena, who had assumed the office-in-exile after Quezon’s death.   
Several major factors at the end of World War II shaped the evolution of Philippine security 
institutions after 1945. First was the sheer complexity of the security challenge awaiting the 
reconstituted Philippine authorities.  The process of reconquering the Philippines was both one of 
expelling the Japanese and of re-establishing domestic order – and the latter task meant reaching 
some institutional arrangement between arriving Army forces and the domestic insurgent groups 
who had taken up arms against the Japanese in their absence. In 1946, local police agencies were 
overwhelmed by the disruptions of war, and in many cases had also been discredited by accusations 
of collaboration with the occupying Japanese.  Weakening of state control had led to an increase in 
the use of private armies by local officials and families, and the strength of private militias-turned-
guerilla-groups relative to local municipal forces had increased.  The result was what Matsuzaki calls 
a de facto ‘warlordism’ in the Philippines.71 In an attempt to regain control during the war, the 
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military actively recognized anti-Japanese guerilla forces, and after reviewing them for potential acts 
of disloyalty, incorporated them into regular Army units. (After the war, Loyalty Status Boards 
investigated accused collaborators.) Even after a postwar firearm recovery program confiscated 
several hundred thousand small arms, officials estimated in 1950 that four thousand more firearms 
remained “loose in irresponsible hands.”72  
The proliferation of local armed groups in wartime had shattered any public monopoly on 
coercive power. One of the most egregious examples in the late 1940’s is Governor Rafael Lacson in 
Negros Occidental and his private militia, composed of 130 “Special Police” supplemented by 59 
provincial guards.73 Lacson obtained control over the municipal police forces by manipulating the 
1947 local elections, and then used those to intimidate the private security forces of the local sugar 
mill into acquiescence.  Most importantly, he delivered a stunning 92% majority for unpopular 
incumbent Quirino in his province during the October 1949 election (compared to a national 
average of 51%).  In exchange, he demanded – and received – control over the personnel 
appointments of the local Philippine Constabulary, including commanding Captain Marcial 
Enriquez.  The Constabulary then assisted Lacson in merging all municipal police into a single 
provincial command reporting directly to him, and in forming local vigilante groups also directly 
responsible to the Provincial Governor. During the 1951 election, Lacson accused the mayoral 
candidate of being a Communist; his Special Police then publicly tortured the man for three days in 
four different public plazas before murdering him – all while Captain Enriquez held Constabulary 
forces in abeyance. Defense Secretary Magsaysay, who had ordered Marines and ROTC cadets to 
the area to attempt to prevent the anticipated electoral violence, paid homage to the slain candidate 
in a trip that received prominent coverage in the Manila Times – written by then-star reporter and 
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future politician-dissident Benigno Aquino, Jr. Even with the brutality of the murder and ensuing 
public outcry, Quirino hesitated; not until the government filed charges and Magsaysay informed 
him that the people were “ready to stone Malacanang Palace,” did Quirino remove Lacson from 
office.  Nor was this the only case of warlord politics; the dynamics persisted elsewhere, founded on 
what observers cynically termed the trinity of Philippine politics: guns, goons, and gold.74  Private 
fiefdoms operated personal security forces that wielded unchecked coercive force against those 
outside the leaders’ social network, exerting a strong disintegrationist pull against central authority.  
 American assistance also proved influential to the evolution of the Philippine coercive 
apparatus, primarily because it freed a rapidly demobilizing Army to concentrate on domestic tasks, 
while U.S. forces assumed responsibility for external defense. After Osmena’s return, the Philippine 
Army was reconstituted under the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under operational 
command of General MacArthur. The wartime and immediately post-wartime Philippine Army 
remained under the U.S. military’s operational command and financial control; it was “not only paid, 
but fed, clothes, and equipped” by the U.S. Army.75 Members of the Philippine Army were released 
from American service, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was officially re-activated on 
30th June 1946, four days before the July 4th declaration of Philippine independence.  Neither the 
army’s size nor resource allocation, however, could be maintained after it was released from U.S. 
control and support. The result was a rapid decrease in the Army’s size: from an estimated peak of 
317,792 to less than 10% of that (30,000) after a multi-stage demobilization process.76  
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At the same time, however, Philippine authorities had to find a way to exert control over the 
7,000 islands that made up the archipelago. Because of the weak capacity and low legitimacy of local 
police forces, in June 1945 Osmena created the Military Police Command (MPC) within the 
Philippine Army. As with the rest of the Army, the Philippine MPC remained under the command 
of the MPC of the U.S. Army until June 1946. The MPC’s 23,000 troops were tasked to maintain 
law and order, to assist enforcement of civil government’s laws, and, additionally, “to supervise local 
police forces and to assist in their reorganization.”77  From the beginning, the MPC was also tasked 
with anti-dissident operations. This placed the MPC in a role nearly identical to that of the previous 
Philippine Constabulary, and in fact, its first two commanders – Brigadier General Federico Oboza 
and Brigadier General Mariano Castaneda – were both officers of the prewar PC.   
After the war, American and Philippine leaders agreed on a division of labor: that the 
Philippine military should concentrate primarily on internal defense and anti-subversion in addition 
to national reconstruction. Under the Military Base Agreement concluded on 14 March 1947, the 
American military would handle external defense through its bases at Clark Air Field and Subic Bay 
Naval Station – which during the Cold War became the largest overseas American military bases in 
the world.78 The Secretary of Defense advised President Truman that “the strategic importance of 
the Philippines is not open to question” and suggested that assistance to the Philippines would be 
advisable.79 The Philippines thus signed a Military Assistance Agreement (21 March 1947) to provide 
defense equipment and supplies, and the U.S. Military Advisory Group (USMAG) based at Fort 
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Bonifacio in Manila provided training and advice – with the result that from 1946 to 1971, the 
United States sent Manila a total of $704 million in military equipment and training.80  After the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S and the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense 
Treaty on 30 August 1951 (predating the MDT with Japan by just over a week). The Philippines also 
participated in SEATO, signing the agreement in September 1954 and ratifying it in February 1955.81 
America’s de facto authority over external defense arrangements meant that the United States 
Department of Defense determined the post-war troop strength of the AFP, increasing it from 
37,000 to 57,000 in 1952.  The United States also “set [the AFP’s] order of battle and supplied much 
of its equipment.”82   
With American forces assuming responsibility for external threats, the primary focus of the 
Philippine military and coercive apparatus became establishing order among the population.  In the 
late 1940’s, the AFP and MPC confronted a serious internal security challenge: peasant rebellion in 
central Luzon by the Communist Party and its 15,000 Hukbalahap, or Huk, guerillas. 83 The Huk had 
learned their combat skills fighting the Japanese occupation, and had refused to rejoin the Philippine 
Army unless they could remain a distinct unit – a demand that was not accepted.84 The absence of 
land reform coalesced Central Luzon’s 2.5 million peasants behind the Huk partisans, especially after 
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its leaders were dismissed from Congress on unproven charges of corruption in 1946.85 Indeed, a 
November 1950 study by the National Security Council accurately concluded that the failure to 
pursue land reform in the Philippines, in contrast to its progress in both Taiwan and South Korea, 
fomented grievances that provided the opportunity for Communist mobilization.86 The lack of land 
reform was also one of the major factors that kept an upper crust of interlocking elite families in 
control in the provinces, where they fielded local police forces who were effective executors of local 
bossism, but inadequate in the face of organized armed rebellion. 
Philippine authorities seemed unable to decide whether they wanted their Constabulary to be 
a military or a police force; they experimented with both to see which might be more effective in 
dealing with the Huk.  In the early years of the rebellion, the brutality and ineffectiveness of the 
MPC in responding to peasant dissidence prompted President Manuel Roxas to split it away from 
the Armed Forces.  Under Executive Order No. 94 in October 1947 (six months after the signing of 
the initial mutual defense agreements) the now-renamed Philippine Constabulary was moved back to 
the Department of the Interior.87 As of 1 January 1948, its troop strength stood at 12,000: 4 zone 
headquarters, 50 provincial commands, 84 MP companies, two light tank companies, and several 
other units.88 Renaming the PC and redrawing organizational lines, however, seemed ineffective 
either in terms of reducing police brutality or in terms of quelling the rebellion. A U.S. Army study, 
observing the decline in Constabulary performance as compared to pre-war conditions, concluded 
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that its troops were inflicting “terror and oppression” amongst the inhabitants of Central Luzon.89 
Seeing the PC’s ineffectiveness and the escalation of the Huk rebellion to its apex in 1949-50, 
President Quirino aborted the civilianization of the Philippine Constabulary. On 30 March 1950, 
Executive Order No. 308 again made the PC one of the services of the AFP (along with the Army, 
Air Force, and Navy) and placed PC units in Luzon under AFP command. Under the advice of 
Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, who assumed his position in August 1950, 
President Quirino confirmed the PC’s status as an AFP service under Executive Order No. 389 (23 
December 1950).90  The Constabulary would remain a military service from then on.  
Magsaysay worked with U.S. advisors – in particular, ethnographer Col. Charles Bohannan 
and the CIA’s Maj. Edward Lansdale, later fictionalized in The Quiet American and The Ugly American – 
to reshape the AFP’s structure and strategy for effective guerilla war.91 The Army became the 
Philippine government’s major striking force, relying on twenty-six American-equipped Battalion 
Combat Teams (BCTs) who operated with unusual autonomy from division headquarters. The 
Scout Rangers, now company-sized mobile commando units, protected BCTs from ambush. 
Magsaysay’s approach to counterinsurgency, which paired “all-out friendship” toward civilians with 
“all-out force” against guerilla fighters, relied heavily on the Military Intelligence Services (MIS) to 
distinguish between the two populations. He placed MIS personnel within the BCTs,92 and directed 
military personnel engaged in anti-Huk operations to emphasize public relations to facilitate “the 
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extraction of important and timely information.”93 These efforts were paired with psychological 
warfare operations, supported by the U.S. Information Service and USMAG and run by Jose Cristol 
in the Civil Affairs Office, that ran the gamut from banal (using public affairs officers to publicize 
military successes) to ruthless (staged executions to frighten the local population into giving up 
names of Huk operatives) to bizarrely macabre (staging attacks by asuwang, a Philippine folk version 
of the vampire).94 On the more conventional “hearts and minds” side of things, Magsaysay also 
attempted to address the social and economic sources of discontent.95 Finally, Magsaysay promised 
significant (250,000 peso) monetary awards for information on top communist leaders; AFP 
members received promotions and awards rather than money, but it is especially important to note 
that – in contrast to the bounty system later used by Marcos – rewards were given for information 
rather than for capture or killing.96   
The information accumulated through this military intelligence program culminated in the 
headhunting and capture of multiple high-level targets in the first half of the 1950’s, including 
elimination of entire Huk Regional Commands and the capture of Huk leader Taruc’s son Romeo.97 
The Huk campaign also led to passage of Act No. 1700, called the Anti-Subversion Law, which 
passed on 19 June 1957 and outlawed dissident organizations such as the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and which was to remain relevant after the Huk insurgency had dissipated. All in all, the 
campaign was judged an unequivocal success by Philippine and American authorities; the global 
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counter-guerilla doctrine promulgated by the NSC in 1962 cited as its sole example the successes 
achieved by Magsaysay.98  
As the PC worked to gradually neutralize the Huks, local police attempted, less successfully, 
to keep local warlords and organized crime in check.  (The PC, however, were not wholly relieved 
from these duties, leading one Brigadier General to observe that the PC may have been 
“overcommitted and undersupported” and that it existed in a state of fragmented and partially 
overlapping responsibility with local forces of questionable commitment and quality.99) Local mayors 
appointed officers on the basis of “political servitude” rather than loyalty, and they served under a 
combination of political pressure and “conflicting, confusing, and antiquated laws,” with no training, 
inspection, or attention to their professional development; performance and morale were low.100 In 
1955, the first postwar study of Philippine policing noted that more than 85% of the country’s 
13,100 municipal police received no training;101 in April 1965, the Philippine Civil Service 
Commission found that only 30% of municipal police officers would be eligible to join the civil 
service on meritocratic grounds.102  
Because jurisdictions were unclear, competition between rival police forces obstructed 
professional behavior.103 Salaries did not meet living standards, but high import duties made 
                                                 
98 National Security Council, Action Memorandum 182, “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” 24 August 
1962/September 1962.   
99 Campos, The Role of Police in Philippine Society, p. 184.   
100 Report to the President of the [Philippine] Police Commission (Manila: 3 May 1968).  Originally cited in 
Campos, p. 210.   
101 Jeter L. Williamson, A Survey of Police Services and Problems in the Philippines (Institute of Public Administration, 
University of the Philippines, 1955), pp. 17-31.   
102 Cited in Frank E. Walton et al, Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: USAID, 1966), pp. 
178-79.   
103 Fidel V. Ramos, “New Perspectives in the Fight Against Crime,” Diamond Jubilee Issue of the Philippine 
Constabulary, 1976, pp. 40-41.  
168 
 
smuggling and other illicit activities lucrative – so the local police often supplemented their wages 
with racketeering and outright participation in criminal operations. Of 1,600 suspected smugglers 
identified in an AFP investigation in the early 1960’s, fifty were in the constabulary and fourteen 
were provincial commanders;104 in 1967 an NBI investigation concluded that an average of forty-
eight policemen were implicated in major crimes every month.105 When they did try to enforce the 
laws, police had to communicate across the sprawling metropolis with commercial long-distance 
telephones that were “frequently out of order.”106 Unsurprisingly, rising urban crime and provincial 
lawlessness spiraled the country into a perceived crisis of public disorder and instability under 
President Macapagal.  Metro Manila – by 1962 a 155-square-mile metropolitan area of 2.4 million 
people – experienced rising crime and decreasing police capacity. The appalling consequences were 
documented in the studies done by the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of 
Public Safety (OPS): in seven years, robberies rose 100%, homicide 150%, and auto theft 300%.107   
 
Marcos the Democrat: Institutions of Public Security 1965-72  
 
Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965 on a promise to restore law and order in the 
Philippines, a policy he termed “Armor con Amor.”108 For the first thirteen months he was in office, 
Marcos occupied both the office of the president and the post of defense minister.  As a 
democratically elected leader whose electoral constituency would hold him accountable for 
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promising to restore popular order and decrease violence in the Philippines, Marcos pursued a set of 
reforms to do exactly that; he sought to increase centralization and coordination within the security 
apparatus and to expand the inclusiveness and reach of Philippine coercive institutions.  These were 
steps that he would reverse after declaring martial law in September 1972, when his primary 
vulnerability shifted from electoral defeat by the population to forcible overthrow by the military.    
During his first term (1965-69), Marcos sought to centralize police power and coordinate it 
through the executive branch.  His efforts took the form of interagency coordinating centers rather 
than complete institutional overhaul or a national police force: the Anti-Smuggling Action Center 
(ASAC); the President’s Agency for the Reform of Government Operations (PARGO); the Peace 
and Order Coordinating Council.109 In September 1966, in the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act No. 
4864), he also established the National Police Commission, charged with implementing the 
provisions of police reform and coordinating among various police agencies.110  
His flagship effort was Metro Manila. In July 1967, Marcos delegated appointment of the 
city’s police chief to the mayor; at the same time, he created the Metropolitan Police (Metropol) to 
coordinate the various police forces of Metro Manila’s four cities and nine municipalities (Executive 
Order No. 76), and created under Metropol a new Philippine Constabulary anti-riot force of two 
thousand mobile troopers.111 The creation of Metropolitan Command (Metrocom), as it was 
eventually called, marked the first operation of the Philippine Constabulary in Manila, which had 
previously relied on its own metropolitan police force and left the Constabulary to manage order in 
the provinces.  (Metrocom’s Intelligence Service Group (MISG), an “elite anti-subversion unit” 
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formed in 1972 after the declaration of martial law, would one day become infamous for its use of 
torture and extrajudicial killing.) Four years after its creation, in 1971, Metrocom had established an 
integrated communications network and fingerprint system spanning four provinces, 113 
municipalities, and six million people in a forty-mile radius centered on Manila.112  Marcos’ 
Metrocom project received millions of dollars of U.S. assistance through the Office of Public 
Security, so much that it dwarfed the poorly funded and badly trained municipal force (which had 
2,800 policemen to cover the area, a ratio of 1:3,000 – and a grand total of fourteen working police 
cars in a city of 8,000 vehicles).113 
Like Metrocom, the majority of Marcos’ efforts at police reform and improvement in 
Philippine public security were assisted and financially supported by the State Department’s USAID 
Office of Public Safety, which shared Marcos’ publicly pronounced goal of increased security and 
safety for the Philippine population.  Eisenhower had employed police programs with 115 advisors 
in 24 countries with a budget of $14.2 million,114 but the OPS program, begun in 1962 by President 
John F. Kennedy, was by 1968 a global counterinsurgency effort with over 400 advisors – who were 
recruited from American police departments, the FBI, the CIA, and sometimes Special Forces – and 
a budget of $35 million.115 The goal, as stated by the 1962 USAID Public Relations Guide, was that 
America’s police training programs would serve as “a vital part of our effort to help less developed 
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countries achieve internal security, which is essential if economic development is to create viable free 
nations”116 – or, as stated internally, to use the strengthened police capacity “to identify early the 
symptoms of an incipient subversive situation.”117 Robert Kennedy, a member of the Counter-
Insurgency Special Group [at the NSC] famously remarked, “I hope we teach these guys more than 
just how to direct traffic.”118 The Director of OPS – former Kansas City policeman turned career 
CIA employee Byron Engle, who served as a police administrator in MacArthur’s occupation of 
Japan – added that “Giving economic assistance without police assistance is like cooking soup 
without the salt” or “a football player running down the field with his pants down.”119  On a less 
colorful note, NSC official Robert Komer, the driving force behind the Kennedy administration’s 
expansion of Eisenhower-era police programs, argued, “We get more from the police in terms of 
preventative medicine than from any single U.S. program…. They are cost-effective… They provide 
the first line of defense against demonstrations, riots, and local insurrections.”120  
USAID expert Frank Walton had conducted a survey of the Manila Police Department in 
October 1964. In April 1966, at Marcos’ request, Engle tasked Walton and a team of experts 
contracted by OPS to conduct a three-month nationwide survey that began in July. This 1966 
USAID report, written after a ten-member survey team had visited for three months, opened with 
the bald statement: “Peace and order in the Philippines is deteriorating rapidly,” and went on to 
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support that assertion with the statistics that closed the previous section.121 OPS then budgeted $2.4 
million for the Philippines in the mid-1960’s – a relatively small amount compared to other 
recipients in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam at $94 million, Thailand at $70-80 million, and 
Indonesia at $10 million – and spent around $5 million from 1969 to 1973.122 These efforts were 
primarily intended to provide training to Philippine police officers and improve police infrastructure, 
and they provided most of the training that police anywhere in the Philippines got. The Police 
Commission’s 1968 report to Marcos, for example, noted, “except for a few large departments, the 
bulk of the training of local policemen was provided from outside sources.”123 284 Filipinos went to 
the United States for advanced training, and ten regional centers were constructed to train an 
estimated 23,902 police: 60% of the nationwide total), including Metrocom’s riot squad of 2,325 
men. Only 8% were trained by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Academy and 23% by 
the Constabulary’s Police School.124 Between 1962 and 1972, eighty-five Filipino officers trained at 
the International Police Academy in Washington, DC.125 The U.S. also helped supply 
communications networks and data management tools.126   
As with the police, Marcos initially sought to decrease fragmentation within the military, and 
to improve the AFP’s inclusiveness by increasing its size.  An upsurge in insurgency in the south 
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during the mid-1960’s led to the creation of a new defense concept in which Luzon and Mindanao 
were accorded equal importance, and of the establishment of a unified command to protect both 
areas – ostensibly a move that decreased fragmentation and improved coordination within the 
armed forces.127 Marcos also increased the overall strength of the armed forces from a baseline of 
45,000 to 55,000 in 1971 and 63,000 by 1972.128 Much of this increase was in the PC, which was the 
most widely deployed component of the AFP and took the brunt of insurgent attacks in Mindanao 
and elsewhere.129 At the same time, however, Marcos began to create parallel commands and units 
that answered solely to him rather than to the established military hierarchy; these included a special 
commando force that conducted Operation Merdeka in 1967,130 and an AFP-controlled “special 
force” that was used to coerce votes in at least two locations during the 1969 elections.131   
Marcos also relied increasingly on particular sets of trusted officials at the top of the internal 
security apparatus, a narrowing of the coercive apparatus’ social composition at the top that offset 
its more inclusive recruiting at the ground level. On the grounds of cleaning up a corrupt 
constabulary, he removed one-third of the provincial commanders from office and forced fourteen 
of the AFP’s twenty-five general officers into retirement. In their place, he began to lay the 
foundation of “a hierarchy bound to him by strong personal ties: old classmates from the [University 
of the Philippines] (UP) cadet corps, blood relatives, and fellows Ilocanos, the northern Luzon 
ethnic group known for being clannish.”132 Ilocano generals recalled from retirement to active duty 
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included with positions including General Ernesto Mata, who became Chief of Staff, and General 
Segundo Velasco, chief of the Philippine Constabulary.133 Marcos looked the other way when it 
came to legal infractions committed by his relatives and cronies.  For example, General Fabian 
Crisologo Ver, chief of presidential security, temporarily allowed one of his relatives – Congressman 
Floro Crisologo in Ilocos Sur, to the south of Marcos’ Ilocos Norte – to maintain a private army of 
300 men who imposed a roadblock “tax” on all tobacco being shipped from the province to the 
south, and who were used to kill local opponents and burn their villages.134  
Ultimately, Marcos’ efforts were far from effective in terms of improving public security. 
Crime in Metro Manila soared, including one of the highest murder rates in the world, and heroin 
use exploded.135 Though the various police agencies may have achieved some increased level of 
coordination, fragmentation and lack of cooperation between local police forces and the PC 
persisted; Constabulary officials complained that attempting to further collaboration simply drained 
resources that they could have applied to basic patrolling, and made them reactive rather than 
preventive in their approach to crime.136 General Rafael Ileto later complained that the disorder in 
the country was the result of a lack of political will at the top rather than limited PC capacity; 
Marcos’ reluctance to crack down on the activities of his friends and supporters blocked coordinated 
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efforts that would have been conducive to public security, such as confiscation of the archipelago’s 
growing number of loose firearms.137  
 
IV. Coercive Institutions and State Violence, 1972-86 
 
After Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he accelerated the process of 
establishing a security apparatus that was fragmented, competitive, and socially exclusive.  He 
divided power between different parts of the security apparatus and allowed each to create special 
teams to track and arrest or kill political dissidents.  He also made the security apparatus more 
exclusive and socially isolated: he preferentially hired members of his own ethnic group, decreased 
the police-citizen ratio, and assigned so many men to presidential protection that it hampered their 
surveillance of dissidents and their ability to patrol.  These changes to the security apparatus 
provided the individuals inside Marcos’ coercive institutions with both material and social incentives 
for violence, and decimated the intelligence capability that might have allowed them to maintain 
control with more judicious and pre-emptive forms of repression.    
 
Enabling Martial Law  
 
From March to August 1972, a set of twenty bombings racked Manila, including an 
explosion on August 21 at Plaza Miranda outside the famous Quiapo church, during a 10,000-
person rally organized by ex-Senator Benigno Aquino’s Liberal Party, then the strongest opposition 
to Marcos and the Nacionalistas.138 The final pretext for the declaration of martial law was an 
assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile on September 22nd, which Enrile later 
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reportedly admitted to having staged himself.139 Marcos ordered martial law into effect at midnight, 
and the military moved swiftly. (The Metrocom chief had been a military attaché to Indonesia and 
observed the trouble that pro-Sukarno radio and TV stations had caused; he recommended midnight 
because the major stations would be off the air, and had a plan to blow up the transmitter stations 
had martial law been imposed in daytime.140)  
The first person arrested, at midnight sharp during a meeting at the Manila Hilton, was 
Benigno Aquino. By 4am scores of Philippine politicians, journalists, and other prominent figures 
had also been taken into custody. Amnesty International estimated that the total number of 
detainees in the weeks after the declaration reached 30,000; the broad and high-level nature of the 
crackdown suggests that it was Marcos’ political opponents, not the small number of plausible NPA 
sympathizers, who were the real targets.141 The authorities also began to disarm private militias: 
perhaps corroborating Ileto’s allegations that will, not capacity, was the fundamental issue, the 
government had confiscated nearly 600,000 firearms by Christmas, and disbanded no less than 145 
private armies.142 A curfew was implemented, and the Constabulary’s Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) 
launched a largely successful crackdown on the heroin trade.143  
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In the fifteen pages of Proclamation 1081, which declared martial law, Marcos laid primary 
blame (18 of 22 “whereas” clauses) on a rising threat from the Communist New People’s Army, 
which he claimed had at least 8,000 active guerillas, 10,000 active support cadres, and 100,000 
sympathizers.144 No one shared this alarmist estimate of NPA strength, which was mocked in some 
of the leading political cartoons of the day.145  The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research concluded that the number of guerillas plus support cadres totaled 9,000 – half Marcos’ 
estimate – while a Rand Corporation report for the U.S. Army placed it even lower: 1,000 guerillas 
and 5-6,000 part-time militia members.  Moreover, the reports concluded, the NPA’s “military 
operations were at a low level and confined to remote areas, while it concentrated on recruitment 
and organization-building”; the NPA’s history records only 350 men with modern rifles.146  No 
objective evidence suggests that a rise in popular threat necessitated the need for martial law.   
In fact, evidence from conversations with Marcos, and from his private diaries, suggest that 
Marcos used martial law as a pretext to remain in office past his constitutionally mandated term, and 
that once he had decided to do so, his primary worry was that he would be opposed and deposed by 
other members of the Philippine elite – either other politically powerful families, or his own military, 
or some combination thereof.147  In his diary, he attributed popular opposition, and even the growth 
of the NPA itself, to the backing of elite families, including the Lopez family and that of his primary 
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political opponent, Benigno Aquino.148 These families were among the first targeted for arrest when 
Marcos declared martial law.  Marcos knew that he needed to manage the military if he wanted to 
survive in office. 149  “Marcos was not stupid,” one interviewee observed “He knew that to declare 
martial law he needed as broad a support from the military as possible... so he cultivated broad 
support, but gave the most sensitive work to the people he trusted most.”150  Marcos feared a coup, 
even in places that did not seem to have the power to execute one – such as a think tank that he 
himself had founded to do advisory work for the presidential office.151 However incorrect his 
perception might have been, the balance of evidence suggests that Marcos’ dominant perceived 
threat was that of a coup rather than the NPA insurgency.  
There is strong evidence to suggest that the bombings were orchestrated by Marcos to 
convince people of the need for martial law, and that Enrile’s assassination attempt was a 
manufactured operation.  The man who reportedly organized the bombings, General Ramon Cannu, 
was one of General Ver’s deputies, a “countersubversion specialist” and chief of Marcos’ Physical 
Protection Brigade in the PSU.  He was promoted to brigadier general on September 19, 1972 – two 
days before the imposition of martial law.152 According to sworn affidavits and interviews with 
American and Philippine military officials, the bombings were financed by “private corporations 
controlled by persons connected with President Ferdinand Marcos,” and actually carried out by 
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squads composed of highly trusted Constabulary officers, called the Monkees.153 (The Monkees 
originated in 1969 as armed gangs in the service of local politician-landlords in central Luzon; the 
Huk units they fought were nicknamed the Beatles.) In Manila, two trusted Constabulary officers 
supervised Monkee operations. Enrile later admitted that the bombing had been planned, explaining 
why he was not in his usual car, but the security vehicle following behind. Marcos’ writings suggest 
that he decided to impose martial law on September 17, rather than after the attack.154 
Whatever the exact truth of the bombings, there is no doubt that Marcos had been 
discussing and planning for the implementation of martial law with a small group of trusted officials 
for several months.  These generals – whom he named publicly two years later – became known as 
the “twelve apostles,” or more cynically, the “Rolex 12,” in memory of the reward with which he 
expressed his appreciation to each of them.155  
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Table 3.1: The “Rolex 12”   [* denotes “major service commander”]  
 
Name  Title (in Official Gazette)  Notes  
Juan Ponce Enrile  Secretary of National Defense Principal architect of martial law. 
Gen. Romeo Espino  AFP Chief of Staff Marcos’ college classmate.  
Maj. Gen. Rafael Zagala*  Commanding General, Army   ROTC graduate. 
Maj. Gen. Fidel Ramos*  Chief, Philippine Constabulary  Marcos’ cousin.  
West Point graduate.  
Maj. Gen. Jose Rancudo*  Chief, Air Force  ROTC graduate. 
Adm. Hilario Ruiz*  Flag Officer in Command, Navy  ROTC graduate. 
Fabian Ver    Head of Presidential Security.  
Marcos’ cousin. ROTC graduate. 
Col. Ignacio Paz  Chief of Intelligence, Joint General 
Staff  
 
Brig. Gen. Tomas Diaz  Commander, First PC Zone   
Brig. Gen. Alfredo Montoya  Commander, METROCOM   
Col. Romeo Gatan Provincial PC Commander of Rizal, 
Special Projects Officer 
PC Commander in Tarlac 
 (Aquino’s district).  
Col. Eduardo Cojuangco  “Recalled to active duty in the 
Armed Forces for Special Projects”  
Only civilian other than Enrile. 
Corazon Aquino’s cousin.   
 
Interviews suggest that Marcos discussed plans for martial law as early as July 1972 with a smaller 
group, nicknamed the Seven Wise Men by presidential aides in Malacanang: Marcos himself, Enrile, 
Ver, Diaz, Montoya, Gatan, and Cojuangco – a circle that, notably, excludes the major service 
commanders.  The fact that the service commanders were reportedly not privy to the operational 
planning that took place in July and August meant that the group making the initial plans had to do 
so assuming that one of their first tasks would be to “neutralize the Chief-of-Staff, even maybe the 
Chief of the Constabulary and all the other chiefs of major services.”156 The initial planning therefore 
relied almost exclusively on the forces that Marcos had developed or reorganized such that they 
reported directly to him, or to one of his most trusted inner circle.  
Marcos therefore ensured that loyalists occupied the positions most critical for seizing and 
maintaining power. In preparation for the declaration, in January 1972, he “promoted” two 
commanders who had made clear their belief that the armed forces’ role was to protect democracy 
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rather than to protect Marcos as the incumbent president. General Rafael (“Rocky”) Ileto became 
the AFP’s deputy chief of staff, and General Manuel Yan became the ambassador to Indonesia. 
These promotions, while flattering on paper, removed the generals from operational control over 
any troops.157  To command key positions around Metro Manila, he named loyalists Tomas Diaz and 
Alfredo Montoya: Diaz at the Philippine Constabulary 1st Zone, and Montoya as the head of 
Metrocom. This targeted rotation of commanders responsible for key internal security positions laid 
the operational groundwork for Marcos’ declaration.  
To make sure that his plans would not meet with strong opposition from the guarantors of 
his external security, Marcos had also discussed the possibility of martial law with U.S. Ambassador 
Henry Byroade. When Byroade indicated the “undesirability” of martial law,”158 Marcos pressed him 
for clarification, and – after flying to the U.S. to brief Nixon and Kissinger on the conditions and 
potential consequences – the ambassador responded that Washington would back Marcos if martial 
law was necessary to put down the Communist insurgency.159 American and Philippine sources, 
including General Romulo, claim that Marcos spoke directly to Nixon about whether the United 
States would object, and received a permissive answer. (Nixon denied this and his records, which are 
generally incomplete, contain no information on communications with Marcos.)160    
In declaring martial law, Proclamation 1081 invoked Article VII of the Constitution, which 
allowed the President to suspend habeas corpus and place the Philippines under martial law.161 
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Marcos next ordered that anyone detained for violating public order be “kept under detention until 
otherwise ordered released by me.”162 Amendment 6 to the Constitution explicitly authorized the 
President – whenever he judged there was a sufficiently severe threat to the country – to issue 
whatever executive decrees he deemed necessary.  Marcos used these decrees liberally, publishing 
over a thousand and issuing others that remained secret.163  These decrees were the legal tools that 
enabled the first wave of detentions of between 30,000 and 50,000 suspected subversives 
immediately after the declaration of martial law.164 And from the instigation of martial law in 1972 
until at least Marcos’ downfall in 1986, the Philippines also had Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders 
(ASSOs) or Presidential Commitment Orders (PCOs), which allowed the military to make arrests 
without warrants, confine suspects in “safe houses,” and conduct unlimited “tactical 
interrogations.”165 Because Marcos’ suspension of habeas corpus also removed the military’s anti-
dissident activities from judicial oversight, each squad was armed with legal backing for their actions 
and de facto immunity for any abuses committed. 
 
Structure and Fragmentation of the Coercive Apparatus  
 
After declaring martial law, Marcos pursued two major changes to the structure of the 
coercive apparatus. First, he consolidated the police and merged them into the Philippine 
Constabulary. Second, however, he made the PC one of four rival organizations with responsibility 
for internal security, each of which was placed in competition with the others.   
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At the start of the martial law period, local police were a conglomerate of “multi-structured, 
diverse, autonomous, and totally fragmented organizations,” ranging in size from two people to 
several thousand. The Philippines’ 33,865 police filled 1,611 municipal police forces and 62 city ones 
spread across a 7,000-island archipelago with minimal cross-unit communications ability.166 In 1975, 
Marcos implemented reforms intended to centralize police power into a single national force and 
pull control away from politically powerful local families.  In March 1974, he created a unified 
command (police, fire, and prison services) for Metro Manila. On August 8, 1975, Presidential 
Decree No. 765 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under a joint command structure with 
the Philippine Constabulary, in which the PC assumed administrative and operational control over 
local police forces, and the Constabulary chief became Director-General of the INP.167 The PC zone 
commander (and in Manila, the head of Metrocom) became the zone directors and director of the 
Metropolitan Police, and the four PC zones that had divided the country were realigned into 13 
regional commands mirroring that of the government and military.168  The PC’s 42,000 officers and 
the 65,000 policemen of the INP were hypothetically supposed to be able to work side by side after 
formal integration was completed around January 1976.169   
Other changes taking place at the same time, however, meant that the consolidation of the 
PC simply made it one of several competing coercive organizations under the Marcos regime. 
Marcos divided authority and power for internal security across several services and their 
commanders: AFP chief of staff General Romeo Espino (until 1981); General Fabian Ver at the 
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Presidential Security Command (and AFP chief of staff after 1981); Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce 
Enrile; and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary General Fidel Ramos.  Each organization possessed 
its own spy and anti-subversion units and interrogation facilities, and Marcos fostered competition 
among them.   
At the outset of martial law, Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, a civilian 
protégé of Marcos and the primary drafter of Proclamation 1081, was the second most powerful 
man in the Philippine archipelago. Enrile established the National Defense Intelligence Office 
(NIDO) and “ran a small antisubversion operation through his Security Unit.”  As chief of staff of 
the AFP, Marcos named his college classmate General Romeo Espino, who served in that post until 
1981 (a ten-year retention, unusually long tenure by normal standards).  Espino attempted to collect 
military intelligence under the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) 
and pursued suspected communists through the Military Intelligence Group (MIG).170 Marcos 
placed his cousin General Fabian Ver in charge of the National Intelligence and Security Agency 
(NISA) and the Presidential Security Command (PSC). The PSC under Ver grew remarkably: from a 
marginal detachment when he was a captain to a 1,000-strong force headed by then-General Ver in 
1972.  After martial law began, the PSC’s power expanded still further, to 7,000 men across what 
would have been multiple services – armed with helicopters, ships, and tanks.  Finally, Marcos’ 
cousin and PC chief General Fidel Ramos controlled the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit (CSU) 
and the Metrocom’s Intelligence and Security Group (MISG, commanded by Col. Rolando 
Abadilla), which would become particularly notorious for their use of torture.  Competition between 
these anti-subversion squads and their leaders became one of the key drivers of political violence in 
the post-1972 period. The rivalry that developed between Ver and Imelda Marcos on the one hand 
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and Ramos and Enrile on the other, which intensified as Ver accumulated power, was also to be 
particularly consequential for the Marcos regime.171 
 
Social Composition and Exclusivity of the Coercive Apparatus  
 
Marcos deliberately designed a set of coercive institutions that were socially exclusive and 
isolated from the wider Philippine population.  He achieved this in two ways: decreasing the number 
of military and police who were assigned to patrol in and work alongside the population, and relying 
increasingly on a small number of Ilocanos and family members for internal security responsibilities.  
This was not, however, how things looked initially. The 1971 ratio of military to population, 
.1% of the population (55,000 troops), was the lowest in Asia, but Marcos expanded the AFP’s 
numbers throughout the period of martial law: 62,000 in 1972; 113,000 by 1977; 150,000 by 1982.172   
He increased the AFP’s budget by 500% in the first four years, something made possible partly by a 
massive influx of American military aid.173  He also initially increased the number of police.  In 
Manila, for example, Marcos increased the police force to 3,200, though he still left significant power 
in the hands of Metrocom and its antiriot squads. By 1975, these increases in police and 
constabulary had raised the total number of internal security forces to 84,000: a police-citizen ratio 
of 1:492, nearly double the ratio four years earlier.   
But these initial results were misleading.  In practice, budget increases were directed at 
ensuring senior officers’ political loyalty, not improving the intelligence and fighting competence of 
the forces as a whole.  Marcos increased the salaries of officers by 150% the week after martial law 
was declared, and kept on generals who had passed retirement age to ensure that senior positions 
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remained in loyal hands; by 1984, over half of the Philippines’ generals had exceeded retirement 
age.174 Moreover, the increase in security personnel was both temporary and misallocated if the real 
goal had been policing the population.  Despite short-term increases after 1972, in the last five years 
of the Marcos regime, the ratio of police to population decreased to 1:1,120 (from 1:492 in 1976), 
even though serious crime continued to rise, exceeding 7.2 per hundred thousand by 1983 – over 
twice what it had been before martial law.175   
Rather than tackling crime and public safety, however, police and constabulary power was 
allocated elsewhere. By 1985, fully one-third of the AFP’s combat forces were assigned to 
presidential security duties, rather than external defense, counter-insurgency, or regular patrols.176  
Ver’s focus on presidential security was relentless and destructive to the AFP’s ability to prosecute 
the insurgency that had justified Marcos declaring martial law in the first place. After martial law 
came into force, Marcos also re-enforced the personnel rotation policy, previously codified on paper 
but not consistently enforced in practice, which required PC commanders to be transferred at the 
end of each three year-tour.177  These rotation policies further hampered the ability of the PC to get 
to know a particular area and understand its geography, social networks, and political dynamics.   
For security, Marcos relied increasingly on family and fellow Ilocanos.  One Filipino scholar 
explained, “It’s about people you can implicitly trust. Here that means relatives, school or fraternity 
members, and people of the same ethnic group or language… there were also Pampango and 
Tagalog generals” in addition to Ilocanos, bound to Marcos by some other social tie.178  From his 
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first political campaign in 1949, Marcos had played on ethnic loyalties, shouting to crowds in Ilocos 
Norte, “Elect me a Congressman now, and I pledge you an Ilocano President in twenty years.”179 
The appeals worked; as historian Teodoro Agoncillo explains clan and regional loyalties, “the 
Filipino believes that a candidate from his province or region, no matter how repugnant, is better 
than one who comes from another region.”180 Moreover, as the cartoon in Figure 3.3 shows, the 
public was well aware of Marcos’ Ilocano preference:  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Political Cartoon: Ilocano “Goon Rule”181   
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Ilocanos were particularly over-represented when it came to key positions in internal security.182  
Marcos’ chief of presidential security, Fabian Ver, was an Ilocano and a cousin, as was Marcos’ 
Constabulary chief Fidel Ramos.  Ver relied particularly heavily on family and ethnic loyalties to staff 
the Presidential Security Command; he appointed his son Irwin as PSC chief of staff, his son Wyrlo 
head of its anti-aircraft unit, and his son Rexor commanded the president’s close-in security.  Ver 
also opened a camp in Ilocos Norte to train Ilocanos for the PSC staff.183 Defense Minister Enrile 
was also an Ilocano, though when Ver monopolized the Ilocano ethnic group, he began to recruit 
Ilongo officers from the western Visayas to staff his security unit. 184 Ver and Ramos had the added 
credibility of having served in Major Marcos’ anti-Japanese guerilla unit (the exact history of which is 
much debated) -- Ver as a Third Lieutenant and Ramos as a Staff Sargeant.185 
School ties were important as well.  Two streams of recruitment fed officers into the AFP, 
each with its own social composition: one from the ROTC programs at elite civilian universities, the 
other through the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). The ROTC cadets were often members of 
the elite class that attended university, whereas PMA cadets were recruited from a “broad, lower-
middle social stratum.”186 Over time, more and more PMA officers were themselves the children and 
siblings of PMA graduates, creating a tight network among particular families and increasing the 
                                                 
182 Republic of the Philippines, Final Report, p. 42; Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, p. 119.   
183 Ferdinand Marcos, “Presidential Security Command: an Elite Unit of the AFP,” in Self-Reliance in Freedom: 
Contemporary Speeches and Writings on Philippine Defense and National Growth (Manila: Philippine Educational 
Promotion, 1977), pp. 71-75; Arturo C. Aruiza, Ferdinand E. Marcos: Malacanang to Makiki (Quezon City: AC 
Aruiza Enterprises, 1991), pp. 42-3; Angela Stuart Santiago, Duet for EDSA (Manila: Foundation for 
Worldwide People Power, 1995); Republic of the Philippines, Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Pursuant to 
RA No. 6832 (Manila: Bookmark, October 1990), p. 46; McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 226-228.   
184 Bonner, Waltzing With a Dictator, p. 14.  
185 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 227.  
186 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 8-9.  
189 
 
military’s insularity.187 By Marcos’ time, these networks of tightly connected PMA cadets dominated 
the more diffuse group of ROTC alumni.    
Marcos, who had attended the UP ROTC program, was suspicious of the tight class bonds 
formed at the PMA. The fact that various classes could conspire to replace him made the PMA 
network a significant threat.  To head his Presidential Security Command, then, he chose Fabian 
Ver, a graduate of the University of the Philippines’ ROTC program, who promoted subordinates 
from the ROTC’s Vanguard Fraternity.  As Ver and Imelda Marcos increasingly aligned against 
Enrile and Ramos, Enrile began to actively balance Ver’s promotion of ROTC reservists with 
advocacy for the traditionally dominant PMA graduates.  (Ramos attended West Point rather than 
the Philippine Military Academy; he had neither automatic backing from a PMA class nor the ROTC 
identity that helped Ver’s protégés.) By creating an alternative bloc within the military, Marcos took 
what had been a nationally inclusive institution, and manipulated its social composition to form two 
rival groups. He used these to protect himself, strengthening the hand of Ver and the ROTC faction 
to provide a check on the threatening lateral ties among PMA graduates.   
Competition between these leaders extended to the ranks below, playing out as the divide 
between PMA graduates and “integrees,” which is what graduates of university reservist/ROTC 
programs were called.188  For the first decade of martial law, Marcos chose to appoint ROTC 
graduates as major service commanders, rather than PMA graduates (see Table 3.1.)  These 
commanders included General Rafael Zagala for the Army; General Jose Rancudo for the Air Force; 
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and Admiral Hilario Ruiz for the Navy.189  When Espino retired in 1981, Marcos selected Ver – a 
reserve officer without the combat experience that had hardened most of the AFP – as the next 
AFP Chief of Staff, appointing him over Ramos, the other principal candidate. After Ver was named 
AFP chief of staff, he continued to promote followers from the ROTC and his previous intelligence 
work: Army General Josephus Ramas; Admiral Brillante Ochoco for the Navy; Gen. Roland 
Pattagulan in the infantry; Col. Pedro Balbanero in the military police; Gen. Artemio Tadiar as the 
Marine commandant.190  His promotion of his son Irwin (PMA class of 1970) to the rank of colonel 
over candidates from more senior PMA classes was particularly galling.191 So, too, was the 
perception that Ver’s integrees, like him, received political sinecures in Manila, where they enriched 
themselves at the expense of PMA graduates who were baptized by fire fighting the insurgency in 
Mindanao.192 In an interview with an American scholar in 1975, an AFP colonel described the 
academy-reservist rivalry as “our own silent war.”193 
From 1975 to 1985, a series of reforms and personnel shifts were enacted to strengthen Ver 
as Marcos’ consigliere and as a counterbalance to Ramos and Enrile.  Though these changes were 
intended to defend against Enrile and Ramos, they actually served to alienate both men, as well as 
the military networks that they commanded.  In 1978, Marcos removed Enrile from the chain of 
command: the first defense secretary in three decades who did not have operational control over 
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troop movements.  As a consequence, Enrile began to recruit Ilongo officers from the western 
Visayas to staff his security unit, to balance Ver’s promotion of reservists with his own advocacy of 
PMA graduates, and, in late 1981, to begin building a 300-person security force under Col. Honasan.   
Other changes marginalized and alienated Fidel Ramos.  After he became AFP chief of staff, 
Ver created Regional Unified Commands (RUCs) that superseded the Constabulary’s regional 
commands, and maneuvered the promotion of his own people into these positions; only one of 
twelve RUC commanders was loyal to Ramos. In August 1983, Marcos moved the INP under Ver’s 
headquarters, removing Ramos’ last operational units, and centralized the budget so that none of the 
service commanders, Ramos included, retained financial control.194 Marcos also blocked promotions 
recommended by Ramos, who though he lacked a PMA class network had become well-liked among 
the Constabulary for his extensive field visits over the course of fourteen years in office.  This not 
only antagonized Ramos, but every officer denied promotion.195  By 1983, Ramos had formed his 
own “PC Special Action Force,” which began sharing smuggled-in weapons and engaging in joint 
training exercises with Col. Honasan’s forces; these would become the basis of the Reform the 
Armed Forces Movement (RAM).196 Although reservists now served in the most politically 
influential positions, the fact that the 44% of the officer corps that had graduated from PMA 
dominated command posts would become problematic to Marcos when Ramos and Enrile, with 
RAM officers behind them, staged a mutiny-coup in February 1986.197   
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Intelligence and State Violence  
 
Fragmentation and social exclusivity within the coercive apparatus both contributed to a 
weak intelligence capacity vis-a-vis Philippine society. Poor intelligence led to indiscriminate violence 
by coercive institutions that were “flying blind.”  
First, Marcos limited the budget of the intelligence and security services and redeployed 
massive resources toward patronage of the elites he was truly worried about.  Just prior to 1975, 
budgetary restrictions placed the AFP’s “armament capability [at] only 60%, mobility 4%, 
communications capability 8%, and investigative capacity 4%” of their targets.198 Poorly financed 
troops on the ground lacked effective communications and surveillance ability, and had limited 
training and capacity to engage in analysis of the information that did exist.  In 1984, after the fiscal 
crisis restricted the government’s budgets, surveillance agents were allowed no more than 5 liters of 
gasoline a day in which to cover the sprawling, traffic-clogged metropolis – so even if the services 
had cars, they sometimes lacked gas to continue patrolling. Foot patrols were discarded.199 
Photographs, which the agents used to identify wanted dissidents, were restricted in circulation to a 
single province, meaning that positive identification of suspects once they’d been apprehended was 
difficult.200 Despite the fact that the ISAFP files contain several mentions of “American friends” 
having provided “advance equipment and gadgets for surveillance,” no evidence of these gadgets or 
their use has yet been located; the most sophisticated technology appears to have been a camera, 
used to create paper books of photographs, many of public events such as rallies or protests, with 
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handwritten annotations of varying accuracy and detail.201 Record-keeping was spotty, and the 
official police journal flags in mid-1985 as one of the “chief defects” of the Philippine police its 
inability to make effective use of a records system.202  
Comparatively speaking, the Philippines’ coercive apparatus relied heavily on violent 
methods to generate its information – much more so than Taiwan, which used pre-arrest 
surveillance to amass files on suspected dissidents that numbered in the hundreds or thousands of 
pages before any “kinetic action” (ie arrest) was taken.  In the Philippines, the AFP and security 
apparatus had three major sources of information: pre-arrest surveillance work; analysis of 
documents captured from the NPA and other dissidents during arrest raids; and information 
obtained through interrogation and torture in detention centers.203 Of these information-gathering 
methods, only surveillance does not involve the use of force against another individual.  Surveillance 
capacity was limited, however, and where it existed, its purpose appears to have been conceived of 
as intimidation, deterrence, and coercion rather than genuine information-gathering. When asked 
about surveillance during the martial law period, interviewees consistently interpreted the question 
and spoke about the visible presence of armed forces on campus and in other public places.  One 
interviewee who was then teaching at the University of the Philippines, for example, recounted 
students he did not recognize, in plain clothes but with a military demeanor, arriving to sit at the 
back of his class.204  Randy David, then the director of the Third World Studies Center at UP, 
commented, “it was not so much espionage, but a demonstration of their capacity to surveill you… 
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The whole idea was to show the capacity of the government to monitor.  It was really to intimidate 
you more than to gather information.”205 Surveillance seems to have served the function of 
intimidation and (unsuccessful) deterrence, rather than of actual information-gathering.  Not until 
the mid-1980’s, when Marcos’ rule was almost at its end, does one see a serious discussion of the 
informational advantages of community participation in policing, or an attempt to set up an 
intelligence network to offset the one operated by dissidents.206 
The AFP’s intelligence operatives also had difficulty infiltrating groups that it suspected of 
radical or subversive activity.  In a memo titled “Recruitment of Agents,” which discusses lessons 
shared between the United States and the Intelligence Services of the AFP, the writer is candid 
about the difficulty of recruiting effective infiltrators. According to the report, neither surrenderees 
nor detainees who had been coerced into signing an agreement to cooperate were terribly effective 
infiltrators.  The former were too suspicious to their comrades, and most of the latter broke their 
bargain with ISAFP to go back underground (though the report did note that the few who remained 
loyal provided valuable information on “organizations and personalities” of interest).  ISAFP’s 
attempts to plant agents among student activists – generally using individuals with family inside the 
coercive apparatus – faltered because these individuals, too, were objects of suspicion.207   
In other words, the Philippines’ domestic intelligence capacity suffered because of the 
limited social strata from which it could draw infiltrators and assets, and because of agents’ apparent 
failure to recognize that social differences would handicap their intelligence collection efforts.  Agent 
instructions did not encourage infiltrators to mingle with the population, and one 1975 report 
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described social distance between intelligence assets and villagers as the official policy, writing “Our 
people are advised to maintain distance between themselves and the village people” for fear that 
local women might be employed as spies.208 At other times, ISAFP agents simply had to be 
reassigned or pulled out because they had been exposed due to their own lack of understanding of 
the social networks and cultural landscape in which they had been directed to operate.  For example, 
agents sent to infiltrate stronghold areas of the New People’s Army were exposed because of their 
recurrent socialization and drinking with the government-backed Civilian Home Defense Forces. 
ISAFP reported that they were unable “to blend well with the residents of the poor barrios. They 
prefer fraternizing with the well-off farmers.”209  
Finally, intelligence was weak because the government appears not to have made much use 
of organizations outside the coercive apparatus to gather information – ones that in other countries 
serve as additional conduits of information.  For example, in April 1975, Marcos used Presidential 
Decree 684 to create the Kabataang Barangay (KB) youth movement.  Modeled on the Chinese Red 
Guards – Marcos was an admirer of Mao, reportedly for what he did to unite China – Kabataang 
Barangay was led by Marcos’ (then nineteen-year-old) daughter Imee, and provided for organization 
of youth KB units in the country’s 42,000 barangay.210 The primary reason that the KB does not seem 
to have served as a channel of information for the regime is that its chair participated only in the 
barangay council, which lacked an institutionalized, close working relationship with either the police 
                                                 
208 “On Hamletting,” Confidential Agent’s Report, ISAFP files, 4 February 1975.   
209 “Asset Planting and Infiltration,” ISAFP files, 20 December 197X [date cut off edge of document]; 
“Assets and Informants,” ISAFP files, Agent’s Report, Top Secret, 22 December 1976.    
210 Barangay, abbreviated Bgy., is Filipino for village, district, or ward – the smallest administrative unit.  KB 
units were abolished/replaced in 1991.  Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, 
November 2011.  
On the Marcoses admiration for Mao, see William F. Buckley, Jr., “Manila (II): Imelda dominates Manila, but 
what does she see in Chairman?” Star News, 27 November 1977.  
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or the Constabulary. The government also did not make use of the reservists and paramilitaries that 
it employed as cheaper substitutes for full-time AFP personnel, at least not in terms of tapping them 
for intelligence collection.  Although Home Defense activities were organized from 1970 on to 
coordinate non-combat and civil actions by the military, and were used increasingly in the 1980’s to 
help counter the insurgency,  the AFP seems to have used them more as a cheap personnel 
management tool than a channel for gathering intelligence.211 They were badly trained and poorly 
supervised; hundreds of reports filed by human rights NGO SELDA show that the Civilian Home 
Defense Forces were responsible for at least some of the extrajudicial killings and salvagings, 
especially in Mindanao.212  
Torture, on the other hand, was commonly used after 1972 in an attempt to generate 
information (and evidence).213 In 1975, Amnesty International’s report noted with outrage that “star 
chamber methods have been used on a wide scale to literally torture evidence into existence.”214 
Most often, this “physical extraction of information” was done at rented “safehouses,” managed by 
ISAFP and institutionalized upon advice from U.S. Embassy advisors, who based their guidance on 
American experiences in Vietnam and Central America, and taught the Filipino forces American 
terminology.215 Because of time pressure to extract information before someone realized the 
                                                 
211 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces, pp. 430, 565. This program educated military personnel in craftsmanship, 
including auto mechanics and basket and mat-weaving.  (Yes, really.)  Pobre also mentions the organization of 
Barrio Self-Defense Units, but these seem to have existed more on paper than as effective institutions in 
practice.    
212 Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, pp. 120-121.  
213 Torture does not appear to have been used prior to the declaration of martial law, though prisoner abuse 
in ordinary police custody had been a problem.     
214 Amnesty International, Report—1975, pp. 13, 57, 72-3, 85.    
215 Soviet and Chinese practice did not use the term “safehouse” or its equivalent. “Institution of Safehouses,” 
Top Secret report, ISAFP files, 2 January 1973; see also “On Clark Briefing,” Agent’s Report, Top Secret, 
ISAFP files, 12 November 1974.  On Soviet and Chinese practice, see Michael Schoenhals, Spying for the People: 
Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949-67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 182 
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detainee was missing and arrived at a military camp to ask for their whereabouts, safehouse 
interrogations quickly turned violent.  Detainee accounts suggest that if they did not provide 
information quickly, their interrogators simply escalated violence until they did.216  One account 
describes a prisoner’s 1982 detention and interrogation by one of the regime’s most infamous 
torturers, Lieutenant Rodolfo Aguinaldo (member of PMA class of 1972) of the 5th CSU:  
 
Aguinaldo grew frustrated when strangulation, beating, and electrocution failed to extract 
information from a twenty-five year old male prisoner named Marco Palo.  “Sonofabitch,” 
the lieutenant shouted at his subordinates, “Make him undress completely and electrocute 
his balls!”217 
 
When asked on a visit to the U.S. in 1986 about his responsibility for torture and other abuses, 
Aguinaldo’s comrade at the 5th CSU, Lieutenant Vic Batac (PMA class of 1971), replied that torture 
arose from “individual initiatives to get information in a short time.”218  A survey by the Philippine 
Medical Action Group of 120 political prisoners held at the National Penitentiary found that 102 
had been tortured. Other surveys showed similar ratios, and human right group SELDA placed the 
number of people tortured under Marcos at a total of 35,000.219  According to ISAFP’s own 
assessment, however, these efforts contributed little information of quality to ISAFP intelligence: 
“Forced confessions while they yield some information are generally not reliable and generate 
adverse publicity.”220  
                                                 
216 Author’s interviews with five former detainees, Quezon City, November 2011 and September 2012.   
217 Recounted in McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 214.  
218 See The Daily Cardinal, 17 October 1986; The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), 17 October 1986.  My 
thanks to Alfred McCoy for pointing me to these articles.  
219 The New York Times, 10 November 1986; Amnesty International, Report --1981, pp. 2-8; McCoy, Closer Than 
Brothers, p. 205; Amnesty International, The Philippines: the Killing Goes On (New York: Amnesty, 1992), p. 14.   
220 “Asset Planting and Infiltration,” ISAFP files, 20 December 197X. (date cut off document).   
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In cases where the coercive apparatus could not rely on coercion to extract information, the 
files make clear that intelligence was either non-existent or of poor quality.  In some cases, coercive 
institutions simply did not have the information, while in other cases, information collected by one 
organization was not shared with competing units.  One former detainee recounted, for example, 
that when he was detained, the Constabulary unit that had arrested him did not understand that the 
Communist movement had split between the old Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, 
PKP) and the new faction set up in December 1968 by Jose Maria Sison (the CPP and its armed 
wing, the NPA).221  ISAFP wrote a memo reporting on the split in late 1967 (as it was developing),222 
but that information had not been transmitted to the men responsible for tactical interrogation.  
Believing that he belonged to the CPP/NPA rather than PKP, they tortured him for a night, all the 
while asking questions appropriate to someone from the other wing.223  Another, who had been out 
of the country for most of the decade before martial law, was detained in 1972 and interrogated by a 
young second lieutenant about a lecture he’d given at the University of the Philippines that had no 
relevance to politics. “They had terrible intelligence,” he said, shaking his head, “It continues to this 
day.  It was partly interference by politicians… Each service had its own intelligence, including the 
police, and they competed with each other.”224   
The impact of fragmentation and bad intelligence on operational effectiveness becomes clear 
when one considers the outcome of one of the few times in which the competing services – ISAFP, 
MIG-15, MIG-4, MISG, and the Naval Intelligence Service Group – were forced to collaborate: 
                                                 
221 International Crisis Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” Asia 
Report No. 202 (February 2011), pp. 3-9.  
222 “Reported Split within the PKP,” Case Evaluation, Confidential, ISAFP files, 30 November-25 December 
1967.   
223 Eventually, he was transferred to a unit where a more experienced interrogator knew the difference. 
Author’s interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.  
224 Author’s interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011.  
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Task Force Makabansa, which achieved some notable tactical successes in February 1982.225 This 
unusual collaboration also seems to have been one of the few times that the coercive apparatus was 
able to act pre-emptively rather than reacting to developments that had already unfolded: the task 
force was organized to “conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist [CT] 
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro 
Manila.”226  Cross-unit cooperation, however, was generally rare.227  Years later, high ranking 
Philippine intelligence officials still discussed intelligence as important, but reactive; even as he 
emphasized that “the best way to neutralize a threat to a country’s stability is the use of intelligence, 
which is the acquisition of correct information that gives a basis for action,” ISAFP Chief General 
Galileo Kintanar spoke of the development of intelligence as a response to the emergence of the CPP, 
rather than information collected in anticipation of dissident action.228  
For all of these reasons, the files of dissidents who had not yet been arrested – and, 
presumably, tortured – are fewer and less detailed than the files of those who had been captured and 
incarcerated.  Perhaps the simplest illustration of this is a summary of the contents of two files, one 
                                                 
225 I count these as tactical successes only, and strategic failures, because they prompted the historic, if 
belated, Aberca v. Ver civil suit against some of Marcos’ most notorious torturers. The suit is described in 
McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 408-413, and the original case proceedings are available in the UP Law 
Library.   
226 Colonel Fidel C. Singson, “Presidential Order of Arrest and Detention Against Felix Manuel Y, Macaraeg 
and Twenty-Six (26) Others,” Annex 1, Rogelio Aberca et al, Plaintiffs, v. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver et al, Defendants, 
Civil Case No 37487, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Quezon City, 27 February 1982.  
227 In one exception, Maria Elena Ang recounts torture conducted by Atty. Lazaro Castillo of the NISA; Lt. 
Victor Batac of the 5th CSU, and Major Arsenio Esguerra of the 5th Military Intelligence Group, ISAFP. 
McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 214-15.    
228 Author’s interview with General Galileo Kintanar, former ISAFP chief, Metro Manila, September 2012; 
see also Kintanar’s doctoral dissertation and his books on the rise of the CPP.  Galileo Kintanar, Lost in Time: 
The Communist Party of the Philippines (Quezon City: Truth and Justice Foundation, 1999, 2 vols); Galileo C. 
Kintanar, A Counterinsurgency Approach in the Philippine Setting (PhD dissertation, Polytechnic University of the 
Philippines, 1990).  
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of a captured activist, and one of a wanted man who remained at large.229  The file of Person A lists 
four aliases, the man’s height, the fact that he sometimes wears eyeglasses (and photos with and 
without eyewear), his date and place of birth, citizenship, marital status and wife’s name, parents’ 
names, educational background (major and year of graduation), last known address, and a list of 
seven previous positions held in the CPP/NPA and other leftist organizations.  A “note” reads: 
“Apprehended by elements of the 5th CSU, Camp Crame, QC on 6th April 1973 at Salinas, San 
Dionisio, Paranaque, while he was about to get some of his clothes in their safehouse in Salinas.”230  
Contrast this to the file of Person B, wanted for violations of Section 4 of RA 1700, who remained 
at large.  His file contains only a photo, his citizenship, a list of six possible aliases and two suspected 
positions, and a last known address of “Bulan, Soraogon.”  The rest of the fields are blank.231   
The treatment of detainees after they were released from detention further confirms the 
coercive apparatus’ weak capacity for surveillance and information processing.  Former detainees in 
the Philippines spoke about being under “house detention” or, in some cases, “city arrest,” in which 
they were released from Camp Crame or Fort Bonifacio, but for a period of several years afterward 
had to appear once a month at the gates to report their activities and verify their presence.232  Others 
recounted having to appear once a week at Camp Crame so that an officer there could sign a report 
card certifying their presence in Manila.233  In contrast to Taiwan, however, the reports appear to 
have been less frequent and less detailed, and only the detainee him/herself was required to appear, 
with no cross-checking, corroboration, or even elaboration on their activities.   
                                                 
229 Names redacted to protect privacy.  While I use these two files for purposes of illustration, I was allowed 
to view approximately twenty files in total; in general, the pattern held.   
230 ISAFP Surveillance File, “Person A,” p. 27.  SECRET.  Anonymized for privacy protection.   
231 ISAFP Surveillance File, “Person B,” p. 28. SECRET.  Anonymized for privacy protection.   
232 Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.  
233 Author’s interview with Professor Amado Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011.  
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Coercive Institutions and Incentives for Violence  
 
The fragmentation and exclusivity of the coercive apparatus provided agents within these 
institutions with social and material incentives for violence.  In material terms, top officials were 
rewarded with access to coveted sectors of the economy, acclaim from Marcos and his wife, and 
public gifts like those that earned Marcos’ martial law planners their “Rolex 12” nickname. Defense 
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, for example, established extensive holdings in coconut and lumber, two 
of the Philippines most important industries.  Other regime insiders amassed extensive financial 
holdings, most of which were kept in overseas bank accounts.234  
At the lower levels, Marcos’ coercive institutions operated a bounty system to reward those 
who captured or killed suspected subversives.235  In 1982, the Philippines’ official police journal 
noted that police performance was measured in terms of body counts rather than information 
obtained or threats neutralized.  An article listed out these metrics: “the accomplishment of the 
PC/INP consists of body counts and quantities, namely: number arrested, numbers killed in 
encounters and raids, volume and amount of confiscated contraband…”236 In contrast to Magsaysay, 
who gave agents and individuals incentives for providing accurate information, the system set up by 
Marcos used acts of violence as the chief measures of professional success – whether the targets of 
that violence had actually done anything to deserve it or not.   
                                                 
234 Belinda Aquino, The Transnational Dynamics of the Marcos Plunder (paper published by UP-Diliman, National 
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Rewards for meeting these professional standards were significant, and clearly outlined. The 
capture of CPP leader Edgar Jopson (Edjop), for example, was worth an unusual promotion and 
P180,000 to Major Nelson Estares, head of the Constabulary Security Unit that captured him.  The 
suspected chairman of the CPP Central Committee was worth P250,000; Rafael Baylosis, CPP 
Secretary-General, brought P200,000; and three other members of the CPP had a reward value of 
P125,000 or P100,000.237  When PC junior officer Rodolfo Aguinaldo successfully apprehended 
NPA leader Jose Maria Sison in Ilocos, he earned a promotion (to captain) and command of his 
own “anti-subversion” unit, equipped with more sophisticated weaponry than usual and a pool of 
fast cars.238  The 1985 issue of the official police journal details numerous medals that Marcos 
awarded to top-performing officers, complete with detailed descriptions of how an officer could 
earn each one.239  ISAFP appeared to regard these incentives as unfortunate but necessary; the 
former head of the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Galileo 
Kintanar, reflected,” The key is motivation.  Unfortunately, this is what motivates people – some by 
patriotism, others by material factors.”240   
At least some Philippine police officials writing at the time also understood the downsides of 
this system of incentivization.  In the early 1980’s, one review of police misbehavior noted that “as 
long as police promotions are based more on arrest made than on ability to improve police-
community relations… it is not likely that citizen misconduct against citizens will be controlled.”  
                                                 
237 Benjamin Pimentel, Rebolusyon! A Generation of Struggle in the Philippines (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
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(The same study also recommended that police not drink on duty, as over 20% of those found guilty 
of unnecessary violence were under the influence of alcohol at the time the abuse occurred.241)  A 
1985 article noted police reluctance to spend time on small cases, because it was big ones that would 
“earn them extra income.”242 And in 1984, the journal bemoaned the negative effects of 
fragmentation and competition between law enforcement agencies, wherein “jealousies precluded 
cooperation among them, and accomplishments were oriented not so much on the desire to serve 
the public as in the desire to outdo one another. The duplication of their functions further 
aggravated the problem.”243 
Social incentives created by exclusivity also mattered.  The social bonds among military 
officers are clear even decades later; ISAFP General Kintanar recounted, “The people I worked with 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s – even today, I still take care of and help their kids.”244  Tight bonds among 
members of the in-group sheltered them from violence, but also appear to have enabled higher 
violence against individuals in the out-group. They did so partly by reinforcing the intensity of 
interagency competition.  Interrogators in Marcos’ security units were almost always junior officers, 
who worked in relatively stable, tight-knit teams with a competitive attitude toward rival units.245 
According to detainee accounts contained in the SELDA archive on human rights at the University 
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of the Philippines, Aguinaldo worked routinely with Lieutenant Billy Bibit, (also PMA class of 1972), 
and Lt. Vic Batac, who graduated one class before them.246  At interrogation centers managed by 
MISG, by contrast, Col. Rolando Abadilla (PMA class of 1965) worked with Roberto Ortega and 
Panfilo Lacson (PMA class of 1971);247 Lacson’s work in MISG from the time he graduated PMA 
until Marcos’ downfall in 1986, including a stint as Abadilla’s Deputy Commander, placed him on “a 
fast track to national police power” – which he achieved when he served as Director-General of the 
National Police Administration from 1999 to 2001.248 Accounts from detainees also suggest 
identifiable differences in unit ‘work styles’: MISG’s interrogation team usually blindfolded their 
victims, maintaining both distance and anonymity, while the 5th CSU’s interrogators became known 
for a brutal, highly personalized torture that “imprinted their names in victims’ memories.”249  
The way in which these social ties contributed to the eventual demise of the Marcos regime 
is relatively well known.  When Ramos and Enrile staged their February 1986 coup, members of 
their security services called on kinship and school connections to prevent fellow officers from 
crushing the revolt at Camp Crame.  Social ties caused a chain reaction of defection across the 
military; commander after commander first refused to attack the troops with Enrile and Ramos, and 
then defected to them.250 In one of the critical moments, Marine commandant General Tadiar (PMA 
                                                 
246 See Proof of Claim Forms for Torture Victims in the SELDA collection, Filipiniana Multimedia 
Collection, University of the Philippines Main Library: Domingo Luneta (22 November 1993); Marcelio M. 
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class of 1959) was ordered to attack Camp Crame, outside which thousands of Filipinos had 
gathered in answer to the Archbishop’s radio call to “protect our friends, the soldiers”:  
 
“Ram through,” Ramas ordered, “Ram through the crowds, regardless of the casualties.” But 
in front of Tadiar were thousands kneeling in the path of his tanks, nuns in white habits 
reciting the rosary, children in his firing line. His uncle’s voice pleaded with him over the 
radio to turn back. His bishop’s voice came next, saying “We’re all Filipinos.” His former 
PMA superintendent, General Manuel Flores, urged him not to kill “classmates and fellow 
alumni.” Three military wives pushed their way through the Marines and lunged forward, 
gripping Tadiar’s arm.  “Temy,” said Aida Ciron, the wife of Enrile’s aid Ruben Ciron (PMA 
’68), “you also have a wife and children, please don’t do it.” Another, Vangie Durian, cried 
out “Temy, you know me – we were neighbors in Navy Village.” Referring to her husband, 
Commander Jesus Durian (PMA ’60), Tadiar asked “Is Jess there?” Yes, she replied, her 
husband was inside the camp with the rebels.251   
 
Tadiar withdrew, and the tide of combat power swung decisively in favor of Ramos and Enrile, who 
were negotiating with opposition leaders for a provisional government headed by Cory Aquino. By 
the evening after Tadiar’s aborted attack, Ramos estimated that “60% of the troops in the field had 
either declared their support or promised to refuse orders” to fire. Later that night, without 
Philippine aircraft to command, Marcos and his contingent – including all twenty-six members of 
the Ver clan – lifted off from the palace in American helicopters.252   
What is less well-known is that these same social ties – close familial, educational, or social 
relationships to those in the coercive apparatus – had sheltered individuals with those ties from 
violence for years prior to 1986.  Professor Amado Mendoza, the son of a government engineer, 
recalled being stopped in the countryside when he was out at night during martial law; when the 
police recognized him, one called to another, “Oh, it’s the son of engineer Mendoza, he can go.”  
Later arrested in Manila, Mendoza went through a series of detention centers where he was tortured, 
including the custody of the Metropolitan Police Investigative Service (the investigative unit of 
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Metrocom), the 5th CSU, and eventually a detention center at Fort Bonifacio.  At Fort Bonifacio, he 
underwent intensive interrogation and torture until one of the ISAFP interrogators recognized that 
his uncle had been the interrogator’s commanding officer. “You’re Ray’s nephew,” the man said, 
and from then on, Mendoza recounted, “I noticed a reduction in pressure.”  Later he found out that 
the guards had consulted his uncle, who asked them to hold him to keep him from joining the NPA, 
but not to mix him with any hardliners in confinement, and to treat him relatively well.253 
Multiple interviews corroborate the argument that competition provided incentives that 
exacerbated violence, but social ties to members of the coercive apparatus could offset it.  The 
dynamic is so familiar to Filipinos that it determines the outcome in Gina Apostol’s novel, The Gun 




Figure 3.4: Political Cartoon: Protecting the Children of “Big Shots”  
 
                                                 
253 Author’s interview with Professor Amado Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011.   
254 In Apostol’s novel, parents who sell arms to Marcos are able to protect their daughter from the 
consequences of subversive student activity, while others who played minor roles are punished harshly, even 
killed. Gina Apostol, The Gun Dealer’s Daughter (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012); Roces, Medals and Shoes. 
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One former political prisoner recalled receiving a phone call in 1975 from a friend who was the 
niece of the chief of naval intelligence.  “I heard from my uncle that they’re all looking for you, all of 
the units are trying to find you,” she told him. “But if you surrender to him, they guarantee not to 
torture you.  The others will not guarantee that.”255 Another detainee, who spent almost four 
months at Fort Bonifacio, heard one day that a famous general – a distant relative who shared his 
last name, Magno – would be visiting the camp.  “So I watched out the window just above the 
ground, at the top of my cell, and when I saw the shiny pair of boots passing, I yelled “Tito Joe! 
[Uncle Joe!]” The general asked them who it was, and they told him, “Oh, just some fellow named 
Magno.””  Two weeks later, he was released.256  
A third former prisoner, Francisco Nemenzo, explained that he was captured by the 
Criminal Investigative Service, one of two strike forces of the Operations division (C3) of the 
Philippine Constabulary, rather than CSU (the strike force of C2, the intelligence division).  There 
was a rivalry between C2 and C3, and so when C3 received a tip, they decided to arrest him 
themselves rather than passing the information on to C2.  After a night in tactical interrogation, 
where he was tortured and asked the wrong questions because the interrogators had mistaken his 
background, the phone rang.  When the officer hung up, he said, “Why didn’t you tell us you were a 
friend of General Ramos?  He would like to have breakfast tomorrow.  Please forget what has 
happened here, we are just doing our job.” Nemenzo did not know Ramos, but played along; the 
next morning, he was brought to the C2 office to meet Ramos.  He discovered that Ramos’ mother 
and Nemenzo’s wife’s mother were good friends, and his wife had known Ramos as a small girl.  
Because release required the signature of a senior officer, Nemenzo was signed out under Ramos’ 
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name for house arrest in Ramos’ personal custody – custody which was then deputized to his 
mother-in-law, Ramos’ neighbor.257 Repeatedly in interviews, detainees and members of the security 
apparatus recounted incidents in which competition between units led to violence, but a social tie to 
a member of the security apparatus, especially a prominent one, could mitigate it.   
These incidents appear to have repeated themselves across the country.  According to a 
study published in National Police Command (Napolcom)’s official journal, two-thirds of prisoner 
escapes between 1973 and 1979 occurred when guards let prisoners that they were on friendly terms 
with out of their cells, and sometimes out of the prisons entirely – for example, to run errands such 
as picking up alcohol for the guards to drink on duty, or for conjugal home visits, which were 
regularly allowed to prominent citizens, or ones who had befriended or bribed the guards. The study 
reported that these incidents were most common when the police forces were controlled by local 
officials, rather than under the centralized and distant supervision of officials in Manila, but central 
control was more strictly enforced from 1973 onward, heightening the social distance between those 
ordering violence and those on the receiving end.258  These social dynamics probably also help 
explain why violence by the major anti-dissident units was worse in the provinces, a fact reported on 
by the U.S. embassy.259  The small in-group that made up the coercive apparatus was centered on 
Manila, and activists in rural areas of the provinces often lacked the social ties and pedigree that 
protected privileged university students in the capital.  
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V.  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has advanced two primary arguments.  First, it has argued that the 
fragmentation and exclusive social composition of the coercive apparatus under Ferdinand Marcos 
can be attributed to Marcos’ fear of elite threats after he declared martial law in 1972.  Second, it has 
demonstrated that the fragmentation and exclusivity of Marcos’ coercive institutions led to rising 
state violence.   
Alternative explanations do not perform well in predicting the structure and composition of 
the security apparatus under Marcos. Although fragmentation has been a consistent feature of 
Philippine internal security institutions since the Spanish and American colonial days, the social 
composition of that apparatus has fluctuated, and in fact, what Marcos inherited was an apparatus 
that – given the dual recruitment channels of the AFP – could easily have been a broadly inclusive 
national force.  Marcos chose, however, to make the security apparatus more exclusive and to foster 
internal divisions, fragmentation, and competition – a choice that is highlighted by the fact that as a 
democratic leader, he pursued nearly opposite policies of inclusion and coordination.  The instability 
of Philippine military and security structures throughout the twentieth century, as well as Marcos’ 
ability to pursue significant reforms, suggest that path dependence cannot account for the design of 
coercive institutions from 1972-86.  Explanations rooted in American or international influence do 
not provide satisfactory explanations either.  American influence was focused largely on external 
defense, leaving the Philippines to its own devices internally; though the U.S. provided support for 
counter-subversion, American  influence waned when Marcos’ priorities began to diverge in the late 
1960’s. Thus neither institutional path dependence nor external influence provides a satisfactory 
explanation for the origins of Marcos’ fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus.   
Alternative explanations also fare poorly in explaining the patterns of state violence observed 
under Marcos. As in the case of Taiwan, explanations rooted in state capacity and organizational 
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cohesion cannot explain why Marcos put so much effort into fragmenting the coercive institutions 
and making them exclusive after 1972, especially when he had pursued such different policies prior 
to declaring martial law.  And similar to the Taiwan case, the Philippine case demonstrates that a less 
cohesive coercive apparatus uses more violence than a cohesive one does, which is consistent with 
some of the predictions of the literature on organizational cohesion but contradictory with the 
predictions made by others.   
Rising threat is also not a satisfactory explanation.  The strength of the NPA did grow over 
time: from between 350 and 1030 estimated fighters in 1972 to around 8,000 in 1984, and in excess 
of 100,000 supporters (loosely defined) by the mid-1980’s.  The timing of this growth, however, 
coupled with within-case evidence, suggests that the indiscriminacy of Marcos’ coercive apparatus 
was the cause of growing opposition from the population, not the effect.  Rather than mobilization 
causing violence, it seems that in the Philippines it was exactly the reverse.  “If I am going to have to 
go through three-and-a-half months of jail when I did nothing wrong,” one interviewee commented 
wryly, “I decided that next time I might as well do something to deserve it.”260 Moreover, 
proponents of a threat-based argument generally attribute increased violence by the security forces 
in the 1980’s to swelling popular mobilization after the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in 
late 1983, but the statistics in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the use of violence by the state had 
already begun to climb before that.  Instead, rising violence most closely correlates with the 
institutional and social changes to the coercive apparatus made early in the martial law period.  
International influence had at best a cosmetic effect on the escalating intensity of state 
violence.  More likely, it actually seems to have shifted the regime from semi-institutionalized visible 
repression toward even less restrained violence conducted underground.  At the same time that the 
                                                 
260 Author’s interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011.  
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United States publicly provided large amounts of military aid, 261 covert advising on internal security 
also occurred.  (Congressional strictures on assistance to repressive police organizations did not 
cover the military relationship.)  Documents obtained from ISAFP clearly show that American 
advisors instructed Filipino counterparts on the use of safehouses where the “physical extraction of 
information” could be conducted without the accountability imposed by taking someone to a formal 
camp or detention facility, as well as on how to conceal safehouse activities from public view.262 
American advisors made clear that they were under pressure to have their allies improve the 
appearance of human rights performance – a distinction not lost on ISAFP, which recorded dutifully 
in briefing notes that “The US government is being pressured by some international organizations to 
advise its allies not to be perceived as tyrants or violators of citizens’ rights.”263  
The reporting of groups like Amnesty International, coupled with public pressure from the 
Carter administration and other countries, did force Marcos to formally restore the trappings of 
democracy over the period from 1978 to 1981. He emptied the prisons, reducing their numbers 
from 6,000 in May 1975 to 563 two years later, announced disciplinary actions against abusive 
soldiers, and renamed the notorious 5th CSU (which became Regional Security Unit 4, RSU-4).264 In 
Proclamation 2045 on 17 January 1981, just before Reagan’s inauguration and a visit from Pope 
John Paul II, Marcos lifted martial law.265  At the same time, however, Marcos privately threatened 
to close the bases at Clark and Subic – then America’s largest military installations overseas – and 
                                                 
261 See Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., The Logistics of Repression: The role of US assistance in consolidation 
the martial law regime in the Philippines (Washington: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977).  
262 “Institution of Safehouses,” Top Secret, ISAFP files, 2 January 1973.   
263 “On Clark Briefing,” Agent’s Report, Secret, 12 November 1974.  
264 Task Force Detainees Report (Manila, 1980), pp. 103-107.  
265 Despite Marcos’ charm offensive, the Pope publicly chastised the Philippine government during his visit.  
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agreed to extend the lease only in exchange for a $500 million aid deal.266  In July, after Marcos was 
re-elected in a ‘highly controlled’ election, Vice President Bush visited Malacanang and applauded 
Marcos’ “adherence to democratic principle.”267   
State violence, however, did not drop. Proclamation 2045 continued the suspension of 
habeas corpus in subversion cases; decrees that Marcos had passed during martial law, allowing the 
security services broad powers and de facto immunity, remained in effect.268 As Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 
Figure 3.5 below indicate, the Philippines experienced its worst violence after martial law was lifted, 
not before.  Salvagings, which numbered only 3 in 1975, rose to 538 by 1984.269   
 
 
Figure 3.5: Political Cartoon: The Lifting of Martial Law270  
                                                 
266 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 407. 
267 State Department official Richard Holbrooke admitted, “We had to choose between using our bilateral 
relationship for human rights objectives, and using it first for putting our military facilities on a stable basis.”  
Bonner, Waltzing With a Dictator, pp. 245-46.  
268 U.S Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 16 September 1980; Embassy Manila to 
Washington, 20 August 1981; Embassy Manila to Washington, 18 May 1983. 
269 Data provided by the Task Force Detainees-Philippines, email communication, December 2011.  
270 Roces, Medals and Shoes.   
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Promises to court-martial or charge abusive soldiers were a sham.  Two officers court-martialed in 
1977 were later found not guilty; two of three lieutenants sentenced to prison for torture in 1978 
were back at work at MISG within a year; of 123 military personnel charged with human rights 
violations in 1985, only five were convicted.271 The State Department concluded that Marcos lifted 
martial law to improve his image overseas, but felt free to do so because all of the powers he needed 
were already “adequately institutionalized in one form or another – economic, military, police, 
media, and of course, political control.”272  In an earlier cable, the embassy had written, “Marcos can 
have the best of both worlds – he rids himself of the onus of martial law while retaining the broad 
powers he now holds.”273  Lifting martial law might well have been prompted by international and 
American pressure, but that cosmetic change had little substantive effect on state violence, because 
the institutions that organized and implemented that violence had already acquired their 
fundamental character.  
Like Chiang Kai-shek, Marcos was able to significantly redesign the Philippines’ institutions 
of coercion.  Unlike Chiang on Taiwan, however, Marcos’ principal fear was of an elite threat, so he 
created coercive institutions that were fragmented and exclusive.  As a result, the coercive apparatus 
possessed social and material incentives for violence, and lacked the intelligence capacity to engage 
in targeted and discriminate violence.  When popular opposition materialized, the coercive apparatus 
was unable to deal with it without resorting to violence, a fact which explains not only the rising 
levels of violence against ordinary Filipino people, but that violence’s increasing brutality.   
                                                 
271 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, pp. 405-6; Amnesty International, Report – 1981, pp. 86-87.  
272 U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 26 December 1980.  









Chapter Four   
 







I. Introduction  
This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation by examining the period of 
authoritarian rule in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) under Presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-
60), Park Chung Hee (1961-79) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88). The Korean peninsula, a Japanese 
colony from 1910 to 1945, was effectively partitioned into Soviet and American zones of control at 
the end of the Second World War, and “South” Korea was under a trusteeship arrangement 
administered by the American military government from 1945-48.  The North did not participate in 
the 1948 elections held in the South, a decision that reinforced the peninsula’s division and led to 
Syngman Rhee’s election as president of the new Republic of Korea (ROK).  After the Korean War 
(1950-53), Rhee maintained a controversial presidency until 1960, when his victory in a disputed 
election sparked widespread protests that culminated in his resignation and exile in Hawaii.   
On May 19, 1961, Park Chung Hee and a group of soldiers aligned with him established a 
military government that ruled until elections in 1963 put Park into the presidency.  Against the 
backdrop of superpower detente, and after being re-elected for a third term in the surprisingly close 
1971 election, Park declared martial law and assumed dictatorial powers through the Yushin 




power passed to General Chun Doo Hwan.  Chun held power until 1988, when he handed power to 
former General Roh Tae Woo, who kept his pre-election promise to democratize the country.   
In the sections below, I trace the origins, evolution, and operation of the internal security 
apparatus in South Korea.  Under all three leaders, the South Korean coercive apparatus was 
strongly shaped by the continuous presence of an existential external threat from North Korea.  
That threat prompted an unusually high degree of external (American) involvement in South 
Korea’s coercive apparatus, including the retention of U.S. command authority over the ROK 
military even under armistice conditions. The presence of an external threat and unusually high 
external influence limited the amount that any Korean autocrat was able to engage in coup-proofing 
behaviors within the military, and also imposed a national service requirement in which every 
Korean male served in the military. The Korean military, therefore, displays low levels of 
fragmentation and high levels of inclusivity.  
Outside the military, however, the degree of fragmentation and exclusivity in the rest of the 
coercive apparatus fluctuated under each of the three presidents. Consistent with the theory 
advanced in Chapter One, the degree of fragmentation and exclusivity depended largely on how 
each autocrat viewed the threats he faced, and also exerted a decisive effect on patterns of state 
violence during their tenure.  Syngman Rhee’s perception of a high threat from elite rivals prompted 
him to create a fragmented and exclusive security apparatus wherever he could bypass the American 
chain of command to do so, and it was these units who were known for large-scale violence against 
civilians during the late 1940’s and 1950’s.  Park Chung Hee’s military background appears to have 
predisposed him to prioritize the external threat and the linked threat of Communist infiltration, and 
he created a coercive apparatus dominated by the KCIA that was unitary and relatively inclusive.  
The declaration of Yushin, however, appears to have shifted Park’s threat perceptions, as it did with 




competitive coercive apparatus whose violence ultimately claimed his life. Chun Doo Hwan, on the 
other hand, faced a popular uprising immediately after taking office; though he relied on a regionally 
exclusive set of officials at the top level, he broadened participation in the riot police to conscripts, 
making the forces in charge of dealing with the population far more representative of Korean 
society than they had been under Park.  Not surprisingly, this made his attempts at protest 
suppression unpopular, and also changed spatial patterns of violence.  The restive Cholla region was 
excluded from the security apparatus at the top levels under both Park and Chun; the region, 
however, was targeted disproportionately for violence under Park but not under Chun, which I 
attribute to the shift to conscription-based and socially inclusive riot police units.   
This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section II provides an overview of the patterns of 
violence that this chapter seeks to explain.  Section III outlines the origins of the coercive apparatus, 
discussing the influence of Japanese colonial policing and American efforts to rebuild the police and 
military from 1945 to 1960. It also analyzes Syngman Rhee’s manipulation of coercive institutions to 
protect himself politically, and demonstrates the effect that this had on violence against civilians.  
Section IV traces the changes that Park made to the structure and social composition of the security 
apparatus during his tenure, both before and after the 1972 declaration of the Yushin regime.  It 
focuses on structural changes that accompanied the creation of the KCIA and social changes that 
occurred as Park replaced Rhee-aligned former Japanese elites with a coalition of his own making.  
Section V discusses changes made under Chun, who relied primarily on the Defense Security 
Command, and explores the contradiction that existed in the social composition of his coercive 
apparatus: it was socially exclusive at the top, but actually became more inclusive at the bottom with 
the adoption of conscript-based riot police units.  Section VI examines alternative explanations and 





II. Overview of Patterns of State Violence in South Korea   
 
The theory advanced in Chapter One purports to explain variations in state violence under 
authoritarianism. It does not address levels of state violence against civilians during war.1 Because 
statistics on state violence under Rhee are confounded by high levels of civil conflict prior to 1950 
and war between 1950 and 1953, I have not included them here.  Explaining these statistics falls 
outside the scope of the project, though I demonstrate in Section III that the non-war patterns of 
state violence under Rhee are consistent with my argument.  The Figures below show the trends in 
state violence under Park Chung Hee (Figure 4.1) and Chun Doo Hwan (Figure 4.2), as measured by 
the number of individuals who were indicted for political crimes each year.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Individuals Indicted for Political Offenses under Park Chung Hee2  
 
                                                 
1 For studies that have addressed this question, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007), pp. 
233-246.  
2 Park Won Soon, Review of The National Security Law, Vol. 2: Historical Uses of the National Security Law [박원순, 
국가보안법연구] (Seoul, 1992). Political charges included both the NSL and ACL in the 1970’s, and the 








Figure 4.2: Individuals Indicted for Political Offenses under Chun Doo Hwan3 
The first pattern to notice here is that state violence is relatively constant in Korea over both Park 
and Chun’s tenure, fluctuating between approximately 150 and 700 people indicted per year.  South 
Korea displays neither the clear drop in violence observed in Taiwan, nor the steady rise observed in 
the Philippines.  This oscillation within a narrow band can be attributed to the constant presence of 
a high external threat, and the institutional stability that this induced within the ROK military, which 
was a major part of the country’s coercive apparatus.   
Second, under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, Korea occupies an intermediate level 
of state violence as compared to Taiwan or the Philippines. Between 1981 and 1987, 1,512 
individuals were prosecuted and sentenced under the NSL: several hundred a year, a figure only 
slightly lower than the average number indicted under Park during the Yushin period.4  Of those, 
only 13 were death sentences and 28 life sentences – an intensity of state violence that is lower than 
                                                 
3 Park, Review of the National Security Law, p. 37.   
4 Park, Review of The National Security Law; Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service.  Communication with 
the Past, Self-Reflection into the Future, Vol. 6, Schools and Espionage [안기부, 과거와 대화 미래의 성찰] (Seoul: 




the Philippines and the early period in Taiwan, but higher than the later period in Taiwan when no 
executions were conducted at all.5  In an otherwise critical account of Park, Kim Sukjo acknowledges 
that South Korea’s authoritarianism was not always more brutal than the authoritarianism of its 
contemporaries elsewhere in the world: “To President Park’s credit, political murder and 
“disappearances” did not become staples of life under the Yushin regime as they have in other 
regimes of kindred spirit.”6   
Third, by this measure, state violence actually appears to be somewhat lower for much of 
Chun Doo Hwan’s tenure than Park’s.  Under Park, the number of indictments each year averaged 
around 500; under Chun, that number averaged around 100 until 1985, and around 250 thereafter.  
This finding contrasts with popular perceptions of Park and Chun; Chun is the more vilified of the 
two.7  As I will explain below, this is likely because Chun relied more on public, visible repression 
than did Park – using paekkol strikebreakers in noticeable uniforms, for example, and employing tear 
gas against protestors that became known among international activists and reporters as the worst in 
use worldwide.8   
The fourth element of variation that is worth explaining is spatial.  Figure 4.3, below, shows 
the geographic distribution of violent state repression in response to protest. It draws on data taken 
                                                 
5 Recall that Taiwan had around 2,000 executions and 8,000 other sentences for political offenses between 
1949 and 1960, but executed no-one after 1970.  
6 Sukjo Kim, “The Politics of Transition: South Korea After Park,” unpublished manuscript prepared for 
East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School, March 1980, p. 23.  One of the difficulties of studying state 
violence under authoritarianism is that no country wants to understate the brutality and violence of its own 
repressive experience.  This makes comparison a morally and emotionally fraught issue for domestic 
historians as well as foreign scholars.   
7 A 2009 poll showed that Park was the most popular South Korean president. See 
http://segye.com/Articles/Issue/INQUIRY/Article.asp?aid=20090129003271&subctg1=&subctg2=  
8 See the graduation speech given by Maria Ressa, former CNN reporter originally from the Philippines: 
Maria Ressa, “Draw the Line,” commencement address at Far Eastern University in Manila, 18 April 2012, 




from an original dataset that I created on protest and repression events in Korea during the 1970s 
and 1980s, using sourcebooks compiled by the Korea Democracy Foundation.9  
 
Figure 4.3 Probability of State Responding to Protest with Violent Repression, By Region10  
As with temporal patterns, the spatial pattern of violence is not necessarily what contemporary 
accounts would have predicted.  First, conditional on a protest occurring, Chun is less likely to have 
responded violently than Park, regardless of region – a finding that is consistent with the indictment 
statistics above, but at odds with popular perception of the two dictators.  Second, Park was much 
                                                 
9 The same sourcebooks were used by Stanford’s Korea Democracy Project, but their data is not yet publicly 
available.  See Korea Democracy Foundation, The KDF Sourcebook on Events [Minjuhwa Undong Kwallyon Sagon 
Sajon], (Seoul: KDF, 2004); Korea Democracy Foundation, Chronology of Korean Democratization Movement 
[민주화운동기념사업회 연구소, 한국민주화운동사 연표] (Seoul: KDF, 2006); Korea Democracy 
Foundation, History of Korea’s Democratization Movement [민주화운동기념사업회 한국민주주의 연구소, 
한국민주화운동사] Seoul: 2008-2010, 3 vols.); Gaudim et Spes Pastoral Institute, Torch in the Dark: Witness 
Reports of the Democratization Movement in 1970s and 1980s, [기쁨과 희망 사목연구원, 암흑속의 횃불: 
7,80년대 민주화 운동의 증언] (Seoul, 1996-2001, 8 vols.).  Paul Chang’s dissertation, which uses KDF data 
in a dataset that links protest and repressive incidents, and which was part of the basis of the Stanford KDP 
project, is Paul Y. Chang, Protest and Repression in South Korea (1970-1979): the Dialectics of Movement Emergence and 
Evolution (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2008). 
10 Repression could be violent (if it involved an act of force) or non-violent (censorship, curfew imposition, 
etc). Figure 4.3 illustrates the pattern of violent response to protest, but the same pattern holds for repressive 




more likely to respond to protest with violence against rival region Cholla (a 37% probability of 
repression versus around 25-26% chance for either his home region of Kyongsang or the rest of the 
country).  Chun, on the other hand, was actually slightly less likely to respond repressively in Cholla 
(4% probability of a repressive response, versus 9% in Kyongsang and 13% in the rest of the 
country). The reasons for these differences will be explored in Sections IV and V, but to telegraph 
the argument here, I suggest that the explosion of popular protest in Kwangju in 1980 made Chun 
much more concerned with popular protest, and that his subsequent diversion of conscripts to staff 
the riot police made the security apparatus more inclusive and representative of Korean society, and 
less likely to engage in repressive behavior than under Park.  
Fifth and finally, it is worth noting that large amounts of data are missing in the South 
Korean case, particularly at the lower bounds of intensity. In the 1970s and 1980s, the police or 
KCIA could arrest and detain someone for several days before the prosecutor decided on the 
charges and filed an indictment; often people were tortured – or at least “knocked about,” to use 
one interviewee’s term – during this confinement.  (Once someone was indicted, KCIA oversight of 
the prosecutor’s office ensured the success of those indictments in court, creating a narrow gap 
between the number of people indicted and those sentenced, akin to Taiwan’s military court 
system.11) Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of individuals arrested but never indicted is 
large, but no systematic data exist that accurately capture this.  Existing statistics, for example, do 
not include the 2,000 students arrested in 1971 under Park’s first Garrison Decree, or the mass 
arrests that typically accompanied the declaration of Emergency Measures, or the individuals 
                                                 
11 On the prosecutorial system in Korea, see Lee Jung-Soo, “The Characteristics of the Korean Prosecution 
System and the Prosecutor’s Direct Investigation,” Annual Report of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute 
for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) (Japan, 1997); Lee Jung-Soo, Report: The 
Relationship of the Prosecution with the Police and Investigative Responsibility, report for the United Nations Asia and 
Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI, Japan, 1997); Kim 
Young-Chul, “The Effective System of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution in Korea,” UNAFEI Annual 




arrested but never indicted during Chun’s purification (jeonghwa) campaign.12  Nor do they record the 
experiences of a reported but little discussed 39,000 people who were imprisoned in Chun’s remote 
Samchung Re-education Camp, many of whom were political dissidents.13 As with previous 
chapters, our estimates of violence become more precise at the higher bound of intensity, and at the 
lower end of the scale, significant omissions and a high degree of uncertainty remain.   
 
III. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Syngman Rhee14   
  The presence of a high external threat from North Korea – supported by the Soviet Union – 
strongly shaped the initial structure and social composition of the security apparatus in South Korea.  
From 1948 to 1960, the United States provided security assistance intended to build a strong, 
cohesive, and professional institution capable of repelling the threat posed by the Communist 
North. Because of this threat, American troops remained stationed in South Korea, and the United 
States retained peacetime operational control over the ROK military; it also increased the military’s 
size so much that the institution became broadly representative, unlike its smaller police counterpart.    
  I had initially expected the presence of an external threat, and the unusually high degree of 
American influence that resulted from it, to overwhelm any incentives for coup-proofing.  However, 
Rhee did not share the U.S. perception that the external threat was dominant, and focused on 
eliminating potential rivals for power.  He therefore created a good deal of fragmentation within the 
parts of the coercive apparatus outside the military chain of command.  Rhee also shared an interest 
                                                 
12 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2010), p. 35.  
13 Lee, Making of Minjung; Heo and Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980, p. 46; Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the 
Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 379; George Ogle, South Korea: Dissent Within the 
Economic Miracle (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1990), especially around p. 55; Cumings suggests that almost 
all of those incarcerated were “journalists, students, teachers, labor organizers, and civil servants” there for 
political reasons.   




with the Americans in a certain degree of social exclusivity – distrusted leftists were not allowed to 
participate – meaning that South Korea’s coercive institutions also fell squarely on the conservative 
side of the postwar social cleavage between right and left.  The division between the military and 
non-military parts of the coercive apparatus was not something predicted by my theory – it is rare 
for one country to retain peacetime command authority over another country’s military.  The finding 
that the most fragmented and exclusive parts of Rhee’s coercive apparatus were the main 
organizations used to violently repress civilians, however, is consistent with my overall argument.   
 
Policing in Korea under Japanese Rule (1905-1945)  
 
  The Japanese colonial experience in Korea left the peninsula with a legacy of strong but not 
particularly inclusive police organization. Consistent with an overall difference in Japan’s approach 
to the two colonies, and in contrast to Japanese policing in Taiwan, the police institutions developed 
in Korea were more militaristic in nature and less socially embedded in Korean society.   
  According to Jinsok Jun, the ‘overdevelopment’ of the Korean state and its dominance over 
civil society date back to the Choson dynasty, but were magnified and strengthened under Japanese 
colonialism.15 The first Japanese police authorities were actually consular police, sent by the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry to the Korean peninsula as early as the 1880’s.16  They were stationed in treaty port 
consulate offices across late Choson Korea with the mission to “serve and control” the Japanese 
                                                 
15 Jun argues that Choson was not a militarized state, since its military officers were subject to control by the 
scholar-gentry.  Jinsok Jun, “South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control,” in Muthiah Alagappa, 
Coercion and Governance: the declining political role of the military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 121-142; Hagen Koo, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell, 1993), especially the 
chapter by Jang-Jip Choi on “Political Cleavages in South Korea.”  See also comments on this problem as 
applied to the Chang Myon period of 1960-61 by Han Sung-joo, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea 
(Berekeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 2-5.   
16 Eric W. Esselstrom, Gai Kei: The Japanese Consular Police in Northeast Asia, 1880-1945 (PhD dissertation, 
University of California-Santa Barbara, 2004).  On the operation of these forces in China, see Mark R. Peattie, 
“Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. 




civilian community, but also played a significant role in later political intelligence work, including the 
surveillance and suppression of the Korean independence movement on the peninsula and in 
Manchuria. With the establishment of the “protectorate” in 1905, Japanese police began to patrol in 
Korea en masse, and after the imperial army was disbanded and resistance from the uibyong guerillas 
largely put down, Korea formally became a colony in August 1910.17   
  Though Korea and Taiwan were both Japanese colonies for the first half of the twentieth 
century, the policing arrangements in the two colonies were quite different. Korea’s was also a 
centralized system that blended police functions with regional administrative responsibility,  but the 
internal security organizations in Korea also remained militarized and less integrated with local, pre-
colonial institutions of security and governance. Korea’s Governor-Generals came from the 
Japanese Army, and possessed authority that was not divided with any civilian counterpart.18  Police 
functions were subordinated to the gendarmerie; a gendarme captain headed every provincial police 
bureau.19 The peninsula was ruled not by regular Japanese law, but frequently by executive or 
emergency decree, and the gendarmes appear to have had a more combative attitude toward the 
Korean population than to the Taiwanese; one colonial official remarked, “what can be done with 
                                                 
17 The Taft-Katsura agreement exchanged Japan’s protectorate in Korea with America’s free hand in its 
Philippine colony.  See Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972); Lee Ki-baik, Edward Wagner with Edward Schultz, trans., A New History of 
Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 146.   
18 In Taiwan, by contrast, civilians occupied the Governor-Generalship after 1919, had more limited 
authority, and deliberately eschewed use of the military and gendarmerie to police the native population, 
choosing instead to integrate civilian police deeply into existing systems of local administration.  
19 There were some steps taken to reduce militarization after 1919, but the significance of these reforms is 
debated.  See Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in Ramon Myers 
and Mark Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1984); 
Edward I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” in Ramon H. Myers and Mark 
R. Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1984), pp. 248-50; 
Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese colonialism in Korea and Formosa: a comparison of the systems of political 




incentives in Taiwan must be done with coercion in Korea.”20 Thus the occupation of Korea never 
took on the civilian character that was deliberately adopted in Taiwan, and coercive institutions 
during the Japanese period were characterized as a “centrally controlled, highly mobile national 
police force, responsive to the center and possessing its own communications and transportation 
facilities” rather than being integrated with local structures.21   
  The coercive apparatus in colonial Korea was formally more inclusive, but lacked the 
informal mechanisms of societal penetration that had led to them being deeply embedded in Taiwan.  
A higher percentage of police forces serving in Korea were themselves Korean. By 1943, Koreans 
made up between forty and fifty percent of the police force (versus one-sixth in Formosa), and they 
achieved comparatively higher rank within police administration.  This advantage, however, was 
offset by the fact that there were simply fewer police to go around in Korea (8:100 police-to-
population ratio in Korea versus 14:100 in Formosa), perhaps due to the fact that the Japanese in 
Korea never penetrated rural areas as thoroughly.22 Moreover, police supervision of the hoko/baojia – 
an additional, predominantly Taiwanese level of colonial administration – had no real counterpart in 
Korea.23  Thus, although the police and intelligence agencies in Korea did constitute “an avenue of 
upward mobility for thousands of the lower class,” the state that they joined was, as Yong-pyo Hong 
describes it, “detached from the civil society” and from local communities.24 Mark Caprio similarly 
                                                 
20 Myers and Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, p. 230.   
21 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 152.   
22 Chengtian Kuo, “The Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan: A New Institutionalist Perspective,” 
Issues & Studies, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 36; Chen, Edward I-te, “Japanese colonialism 
in Korea and Formosa.” 
23 See Chapter Two. 
24 Yong-pyo Hong, State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South 




characterizes the Japanese occupation of Korea as highly segregated and exclusive.25  Not until 
wartime mobilization efforts began did organizations like the Korean League for the General 
Mobilization of the National Spirit or the Korean Anti-Communist Association establish branches at 
the province, county, town, workplace, and local levels that were capable of even approaching the 
social penetration that had long been institutionalized in Taiwan.26   
 
External Threats and External Influence: Building the Military  
  After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea became an American trusteeship until 1948.27  
The primary focus of the U.S. military occupation, and the impetus for American assistance after 
1948, was to strengthen the Korean military to counter the external threat posed by communism and 
the North Korean regime.  As historian Gregg Brazinsky explains, “Between 1946 and 1960, the 
United States transformed the military of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from a small disorganized 
constabulary into the most dominant institution in South Korean society.” 28 In terms of its size, 
group cohesion, institutionalization, and mobilization, the military exceeded any other political 
organization,29 and over the course of two decades, it became a capable, highly professional force 
with regards to its mission of external defense.  
  Formation and expansion of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) were among the earliest 
priorities of commanding General John Hodge and the U.S. Military Government in Korea 
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(USAMGIK). In December 1945, the American military government established the Military 
English Language School (MLES), precursor to the Korean Military Academy. “Plan Bamboo,” 
approved in January 1946, had called for a 25,000-strong “constabulary” force, organized into one 
light infantry regiment for each province, a total of nine in all.30  Under military adviser Army 
Captain James Hausman, however, the MLES became Officer Candidate School, and the 
constabulary swelled from 6,000 in November 1946 to 31,000 in December 1947 to almost 50,000 
upon the declaration of statehood in August 1948.  By summer 1949, five hundred American 
military advisors comprised the Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG), which operated with a 
$20 million annual budget and opened a range of new centers for military training.31  Between 1945 
and 1950, the Korean military had grown rapidly in terms of size and professionalism.   
   Japanese-trained personnel were the foundation of this new military. By 1945, approximately 
50,000 Koreans had served in the Japanese military; most were conscripts or enlistees, but several 
hundred had served as officers.  Park Chung Hee and his KCIA-chief-turned-assassin Kim Chae-
kyu, both former officers in the Japanese armed forces (Park had even taken the Japanese name 
Masao Takagi), graduated from the second class of the American-organized military academy.32  
USAMGIK drew the school’s first classes from those who had served in the Japanese or Kwangbok 
army (Korean nationalists who fought with Chinese forces against the Japanese), but a high rate of 
attrition by the Kwangbok army led to a majority of the officer pool being men who had served 
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under the Japanese rather than nationalists who had fought them.  In addition to Park and Kim, this 
included the officers in charge of all six divisions with which the ROKA was inaugurated in 1948.  
  A mutiny at Yosu in October 1948 further skewed the military’s political orientation. The 
incident prompted a backlash against alleged American pressure to include leftist Koreans in the 
military, and resulted in a purge of about 10% of the 80,000-strong force, as well as the execution of 
between thirty and forty officers.33 Eventually, a military structure modeled on the American 
template was populated by men whose ethos and values came from “Japanese imperial military 
tradition with its nondemocratic, authoritarian, and militaristic, not to mention brutal, values.”34   
 
The Leftist Threat: Postwar Policing in South Korea  
  In addition to the military, former Japanese officials also dominated the police.  Unlike 
Taiwan, where the Japanese colonial legacy conflicted with institutions imported by the Nationalist 
government from the Mainland, in Korea the interests of the new rulers were more congruent  with 
those of the old, and there was a higher degree of institutional consistency.  In the North, the 
nascent, Soviet-supported North Korean regime purged all former Japanese-colonial administrators, 
using the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee decree of 7 March 1946 to shut them out 
of power, and marking them with a negative social classification that followed them for life.35 By 
contrast, South Korea maintained many of the police and administrative officials who had served 
under Japan.   
  Under the military trusteeship that governed Korea from 1945 to 1948, American officials 
faced a choice: they could choose to govern Korea with the centralized bureaucracy used under 
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Japanese rule, or they could align with the nascent, leftist, provisional government, which had 
established local branches (“People’s Committees”) to assume administrative functions and 
christened itself the Korean People’s Republic in Seoul on 9 September 1945.36  Despite initial calls 
by the Supreme Command, Allied Powers (SCAP) for lustration of collaborators, USAMGIK 
administrators, suspicious of Communism, chose the former option.  Syngman Rhee, a long-time 
exile, advocate of Korean independence, and graduate of both Harvard and Princeton, became the 
“uncontested leader of the right,” with American rather than local backing. 37  In fact, U.S. officials 
perceived it as an advantage that “he had no deep local roots outside of Seoul” because they thought 
this would give him the advantage of demanding fealty “from more men and more groups and in a 
more super-local way than could a leader of strong regional attachments.”38  What mattered most to 
the American, however, were his anti-Communist credentials.   
  Beyond Rhee, American administrators opted for a policy that grafted a coalition of 
conservative domestic politicians and exiled nationalists onto and into the Japanese administrative 
apparatus.  They chose this over two alternatives: either relying on anti-Japanese nationalists who 
had fought with Chinese partisans, or turning to the fledgling “indigenous mass-based movement 
with leftist leanings.”39  Jun attributes USAMGIK’s decision to a combination of “pervasive social 
and political chaos followed by national liberation; time and resource constraints in building new 
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institutions; and scarcity of administrative human resources amid acute social and political crises 
resulting from the ideological confrontation of left and right.”40  From the American vantage point, 
their policy had the added advantage of meeting with approval from leader-elect Syngman Rhee, 
who quickly realized the political advantage conferred by this coalitional composition.   
  The pattern of appointments extended directly to the Korea National Police. Whereas 
American administrators in the Philippines had preferred decentralized police forces under local 
control, in Korea USAMGIK opted to maintain the existing centralized, national force, 
supplemented in the short term by local auxiliaries.41  National director Cho Pyong-ok and head of 
Seoul’s metropolitan police force Chang Taek-sang were both American-favored appointees. In 
November 1946, 83% of officers of the Korean National Police had served in the Japanese colonial 
police: 806 out of 969. (Note that, in late 1946, the Army already had 6,000 men, indicating the 
importance of the Army relative to the police.) Many of these former Japanese officials continued 
their careers through 1960 – for example, Kim Tong-jo, who began as a National Police officer 
under the Japanese, worked for the American occupation, and then worked for Rhee in the foreign 
ministry and as vice minister.42  The new police force also accepted individuals who had fled South 
after being removed from their jobs in the North; many of them “had records of brutality in 
arresting and torturing their fellow countrymen” during the Japanese era.43  Those who had worked 
in police intelligence were recruited into army intelligence units (G-2) and the Counter-Intelligence 
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Corps.44 One interviewee recounted that after his family moved south in 1946, his father saw a 
police official who had tortured him: the man was now a provincial police chief in the new postwar 
administration.45   
  While some historians are critical of what they see as a highly ideological decision, others 
regard it as pragmatism: the Americans simply hired people who looked like they knew how to be 
policemen.46  Whether one defines the social cleavage as one of rightist versus leftist ideology, or 
nationalist versus collaborator,47 there was significant overlap in practice, and very little question 
about which side the police fell on.  By 1948, the Korean National Police was directly aligned with 
executive power, and understood to be “faithful and fanatically loyal to the government.”48   
 
Internal Security under Civil Strife, 1948-53  
  Conflict was endemic on the Korean peninsula between 1948 and 1953.  Internal security 
demands collided with external security problems, and together exceeded the capacity of the newly 
formed coercive institutions. ROKA and KNP forces tried to suppress the rural people’s 
committees that formed in the aftermath of war, fought the leftist rebellion that followed this 
suppression – including the insurrection at Cheju Island by supporters of the People’s Committee 
and a related military insubordination at Yosu – and worked to combat the guerilla campaign that 
existed through 1948-49.49  Though American officials assessed subversive activity to be on the 
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decline by the spring of 1950,50 the outbreak of civil war in late June of that year quickly handed the 
KNP responsibility for policing areas in the North with which it was wholly unfamiliar, and which it 
regarded as hostile.  
  These conditions led to an increase in the number of personnel and resources devoted to 
policing, but also heightened the adversarial nature of the police-population relationship.  In 
December 1948, Rhee’s government passed the National Security Law, which was used to prosecute 
political offenders for decades afterward.51  Originally approved as a response to the Cheju uprising 
and Yosu insurrection, and based in part on imperial Japan’s Security Maintenance Law,52 the 
National Security Law gave vague and expansive powers to the state, enabling it to deploy the army 
and police in response to domestic disorder and making any citizen who criticized the government 
subject to draconian punishment, up to and including execution.53   
  Under NSC 8/2, adopted by the Truman administration in March 1949, America also 
poured millions of dollars into police and military aid ($56 million by June of that year) to the 
Republic of Korea, with the aim of creating a 35,000-man police force and a 65,000-strong army 
“suitable for maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder, and 
for maintaining border security.”54  Not content with these numbers, Rhee swelled the army to 
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nearly 100,000 and the police force to 50,000 by the beginning of September – making the KNP 
more than twice the size of the Japanese colonial force.55   
  The Korean War led to a dramatic expansion of the size and resources of the ROK military. 
During the war, Rhee convinced American officials that to avoid an ROK collapse, they had to 
either provide extensive military assistance, or send more troops; the Americans chose aid. After the 
war, Rhee continued to exploit American fears of Korea’s weakness to extract support.56  Army 
strength increased from 100,000 to almost half a million by the time the armistice was signed, and 
under the 1953-54 negotiations surrounding the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to 
provide assistance for a military of up to 720,000 men.  For the rest of Rhee’s tenure, American aid 
totaled around $300 million a year: as much as 87% of the ROK defense budget.57   
  The United States also provided extensive advising. During the war, KMAG used a 
“counterpart system” to pair U.S. advisors with South Korean officers in an attempt to replicate 
American military structures and practices. The Korean Military Academy, a version of MLES 
modeled to an extraordinary degree on West Point, opened in January 1952. Command and staff 
colleges opened in the 1950’s similarly mirrored the organization and curriculum of their U.S. 
counterparts, their development supervised by American personnel.  Finally, top Korean officers 
received training in U.S. From 1950-57, over 7,000 ROK Army officers were trained at American 
schools through the Continental United States (CONUS) program – including future president Park 
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Chung Hee, who went to Fort Sill’s artillery school in 1954. The preferential placement given to 
these graduates upon their return guaranteed that their influence outstripped their already-
remarkable numbers.58  
  From 1948 to 1953, Korea’s isolated and conservative security forces pursued aggressive 
policies of counter-subversion that resulted in violence against civilians.  In 1949, visiting American 
officials observed police boxes that were fortified like military outposts, and commented openly on 
the high levels of distrust between the police and the population.59  The police and military forces 
were accused of widespread abuses of civilians, including executions of thousands of suspected 
communists, and arrests and detentions made on political charges reached extraordinarily high 
levels.60 There appear to have been 17,000 people in prison in southern Korea in August 1945, 
increasing to 21, 458 in prison in December 1947; by 1949, there were a total of 30,000.61  In spring 
of 1950, the Ministry of Finance listed 21 prisons with a population of 58,000.62  From September 
1948 to April 1949, 89,710 people were reported to have been arrested; of these, 28,404 were 
released; 21,606 sent to the prosecutor’s office; 29,284 transferred to some kind of “security office”; 
6,985 remanded to military police custody; and 1,187 pending. Between 50% and 80% of prisoners 
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had been charged with violating the National Security Law, and of the cases turned over to the 
prosecutor, 80% were found guilty.63  War intensified these dynamics; during the brief southern 
occupation of northern Korea in late 1950, Cho Pyong-ok reported that almost 56,000 collaborators 
and traitors had been arrested.64  South Korean and American forces have been accused of atrocities 
and “white terror” killings of civilians during the war as well.65   
  Rhee used the Korean National Police both to implement this agenda and to intimidate the 
other branches of government into collaboration with his actions.  Under Rhee, the KNP became 
known as “the political tool of the president,”66 engaging in “surveillance, sudden arrests, unjust 
trials, trumped-up accusations, threats of all kinds to the opposition, and torture.”67 During wartime, 
the KNP was so heavy-handed in supposed Communist areas that U.S. commanders recommended 
that they not be allowed to operate north of the DMZ.68  The judiciary was either appointed because 
they would be compliant, or were intimidated into cooperation; according to Gregory Henderson, a 
diplomat in Korea during this period, police requests for arrest warrants were not turned down in a 
single instance in 1948, 1949, or 1950.69  Rhee also took advantage of KNP loyalty to press for 
political advantage, intimidating rivals and, in some cases, intervening to stop his opponents from 
voting. 
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  The result was fragmentation; resistance to Rhee’s actions prompted the National Assembly 
to create on a separate police force that they, not Rhee, controlled.  In August 1948, the National 
Assembly accused Rhee’s police chiefs of collaboration, and set up its own police and courts to 
investigate and sentence the offenders. “Institutional warfare” broke out between the Assembly and 
their Special Police (SP) on the one hand, and Rhee and the KNP on the other.  From January to 
June 1949, SP forces arrested members of the KNP; in May and June, the KNP responded by 
arresting sixteen assemblymen, murdering opposition leader Kim Ku, and physically attacking the 
SP.  Syngman Rhee then issued an executive order dissolving the SP, and replaced the National 
Assembly’s courts with trials of the assemblymen themselves. By early October, 7% of the Assembly 
had been jailed.70   
  Institutional infighting continued during the Korean War, as the legislature tried to remove 
Rhee from office. Rhee’s security forces conducted reprisal killings against Koreans who 
collaborated with northern occupation, and when the National Assembly objected, Rhee not only 
ignored their protests, but used a joint army-police inquiry commission to punish individuals 
suspected of treason: 16,115 arrested by November 1950.  In summer 1952, when the National 
Assembly looked likely to oust Rhee from the presidency, Rhee simply declared martial law.  Army 
chief of staff Yi Chong’an refused to divert combat divisions to hold the legislature hostage, so Rhee 
sent military police instead, arresting some 45 lawmakers on their way to the Assembly and detaining 
them for several days. He later dismissed Yi, and put seven of them on trial for “Communist 
conspiracy.”71 (Yi apparently offered in the interim to oust Rhee in a coup, something American 
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officials seem to have seriously considered.72) The distrust of the KNP that began in this period 
would remain in place for decades to come.73  
 
After the Korean War: Circumscribed Autocratic Manipulation 
  After the signing of the 1953 armistice, the continued presence of the North Korean threat 
led to ongoing U.S. involvement in the ROK military.  The Americans were sufficiently concerned 
that Rhee’s views on how to handle the threat did not align with theirs that they took pains to limit 
his authority over the military.  In ensuring that he would not be able to order an attack across the 
DMZ without U.S. approval, the State Department observed in 1955 that fortunately, “the present 
leaders of the Army are friendly to us and it is our belief that they will not act against our interests 
even under orders from Rhee.”74  Moreover, from July 1950 onward, operational control of the 
ROK military remained with UN Command (and therefore under American military authority).  
  The presence of this external threat therefore created a bifurcation in Korea’s coercive 
apparatus, between an American-controlled military focused on external defense, and the purely 
internal forces responsible to the ROK president.  On the one hand, American retention of 
command authority insulated the Korean military from Rhee’s meddling.  At the same time, however, 
American support vis-a-vis the external threat seems to have freed Rhee to focus on elite rivals – not 
unlike Ferdinand Marcos. As Brazinsky observes, “Whereas most governments must bargain with 
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key elites or the general population to acquire the resources necessary for waging wars, Syngman 
Rhee wheedled support for the expansion of ROK forces from the United States.”75   
  American support, therefore, narrowed the space in which Rhee could pursue coup-proofing 
practices, but also freed him to do so within those confines.  Wherever he was allowed to do so, 
Rhee engaged in coup-proofing measures designed to marginalize rivals.  He fostered competition 
between factions and regional groups, and controlled appointments to promote loyalists. He 
particularly relied on the KNP and a handful of small units that remained outside CFC command as 
a parallel force to ensure his security.  Unsurprisingly, it was these forces who engaged in the work 
of domestic repression for the remainder of the 1950s.        
  Rhee fostered fragmentation within the coercive apparatus. He used a military police unit 
headed by Lieutenant General Won Yong-dok, designated the Joint Military Provost Marshal or 
Joint Provost Marshal Command (JMPM or JPMC), a unit that was outside Army jurisdiction and 
responsible only to the civilian Minister of Defense and to Rhee.  Rhee played this unit off the 
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) headed by Major General Kim Chang-yong.76 After Kim’s 
assassination in January 1956, one of the first people arrested was the commander of General Won’s 
unit.77 U.S. embassy cables from Seoul to Washington throughout the 1950’s testify to Rhee’s use of 
these special military and police units to intimidate, arrest, and eliminate political opponents. Both 
                                                 
75 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 27.  
76 This latter unit was then called the Special Task Command, Teukmudae, but most of the literature refers to it 
by the name it acquired under Chang Myon’s government, which renamed it the Counter-Intelligence Corps, 
or Bangchupdae, in an attempt to rehabilitate its image.  Jun, “South Korea,” p. 136.  




the CIC and the JPMC were specifically named as units used for “security as well as political 
actions.”78   
   Rhee personally controlled most national and provincial-level appointments, reportedly even 
reviewing passport application approvals.  He used this power to purge KDP (conservative) rivals 
who had served in the American-led military government;79 six months after taking office, half of the 
old ministers were gone.80 By 1949, the State Department reported, not a single one of Rhee’s 
ministers or vice ministers were individuals who had held significant positions in the American 
military government.81  He appointed loyalists as a reward, and “relied on those who professed their 
personal allegiance to him rather than on those who demonstrated administrative competence.”82 He 
also used personnel rotation to prevent bureaucracies and individuals from amassing power that 
could challenge him; “periodic cabinet shake-ups deprived the administrative agencies of stability 
and consistency and, at the same time, engendered the temptation for the ministers to amass a 
fortune and pay off political debts while in office.”83 Periodic is perhaps an understatement; 
according to Henderson, “Rhee ran through ministers at the rate of more than ten a year,” a total of 
129 in less than twelve years.84  The policy was used “to destroy or to prevent the consolidation of 
                                                 
78 U.S. State Department, “Report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea,” Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-57, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 74-75; see also Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, pp. 
73-74; U.S. State Department, “Situation and Short-Term Prospects of the Republic of Korea,” 21 November 
1957, RG59, CDF 1955-59, 795b.00/11-2157.  
79 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 17.   
80 Henderson, Korea, p. 239.  
81 U.S. State Department, “The Composition of the Present Korean Government,” 24 March 1949, RG59, 
CDF 1945-49, 895.01-3-2449.  
82 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution, p. 20.   
83 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution, p. 21.  




groups, bonds, personal powers, and vested interests in any province, ministry, or board.”85 
Comparing Rhee to Haile Selassie and the rulers of the late Yi dynasty, Henderson adds that 
“streams of aspirants depended on him alone for advancement and, through the frequent shifts he 
made, were rendered addedly [sic] incapable of attaching themselves to an interest group.”86 A 
baffled State Department observed that without the appeal of these appointments and the threat of 
dismissal, it was “difficult to imagine how a political leader with such a small quantity of actual 
ability and substance to offer his following has been able to attain such great popularity.”87   
  Rotation of high officials deliberately exploited regional and factional rivalries. Under Rhee, 
“the façade of top-down control masked a fractured regime that frequently splintered into 
competing clusters of power,”88 as he fostered competition between subordinates in different 
positions and different organizations. Regional alliances dominated the Army.  There was a 
northwest faction based in the Pyongan area, headed by the two Paek brothers from the Japanese 
Kwantung Army and later by Chang To-yong; these men were patrons of Park Chung Hee, who had 
strong ties there despite his southeastern origins. Their faction was counterbalanced by a northeast 
faction based in Hamkyong, led by former Japanese officer Chong Il-gwon and then Yi Yong-mun.89  
Though Paek and Chong both came from the north and served in the Manchurian Army, they led 
rival factions grouped around their respective provinces; Rhee rotated the position of army chief of 
staff between the two groups to ensure continued competition and prevent one from dominating.90 
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There was also a third faction, from the middle-southern provinces, headed by Yi Hyong-gun.91  
According to Yong-sup Han, there were also rival factions based around schools: graduates of the 
Japanese Military Academy were rivals to those who had been trained at the Fengtian and Xinjing 
Officers’ Schools (the latter of which was attended by Park Chung Hee).92 
  In addition to stoking factional competition, Rhee engineered appointments to marginalize 
the supporters of his potential political rivals.  He was able to pursue these policies because the 
preferences dictated by his personal desire for power overlapped with those of Americans 
concerned about Communist subversion, who found former Japanese officials to be better trained 
and politically more reliable.  Rhee used this bias to avoid assigning command posts to the Koreans 
who had fought for independence in China, and to sideline their leader Kim Koo.93  Instead, he 
promoted a younger, more malleable group of commanders, including young soldiers from North 
Korea who professed a particularly strong anti-Communist orientation based on their experience 
there. (Somewhat paradoxically, Rhee was able to use their experience to reassure the Americans of 
their loyalty, while calling the political orientation of Korean nationalists form China into question.) 
These officers’ pursuit of American training and appreciation for U.S. support against the 
communist North further increased American counterparts’ trust, enabling Rhee to simultaneously 
strengthen the relationship with his U.S. patron and marginalize his political opponents.94  
  At the same time, however, Rhee’s attempts to create a coercive apparatus that was 
personally loyal made the security forces as well as his inner circle more exclusive than before.   
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First, Rhee reduced the size of the police force; between 1953 and 1957, its numbers decreased from 
63,427 to 33,000.95  At the top, moreover, the octogenarian leader Rhee relied more and more on his 
wife, Austrian-born Francesca Rhee, and on his Presidential Assistant Park Chan-Il.  The two 
“strictly controlled and limited the matters brought to Rhee’s attention, removing those which might 
excite or disturb him.”96  This reliance on a narrow group of individuals decreased the quality of 
intelligence available to him, particularly regarding popular unrest, and led to unnecessary repression.  
Opposition leaders lamented that Rhee was “not aware of the manner in which his policies were 
implemented, of the full nature of the problems that they confronted, or of the changing nature of 
the domestic political situation.”97  He became “isolated from the uncontrolled outside information 
needed for effective leadership,” and subject to the information presented by subordinates whose 
view was skewed by parochial and personal interest.98  
  As a result of this misinformation, Rhee overestimated certain threats, allowed hardliners to 
use coercion for political ends, and was unaware of the indiscriminacy of the violence that he had 
unleashed. In December 1958, for example, his Liberal Party pushed through an amendment to the 
National Security Law by using some 300 special ‘security guards’ to haul opposition assemblymen 
from the Democratic Party (DP) from the chamber and lock in the basement.  Justified on anti-
Communist grounds, the bill looked much more like a way to muzzle the press and target political 
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opponents; the British Foreign Office less subtly called it “a hunting license.”99  Rhee claimed 
(wrongly) to the protesting U.S. ambassador that the DP had been infiltrated by Communists; he did 
not know that his subordinates had locked the opposition in the basement to secure passage of the 
law.100  The law was then used to close an opposition newspaper that supported Vice President 
Chang Myon,101 to weaken the opposition party,102 and to execute Progressive Party leader Cho 
Pong-am on grounds of espionage, subversion, and collaboration with Communists.103  
  Ultimately, however, Rhee’s efforts at fragmentation backfired. As happened under Marcos, 
Rhee’s interference created a divide within the military between the (senior) officers who benefitted 
from his patronage, and those who were excluded – largely, a group of ambitious, American-trained 
junior officers.104  These men resented the fact that officers who received early loyalty-based 
promotions were still young enough to remain in service for years to come, allowing less room to 
promote those below and limiting junior officers’ opportunities for advancement.  In September 
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1960, sixteen officers, including eventual coup-architect Kim Jong Pil, demanded that the Army’s 
Chief of Staff remove senior commanders tainted by politicization and corruption. The junior 
officers were arrested for insubordination and no action against the senior officers was taken.105 
Discontent among the lower ranks helped push these officers to intervene in politics in 1961;106 
Rhee’s pursuit of intra-military fragmentation for political advantage ultimately contributed to his 
own downfall.   
  In sum, the external threat from North Korea led to an American presence that, through 
retention of command authority, insulated the South Korean military from standard coup-proofing.  
Both the Americans and Rhee, however, sought to exclude large swathes of Korean society from 
participation in the institutions of public security and coercion.  And in the parts of the coercive 
apparatus not under American control, Rhee deliberately fostered a high degree of fragmentation. 
This helps explain why Rhee’s tenure was relatively violent compared to those of the autocrats who 
followed, and why under Rhee it was the police, rather than the military, who were known for 
violence against Korea’s civilian population.   
 
III. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Park Chung Hee 
  Although Park’s authoritarianism is typically associated with the 1961 coup and post-1972 
military dictatorship, a comprehensive new examination concludes that the 1972 Yushin declaration 
formalized rather than established his “imperial presidency.”107 As with Marcos, it is helpful to 
examine Park’s design and management of the coercive apparatus both before and after 1972.  This 
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section therefore discusses the structure and social composition of the coercive apparatus across 
Park’s time in office, with particular emphasis on the post-1972 period.  
  In the 1960’s, Park Chung Hee presided over a coercive apparatus that was principally 
focused on defending South Korea from external threat.  He therefore created a new coalition that 
was relatively inclusive, and also established a single, unitary coordinating institution to handle 
internal security: the KCIA. After he declared Yushin, however, Park’s perception of the dominant 
threat appears to have shifted; he became more concerned about managing elites and protecting 
himself from his own coercive apparatus, with the result that fragmentation and competition re-
emerged over the course of the 1970’s. Regional favoritism also deepened.  Consistent with the 
arguments made in Chapter One, the increase in fragmentation and exclusion of Cholla from the 
security apparatus help to explain both the higher rate of violence in the 1970s (relative to the 
1960s), and the higher rate of repression directed at Cholla during that decade.  
 
Overview: Political Developments under Park  
  On 19 April 1960 (4.19, sa-il-gu), popular protests began that toppled the unpopular Syngman 
Rhee: what would come to be known as the April Revolution.108  A brief interregnum – the 
democratic, weak Second Republic under prime minister Chang Myon – ended on May 16, 1961 
(5.16), when Park Chung Hee and a group of colonels from the Korean army and marines – an 
estimated 250 officers and 3,500 men out of a military of 600,000 – seized power in a coup.  A 
military junta of around thirty colonels and brigadier generals declared the Supreme Council for 
National Reconstruction (SCNR); on June 6, they issued the “Law Regarding Extraordinary 
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Measures for National Reconstruction,” which superseded the constitution and appropriated the 
powers of the legislature, executive, and judiciary to the SCNR.   
  On May 17, the junta headed by Park closed the National Assembly and banned political 
activity.  Within six days, 2,014 politicians had been arrested, including the prime minister, and by 
March 1962, 4,367 of them had been banned from engaging in political activity for the next six 
years.109  In June 1961, the SCNR issued its “Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures,” and Park 
added the Anti-Communist Law (ACL) to the National Security Law (NSL) and other “political 
control laws” (chongchi kyujepop).110  The junta closed newspapers, instituted a curfew, and arrested 
nearly 14,000 people as “hooligans.”111  13,300 members of the civil service and military were purged 
or retired within weeks, and the total rose to 17,000 by the end of summer 1961.  Military officers 
formed a revolutionary tribunal headed by one of the colonels of the coup, and military court cases 
handled increasing numbers of criminal cases: 10,080 in 1960; 22,195 in 1961; 35,044 in 1962.112  
  Partially due to pressure from the Kennedy administration, Park agreed to hold elections and 
form a civilian government in 1963.113  He and the government-backed Democratic Republican 
Party (DRP, 민주공화당) won the presidency and a legislative majority.  The 1964-65 protests over 
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the Korea-Japan normalization talks, however, resulted in the declaration of martial law in June 
1964, the passing of a Garrison Decree in August 1965, and a US-supplied crackdown by the ROK 
Army (ROKA).114 August 1964 also saw the creation of a Media Ethics Committee Law, which, 
though held in abeyance, served as an ever-present reminder that the regime could become more 
restrictive if it wished.   
  After Park was re-elected in 1967, domestic and international developments heightened his 
sense of threat.  In the late 1960’s, North Korean infiltration attempts increased, most notably the 
1968 Blue House raid by commandos from the (North) Korean People’s Army, who got within a 
kilometer of Blue House before being apprehended.115 In 1970-71, international developments also 
made Korea’s external situation seem more precarious: the Nixon doctrine, Nixon’s visit to China, 
the withdrawal of a full division of American troops from Korea (decreasing troop strength from 
62,000 to 42,000), and superpower détente. In response, Park initiated South Korea’s pursuit of a 
plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, and dispatched KCIA chief Lee Hu-rak to Pyongyang 
to negotiate a joint declaration. He also created new squadrons of combat police (chongtu kyongchal) 
under the Ministry of National Defense to conduct counter-espionage and counter-infiltration 
missions.116   
  Park’s 1969 attempt at constitutional revision (to make himself eligible to run for a third 
term) prompted widespread student protest, and in 1971, as labor disputes rose, he eked out an 
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uncomfortably narrow victory in the presidential race (53%-45%) over Cholla-based challenger Kim 
Dae Jung.117  According to testimony from his former chief of staff, Kim Chong-ryom, Park began 
planning for Yushin in April 1971, as he ran for his third presidential term.118 In October 1971, he 
issued a Garrison Decree that stationed troops on eight different university campuses; in December 
he declared a state of national emergency, and moved against the so-called “Four Man faction” that 
was challenging his authority in the National Assembly. The KCIA and Kim Jong-Pil protégé Oh 
Chi-Sung arrested and interrogated twenty-three DRP politicians, torturing at least nine in the 
process.119   
  Finally, in October 1972, Park declared martial law, dissolving the National Assembly, 
closing colleges and universities, and banning political parties.120  In a “self-coup” in November, 
Park promulgated the Yushin constitution, which allowed him to appoint and fire the prime minister 
and cabinet, appoint one-third of the National Assembly, suspend civil liberties, and rule by 
emergency decree.121  Shifting to indirect election by a body whose membership Park now controlled 
ensured that he could remain in office for life.122   
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  The Yushin system also adapted the legal structure used to deal with dissidents and 
opposition; Park gained the ability to make Emergency Decrees (EDs, or Emergency Measures, 
EMs) without the approval of the National Assembly. In the years that followed, Emergency 
Measures were used for ordering repressive responses to campus unrest, outlawing work stoppages 
and strikes, and were usually accompanied by mass arrests (minchong sagon).123  The infamous EM #9, 
passed after the 1975 fall of Vietnam, made mere criticism of the regime a violation of national 
security laws, and unlike the other, more specifically targeted EMs, remained in effect until Park’s 
death nearly five years later.124 Table 4.1, below, shows a list of these Emergency Measures:  
Table 4.1 List of Garrison and Emergency Decrees in South Korea125  
Decree Number Date  Purpose  
Garrison Decree 15 Oct. 1971  Reaction to major student protests against military training.  
Soldiers deployed to major universities, 2000 arrested.  
Martial Law  17 Oct. 1972  Martial law declared, National Assembly dissolved.  
EM #1   
8 Jan. 1974 
 
Disallowed criticism of Yushin, forbade anti-government 
petitions, and created General Emergency Court Martial 
system  
 
EM #2  
EM #3  14 Jan. 1974  Eased tax burden of low-income earners to stabilize economy  
EM #4 3 Apr. 1974  Made student political organizing illegal; targeted National 
Democratic Youth-Student League (minchonghangnyon)  
EM #5  23 Aug. 1974  Annulled EM #1 and EM#4  
EM #6  31 Dec. 1974 Annulled EM #3  
EM #7 8 Apr. 1975 Closed Korea University (because of student activism)  
EM #8 13 May 1975  Annulled EM #7  
EM #9  13 May 1975  Made criticism of government illegal and allowed 
imprisonment without due process.  
Garrison Decree  20 Oct. 1979  Reaction to major protests in Pusan, Masan, and Changwon 
that followed KYS’ expulsion from NA.   
Martial Law  12 Dec. 1979 Martial law declared with Chun Doo Hwan’s takeover.  
Expanded on 17 May 1980, which led to demonstrations in 
Kwangju and Kwangju massacre.    
 
                                                 
123 Shin Gi-Wook, Paul Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookyung Kim, South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-
1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report (Stanford: Korea Democracy Project, 2009), p. 25.  
124 Oh, Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime, pp. 227-28.  See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
“Memorandum for the President: Emergency Measure 9,” White House, 10 August 1978.   




Park ruled under this “Fourth Republic” until his assassination by KCIA chief Kim Jae-kyu in 
October 1979.   
 
The Social Composition of Park’s Coercive Apparatus 
  In the early 1960’s, the social composition of South Korea’s coercive apparatus changed 
significantly. Many of the Japanese-era police and military officials were removed from their 
positions.  To better understand who replaced them, I constructed a new dataset of internal security 
elites.126 This dataset suggests that the coercive apparatus that Park created was relatively broad and 
inclusive in terms of its social composition.  I find that Park’s reputation for regional favoritism was 
true at high levels in the coercive apparatus, but only to a limited degree; that he relied on a fairly 
broad coalition of military elites from different classes; and that he pursued deliberately inclusive and 
faction-minimizing personnel policies.  These policies were largely motivated by the need for South 
Korea to combat the external threat it faced from North Korea.   
  The interim government, Chang Myon government, and the first years of military rule 
removed former Japanese officials from office. In 1960-61, a massive purge of civil servants and 
officials occurred, including provincial and local levels. Turnover was rapid; ministers, advisors, and 
councilors rotated frequently. Chang Myon “changed his ministers at the most rapid rate … since 
the end of the Yi Dynasty, some remaining in office only a few weeks or even days. There was a new 
Minister of Home Affairs in each of the first four months of the government.”127  The majority of 
the approximately six hundred KNP officers from the colonial police force – many of them now in 
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key positions – resigned or were fired. They were replaced by “recruits, some of them college 
graduates, who were hostile to older police traditions.”128 Over the course of 1960-63, senior military 
officers were similarly purged or retired, especially members of the Northeastern and Northwestern 
factions and officers of North Korean origin who had risen to prominence under Syngman Rhee.129  
All seven of the lieutenant generals ousted from the military after the 5.16 coup were of North 
Korean origin.130 Observers also noted that the “penalties for those dropped became decidedly more 
extreme; imprisonment and even torture were visited on many who were dropped from high 
posts.”131  The purges led to a short-term spike in NSL indictments in 1961-63.132   
  After 1963, however, Park made what one State Department observer called “a conscious 
effort to stabilize the bureaucracy” by decreasing the frequency of rotation and reshuffling.133 
Appointment patterns from 1963-72 were remarkably different: 50.4% of those at the vice-
ministerial level or above under Park stayed in office for two years or more (versus Rhee’s 10-11 
months); from 1972-79 that share increased to 60.9%.  Multiple appointments also contributed to 
stability.  Of 162 men at that level between 1963 and 1972, 37 men held such posts twice, and 35 of 
them did so three times or more.  After Yushin began, 22 of 91 served twice and 24 served three 
times or more.134   
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  One might plausibly expect Park to have exploited regional rivalries in constructing his 
coercive apparatus.  Regionalism (chiyokju’ui) is a long-standing and sensitive subject in Korea, whose 
origins extend back to the Three Kingdoms period (7th century).135 Regionally-based political factions 
have been a hallmark of Korean politics since the Choson dynasty, in which a regional education 
system called seowon was used to recruit faction members.136 A number of authors have noted Park’s 
tendency to preferentially allocate economic resources toward his home province of Kyongsang;137 
Bruce Cumings, for example, writes:  
Park’s one great mistake (completely predictable, given his political coalition) was to 
festoon his home region with all these new industrial complexes and to shortchange the 
Chollas.  Of the six new target industries, only one went to the southwest… the steel 
mills, auto plans, shipbuilding facilities, free-export zones, the capital to pay for them, 
the jobs they created, the new highways and sprouting cities they needed were all going 
with clockwork regularity to Korea’s southeast, home to Park and just about everyone 
associated with him….[Towns] were transformed overnight because they were near 
Park’s birthplace (next to Kumi) or were hometowns of one of his close associates 
(Pohang).138 
Kyongsang elites dominated the interpenetrated business-government elite fostered by Park.139  
Byung-Kook Kim writes that Park’s time as the deputy director of the army headquarters’ 
intelligence bureau taught him three rules: “control the flow of information, divide and conquer, and 
use regionalist sentiments,” and that in economic policy Park preferred to recruit rising stars from 
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the Kyongsang region “for an additional assurance of loyalty.”140 Kyongsang was about a third of 
Korea’s population, but by 1989, individuals from Kyongsang region comprised twenty-three of the 
fifty biggest chaebol owners (46%), nine of twenty-four cabinet ministers (37%), and half of the 
central bank’s board; they openly credited their success to provincial origins.141  The southwestern 
region of Cholla – Kyongsang’s historical rival and the ancestral home of Syngman Rhee – was 
systematically neglected, its economy underdeveloped.   
  No previous analysis has examined whether Park’s preference for Kyongsang affected 
appointments within the coercive apparatus.  Several factors might push against regional favoritism, 
including Park’s reliance on members of the northwest faction to execute the 1961 coup and the 
idea that Park, not having belonged to the Kyongsang elite, would not actually have had access to 
elite regional networks.142 The data that I gathered suggests that Park did have some preference for 
personnel from Kyongsang, though not necessarily to the degree evidenced in the economic realm.  
Figure 4.4 below shows the provincial origins of security officials under Park:   
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Figure 4.4 Regional Makeup of the Coercive Apparatus under Park  
In 1960, Kyongsang (including Busan) made up 35% of South Korea’s population, but 38% of 
internal security elites under Park.  Chungcheong, the regional home of coup architect and KCIA 
creator Kim Jong Pil, is also slightly over-represented (16.7%, relative to 15.6% of population). 
Regional favoritism was more pronounced for individuals without a military background; all of the 
Chief Prosecutors responsible for prosecuting political crimes, for example, came from Kyongsang 
or Chungcheong.  Table 4.2 summarizes regional representation in the coercive apparatus:  
Table 4.2  Regional Representation in Coercive Institutions under Park  
Province  
Population  
in 1960  
Number of Internal 
Security Officials  
Percentage of 
Population 
Percentage of Internal 
Security Officials  
Cheju 281,720 0 1.1% 0.0% 
Cholla 5,948,498 1 23.8% 1.7% 
Seoul 2,444,883 2 9.8% 3.3% 
Gangwon 1,636,726 2 6.5% 3.3% 
Gyeonggi  2,758,027 5 11.0% 8.3% 
Chungcheong 3,894,959 10 15.6% 16.7% 
Kyongsang  8,029,304 23 32.1% 38.3% 
North Korea 0 4 0.0% 6.7% 
Missing 0 13 0.0% 21.7% 





Most striking is the exclusion of officials from Cholla, which when Park assumed office in 1961 
comprised around a quarter of the Republic of Korea’s population (23.8% to Kyongsang’s 32.1%). 
Compared to 23 officials from Kyongsang who were involved in internal security decision-making, 
however, only one official from Cholla is known to have held an important position related to 
internal security in the eighteen years of Park’s tenure: Chang Il-hoon, who headed the National 
Police for a mere seven months from May 1975 to January 1976.  North Korea was actually better 
represented than Cholla; four prominent individuals in the coercive apparatus came from provinces 
north of the DMZ.  Table 4.3 shows that the coercive apparatus was less representative, regionally 
speaking, than the broader political elite under Park:  
Table 4.3 Regional Origins of Officials in Government & Internal Security143 
 
Province  
Percentage of RoK 







Percentage of Internal 
Security Officials  
from Province  
Cholla 23.8% 13.2% 15.3% 1.7% 
Seoul/ 
Gyeonggi 
20.8% 14.1% 15.2% 11.7% 
Gangwon/Cheju  7.7% 7.7% 7.0% 3.3% 
Chungcheong 15.6% 13.9% 16.3% 16.7% 
Kyongsang  32.1% 30.1% 29.8% 38.3% 
North Korea 0.0% 21.0% 16.4% 6.7% 
Missing 0.0% 0.0%   21.7% 
 
                                                 
143 These official statistics combine Seoul with Gyeonggi province, which surrounds the city.  For reasons that 
escape me, they also combine Gangnam (a province in the northeastern part of the Republic of Korea), with 
Cheju (an island off the southwestern coast).  These combinations explain the differences between Table 1 
and Table 2.  Statistics on ministers and high officials from주승만, "지역주의 선거 근본원인에 대한 
성찰과 해결방안" (2003), 서울, 연세대학교, 페이지 47. [Joo Seung-man, "Reflection on and Resolution 




Importantly, the regional backgrounds of internal security elites narrowed over time.  Consistent 
with the argument that Park’s perception of the dominant threat shifted from external to elite, there 
is a more pronounced bias toward Kyongsang in internal security in the 1970’s.  
  Park relied on a broader range of military ties and a more inclusive military network than is 
sometimes asserted.  As in the Philippines, lateral networks among classes of KMA graduates are 
important. In 1969, for example, all five corps commanders (the position between Korea’s division 
and Field Army commanders) were members of Park’s class.144  Figure 4.5, below, shows the military 






Figure 4.5: Military-Education Background of Internal Security Elites under Park  
This reveals both Park’s reliance on particular military classes to form his coalition, but also a 
heterogeneity somewhat at odds with existing accounts.146 Park forged close ties with members of 
the 5th KMA class as a company commander at the Academy, and with members of the 8th class 
while working in the intelligence division at army headquarters. By forming a bridge between them 
                                                 
144 Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, p. 156.   
145 I omit the Chief Prosecutors and post-1966 police chiefs, none of whom received a military education.  
146 Kang also finds that Park selectively, rather than blindly, employed people from his military networks.  




and the senior members of the Northwestern faction, Park “put himself at the center of the 
coalition” and became the glue that held it together.147 Park had been in command of a logistical 
headquarters in Busan during the initial stages of planning, and even later, in Seoul, he did not have 
many operational troops under his command.  Because of this, he was forced to reach out to the 
lieutenant colonels and colonels of the 8th KMA class, by then in command of combat battalions 
and regiments, to get operational control of the troops in and around Seoul that he would need to 
stage a successful coup. Over the course of his presidencies, these classes were well-represented in 
the internal security apparatus; the 5th and 8th KMA classes and 1st MLA class (the class immediately 
prior to Park’s) together comprised over half of the internal security elites who held top-ranking 
positions under Park (17%, 22%, and 19.5%, respectively).  Kim Jong-pil’s famous 8th KMA class, 
for example, produced twenty-four national assemblymen and sixteen ministerial-level officials, 
including two KCIA directors, the founding director of the Presidential Security Service, four of the 
seven heads of Capitol Garrison Command, and three heads of Army/Defense Security 
Command.148 There are also a few surprises, however.  The KMA 3rd class achieves more 
prominence than historical accounts would have suggested (15%), and not a single member of the 
KMA 9th class achieved one of the top-ranking positions included here, somewhat surprising if the 
claim of current scholarship is correct that this class was part of the core group joining the KMA 8th 
to execute the May 1961 coup.149  
  Park’s external orientation is reflected not only in this relatively inclusive coalition, but also 
in the fact that he attempted to minimize intra-military division and competition, focusing instead on 
                                                 
147 Han, “The May 16th Coup,” pp. 40, 44.  
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coordination and external effectiveness. He found ways to protect himself from collusion of the 
same type that had vaulted him into office without compromising the ROK’s combat preparedness.   
 In contrast to Marcos, Park deliberately tried to smooth over the difference between officers 
produced at the Korean Military Academy, by ROTC, and by Officer Candidate School programs.150 
He de-emphasized the differences between these groups of officers, and spread KMA graduates 
across a wide range of posts to mix them with the other groups and prevent them from acting as a 
cohesive bloc.151 As a result, American observers such as Ambassador Samuel Berger praised Park 
for his efforts to combat factionalism.152 Park’s active cultivation of networks across the different 
classes, and the fact that prominent positions were fairly broadly distributed across classes, also 
ensured that no class or group of classes would have reason to unify against him.   
  At the same time that Park made the military an internally cohesive unit bound by regional 
and military ties centered on him, he prevented the military from developing ties to social groups, 
business interests, or rival politicians who could support a future coup.  Joo-Hong Kim characterizes 
his strategy as one of “isolation and monopolization.”153  Park made clear that close collaboration 
between military officials and national assemblymen could derail an officer’s career.  Until they 
retired, active-duty officers focused on their professional responsibilities rather than getting involved 
in civil administration or business154 -- and once retired, they kept their distance from those on active 
                                                 
150 This system is similar to the American one, in which an individual may become a military officer through 
three processes: 1) attending a service academy; 2) participating in ROTC at a civilian university; or 3) 
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151 Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, p. 160.   
152 Samuel Berger to Dean Rusk, 15 December 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Vol. 22, p. 
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153 Kim, “The Armed Forces.”   
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duty. In May 1965, for example, when Park named the Northwestern faction’s retired general Chong 
Il-kwon to be prime minister, he issued a stern warning: “Do not socialize with generals who 
command key military units, nor with chaebol leaders… Be wary when people of the northern regions 
approach you, lest others perceive you as building a personal power base.”155 When Prime Minister 
Chong recommended a particular army general for promotion, Park retired the general instead.156 
Keeping officers away from domestic politics kept the military focused on its primary task, external 
defense, and prevented younger officers from developing ties to Park’s political opponents.   
  Many autocratic leaders rely on appointment, monitoring, and promotion practices that 
compromise the military’s external effectiveness. Park, unusually, found ways of considering political 
factors that did not compromise the military’s combat effectiveness.  First, he created a two-track 
system that allowed him to promote commanders with responsibility for external defense on the 
basis of professional merit, and commanders in the most politically sensitive internal positions on a 
basis that laid relatively more emphasis on loyalty.  Jinsun Jun explains:   
He divided military positions into two levels: one consisted of command structure 
positions, including the army chief of staff and the join chief of staff; the other consisted of 
intelligence/security positions such a commander of the Defense Security Command and 
commander of the Capital Defense Command. He then had the defense security 
commander report directly to him rather than to the minister of defense or the army chief 
of staff.  Park used this dual structure to ensure a system of checks and balances…. Park 
politicized the military security apparatus in depoliticizing the military.157 
Joo-hong Kim similarly argues that Park used a two-track system, placing politically loyal “praetorian 
guards” in strategic military intelligence units and promoting professional soldiers through the field 
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Solitude,” p. 152.  
156 Incident recounted in Oh, Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime, p. 123.  




army, with little overlap between the two career paths.158  This comparatively unusual two-track 
system was designed to protect Park internally while still allowing the majority of the ROK military 
to stay focused on its primary external security mission.   
 Second, Park paid special attention to the activities of military and internal security elites. A 
former intelligence official himself, he monitored loyalty through the Army Counter-Intelligence 
Corps (renamed the Army Security Command in 1968), whose director reported to Park in writing 
on a daily basis.159 He directed his security and intelligence agencies to specifically track relationships 
between retired and active officers, to detect and prevent coalescence of an opposition bloc.160 
Unlike Rhee, who had used a “fire alarm” strategy of controlling his agents (waiting to react until a 
problem arose), Park used a “police patrol” strategy of routine and proactive information-gathering, 
holding monthly meetings and visiting various sites and units to dispense “on the spot guidance.”161  
When he died, officials found that his private safe was full of meticulous, handwritten notes on 
various individuals, organized and indexed according to Park’s own particular scheme.162   
 Monitoring was accompanied by incentives that Park controlled and used to minimize 
collusion. Promotions in the combat track were merit-based, but Park “personally awarded every 
pip.”163  And though he maintained strict separation between active-duty military officers and civilian 
politicians, those same military officers could count on doing well in both business and politics after 
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their retirement, occupying prominent positions in state enterprises, ambassadorial posts, and the 
cabinet.  Whereas retired officers had been 7% of the cabinet in the First Republic (under Rhee) and 
3% in the Second (under Chang Myon), under Park they averaged 28%; they also made up 16% of 
the National Assembly.164 Though Park himself lived a spartan lifestyle, he offered the promise of 
business success in the future to military officers as a reward in exchange for loyal and effective 
service in the present.   
 
Structure and the Creation of the KCIA  
 The central change made by Park Chung Hee to the structure of the internal security 
apparatus was the establishment of a new organization with coordinating authority across the 
internal security apparatus: the Korean CIA (KCIA, Chungang Chongbobu, though the English 
abbreviation is used most commonly even in Korean texts).   
 The creation of the KCIA stemmed from two factors: a desire to take power away from the 
KNP, and the desire to prevent a counter-coup.  When Syngman Rhee fell from power in 1960, 
much of the public’s anger was directed at the Korean National Police; some 65% of Seoul National 
University students who participated in the events of April 1960 said that they did so because of 
“anger at the outrageous police.”165  The creation of the KCIA was largely an effort to reduce the 
power of an organization strongly associated with Syngman Rhee and generally abhorred. It was 
also, however, to prevent a counter-coup against the junta.  Se-jin Kim remarked, “A clique that has 
seized power must guard itself against those who might seek to emulate its successful actions.”166 
                                                 
164 Note that these percentages declined somewhat over time, and that military governance accelerated during 
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of the KCIA (see below). Jun, “South Korea,” pp. 128-29.   
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When Park came to power, his potential opposition was scattered, and the KCIA, ordered into 
existence by Decree No. 619 on 19 June 1961, was inaugurated to see to it “that the scattered 
particles nowhere cohered.”167 Though modeled in name on the American CIA,168 the merging of 
domestic and external surveillance and operations in the KCIA made it closer in substance to that of 
the Soviet KGB.169 The KCIA was divided into three major wings, which written scholarship 
characterizes as management, security, and intelligence,170 but which former KCIA officials 
explained in interviews as having more to do with the focus of each branch’s work: one branch 
handled all foreign intelligence and operations, one handled domestic intelligence and operations, 
and the third handled North Korea (which didn’t fall neatly into either the domestic or foreign 
category).171 
 The key official behind the creation of the KCIA was thirty-five-year-old retired Lt. Col. 
Kim Jong-Pil, Park’s protégé and nephew by marriage.  He was a graduate of the 8th class of the 
KMA in 1949, and, along with Park and Kim Dong-ha, one of the principal planners of the 5.16 
coup. To staff the KCIA, Kim Jong-Pil recruited a 3,000-person elite corps, drawn in part from 
members of the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (the precursor to the Army/Defense 
Security Command).  He hand-picked the director, deputy director, and heads of the agency’s six 
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bureaus and six divisions, filling these positions with members of his clique.172  An organizational 
architect of the highest degree, Kim Jong-Pil also organized the Democratic Republican Party 
(민주공화당), a government party formed during the 1961-63 period that won a legislative majority in 
the November 1963 elections, and was thought to have been funded by the KCIA. (There is some 
indication that Kim Jong-Pil attempted to model the DRP on the Kuomintang in Taiwan, albeit with 
mixed success.)  Kim would also serve as the Republic of Korea’s prime minister under Park from 
1971-75, and again from 1998 to 2002.    
 The process by which the KCIA established dominance over the internal security apparatus 
was remarkably similar to that of Taiwan in terms of both process and effects: a short-term increase 
in violence, and a post-consolidation decrease in fragmentation, competition, and violence.  Among 
the KCIA’s first tasks was a loyalty review of all major political and government figures, wherein the 
KCIA reported that 1,863 of the 41,000 people screened were found to have committed some 
offense.  The KCIA also claimed to have uncovered at least thirteen “anti-revolutionary” cases 
between June 1961 and May 1963.  As in Taiwan, two of the most notable early cases eliminated 
potential rivals to Park and to Kim Jong-Pil; State Department officials noted that during the 1961-
63 period, “the main danger courted was internal factional struggle for a control too tightly exercised 
by the KCIA.”173  The first casualty of this struggle was Lt. Gen. Chang Do-young (To-yong), the 
original chairman of the SCNR, who with 45 “co-conspirators” was implicated in an alleged plot to 
assassinate Park, and arrested on July 3, 1961.174  The second case was that of Maj. Gen. Kim Dong-
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ha, who had helped plan the 5.16 events with Park Chung Hee and Kim Jong-Pil.175  Maj. Gen. 
Kim’s attempt to remove Kim Jong-Pil from leadership of the Democratic Republican Party 
culminated in the court-martial of Kim Dong-ha and Kim Jong-Pil’s resignation to take a multi-
month trip overseas.  
 With his potential rivals sidelined and only six of the original 32 members of the SCNR 
remaining, Park’s authority was unchallenged by any remaining elites.  The KCIA settled into a 
supervisory role, unifying and streamlining internal security operations under its aegis. Article 1 of 
the KCIA’s founding decree (Law No. 619), drafted by members of the KMA 8th class, spelled out 
its purpose and intended authority:  
The [Korean] Central Intelligence Agency was created directly under the Supreme 
Council of National Reconstruction in order to supervise and coordinate both 
international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all 
government intelligence agencies, including that of the military.176 
Article 3 gave the KCIA the right to set up domestic branches, and article 7 authorized it to receive 
“support and assistance from all state institutions when necessary for work,” including hiding the 
KCIA budget in that of other agencies’ for reasons of national security, a measure that allowed it to 
evade National Assembly supervision.177  A regulation enacted in December 1963 confirmed the 
KCIA’s powers of control and coordination. In the mid- and late 1960’s, the KCIA assumed what 
later histories referred to as “coordinating power” or “coordinating authority” over the internal 
security apparatus, unifying intelligence and anti-dissident investigations and operations under a 
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single authority.178  Henderson identifies the KCIA’s role as a blend of the rule-by-council tradition 
that characterized traditional Korea and Communist organizational methods, which he refers to as 
“tyranny by council”; he writes that the KCIA “and its relationship to President Park [were] closer 
to Yi council in its relationship to the king than either the assembly or the liberal party were.”179  
Noting the familiarity of KCIA officials with North Korean communist organization, he adds that, 
like Ngo Dhin Nhu in Vietnam, the KCIA appears to have been “influenced by Communist 
techniques while retaining anti-Communist motivations.”180  (In this, the Korean peninsula may bear 
some resemblance to the “interactive borrowing” between Nationalists and Communists in China, 
though the process is much less well documented.181)  
 The “coordinating power” of the KCIA meant that, in practice, it had the authority to show 
up at a local police station and demand to see someone’s records,182 or to issue commands to the 
other police and intelligence agencies.183  The KCIA also directed the activities of the Prosecutor’s 
Office, which under Korean law manages police investigations and whose approval is required for 
warrants related to arrest and search/seizure.184 By law, any agency that initiated an investigation had 
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to notify the director of the KCIA of its action, and the prosecutor had to notify the KCIA of which 
charges he had decided to press and of each sentence handed down.185  In one notable case in 1981, 
prosecutor Koo Sang-jin attempted to suspend the arraignment of two Yonsei University students 
that the KCIA wanted to charge with treason; the KCIA overruled him and the prosecutor 
resigned.186  The KCIA’s authority over other security agencies gave it de facto legal immunity; 
according to Christian activist and law graduate Shin In-ryong, the KCIA agents who tortured her 
told her, “The KCIA is the top policy-making body of the government. We are not regulated by any 
law. We can kill any traitor like you… We can set free any individual.”187  In short, the rise of the 
KCIA reduced fragmentation among the security agencies in South Korea, in favor of a single 
powerful bureaucracy.    
 Though the assertion of being ungoverned by law was only partly correct – the KCIA was 
established by law, but governed by presidential statute and executive order – this passage does 
accurately convey the place that the KCIA occupied relative to other government agencies.  (It was, 
however, not always the case that the KCIA agents themselves engaged in arrest and torture; rather 
than get their hands dirty, they could order police inspectors to do it for them.188) The official history 
of the National Intelligence Service (NIS, the organizational descendant of the KCIA) explicitly 
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notes that the KCIA possessed this authority “to enhance efficiency in security investigations by 
decreasing the waste of effort from engaging in unnecessary competition or executing redundant 
tasks.”189  By the start of the Yushin period in 1972, some interpersonal power struggles within the 
KCIA remained, but for all intents and purposes it was “a smooth-functioning agency, with swift 
communications up and down its lines, and sideways with the National Police, the Army Security 
Command, district and local governmental offices, and many other agencies.”190  
 The KCIA achieved a high level of social penetration.  By 1964, it had 370,000 employees: 
one for every 54 of Korea’s twenty million citizens.191  The KCIA sent informants to campuses and 
to monitor dissidents overseas; it had a presence in other government agencies and branch offices in 
each province and major city. One college professor claimed that he had to report to seven different 
intelligence agencies every week, several of which were in the KCIA (in addition to reporting to 
district police, government offices, and military intelligence).192 A source of career mobility for 
thousands of ambitious officers and politically minded citizens, the KCIA also sponsored entrants 
into every other ministry, allowing it to monitor and influence politics in those agencies.193 Korean 
citizens generally speak of the KCIA as omnipresent under Park; one resident wrote, “The 
impression that Park’s domain was infested with his intelligence agents permeated every nook and 
cranny of society.”194 Another writes, “Its agents penetrated virtually every segment of society, from 
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students and churches to labor and the military.”195  The regime also pursued broader attempts at 
popular mobilization and co-optation through civil society groups like the Student Corps for 
Defense of the State and the New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong) in rural areas.196  
 Finally, KCIA personnel had primary responsibility for enforcing the regime’s informational 
control and censorship policies, a task that allowed them to collect information even as they 
prevented its public dissemination.  (Besides the KCIA, other agencies with authority to censor 
media included Blue House (Cheongwadae, the Korean White House); the Ministry of Culture and 
Information; the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the headquarters of the Korean 
Army and Navy.)  KCIA members regularly showed up at media offices to “discuss” certain cases 
and to advise papers on whether and how politically sensitive developments should be reported.  
One media office (TBC, previously Tongyang Bangsong) recorded a list of all visits and media 
censorship requests for a period of four years and six months during Yushin, from May 1975 to 
November 1979.  Though reporting guidelines were often delivered by phone (sometimes 3-4 times 
a day), the documentation also highlights the frequent in-person appearances of KCIA official Park 
Kwangsu – often referred to as “Park Namsan,” a nickname based on the mountain in the center of 
Seoul where the KCIA’s infamous interrogation facility was located.  Sometimes entire articles were 
embargoed, and at other times, more specific guidelines were issued on the depth and length of 
coverage desired.  Among the topics censored were controversies over Park’s Emergency Measure 
No. 9, accidents involving military vehicles, armed deserters from the military, the issue of Koreans 
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who remained in Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War, and statements made by opposition 
politician Kim Dae Jung.197   
 
Renewed Elite Threat: Fragmentation Re-Emerges 
 Like Marcos, Park became more worried about elite threats as an autocrat than he had been 
as a democratically elected leader, and like Marcos, his coercive apparatus reflected that shift in 
thinking, characterized after Yushin by increasing fragmentation.  Two rival organizations, the Army 
Security Command (ASC) and the Presidential Security Service (PSS) – weakened the KCIA’s 
monopoly, and inter-agency competition re-emerged. Factional competition also developed between 
Kim Jong Pil and the KMA 8th class on the one hand, and Hanahoe (“unity”) on the other – a group 
established by Chun Doo-hwan and other members of the 11th KMA class from Kyongsang region 
to act as a counterweight to Kim Jong Pil.198   
 The early 1970’s saw a rivalry between Kang Chang-song’s ASC and members of the 
Hanahoe faction in the Capital Garrison Command (CGC) led by Commander Yun Pil-yong.  In 
1968, Park had transformed the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) into the Army Security Command 
(ASC), headed first by Kim Jae-kyu (the man who would go on to head the KCIA and assassinate 
Park), and then by Kang Chang-song.199  In early 1973, KCIA Director Lee Hu-rak – best known to 
Americans for brokering the 1972 agreement between North and South Korea, and for the KCIA’s 
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1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung200 – discovered a coup plot by CGC’s Yun Pil-yong and Hanahoe 
members, and appointed the ASC’s Kang Chang-song to investigate.201 Yun and nine other 
Kyongsang-origin Hanahoe members were sentenced for corruption, while he and three other 
generals received maximum sentences of fifteen years in prison. Two hundred other officers were 
forced to resign in a related investigation.202  It was widely believed, though never confirmed, that 
the investigation was approved by Park because he felt threatened by Yun.203  
 The Army Security Command continued to gain power throughout the 1970’s at the expense 
of the KCIA. After the advent of Yushin, the KCIA lost the authority to monitor the military, which 
was transferred to the ASC,204 and military men serving in the KCIA were forced to either retire or 
go back to active duty.  In 1977, Park further strengthened the ASC by merging the various services’ 
CIC units into it, creating a new National Defense Security Command (NDSC, or DSC, kukkun poan 
saryongbu), whose head reported directly to him rather than to the minister of defense or the chief of 
staff of the army.205  In March 1979, Hanahoe founder Chun Doo-Hwan was appointed the head of 
DSC.  By then, Hanahoe members dominated many of the “political” military units located inside or 
near Seoul – units like the CGC, ASC, PSS, KCIA, and Airborne Command, which “lay outside the 
US-dominated CFC command structure and hence were available for Park’s mobilization without 
consultation with the United States.”206  Park also began to use the KCIA as a public scapegoat for 
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regime excesses: directors Kim Jong-Pil, Kim Hyong-uk, and Lee Hu-rak all received the lion’s share 
of opposition and public blame and discontent.207   
 In addition to ASC/DSC competition with CGC and the KCIA, the KCIA also had an 
organizational rivalry with the increasingly powerful Presidential Security Service (PSS).208  
Increasingly concerned about the power of the KCIA as well as about its competence – especially 
following the 1968 Blue House raid and the 1974 assassination of Park’s wife – Park allowed the 
PSS to aggrandize more and more power.  This rivalry began in the early 1970’s, when Lee Hu-rak 
was head of the KCIA and the PSS was run by Park Chong-Kyu,209  and became acute during the 
period after that, in which the PSS was headed by Park’s former bodyguard, non-KMA retired army 
lieutenant colonel Cha Ji-chol,210 who historian Bruce Cumings describes as “a short squat man 
without a visible neck, known for his ability to kill a man with his bare hands.”211  Cha’s role in 
presidential security, and his effect on the coercive apparatus, seem to have been similar to that of 
Ver in the Philippines: powerful, antagonistic, and ultimately disruptive.   
 During the 1970’s, Cha created new offices within the PSS and recruited elite KMA 
graduates to fill them, bringing in Hanahoe members to serve in key positions to cultivate their trust.  
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He expanded important Presidential Security Guard Units, and appropriated equipment and troops 
from other military units to increase the firepower under direct PSS authority.  He also obtained a 
presidential decree that gave the PSS command over Capitol Garrison Command in the case of an 
emergency.  Finally, he began to distribute bonuses in Park’s name to win favors inside the military, 
and started to interfere with the army’s promotion of officers and personnel policies.212 These 
activities created intense friction between PSS head Cha Ji-chol and KCIA director Kim Chae-gyu.   
 On October 26, 1979, Kim Chae-gyu assassinated Park and Cha over dinner at a KCIA 
facility on the Blue House grounds. A post-assassination investigation did not resolve whether Kim’s 
actions were pre-meditated, or whether he acted as part of a larger conspiracy. The shooting 
followed the “YH incident” of August 1979 and a disagreement over how to handle the protests 
that followed in Busan and Masan (the “Pu-Ma struggle”).213 Reportedly Cha Ji-chol, who came 
from Seoul, favored a hardline response; Park was reportedly leaning toward violent suppression as 
well.  Kim, who (like Park) came from the Kyongsang region where the protests were occurring, 
opposed a crackdown and favored a more moderate response.  Reportedly, when it became clear 
that Park was inclined toward Cha’s hardline stance, Kim exclaimed, “How can you do politics with 
a worm like that by your side?” and shot both men.214  Internal competition and violence, which had 
led to attacks on and the fall of so many key members of the security apparatus already, escalated at 
the end to include Park himself – as well as Kim Chae-gyu, who was hanged in May 1980 with four 
other conspirators.215   
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 Park’s perceived need to address the external threat from North Korea resulted in a coercive 
apparatus that was initially unfragmented and broadly representative of Korean society, which is one 
reason why violence in Korea under Park never approached the level observed in the KMT’s early 
years on Taiwan or the later years of the Marcos dictatorship.  The smaller fluctuations in violence 
that do occur, however, correlate with the rising level of fragmentation and competition observed in 
Park’s coercive apparatus, as well as its increasing exclusivity.  Violence is high from 1961-63 when 
fragmentation and rotation practices from the past regime have not been abolished, when former 
Japanese officials are being removed, and when the KCIA is being established.  After the KCIA 
establishes its coordinating authority, violence is low until around the declaration of Yushin. After 
Yushin, competition between factions and rivalry between the KCIA and PSS becomes more acute, 
Park’s coercive apparatus becomes (slowly) less inclusive, and violence rises over time.   
 
IV. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Chun Doo Hwan    
  Chun Doo Hwan, who assumed power as the head of Defense Security Command, gave that 
organization the same coordinating authority that had previously been given to the KCIA.  This, 
combined with the fact that DSC was a military organization and strongly influenced by the U.S., 
meant that the coercive apparatus under Chun was relatively unfragmented.  Its social composition 
and degree of exclusivity, however, were more complicated.   The top levels of Chun’s coercive 
apparatus were heavily drawn from Kyongsang, even more than Park’s elites were.  At the ground 
level, however, Chun responded to high levels of popular protest during his ascent to power – 
including the May 1980 Kwangju incident – by creating riot police units that were staffed by 
conscripts randomly assigned from the pool of people summoned for compulsory military service. 
This may explain why, under Chun, Cholla was no longer singled out for regional violence, and why 




visible style of repression, the inclusivity and representativeness of his riot police may explain why 
his coercive apparatus eventually balked at engaging in further repression, and advocated for 
democracy.  Consistent with my larger argument, South Korea under Chun shows that high external 
and popular threats contribute to a less fragmented and more inclusive coercive apparatus, and that 
that apparatus will be less willing to engage in repression against its own people.  
 
Political Developments in Korea in the 1980s   
  Immediately after Park’s death in October 1979, Choi Kyu-ha became the acting president, 
and Army Chief of Staff General Chong Seung-hwa assumed the post of the martial law 
commander. Choi began a cautious liberalization, pledging support for democracy and releasing 
activists who had been in detention. Meanwhile, Chong appointed the head of Defense Security 
Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, to lead the investigation into Park’s murder. Chun, a 
long-time supporter of Park, had led a demonstration in favor of Park during the 1961 coup, and 
had been a favored acolyte ever since, rising through positions at the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, KCIA, the office of the Army Chief of Staff, and the deputy directorship of the 
PSS.  In 1968, as head of Capital Security Command, he had led the effort to apprehend the North 
Korean commandos who launched a raid against Blue House.216  
  On December 12 (12.12), General Chun and his allies launched a “multistage military 
coup.”217 Chun was assisted by thirty six other officers, among them General Roh Tae Woo: a 
classmate of Chun’s from the 1955 11th KMA class and commander of the Ninth Division, which 
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Roh pulled off its assigned post at the DMZ to assist Chun in the coup.218  Their first move was 
against General Chong, who had been rumored to be thinking about removing or reassigning Chun 
(and several other generals) and sending him to the backwater East Coast Security Command.219 
Under the pretext of the assassination investigation, Chun arrested General Chong and (falsely) 
accused him of conspiring with Kim Jae-kyu to assassinate Park – a move that meant that Chun 
assumed power over the military chain of command.220 At this point, U.S. Ambassador William 
Gleysteen Jr. cabled to Washington, “We have been through a coup in all but name. The flabby 
façade of civilian government remains but almost all signs point to a carefully planned takeover of 
the military power positions.”221  Two days after the coup, on December 14th, Chun reshuffled the 
security apparatus to place his classmates and friends in important posts; Roh Tae Woo, for 
example, became the head of Capital Security Command.222 In late April, Chun was promoted to 
Lieutenant General, and assumed leadership of the KCIA while staying at the helm of Defense 
Security Command, thereby consolidating control of the military and civilian intelligence and 
security apparatus in the hands of a single person.  
  On May 17, President Choi declared martial law, placing Chun in effective command of the 
country.  Chun dissolved the National Assembly, banned political activities including labor strikes, 
closed the universities, and arrested thousands of opposition leaders and activists. Among those 
arrested were the “three Kims”: Kim Jong-Pil, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung.223 He also 
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appointed himself the head of a new committee on national security measures. When these measures 
failed to calm – and actually inflamed resistance in the city of Kwangju in Cholla province – Chun 
ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations in a violent crackdown that many have called 
“Korea’s Tiananmen.”  In August 1980, Chun promoted himself to four-star general, and resigned 
his military commission to run for the presidency. The government also launched a media 
purification campaign and passed a Basic Media Act that closed periodicals, fired journalists, and 
forced integration within the media industry; in a parallel to media requirements north of the border, 
newspapers were required to feature Chun’s photo every day.224  A similar purification campaign 
cleaned out labor unions and forced them under government control.225 Chun was elected President 
on August 27th, using the indirect electoral college system (the National Conference for Unification) 
constructed by Park.  After amending the constitution to maintain Yushin but set a seven-year 
single-term limit, Chun won the presidency again (and again, indirectly) in February 1981.   
  Protests intensified in spring 1987, as social movement organizations began to cooperate 
with each other, and the minjung (common people or masses) movement – a blend of “Marxism, 
nationalism, Catholic liberation theology, anti-economic dependency, and a peace movement – 
gained force.226  The middle class increasingly supported students, workers, and churches in their 
demonstrations, coalescing the movement into what Sunhyuk Kim refers to as a “grand democratic 
alliance.”227  The United States, having been burned by Kwangju, pressed Chun not to repress the 
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growing protests.228 In June 1987, with the regime under pressure from protestors and abroad, with 
Chun nearing the end of his seven-year term, and with the 1988 Seoul Olympics in sight, his 
successor-designate Roh Tae Woo announced that the country would hold open democratic 
elections in 1988.   
  Chun also seemed to believe that leaving power voluntarily would prolong his life.  Having 
set himself a single, seven-year term, he appeared less worried about the threat of a coup or elite 
plotting than the problem of dealing with popular resentment and a potential assassin’s bullet.  He 
volunteered to Reagan that the demise of Rhee and Park had convinced the people “that a change of 
presidents is possible only through violence… a very dangerous way of thinking” and quizzed the 
United States Secret Service on their arrangements for protecting ex-presidents.  (Having assigned 
the PSS that responsibility in 1981, in 1988 he became the first former president to receive PSS 
protection.229)  Thanks to a split between the two opposition candidates Kim Young Sam and Kim 
Dae Jung, Roh won the heavily regionalized election, and South Korea moved toward democracy.230  
  Historical scholarship has expended much less ink on examining Chun’s regime than  Park’s.  
While Park remains Korea’s most admired president despite his authoritarian legacy, Chun is – with 
the exception of a small group of devotees – held in contempt for both his dictatorship and his 
corruption.231 Despite the fact that he eventually relaxed some social and cultural policies, such as 
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the curfew, in a “decompression phase” (yuhwa kungmyon) after 1984, his rule is generally perceived 
to have been more heavy-handed.232 By then, Park’s ideology of total security (chongryok anbo) had 
been discredited by its misuse to justify domestic crackdowns, and by a drop in provocations from 
the North.  Chun tried, unsuccessfully, to use the threat of North Korea’s increasingly forward-
deployed troops to bolster his claim that military rule was necessary.233 From the beginning, he 
lacked the economic or popular legitimacy that had characterized Park Chung Hee’s time in office; 
people who objected to Yushin but refrained from criticizing President Park personally did not shy 
away from criticizing Chun.234  
 
Structure: Defense Security Command and Military Dominance  
  Under Chun, Defense Security Command (kukkun poan saryongbu) rather than the KCIA 
became the coordinating organization for internal security in South Korea. After the KCIA Director 
assassinated Park Chung Hee, Chun removed the KCIA’s coordinating authority over other internal 
security agencies.  He personally assumed leadership of the KCIA while retaining his role as head of 
the DSC, uniting civilian and military intelligence and security agencies that had previously been at 
loggerheads. Through presidential orders and in legislation, he redefined and limited its role to 
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collecting and processing intelligence.  He also renamed it the Agency for National Security Planning 
(Kukka Anjon Kihoekpu).235     
  The military dominated top positions across the coercive apparatus. Except for the Chief 
Prosecutors and Directors of the Korean National Police, every individual who held an internal 
security leadership position under Chun had attended a military academy; all but two had attended 
the KMA.236  Figure 4.6 shows the military-educational backgrounds of Chun’s internal security 




Figure 4.6  Military-Educational Background of Internal Security Elites under Chun237  
Three main trends emerge from these statistics.  First, Chun’s regime drew its internal security elites 
almost exclusively from the KMA, whose graduates occupied almost every leadership position for 
every year that Chun was in power.  Second, Chun relied on a wide range of KMA class 
backgrounds, even broader than Park’s.  Though his classmates were instrumental in the 12.12 coup, 
the conventional wisdom that the coup brought the KMA’s 11th class to power seems unwarranted; 
they did not dominate post-coup leadership, even as much as the 5th and 8th classes did under Park.  
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Third, there is strikingly little overlap between these elites under Park and Chun.  Chun Doo Hwan 
was Park’s trusted protege, but they relied on different military coalitions, in part for generational 
reasons.238 Two of the three members of the KMA 5th and 8th classes included in Chun’s regime were 
replaced after December 1979, and all were gone by 1981. Even before he became head of the 
KCIA in April 1980, Chun purged and reshuffled numerous personnel, particularly those he thought 
might have be loyal to fallen General Chung.239  A major financial scandal in May 1982 completed 
the housecleaning; Chun replaced half of his 22-person cabinet and five officials from the 
Democratic Justice Party that month, and a twelfth cabinet official  – Yoo Hak Sung, head of the 
(formerly KCIA) Agency for National Security Planning and an appointee of President Choi – was 
replaced the following month.240    
  In the realm of public politics and the legislative domain, however, Chun relied less on the 
military than did Park. Retired military officers comprised 16% of National Assemblymen under 
Park, but under Chun that percentage dropped to 9%. Cabinet positions given to former military 
personnel also dropped from 28% to 21%.241  
 
Kwangju: The Regionalization of Violence?  
  Even before Chun assumed formal power, he faced widespread popular protest, particularly 
in the area of Cholla and its capital city, Kwangju.  Like 2-28 in Taiwan, the Kwangju protests in 
May 1980, which observers have called “Korea’s Tiananmen,” have become the subject of extensive 
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historical scholarship and popular commemoration.242 This incident has also strongly shaped the 
narrative about state violence under Chun.  While it is indeed possible to view the Kwangju 
suppression through a regional lens, it is also important to realize that the incident – which took 
place before Chun had completely assumed power – does not necessarily represent the broader 
pattern of state violence during his regime, just as there was more to state violence in Taiwan than 
the Mainlander-native fault lines of 2-28.    
  After Chun Doo Kwan took over as head of the KCIA in April 1980, protests flooded the 
streets. On May 17, Chun declared martial law, closed schools, banned political activities, dissolved 
the legislature, and arrested thousands of activists – among them Kim Dae Jung, Cholla’s champion 
and one of Chun’s principal political opponents.243  Protests continued in Cholla, particularly 
Kwangju, which observers at the time blamed on past regional discrimination and the attempt to use 
Kim as a scapegoat. U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen reported, “Having their hero singled out by 
the military as the trouble maker in Seoul tapped into a deep pool of resentment in Cholla, where 
people felt they had been treated as second-class citizens if not outcasts by the rival region of 
Kyongsang and the leadership in Seoul.”244  When a student protest on May 18th at Chonnam 
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National University was violently suppressed by paratroopers,245 the people of Kwangju ejected the 
soldiers from the city, setting up “Citizens Committees (also called a Citizens Army, simingun).246 
Ambassador Gleysteen called Kwangju “a massive insurrection… [it is] out of control and poses an 
alarming situation for the ROK military.”247  On May 27th, approximately 20,000 soldiers from the 
Korean military entered the city and forcibly subdued the uprising.248  The Martial Law Command 
announced in late May that 170 people had died (144 civilians, 22 soldiers, 4 policemen), and 380 
people had been wounded (127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen); contemporary estimates 
place the total closer to 500 dead and 3,000 wounded.249 
  The suppression, one of the most politically sensitive issues in South Korea, has at times 
been viewed through a regional lens.  It was widely believed in Korea in 1980 that the troops used in 
Kwangju came from Kyongsang.  The paratroopers sent on May 18th were under the command of 
Lt. General (and eventual Chief of Staff) Chung Ho-Yong, who came from Taegu in Kyongsang 
province and graduated with Chun in the KMA’s 11th class.  His soldiers came from Special Warfare 
Command, identified that February as part of Chun’s power base, and trained in guerilla warfare, 
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counter-infiltration combat, and riot control.250 They may have been told that the uprising was the 
work of North Korean instigators; to this day, though most elites now see the crackdown as 
unnecessary, at least some senior ROK military officials still argue that a failure to act would have 
allowed North Korea to take advantage of the disorder.251 Accounts by Western missionaries report 
that airborne units spoke in a Kyongsang accent about killing “no good Cholla rascals.”252  The 
American embassy, too, accepted a regional interpretation of the violence, reporting rumors that 
“Special Forces employed in Kwangju are from the area’s traditional rival Kyongsang,”253 and adding 
a day later that police and military severity was due both to “the spirit of the challenge, but possibly 
because that was how they felt they should treat Cholla people.”254   
  The regional origins of the paratroopers has never been clarified, but the Chun regime’s 
response suggests not only that the Kyongsang rumors had some truth behind them, but that the 
leadership, too, believed that Kyongsang-born soldiers would be more violent and Cholla-born ones 
less so.  On May 21, a Defense Department/Joint Chiefs of Staff report noted that the regime was 
specifically identifying Cholla-born officers within the ROK military and ordering them to Kwangju 
to do riot control.  The rationale, they said, was “that these officers will have more success in 
quelling the demonstrations that [sic] others due to their provincial ties, knowledge and accents.”  
The report also commented that the orders were “meeting with some limited resistance but were for 
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254 Mobs in Kwangju apparently attacked Kyongsang-owned industrial facilities in retaliation. U.S. 
Department of State, Embassy Seoul to Washington, “Kwangju Riot and Future Political Stability,” 21 May 




the most part being grudgingly obeyed.”255 Officers from Cholla, the authorities believed, would 
have the local intelligence necessary to calm the situation without excessive violence.   
  After the immediate crisis had passed, attempts were made to reassure officers from Cholla 
whose loyalties might have become conflicted or who feared discrimination on the basis of their 
regional background.256  A “respected Kwangju man,” Major General So Chun Yol, was promoted 
and selected to command the ROKA Training Command, and the provincial governor was also 
replaced by a South Cholla native. No disciplinary action against the paratroopers has been 
discovered – most likely, the embassy noted, because its commanding general was part of Chun’s 
“first echelon core group members”257  -- but the KNP Director and the provincial police chief were 
also replaced.258 In September, Cholla leader Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death for plotting the 
uprising – among the men arguing most forcefully for his execution was Chung Ho-Young, the 
Taegu commander associated with the Kwangju suppression – but Kim’s sentence was commuted 
to life imprisonment in exchange for Chun’s state visit to the Reagan White House.259 Not 
surprisingly, the incident worsened regional tensions in South Korea.260   
 
                                                 
255 Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff report, 21 May 1980.    
256 Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The ROK Army in Perspective,” 29 May 1980. In the 8 
May 1980 report, the JCS had noted that “many were growing weary of the internal security role that SF was 
assigned”; officers “ready to break heads” at Pusan/Masan in October had, by the April coal miners’ incident, 
begun to believe that the miners were right, and expressed no enthusiasm at the future prospect of quelling 
student protests. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” 8 May 1980. 
257 Department of Defense report, “ROKG Kwangju Follow-Up,” 20 June 1980.   
258 U.S. Department of State, Embassy Seoul to Washington, “Korea Sitrep,” 23 May 1980.   
259 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 135; Heo and Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980, p. 36.  
260 Declassified intelligence report, “Republic of Korea/Relocation of Two Special Warfare Command 




Social Composition: Exclusive Elites and Inclusive Frontlines  
  The social composition and regional makeup of internal security elites during the remainder 
of Chun’s tenure is telling.  On the one hand, Chun, even more than Park, favored officials from 
Kyongsang at the top level of his coercive institutions; his Hanahoe clique was composed of so 
many officials from Taegu and Kyongsang that the faction was nicknamed “TK.”261 
On the other hand, at the ground level, Chun pursued almost the opposite strategy, introducing riot 
police units that were conscript-based, and therefore broadly inclusive and representative of Korean 




  Figure 4.7: Regional Origins of Internal Security Elites under Chun  
Individuals from the Kyongsang region held nearly two-thirds of top positions related to internal 
security during the 1980’s, despite being less than a third of the population.262  See Table 4.4 below: 
                                                 
261 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 380; Yea, “Cultural Politics of Place,” p. 117.  
262 Kyongsang’s population increased in the 1960’s and 1970’s as economic growth stimulated by Park’s 
preferential policies brought people to the region.  However, the increase in internal security officials from 
Kyongsang far outstrips population growth.  Population statistics taken from the 1980 census, Korean 














Percentage of Internal 
Security Officials  
Cheju 462,941 0 1.2% 0.0% 
Cholla 6,067,425 4 16.2% 9.3% 
Seoul 8,364,379 2 22.3% 4.7% 
Gangwon 1,790,954 2 4.8% 4.7% 
Gyeonggi  4,933,862 1 13.2% 2.3% 
Chungcheong 4,380,297 3 11.7% 7.0% 
Kyongsang  11,436,457 27 30.5% 62.8% 
North Korea 0 4 0.0% 9.3% 
  37,436,315 43     
 
 
As it was under Park, the Kyongsang bias was especially pronounced in the coercive apparatus.  See 
Table 4.5:  
  Table 4.5: Regional Origins of Officials in Government Versus Internal Security263 
 
Province  
Percentage of RoK 







Percentage of Internal 
Security Officials 
 from Province  
Cholla 16.2% 14.1% 12.6% 9.3% 
Seoul/Gyeonggi 35.5% 24.6% 19.4% 7.0% 
Gangwon/Cheju  6.0% 4.7% 5.4% 4.7% 
Chungcheong 11.7% 13.2% 12.3% 7.0% 
Kyongsang  30.5% 33.0% 41.2% 62.8% 
North Korea 0.0% 7.9% 9.1% 9.3% 
 
There is a far higher proportion of individuals from the Kyongsang region in internal security 
(62.8%) than among regular ministers (41.2%, only slightly over-represented) or high-ranking 
officials (who, at 33% of the total, are very close to the actual percentage of population that 
Kyongsang represented at the time). Some of this can be explained by the fact that military 
promotions are a slow mechanism of change; it would be relatively easy to replace a provincial 
                                                 
263 Statistics on ministers and high officials taken from Joo, "Reflection on and Resolution Of the 




governor, but if military elites drew predominantly from Kyongsang, Chun’s choices for internal 
security appointments might be more limited.   
 At the same time, however, Chun expanded the size of the coercive apparatus to deal with 
the threat of popular protest. In December 1980, just after Chun’s takeover, the Combat Police 
(chontu kyongchal) were assigned an auxiliary mission of protecting peace and public order.  At the end 
of that year, however, a new amendment to the law on the “compulsory duty police service system” 
was added, which divided the CP into two different types.264 The first, the Combat Police for 
counterespionage (Combat Police) were assigned to the Ministry of National Defense, and would be 
selected by random assignment at basic military training.265  The second group was the combat 
police for public order, also known as the Auxiliary or Riot Police (uikyong).  The uikyong were 
originally supposed to be recruited by the National Police Agency, but because there was a surplus 
of men who needed to do their compulsory military service, the government began simply assigning 
them to riot police units and dispatching them to protests instead. (In late November 1980, 
President-elect Ronald Reagan exclaimed to outgoing President Jimmy Carter, “Mr. President, I’d 
like to have the power that Korean presidents have to draft dissenters.”266) Riot Police conscripts 
were randomly assigned and not grouped by the region from which they came, though interviewees 
who had been through the system told me that someone assigned to the riot police could sometimes 
                                                 
264 In English, the term Combat Police has been used to refer to both types, creating confusion.  I am grateful 
to officers at the Korea National Police University for explaining the differences and this history to me.  The 
following sources in Korean provide some further information. Kim et al, History of National Police; Kim, 
Military Service System; Jung et al, Directions of Military Service Policy.  
265 Author’s interview with Dr. Ahn Seokki, Seoul, Korea, January 2012; see also Kim Doosung, Military 
Service System in South Korea (Seoul: Jacil Press, 2002); Jung Joosung, Wonyoung Jung, and Seokki Ahn, 
Directions of Military Service Policy in South Korea (Seoul: Institute for Defense Analysis, n.d.).  For general 
background on the Military Service Law mandating conscription and on the Military Manpower 
Administration that administers this law, see publications by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis titled 
“Military Service System in South Korea” and “The Military Service Law lays out rules regarding military 
service responsibilities,” (Seoul, KIDA, nd).  




finagle their way into being assigned near their home district.267 The system of assignment took 
effect nationally in late 1982, and by the mid-1980’s, the number of riot police had reached 150,000.   
 One of the effects that the reliance on large numbers of conscripted riot police had was to 
make repression much more visible to the population. In general, Chun seems to have used his 
forces for intimidation rather than intelligence-gathering, with little regard for the costs of public 
violence. Bruce Cumings describes the uikyong as “Darth Vader-like figures,” wearing: “black 
helmets, tight screens over the face, leather scabbard protecting the back of their neck, padded 
clothing, thick elbow, knee, and shin guards, heavy combat boots, and long metal shield in the left 
hand and riot batons in the right.”268 Chun’s regime also became famous for its use of “white skull” 
(paekkol) strikebreakers: padded and shielded troops who arrived on motorcycles to break up labor 
strikes and thrash the participants.269 A similar emphasis on force without apparent attention to the 
unnecessary cost it incurred was observable upon Kim Dae Jung’s return from exile; when Kim 
arrived at the airport, escorted by an American delegation that included two congressmen, the KCIA 
attacked the delegation, knocked some of them to the floor, and whisked Kim and his wife away to 
house arrest.270   
 The practice of “afforestation” (nokhwasaop), seemingly unique to Chun’s regime, also reveals 
the heavy-handedness of his approach and the abandonment of potentially useful intelligence-
gathering mechanisms. In the early 1980’s, Defense Security Command created a list of young men 
suspected of politically problematic views or potential for anti-government activity, who they 
                                                 
267 Author’s interviews with Korean National Police officials, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.   
268 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 381.   
269 Chun sought tighter control over labor from early in his regime, and one-third of the political prisoners 
arrested under NSL violations in the early 1980’s were workers. Shin et al, South Korea’s Democracy Movement, p. 
x; Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 379.  




planned to draft for military service, indoctrinate, and send back to spy on students and anti-regime 
activists. (At one point in the 1980’s, over 1,000 dissenters were on their watch list.) After the 
suspicious deaths of several students undergoing military training caused public furor, however, 
nokhwasaop was abolished in 1984.271  
  Using conscripts to police Korean society provoked an outcry because it forced the coercive 
apparatus to repress in ways that were socially and morally problematic; the inclusiveness of these 
units created strong incentives against repressing the incidents that had led to their creation in the 
first place. Forcing young Koreans to repress their fellow citizens was seen as a perversion of the 
patriotic purposes of national military service.  Additionally, it imposed heavy social costs by forcing 
members of Korean society to do the regime’s repressive work – pitting students against their 
friends and sons against their parents.  One police officer recounted the following story from when 
he, a junior officer recently graduated from the Korea National Police University, was assigned to a 
conscript-based riot police unit – a standard assignment for police university graduates and new 
officers – and sent to a farmers’ protest:  
My lieutenant came to me and said, “You need to go talk to this guy, his father is one of the 
protestors.” I went to the front of the line, and there was a young man, just out of military 
training, and it was true, he could see the face of his father, and his father’s friends in the 
crowd. I told him, “Get out of line, go back to the barracks. You don’t need to be here 
today.” I could see him clenching his shield, and I could see that he had tears on his face 
under his helmet. But he said, “Sir, I cannot leave my post, I cannot leave my unit.” He 
thought it would be a dishonor.  But then how could he go against his own father, and the 
friends of his father? It affected everyone in the unit. Not just that day, but for a long time.272 
                                                 
271 Han Hong-ku, “Is ‘Nokhwasaop’ Forgivable?” [한홍구, “‘녹화사업’을 용서할 수 
있는가?”], Hankyoreh21, 1 October 2002, p. 77; Kim Jung Ho, “Nokhwasaop was directed by Chun”, Hankook 
Ilbo, 12 October 2002, p. 23; Lee Sae Young, “Compulsory conscription ‘Nokhwasaop’: “evidence that former 
president Chun ordered it” [이새영, 의문사위 "녹화사업 전두환씨가 지시"], Daehan Maeil, October 
12th 2002, p. 1; Lee Sae Young, “The process and issues of Nokhwasaop”,  [이새영, “녹화사업 
진행과정, 문제점/강제징집 운동권 출신 256명 사상교육통해 프락치등 활용"], Daehan Maeil, 12 
October 2002, p. 22.  




Interviewees also recounted stories of students who had graduated from university and gone to 
complete their military service, only to be sent back to campus on the other side of the protest line, 
aiming tear gas at their friends and classmates.273  The trope is so common in South Korea that it 
was the storyline of the 1999 movie Peppermint Candy (박하사탕, Pakha Satang), in which the 
protagonist transforms from student to military conscript in Kwangju to police torturer.274 Former 
policemen and activists alike asserted that because of this dynamic, the police became unwilling to 
actually inflict violence. As a result, democracy protests evolved into a scripted performance: the 
students would come out, they would chant and drum, and eventually the police would fire the tear 
gas and everyone would disperse. Sometimes the protestors even coordinated with the police in 
advance.275 The performativity of protest during the Korean democracy movement was actually a 
way of coping with the social tensions that protest and repression had engendered within society.276  
  When Chun Doo Hwan came into office, he appears to have focused primary on the threat 
of popular unrest, particularly in Kwangju and the Cholla region, and secondarily on the continued 
external threat from North Korea.  He managed internal security primarily through the 
unfragmented use of Defense Security Command.  Though he relied heavily on Kyongsang military 
men to staff the top levels of his coercive apparatus, he widened participation in the ground-level 
police units to include conscripts from all corners of Korean society (albeit still all young men).  As a 
                                                 
273 Author’s interviews, Seoul, Korea, March 2011 and January 2012.  
274 For an English-language synopsis of the plot, see http://www.yaentertainment.com/catalog/pc.html 
275 Author’s interview with a democracy activist, Seoul, Korea, March 2011; author’s interview with a reporter 
in Korea during the democracy movement, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.  
276 These protests also explicitly sought to turn the regime’s claims to legitimacy on their head.  One example 
is the use of traditional drumming, which the regime had protected under its national heritage preservation 
laws, and which became so associated with protest that the drum found in the backpack of one student was 
used as evidence of his intent to protest. See Katherine Lee, “The Drumming of Dissent during South 
Korea’s Democratization Movement,” paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual 




result of these decisions, violence against Cholla dropped (after Kwangju), as did state violence 
against society at large. Unsurprisingly, however, this coercive institutional design created tension 
within the repressive apparatus itself.  South Korea under Chun, therefore, illustrates the broader 
point that popular threats push autocrats toward unitary and socially inclusive coercive institutions, 
which have strong incentives to avoid using violence against their own people.  
 
VI.  Alternative Explanations and Conclusion  
South Korea’s leaders perceived their threat environment in ways that shaped the structure 
and social composition of their coercive institutions, which in turn shaped temporal and spatial 
patterns of state violence.  Broadly speaking, all three autocrats operated within constraints imposed 
by an existentially high North Korean threat, which precipitated extensive American involvement 
and even U.S. command authority over the ROK military. At times, however, Syngman Rhee (for 
most of his tenure) and Park Chung Hee (after declaring Yushin) appeared to worry relatively more 
about elite threats to their power; when they did, they fostered fragmentation and competition 
within (the non-military parts of) the coercive apparatus; they were also more likely to make it 
socially exclusive. Consistent with the theory proposed in Chapter One, it was at these times that 
state violence was the highest. By contrast, Chun Doo Hwan, who was forced to deal with popular 
unrest in the earliest months he was in office, sought to minimize fragmentation, maintain a strong 
military, and create a large and inclusive coercive apparatus to handle popular protest. The social 
composition of these frontline coercive units explains not only the lower level of violence under 
Chun, but why the violence that did occur was so detested.   
Neither the idea that autocrats use increased violence to handle increased threats nor the 
explanations founded in American and international influence successfully explain the patterns of 




opposition movement became most active and most threatening (as measured both by the number 
of protestors and by the extent to which protests employed disruptive or aggressive tactics) in the 
1980’s,277 yet the coercive apparatus at that point is not noticeably more violent toward civilians than 
it had been throughout Park’s tenure.  As in Korea, the timing of protest participation post-dates 
rather than precedes the increase in violence observed under Chun in the late 1980’s – suggesting 
that, as in the Philippines, mobilization is caused by violent repression as much as causes it.    
American and international influence is also not a strong predictor of the patterns of state 
violence observed here, nor does that theory correlate with some of the within-case evidence we 
have about the drivers of repressive behavior.  The evidence is simply mixed. Violence against 
civilians peaked under Syngman Rhee, when American assistance was at its highest, but declined 
during the 1970s and 1980s as Korea’s international linkages increased and the United States placed 
human rights more centrally in its (public) foreign policy. Within-case evidence provides relatively 
little evidence to support the hypothesis that international or American influence was decisive.  In 
1972, the United States adopted a policy of “dis-association” from Park’s declaration of Yushin 
rather than one of active opposition or criticism, and in 1980, officials expressed more concern 
about the need to maintain stability in Korea than either Chun’s seizure of power or the crackdown 
in Kwangju.278  Although American military support was a potential bargaining chip, as were the 
sanctions and potential trade losses created by increased linkage with the American/international 
economy, policymakers either used those tools ineffectively (under Carter) or rarely (under Reagan).   
                                                 
277 Shin et al, South Korea’s Democracy Movement, pp. 10, 12.  
278 The American government reacted to Chun’s policies rather than influencing them in advance. 
That the debate centers on whether the CFC “approved” or “was notified” of troop transfers to Kwangju 
emphasizes that there was no strong American objection until after the initial reports of brutality appeared. 
U.S. officials did urge restraint, and intervened to save Kim Dae Jung’s life, but also supported the 
“restoration of order” against the “Kwangju mob.” They tacitly approved of the deployment of the 20th 
Division to retake the city because they thought the conduct of those troops would be preferable to that of 




American influence appears highest in two cases: first when officials intervened to save the 
life of Kim Dae Jung after his kidnapping by the KCIA in 1973 and his post-Kwangju death 
sentence in 1980,279 and second in a diplomatic note delivered in 1987, just as Chun was preparing to 
pull troops off the DMZ for a crackdown, urging him to avoid military suppression. Aides recount 
that Chun commented on domestic and international backlash if the police lost control and he had 
to use the military; Reagan’s letter reinforced this concern.280 But the actual impact of American 
advocacy is unclear, especially in the face of active opposition to that course of action from within 
Chun’s military and coercive apparatus, coupled with Chun’s reluctance to allow the military to 
intrude into domestic affairs even in times of crisis.281  Even when America did actively intervene, its 
influence was either limited, or must be weighed against domestic factors of equal or greater 
importance.  Over the course of Korea’s post-1945 trajectory, American influence had its deepest 
and longest lasting effect on state violence and human rights violations not through any direct 
interventions in Korean policies on repression and violence, but by shaping the structure and 
composition of the institutions that carried them out.   
 
                                                 
279 In Korea as elsewhere in Asia, American human rights diplomacy tended to prioritize the cases of high-
profile individual dissidents, who had a face and a story attached and who had often spent time in the West.  
For a contemporary example, see American officials’ comments in 2012 on their personal interactions with 
Chen Guangcheng: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/05/182850.htm 
280 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 169.   
281 Chun’s military officers to conveyed these concerns to outgoing Minister of Home Affairs/soon-to-be 
Minister of Defense Chung Ho Yong, who conveyed them to Chun via Roh Tae Woo.  Chun also believed 
that forcing unwilling junior officers into internal security work could make them likely to seize power from 








Chapter Five   
 







I. Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses how the argument of the dissertation travels to North Korea and 
China.  Because information on the coercive institutions of these countries is limited,1 and almost no 
systematic data are available on the ultimate dependent variable of this project – patterns of state 
violence – the treatment of these two countries cannot be identical to the cases in preceding 
chapters.  For this reason, I do not treat North Korea and China as full in-sample cases.  
Instead, I have treated them as an out-of-sample test of my argument, to examine how it applies 
to two Communist Asian regimes on the opposite side of the Cold War divide.  I ask: what would 
                                                 
1 Primary source materials on North Korean internal security are essentially non-existent, with the exception 
of a cache of documents captured during the Korean War and used in Charles Armstrong’s book cited below.  
I have also incorporated defector memoirs, testimonies, and interviews wherever possible. See Thomas 
Hosuck Kang, “North Korean Captured Records at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, 
Maryland,” in Association for Asian Studies, Committee Asia Libraries Bulletin (Feb 1979). For NARA’s 
overview of the collection, now at College Park, see http://research.archives.gov/description/569. 
Sources on China are somewhat more plentiful, though systematic data is still lacking.  Archival access to 
public security files remains non-existent, since these organs have been exempted from the standard 
requirement to transfer documents to state, provincial, or municipal archives after a set period of time has 
elapsed. The best work on domestic intelligence under Mao, by Michael Schoenhals, makes extensive use of 
private sources collected from Beijing flea markets. Wherever possible, I have used original Chinese sources, 
including memoirs, official histories, documentary compilations, journal articles, and a handful of books. For 
archival processes related to public security, see Guojia Dang’anju Bangongshi, Collected Documents on Archival 
Work (Beijing: Dang’an Chubanshe, 1985-86) / 囯家档案局办公室编, 档案工作文件汇集  (北京: 档案出
版社, 1985-86), Vol. 1, pp. 124-25. 
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the theory predict about these countries, in terms of both the construction of their coercive 
apparatus and its subsequent behavior?  What evidence is there that the theory can explain 
important features of the two cases, and what evidence does not fit with the predictions made by my 
argument? In what ways do these two countries differ from the anti-communist cases described in 
previous chapters, and how do such differences refine our thinking about internal security in 
authoritarian regimes?   
In an attempt to think through these questions, the sections that follow outline what is 
known about the development of coercive institutions in North Korea and in China. The chapter 
compares these countries’ approaches to internal security to each other, and provides an initial cut at 
comparing and contrasting them with the anti-Communist countries examined in previous chapters.   
Several themes emerge. Some corroborate the arguments advanced in previous chapters, 
albeit preliminarily.  The connection between the nature of threats and the design of the coercive 
apparatus holds: the combination of popular-external threat that occurred in both North Korea and 
China during their revolutionary history leads to the predicted institutional configuration 
characterized by low degrees of institutional fragmentation and high degrees of societal inclusion, 
particularly in the intelligence networks employed by both regimes.  Threat is a more convincing 
explanation for the structure and composition of coercive institutions than either path dependence 
or Soviet influence. The attention paid to social classification and its use as a tool of intelligence is 
particularly striking in both countries, as is the process by which initial classifications come to define 
the boundaries of participation and inclusion.  In the Chinese case, moreover, attention to 
intelligence appears to have been explicitly linked to the belief that inclusivity in intelligence 




These cases also raise additional issues to consider about both the origins of the coercive 
apparatus and its effects.  In terms of institutional origins, they prompt questions about the effect of 
revolution on threat perceptions (and particularly the relationship between revolution and elite 
threats); about the relatively high rate of institutional evolution and adaptation observed in both 
countries; and about the ways in which generational change and succession alter the use of the 
coercive apparatus.  In terms of effects, they ask us to consider whether the basic patterns of 
violence are similar in communist versus non-communist countries; and what coercive institutions 
can and cannot explain about those patterns – including the claims that China and North Korea are 
generally considered to be among the most destructive and violent political systems ever to have 
existed.2  
This chapter proceeds in four sections.  Section II discusses the development of coercive 
institutions in North Korea, Section III addresses the development of these institutions in China, 
and Section IV concludes with some comparative thoughts.   
 
   
II. The Development of Internal Security in North Korea  
The development of the coercive apparatus in North Korea highlights several arguments 
consistent with the overall theory advanced by the dissertation. As in the previous cases, neither 
path dependence nor external influence is a full and satisfactory explanation for the development of 
the country’s internal security institutions. The North Korean regime did originate under 
extraordinarily high external influence: Kim Il Sung was essentially installed as the leader of North 
Korea by the Soviet military occupation, and the initial institutions of coercion reflected both Soviet 
                                                 
2 For statements to this effect, especially about China, see R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: 
Transactions Publishers, 1994); R.J. Rummel, China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991).  
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influence and the presence of a high degree of external threat from the nascent American-backed 
regime in the South.  
Over time, however, threat exerted a decisive influence over the shape of the coercive 
apparatus. Admittedly, the dominant perceived threat is difficult to determine in the case of North 
Korea – probably impossible to determine with any degree of confidence, given that all three types 
of threats could be perceived as existentially high, and no sources offer a reliable view inside the 
thinking of Kim Il Sung at this time. What is known, however suggests that the case is broadly 
consistent with the theory presented in Chapter One.  Kim Il Sung was installed as the head of the 
regime as the leader of one of four factions, and not the strongest one. Rather than trying to 
fragment the coercive apparatus in order to manage these elite threats – and perhaps because he was 
constrained from doing so by a combination of Soviet organization, external threat, and the 
pressures of state-building – Kim Il Sung appears to have responded to this elite threat by 
eliminating rivals through Soviet-style purges. Rather than subordinating elite politics to the 
demands of war, he used battlefield failures within the KPA as a pretext for eliminating his rivals 
from North Korea’s security institutions during the war and in the years afterward.    
The reduction of these elite threats enabled (though it is not clear that it caused) a full-scale 
turn to the task of popular management and social penetration.  The North Korean regime 
accomplished this not only through reliance on formal institutions of public security, but also by 
employing policies that focused on social classification and mass mobilization, implemented through 
institutions like resident registration and organizational life. Over time, North Korea revised the 
inherited and imposed coercive structures and replaced them with institutions of its own making – 





Origins of Internal Security in North Korea  
North Korea’s initial public security institutions were established in the second half of the 
1940’s, and originated from a mix of factors.  Imposed under de facto Soviet military occupation, they 
exhibited Soviet influence as well as institutional legacies from both Japanese administrative 
precedent and traditional Korean practices at the local level.  The makeup of these early institutions 
also reflected the power distribution across four factions: the domestic faction, the Soviet Korean 
faction, the Chinese or Yenan Korean faction, and the guerilla faction headed by Kim Il Sung 
(sometimes also called the Kapsan faction). According to Soviet sources present at the time, the 
differences between the factions were less a matter of “fundamental differences on important 
political issues” and more a matter of “personal interests, the struggle for dominant positions… 
aggravated by a lack of experience and political maturity.”3  
In the chaos following Japanese surrender, a variety of indigenous self-protection units 
emerged in North Korea, based more on local tradition than anything else.4  Historian Charles 
Armstrong notes that self-defense institutions were a “common feature of traditional Korean 
villages,” and Japanese colonial authorities had already linked these to the central state.  While 
Armstrong argues that this means that the Soviet role was essentially one of formalizing existing 
structures,5 Soviet oversight clearly did exist.  In October 1945, when the Soviet Civil Administration 
(and 25th Army) became the governing authority, it set up local units for protection and security of 
                                                 
3 Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945-60 (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 
2002), pp. 88-89.  
4 These included public safety units (chi-an-dae), guard units (kyeong-bi-dae), and self-defense units (ja-wi-dae).  
Ken E. Gause, Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State 
(Washington: Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), p. 85; Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik 
Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Charles K. Armstrong, The North 
Korean Revolution, 1945-50 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 197-201; U.S. Army, Intelligence Group 
(G-2), “Intelligence Summary North Korea #43,” Record Group 319, 15-27 August 1947, p. 25.  
5 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 205.  
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law and order (bo-an-dae), comprised of local citizens but also staffed by the transfer of 2,000 Soviet 
Koreans.6 Kim Il Sung himself reportedly entered North Korea from Russia in September as a 
major in the Soviet military group. Soviet Colonel Balasanov oversaw the construction of the police 
forces, with Soviet Korean Pang Hak-se second in command.7  The contribution of these early 
Soviet and Korean administrators to the social composition of local units, however, was perhaps 
even more significant than their contributions to institutional structure.  Speaking of these 
organizations as explicitly inclusive and participatory, Soviet and Korean administrators upended 
local order, putting poor local peasants rather than village elders in charge.8   
Without better information on where the Soviets and Koreans would have preferred courses 
of action that differed from one another, the exact balance of influence between the two groups is 
probably unknowable. It is clear, however, that the formalization and centralization of local units 
took place under Soviet oversight, over the course of several years.  In November 1945, the bo-an-dae 
were placed under a new Administrative Committee in charge of North Korea’s five provinces; 
People’s Committees (inmin wiwonhoe) were established as local governing bodies in the provinces.9  
When the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee (NKPPC) was established under Kim Il 
Sung’s leadership in February 1946, Soviet advisors “occupied positions of authority in the ten 
                                                 
6 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2005), p. 26.  
7 Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-47 (Oxford: Berg, 1989); Dae-Sook Suh, The 
Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton, 1967), pp. 317-18; Carter J. Eckert, et al., Korea 
Old and New: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 341.     
8 Charles Armstrong, “Surveillance and Punishment in Postliberation North Korea,” Positions, Vol. 3 (1995), 
pp. 710-712.  
9 Andrei Lankov, “The Repressive System and Political Control in North Korea,” online article enlarged and 
reworked in English from a chapter printed in Severnaia Koreia: vchera I segodnia [North Korea: Yesterday & today] 
(Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1995), p. 12.  
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bureaus of the NKPPC.”10 Kim’s guerilla comrade Choe Yong-gon led the Protection and Security 
Bureau (PSB or bo’an-guk, which oversaw the bo-an-dae), and also led the Korean Democratic Party 
and at least two military training centers.11 The new legal code of 1946, as well as the courts and 
procuratorial system, combined old Japanese provisions with Soviet judicial structure, and were 
extended down to the local level by early 1947.12 In February 1947, the NKPPC became the North 
Korean People’s Committee, and the PSB became the Bureau of Internal Affairs (Naemu-guk).13   
Meanwhile, the broader contours of the new regime were also taking shape.  The Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP) formally came into being in late August 1946, as a merger of the Korean 
Communist Party (Northern Branch) headed by Kim Il Sung, and Kim Tu-bong’s Korean New 
People’s Party composed of Yenan Koreans who were veterans of the Chinese Civil War. Kim Tu-
bong became party chairman, and Kim Il Sung vice chairman.14  These leaders began a period of 
“anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution,” seeking to restructure North Korea’s social 
classes, overturn the pre-colonial Choson-era social order dominated by the gentry (yangban), and 
empower the working class.15 One major element of the revolution was land reform, promulgated in 
                                                 
10 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Name, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State,” in Samuel S. 
Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 48.  
11 Gause, Coercion, p. 86; Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army, pp. 30-31.  
12 Hyun Joon Chon, A Study of the Social Control System of North Korea: Focusing on the Ministry of People’s Security 
(Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, July 2004), pp. 5-6; Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 
pp. 201-202; Sung Yoon Cho, “The Judicial System of North Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 12 
(December 1971), p. 1172. 
13 Gause, Coercion, p. 87.   
14 At that time, the KWP shared power on the Central People’s Committee with the conservative KDP and 
the Young Friends’ Party 
15 Versus “true socialist revolution,” which either began after 1948, or after the Korean War.  See Armstrong, 
“Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 47; Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, pp. 72-74; Eckert et al, 
Korea Old and New, pp. 336-37.  
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March 1946; rather than collectivization or distribution for payment, it was a “land to the tiller” 
program that redistributed land to around 700,000 peasant households.16  
Other elements of reform would have important effects on the internal security apparatus in 
both the immediate and the long term. In March 1946, and unlike the American-backed South, 
authorities in the northern half of the Korean peninsula ordered a thorough purging of 
administrators who had worked under the Japanese.17 They also began to form social organizations 
nationwide that were closely connected to the state and KWP. Thanks to overlapping membership, 
“by the fall of 1946, nearly every resident of North Korea over the age of 15 belonged to one or 
more of these social organizations.”18 In autumn 1946, a citizen registration campaign was also 
conducted, and the traditional family registry system replaced with new citizen identification cards.  
The authorities changed the old 10-household Japanese “Patriotic Units” (Aegukban) into “People’s 
Units” (Inminban), and required each of the units to register all of its households.19  By 1947, head of 
the Bureau of Internal Affairs Pak Il-U indicated to provincial chiefs that they should “examine the 
class background and thoughts” of all neighborhood leaders under their jurisdiction.”20 And as the 
Korean People’s Army was constructed (see below), North Korea’s leaders organized the National 
                                                 
16 Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 49; U.S. Department of State, North Korea: a Case Study 
in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961 [1951 original]), pp. 56-
57.  
17 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).  
18 Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 49. 
19 Gause, Coercion, pp. 42-43; Chae Gyeong-hee, “A Study on Neighborhood Units in North Korea: Focusing 
on Organization, Function, and Roles,” graduate thesis (Seoul: University of North Korean Studies, 2007).  
20 Captured North Korean document in the National Archives, “Saop Gwangye Seoryu,” Record Group 242, 
SA 2005, document number 6/11; originally cited in Gause, Coercion, p. 42.   
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Defense Sponsors Association, with branches at the village level designed to link the people to their 
army.21  
Soviet influence throughout this period remained strong. The DPRK constitution was 
modeled on (though not identical to) the 1936 Stalin constitution; Soviet and Eastern Bloc aid to 
North Korea was significant; and the economy centered on heavy industry industrialization laid out 
in multi-year economic plans.22  The term Suryong, or Great Leader – now famously used only for 
Kim Il Sung – was until 1948 used solely to refer to Stalin. 23  Soviet investigators did background 
checks on the individuals who replaced Japanese-trained administrators, as well as on those elevated 
to the People’s Committees in November 1946 and the NKPC in February 1947. Moscow 
dispatched security advisors to work in the DPRK Bureau of Internal Affairs, including Colonel 
Bodyagin, who commanded the Soviets’ own secret police in Korea during the occupation.24  These 
advisors had more direct powers of oversight over the internal security system than North Korea’s 
own cabinet,25 and stayed from the launching of a full Ministry of the Interior (Naemu-seong) in 1948 
through the late 1950’s.  The initial lack of jails in North Korea and the presence of Soviet military 
                                                 
21 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 1 (Seoul: KIMH, 1997), p. 56.  
22 The North Korean constitution referred to “the people” more than to “class struggle.”  Colin Mackerras, 
“The Juche Idea and the Thought of Kim Il Sung,” in Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight, eds., Marxism in 
Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, eds., China and the Postwar Reconstruction of 
North Korea, 1953-61 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, North Korea International Documentation 
Project, May 2012); Karoly Fendler, “Economic Assistance from Socialist Countries to North Korea in the 
Postwar Years, 1953-63,” in Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1996), p. 164.  
23 Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 50.  
24 U.S. State Department, North Korea, p. 100.  
25 Lankov, “The Repressive System”; Gause, Coercion, p. 87.  
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courts during the occupation period also resulted in prisoners being deported to serve their 
sentences in the Siberian gulag in the late 1940s.26   
There were elements of Chinese influence, too, transmitted largely by the Yenan faction with 
whom Kim Il Sung shared power for a decade. 27 Lankov notes that the Chinese faction ascribed to a 
Maoist rather than Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism, and brought to Korea “the ethos of 
Chinese communism and its bureaucratic patterns and political idioms.”28  On the cultural front, 
DPRK policies adhered to both Soviet Zhdanovism and Maoist themes – for example, a 1951 
speech by Kim not only echoed Mao’s “Talk on Arts and Literature” nine years earlier, but was 
drafted by Yenan faction member Kim Chang-man. Kim Il Sung quoted from Mao frequently, and 
concepts embedded in Maoism influenced the development of both chuch’e ideology and the DPRK 
“mass line.” 29  North Korea drew closer to China after parting ways with a Khruschev’s de-
Stalinization campaign in the late 1950’s (a process described more fully below).30   
A mix of Soviet and Chinese influence was in evidence in the construction of the Korean 
People’s Army (KPA).  Created in 1948, the KPA was built around a core of Kim Il Sung’s most 
trusted Kapsan colleagues, and had three regular divisions, one infantry regiment/brigade, and two 
                                                 
26 Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 11; Andrei Lankov, North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North 
Korea (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2007), p. 188. 
27 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 220-221; Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 80.   
Bruce Cumings argues that Lankov’s background leads him to overstate the degree of Soviet influence 
relative to Chinese and indigenous sources.  See Bruce Cumings, “Review: Lifting the Veil on North Korea,” 
The National Interest, May/June 2013.  
28 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 80.  
29 Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” pp. 51-52.  
30 Glenn D. Paige, “North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior,” in A. Doak Barnett, 
ed., Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties (New York: Prager, 1963). 
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border security brigades.31  Its leadership worked closely with the Soviets to adapt Soviet military 
organization to Korean circumstance, meaning a heavier focus on infantry than the armored and 
mechanized force emphasis of the Soviet Union.32  The USSR initially provided a colonel to advise 
each individual Korean division commander, and 150 advisors to each division, but rapidly 
decreased their presence after the formal inauguration of the DPRK in September 1948, to 20 per 
division in 1949, and 3-8 per division in 1950.33   
Much of the KPA’s fighting power, however, was aligned with the Yenan faction, since the 
three divisions that existed in 1948 were dramatically strengthened by the arrival in in 1949 and 1950 
of three ethnically Korean divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – largely 
composed of ethnic Koreans from Manchuria.34  Historians differ on the exact number of troops 
transferred back; Bruce Cumings says 75,000-100,000, while Donggil Kim estimates just over 
35,000.  It is clear, however, that at the outbreak of the Korean War, 10 of the 21 regiments on the 
frontline were PLA repatriates, many of whom had gained combat experience fighting the 
Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War. 35  Political control over the KPA was exercised by the 
                                                 
31 A Peace Preservation Officers’ Academy had been inaugurated in August 1946. Armstrong, “Name, 
Origins, and Development,” p. 50; Donggil Kim, “Prelude to War? The Repatriation of Koreans from the 
Chinese PLA, 1949-50,” Cold War History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May 2012), pp. 227-28.   
In Korean, see An Chong-ae, “Study on the Character of Soviet Policy on Military Support to North Korea: 
As Related to the Establishment and Strengthening of the Korean People’s Army and the Outbreak of the 
Korean War,” Kunsa [Military History], Vol. 38 (Seoul: Korean Institute for Military History Compilation, 
1999), p.161-181. My thanks to Bob Collins for directing me to this compilation.  
안정애. 1999. "소련의 대북한 군사 원조 정책의 성격에 관한 연구: 인민군 창설-강화 및 한국전쟁 
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32 These included Choe Yong-gon, Kim Chaek, An Kil, Choe Hyon, and Kang Kon. Minnich, The North 
Korean People’s Army, pp. 21-22.  
33 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 42; U.S. State Department, North Korea, pp. 
113-114.  
34 For details on the transfer’s motivation and processes, see Kim, “Prelude to War,” p. 234.  
35 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, pp. 239–41; Kim, “Prelude to War,” p. 228.   
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Political Defense Bureau (PDB) of the Ministry of Defense, which provided administrative 
oversight, while the Ministry of the Interior’s PSB gave operational guidance.36  
The internal security apparatus also reflected the regime’s mixed heritage, most notably in 
the appointment of its personnel. In 1948, the Ministry of the Interior (Naemusong) was established, 
and by 1949 political policing responsibilities rested with the four main offices of the Ministry’s 
Political Security Bureau (PSB).37  The Ministry was led by Pak Il-u, from the Yenan faction, while 
the PSB was headed by Pang Hak-se, a Soviet Korean who had reportedly worked for Soviet law 
enforcement and came to be known as “North Korea’s Beria.” Soviet Koreans were rumored to be 
over-represented in the PSB, even compared to other bureaus of the Interior Ministry, though no 
precise data on this exists. 38   Chinese and Soviet influence was also apparent in the guidance 
circulated, which included a Soviet manual on self-criticism and various Chinese articles about 
“thought guidance” – instructions that were also not dissimilar to practices employed by the 
Japanese, sometimes on the Korean communists themselves.39  
From the beginning, the Ministry of the Interior kept close watch on North Korean society.  
It reportedly employed 4-5,000 people at its headquarters, plus 12,000 regular and 3,000 political 
police organized down to the village level, and 45,000 additional employees of the Security Guard (a 
mobile police reserve with regular guard duties), Border Constabulary, and Railroad Guard; it also 
                                                 
36 Gause, Coercion, pp. 94-95. The U.S. State Department’s North Korea report portrays a much heavier Soviet 
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administered prisons through its Prisons Bureau.40 Regular police, with frontline responsibility for 
law and order, reported to the Ministry through the Security Bureau, and typically employed about 5-
10 officers at the village and township level.41  The police drew on networks of unpaid informants 
from local organizations such as the Youth League, approximately 3-10 people per village; one 
source estimates their number at 5% of the population – a total of 400,000 – at the start of the 
Korean War. 42   They drew maps showing the residence location of “suspicious persons” and 
reported every other week to the Internal Ministry.43  In addition to the regular police, the PSB also 
had offices at the county and city level (13-15 officers each) to conduct political policing work, 
where they gathered information on public opinion and reported it upward every three days, 
employing their own informant network to do so.44  These informants – who probably overlapped 
in places with those of the regular police – numbered between 3-10 people per township: about 5% 
of the population. 45  They were paid 1-2,000 won/month, and given bonuses for providing 
information in important cases, ranging up to 20-30,000 won.  Accusations of guilt by one 
informant were invariably cross-checked by another. 46  
The police system in North Korea was inclusive and information-focused by design, and 
much attention was paid to the social relationship between the police and the people.  Pak Il-U 
                                                 
40 “North Korean People’s Committee District Administrative Staff and Duties in Province, City, and County 
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urged police to “come from amidst the people [and have] ceaseless comradely love for the masses 
[minjung].”47 The PSB deliberately urged recruitment from women, farmers, and workers in order to 
broaden the social composition of the “people’s police.”48  Inclusivity was seen as both normatively 
desirable and politically useful.  Though one historian calls the spying a “clumsy and ill-coordinated 
venture” that failed to produce much actual evidence of subversive activity, U.S.-UN surveys of 
occupied areas later concluded that the “omniscient informant network” had been quite effective at 
deterring the formation of potential opposition – a different but probably even more successful 
outcome than catching conspirators in the act.49  This system of “detection and prevention of crime” 
advanced well beyond what Japanese authorities had constructed; the U.S. State Department 
observed in 1961 that North Korea had replaced Japanese reliance on forcible interrogation with 
“thorough organization” and an emphasis on information superiority.50   
 
War and the Indigenization of Internal Security  
North Korea’s rejection of foreign influence began with the Korean War. Somewhat 
paradoxically, it is possible to see in the Korean War not the pressures on external defense imposed 
by wartime stalemate, but a near-obsession with domestic security. The war not only provides 
evidence of a continuing focus on popular control, as one might expect in a civil war environment, 
but a surprising emphasis on elite threats.  War appears to have heightened the perceived threat to 
                                                 
47 Pak Il-u, “Letter to 38th Parallel Security Personnel and Democratic Youth League Self Defense Forces,” 27 
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48 “Minutes of First Meeting of Heads of Investigation Services of Provincial Security Bureau,” RG242, 
SA2005, 6/1.2, 16 July 1946, p. 7, originally cited in Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 207.  
49 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, pp. 208-10; U.S. Department of State, North Korea, p. 90.  
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Kim Il Sung from the three rival factions, and led to a concerted campaign in the 1950s to eliminate 
his opponents.  
First, Kim maintained the focus on popular management that had already become a hallmark 
of the North Korea regime.  He did so even at the cost of prosecuting the war he had just launched; 
for example, on 28 June 1950, after the fall of the Ongjin peninsula and capture of Seoul, the KPA 
chose not to continue its attack on the weak, disorganized, and retreating U.S. and ROK forces, but 
to stop in Seoul to construct “people’s committees.” Though the decision has baffled Western 
military historians and experts,51 it is consistent with the regime’s previous and later emphasis on 
domestic consolidation.  The dislocations of wartime, if anything, increased the need for effective 
popular management; an estimated 685,000 North Koreans fled south during the war, and in fall 
1950, the PSB launched a campaign to eradicate political prisoners and round up the opposition that 
had not yet fled south.    
In addition to sparking worries about popular management and internal subversion, the war 
substantially increased Kim’s fear of elite rivals – particularly those from the Yenan faction who 
comprised so much of the fighting power of the KPA. These concerns became particularly acute 
after North Korea’s retreat from Naktong in the fall of 1950, which prompted the intervention of 
the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under General Peng Dehuai. 52   Peng took operational 
control over KPA forces through the North Korea-China Combined Forces Command (NKCCFC), 
and Yenan faction member and former Interior Minister Pak Il-U became his deputy commander 
and political officer. Officers affiliated with the Yenan faction commanded many of the important 
combat units of the KPA, possessed some of the most seasoned experience, and were trusted by the 
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NKCCFC and CPV leadership because of their fluent Chinese and close interpersonal ties. 53  
Among them was renowned general Mu Chong (Jeong), “the best known of the Yanan generals.”54 
In response to heightened threat from the Yenan faction, Kim Il Sung pursued a major 
intrawar reorganization of the internal security apparatus, centered around three key changes.  First, 
he reorganized public security, removing the PSB from the Interior Ministry in March 1951 and 
establishing it as a new Ministry of Public Security (MPS, Sahoe Anjon Song), headed by Pang Hak-se.  
(The PSB was moved back to the Ministry of the Interior in October 1952, with Pang Hak-se still 
serving as Minister.) The second and third levels of response focused on improving his command 
over the military.  Kim sought to strengthen the KPA’s political commissar system, establishing 
party committees at every level and expanding the small Cultural Department into a full General 
Political Bureau (GPB). 55   He also purged high-level commanders – eventually, 90% of North 
Korea’s generals during the Korean War – for ostensible wartime failures.56   
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The war thus provided pretext, over time, for eliminating elite rivals from the other factions.  
North Korea held its first show trial in August 1953, and convicted twelve defendants of the 
“domestic” faction, including Yi Sung-yop, former secretary of the Central Committee, and Pae 
Chol, the head of the KWP’s liaison department responsible for operations in the South. They were 
charged and convicted first and foremost of planning a coup, though their other offenses included 
sabotaging the southern Communist movement, spying for the US, and cooperating with Japanese 
police.  Ten were sentenced to death and the remaining two given prison sentences.57  It is not clear 
whether the Soviet Union, which advised similar show trials in Eastern Europe at around the same 
time, helped to orchestrate these proceedings in North Korea. 58  Pak Hon-yong, leader of the 
domestic faction, was also arrested in August 1953, but was not tried and sentenced until 1955, 
when he was the center of North Korea’s second (last and smaller) ‘show trial’; he was sentenced to 
death and is believed to have been killed in 1955 or 1956.59   
Kim then turned his attention to the Soviet and Chinese factions. As de-Stalinization got 
underway in the Soviet Union, Soviet Koreans in the north began to call for more collective rule and 
“de-Stalinization” in North Korea.  North Korea officially denounced these efforts – and continued 
to do so for decades.60  It was in this context of a transition away from the liberalizing Soviet Union, 
that North Korea first promulgated the idea of juche (loosely translated as self-reliance) in December 
1955 – partly as a critique of Soviet Koreans and a call for self-reliance in place of reliance on the 
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Soviet model.61  Purges directed at the Yenan faction followed.  Pak Il-U, for example, was relieved 
of duty and transferred to the Ministry of Communications in 1952-53, and purged from the 
leadership in 1955.62  Mu Jeong, the influential Yenan figure who participated in the Chinese Long 
March, fought as an officer in the Chinese Red Army, and commanded North Korean forces during 
the Korean War, was denounced and purged after the war also; he moved back to China and died 
there.63 So, too, was Choe Chang-ik, Politburo and Finance Minister; arrested and imprisoned for 
Communist activities in Korea until 1935, and afterward leader of the Korean communists in Yenan, 
Choe held a series of influential party and government posts until he was purged in 1956 after the 
Third Party Congress.64  Other prominent leaders purged in the mid-1950’s included Pak Chang-ok, 
chair of the State Planning Commission; Kim Yol, Politburo member and chair of the party in 
Hwanghae province; and Ho Kai, head of the KWP Organization Department.65   
Events surrounding the Third Party Congress in 1956 both revealed and continued the 
swing toward the consolidation of power by Kim Il Sung and his guerilla faction.  Of 67 Central 
Committee members from the Second Party Congress in 1948, only 29 were re-elected to the new 
71-member Central Committee, indicating the high rate of elite turnover. The Standing Committee, 
which replaced the presidium and the Politburo, was made up of eleven members: five were former 
members of Kim Il Sung’s small guerilla group, compared to two each for the Soviet and Chinese 
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factions.  Kim publicly praised the accomplishments of the guerilla faction, and the number of 
power holders from rival factions continued to decline.66   
When Kim Il Sung took a trip to the Soviet Union in summer 1956 after the Party Congress, 
remaining members of the Soviet and Chinese factions cooperated to mount an unsuccessful 
challenge, declaring Kim “anti-people” in August.  The challenge failed, but it resulted in a further 
expansion and reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – still, interestingly, under the 
leadership of Soviet Korean Pang Hak-se – and the reported creation of a Political Security Bureau 
within the Ministry of Defense, headed by former guerilla Sok San.67  Large-scale purges of the 
Yenan faction began in 1957, and over a quarter of the Soviet Korean leadership were purged and 
had died by the early 1960’s.  The violence precipitated a mass exodus of former Soviet citizens 
between 1958-61. Members of the Yenan faction were not so fortunate; despite the attempted 
intervention of a joint Soviet-Chinese delegation in 1957, very few of them were able to escape, and 
by 1957-58, Lankov writes, “the Yanan faction ceased to exist.” 68 By September 1961, at the Fourth 
Party Congress, Kim Il Sung reported triumphantly that the party had successfully “eliminated 
factionalism” and achieved “complete unity” within.69  
 
The Turn to Popular Control  
As the threat from elite rivals decreased, the Kim regime increasingly turned its attention to 
popular control.  Social classification processes were used to widen the purges from the elite to the 
                                                 
66 Andrei Lankov, “Kim Il Sung’s Campaign against the Soviet Faction in late 1955 and the Birth of 
Chuch’e,” Korean Studies, Vol. 23 (1999), p. 60; Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 52.  
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68 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 103-105.  
69 Rodong Sinmun, 12 September 1961; cited in Gause, Coercion, p. 101.  
 313 
 
popular level, and to organize Korean society for the purposes of obtaining information on every 
citizen.   
As mentioned previously, these processes were not new. The Soviet Civil Authority had 
conducted background checks to purge those who had worked for the Japanese, and new categories 
of enemies had been added during the Korean War. 70  In May 1957, however, the process expanded 
significantly. The KWP Standing Committee announced a resolution that called for “The 
Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People’s All-Party 
Movement,” which became the basis for an extensive social classification project designed to 
establish people’s class background, or songbun. 71  In 1958-59, the KWP Central Committee 
established the Central Guidance Office, headed by Kim Il Sung’s brother Kim Yong-ju, to 
implement the “Party Intensive Guidance Project.”72  Replicas of this committee at lower levels, 
over 7,000 people nationwide, were trained in Pyongyang and dispatched to supervise provincial 
“security committee” investigations. As a result of this survey process from 1957-60, an estimated 
100,000 people were punished, including 2,500 executions, and an estimated 70,000 members of the 
“hostile class” forcibly transferred away from the urban, border, and coastal areas to remote inland 
mountains.73  Their ID cards marked with a special stamp, these “special settlers” were subject to 
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extra monitoring, and travel outside their districts was restricted. 74  In parallel with the Party 
Intensive Guidance Project, control mechanisms in the countryside were decentralized to be closer 
to villagers; in 1958, the police boxes or substations that had existed at the county level (exercising 
control over a cluster of villages) were replaced by a policeman resident in each village, who reported 
to MPS at the district level.75   
Both the formal internal security apparatus and the classification of the population were 
subject to perpetual adjustment.  At the end of the 1960’s, Pang Hak-se was replaced as Minister of 
the Interior by Sok San, former leader of the Defense Ministry’s PSB (Inmingun Jeongchi). (Reports on 
personnel shuffling in the security bureaus of the Defense Ministry and MPS agree that other 
reassignments happened at the same time, but offer conflicting reports about who else was moved 
from where to where.76) The Ministry of Public Security was re-established in October 1962 and 
again given control over both criminal and political policing, while the Guard Bureau led by Chon 
Mun-sop took over personal security for Kim Il Sung.  By October 1966, Col. Gen. Sok San had 
joined the Politburo as Minister of Public Security, along with six other military men.  
Social classification and re-classification continued as well.  In 1961, Kim observed that the 
majority of the North Korean population had at least one “unreliable” relative, and called for re-
educating the majority. In 1964, perhaps influenced by China’s Socialist Education Movement, he 
declared “we cannot make a revolution with young people who do not know who a landlord or a 
                                                 
74 Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 6; Collins, Songbun, pp. 22-23; Suh, “The Transformation of Class 
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capitalist is.”77  Additional classification campaigns followed, in 1964-69, and again from 1966-67, 
each time increasing the regime’s information on its citizens.78  Yet another round of classification, 
from 1967-70, produced the system known today: it sub-divided the population into 51 categories, 
each placed into the core, wavering, or hostile class (haeksim/kibon kyechung, dongyo kyechung, and 
choktae kyechung).79  Kim affirmed this tripartite structure to the Fifth Party Congress of 1970, and it 
was circulated to party cadres by order of the KWP secretariat in February 1971. An estimated 3.9 
million people were classified as part of the core class; 3.1 million fell in the wavering class; and 7.9 
million belonged to the hostile class.80  In a bit of gallows humor, North Koreans joke that the core 
classes are ‘tomatoes’ (red inside and out), the wavering class are ‘apples’ (red outside but white 
inside), and the hostile class are politically unredeemable ‘grapes’ (Chinese public security officials 
referred to double agents with a similar agricultural metaphor, as ‘radishes’).81  
The result was a coercive apparatus that achieved a remarkably high degree of societal 
penetration, providing the regime with an almost unmatched level of surveillance. An extraordinarily 
large number of people were included in the process of information provision, though either formal 
or informal means.  These included two (eventually three) main formal security agencies, as well as 
three less formal institutions that nevertheless provided the coercive apparatus with significant 
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quantities of information.  (For the sake of brevity, I omit judicial and penal institutions from my 
discussion,82 including the prison camp system for which North Korea has become infamous.83)  
The three formal agencies are the State Security Department, the Ministry of Public Security, 
and the Military Security Command.  The State Security Department (SSD, kukka anjon bowibu) 
employs an estimated 50-70,000 people, and is organized into provincial headquarters in all 9 
provinces (with 200-300 personnel at each), county offices (70-80 officers), and district offices (6-10 
people) – allocated at a ratio of approximately 1:1,000 residents.84  The Ministry of People’s Security 
(MPS, Inmin Bo’anbu, sometimes referred to as the Anjeonbu) handles most non-political policing; it 
employs an estimated 210,000 police, with an additional 100,000 civilian staff, and is more deeply 
embedded at the local level than the SSD, with officers down to the village level.85  Third is the 
Military Security Command (MSC, Bowi Saryeongbu), which handles surveillance and internal security 
inside the armed forces (Choson Inmingun, the world’s fourth largest military at 1.2 million people).86  
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Smaller than the MPS or the SSD, the MSC employs an estimated 10,000 people, stationed within all 
command bodies of the KPA and in units down to the battalion level.87  
All three agencies employ informants.  MSC officers manage an estimated 6-7 informants in 
each 120-soldier company.88  Defectors who previously worked for the SSD claim that under normal 
circumstances, the SSD aims for one informer per fifty people, with an even higher proportion in 
“politically difficult” circumstances; another suggests that each SSD agent fields about fifty 
informants, so one in every twenty North Koreans informs for the SSD.89  Informants are not 
rewarded materially; instead, they are usually chosen from “amongst those with a minor weakness, 
such as having a relative who had defected to South Korea or a grandfather who was close to the 
Japanese.”  This makes the informant less likely to be identified by his or her neighbors, more 
susceptible to threats and control by the security agencies, and more motivated to provide 
information that might lead to a “mark of honor” on his record or the expunging of something 
bad.90  The quality of informants’ reports is questionable, as anecdotal evidence suggests significant 
political pressure by “control officers” to come up with evidence of subversion; in at least one case, 
falsified reports created under pressure resulted in the report’s subject and family being arrested.91     
Beyond formal informants, however, much of North Korea’s intelligence advantage appears 
to come from social institutions that are linked to the coercive apparatus and regularly gather 
extensive information on society (mechanisms similar to the baojia on Taiwan).  These institutions 
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broaden participation and improve the volume and accuracy of the regime’s information. The 
principal institutions are the songbun system of social classification; the system of “people’s groups,” 
or inminban; and the “organizational life” in which every North Korean citizen must participate.   
The first of these social institutions is the classification system developed through the Party 
Intensive Guidance Project and refined continuously afterward. It is based on an individual’s songbun, 
or class background, and implemented through the Resident Registration System. Songbun technically 
consists both of one’s ideological background (chulsin songbun) and one’s individual behavior (sahoe 
songbun), and can evolve over time.  In practice, however, a bad family background is difficult to 
overcome, and it is easier to move down the ladder than up; there are many ways to become an 
enemy of the regime, but fewer ways to earn merits (many of which rested on historical 
opportunities that have now passed). As Andrei Lankov explains, the key determinant of a North 
Korean’s status, in practice, is “what his or her direct male ancestors did in the 1930’s and 1940’s.” 
The father’s songbun matters much more than the mother’s, he argues, and once determined, one’s 
status is essentially “unchallengeable.”92 As a result, the institutionalization of the songbun concept has 
made North Korea one of the only Communist systems to formally enshrine hereditary privilege, 
Oh and Hassig compare it to India’s social castes.93  
A class category turned to caste, songbun is a critical determinant of the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion in North Korea. It is the “starting point for the regime’s security policies,” 
as it determines who is an enemy and who is a friend; as one might expect for a system primarily 
designed to monitor one’s (real or potential) enemies, the most detailed classification system relates 
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to the ‘hostile forces’” – 30 of the 51 categories.94 Songbun investigations are conducted for the 
explicit purpose of isolating hostile elements, serving the majority of the people,95 and furthering the 
protection of the Kim family. Among the system’s guiding principles is the need to investigate 
everyone’s past and present, in detail and without exception.96  Where one falls determines whether 
and how one is include, down to a very granular level: where you live, what school you attend, what 
job you are assigned, and even perhaps your food allocation through Public Distribution System. 97 
Even though North Korea has a reputation for being more inclusive than other Leninist regimes 
when it comes to party membership, individuals with bad songbun are usually prohibited from joining 
the KWP.98  And although 20% of the KPA comes from the hostile class, they serve only in rear 
areas, on assignments such as construction work. They are not allowed to occupy the front lines or 
carry weapons, nor are they represented in the officer corps.  The officer corps is 80% core class and 
20% wavering, and the wavering class members are not allowed to lead units larger than a battalion, 
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(roughly 500 people).99  Those outside the boundaries of the “core class” are, not surprisingly, 
targeted for violence: if accused of a crime, people with low songbun generally receive harsher 
sentences than those with a more favorable background.100  
Songbun and the Resident Registration System create an impressive informational advantage 
for the regime, providing organized and detailed intelligence on every individual in North Korea. 
Both the individual files and the classifications themselves are extensive, and are updated regularly to 
reflect new events and emerging social and economic categories, such as the return of ethnic 
Koreans from Japan and changes to the DPRK domestic economy that occurred in the 1990s.101  
Individual files, created at age 17, contain information on one’s family background (chulsin songbun), 
birthplace, birthdate, basic family information, medical information, fingerprints, blood type, 
handwriting samples, as well as birth records, military service records, citizen registration papers, 
records of internal and foreign travel, organizational entrance and membership documentation, 
marriage records, housing unit forms, political information, and any prison or security-related 
paperwork.102 Changes or updates must be reported within 15 days or a penalty is imposed (three 
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days in the case of changes in residence).103  An investigative update is conducted every two years by 
local MPS officers assigned to the “Resident Registration Project” unit, a process that includes 
interviews with the individual as well as with family members, local members of the party 
committee, and members of his/her housing and work unit.104  
As a concept, songbun is determined, implemented, and used by the coercive apparatus.  The 
initial survey is done by an investigating officer, reported to a committee including the city/county 
police chief, MPS section chiefs, and a Resident Registration officer, and then approved by the local 
party secretary.105 The file is then held by the Registration Officer at the local MPS office, and this 
person works with the local “people’s group” supervisor (inminbanjang, see below) to keep the 
records up to date. Files are now digitized and stored underground, and are available to a wide range 
of local and national security and “organizational life” personnel for use in investigations (SSD for 
civilians, MSC in the KPA). A second copy is regularly held by the SSD in order to prevent officers 
from being bribed to upgrade one’s status.106  The files of any personnel assigned to the protection 
of the Kim family – including those that work on products that they consume – are color-coded to 
facilitate special monitoring.107  
Another feature of surveillance and social control is the inminban system. A “people’s group” 
(inminban) typically consists of 30-40 families living in the same neighborhood or apartment building, 
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with the inminban number labeled on the outside of the residence. Each is headed by an inminbanjang, 
usually a middle-aged or older woman who receives increased food rations or a small payment as a 
perk for the position. Her tasks typically include conducting ideological study sessions and 
organizing people for civic duties like neighborhood maintenance. However, inminbanjang are also a 
front-line component of the surveillance system; they formally report to the local party offices and 
also consult with the MPS and SSD approximately once a week.108  Inminbanjang own copies of keys 
to all residences, conduct radio checks, and make unannounced home visits (sukpak komyol) at night. 
They are responsible for recording and reporting to the local police on any overnight visitors: name, 
gender, place of registration, identification number on their citizens’ certificate (gongminchung), travel 
permit (tonghaengjung) number, length of visit, and reason for visiting.109 Inminban heads are held 
responsible if members of their group do anything wrong, and the system is enforced through 
overlapping jurisdictions designed to prevent bribery and misreporting: MPS or SSD officials 
accompany the inminbanjang on home checks, and each inminban has one undercover informant 
reporting to MPS, and one to SSD –  leading to triplicate reporting on each residential unit.110  
If songbun investigations, resident registration, and the inminban are not enough, yet another 
feature of North Korea’s social control system is “organizational life” (chochik saenghwal), described as 
“a highly formalized array of surveillance and indoctrination practices that are conducted within a set 
of networks, each run by a particular government-controlled ‘organization’.”111 North Korea has five 
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organizations, the most important of which is the Korean Workers’ Party.  For those ages 14-30, 
there is the Youth Union; for those over thirty in agriculture or industry, the Farmers’ and Trade 
Unions; and for unemployed women over age 30, the Women’s Union.112 Derived from Soviet 
“social life” (obshestvennaia zhizn) and having some resemblance to its Chinese cognate (zuzhi 
shenghuo), North Korea’s organizational life is nevertheless distinctive in two significant ways.113  
First, the system is totally inclusive: in contrast to the Soviet Union, which included Party members 
but not the general population in its organizational reach, membership in one of the five 
organizations in North Korea is compulsory and non-voluntary.  Except for KWP membership, it is 
assigned automatically based on one’s workplace, age, gender, etc.114  Second, membership is non-
duplicative: unlike the Soviet Union, since 1974 overlapping membership has not been allowed.115 
Both universality and non-redundancy of membership prevent ambiguity and facilitate efficient 
social control.  North Korea still discusses organizational life using the Stalinist metaphor of a 
“transmission belt” (inchontae); cells of 10-20 members conduct twice-weekly education and mutual 
criticism sessions (saenghwal chonghwa) that perform the functions of indoctrination and 
surveillance.116  
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Kim Jong Il: Succession and the Re-Emergence of Elite Threats?  
 
As Kim Yong-ju’s health weakened, the role of successor shifted to Kim Jong Il, a son of 
Kim Il Sung who had spent the 1960’s working on party organization and propaganda.117  While the 
balance of threats in the minds of the North Korean leadership cannot be determined with any 
certainty, the succession process appears to have re-awakened fears of an elite threat in North 
Korea, particularly from powerful figures in the military and security apparatus.  According to 
Hajime Izumi, Kim concluded from the Lin Biao incident in China that appointing a non-relative as 
a successor had weakened Mao too much, and that only a son could be trusted to manage the 
country on his behalf without creating an alternate center of power. 118  Kim Il Sung therefore 
orchestrated the succession process to avoid that risk; the limited evidence available suggests that he 
did not entirely succeed. As Kim Jong Il gradually assumed power, rumors of opposition and coup 
plots began to mount, particularly in the early 1990s when he formally took control of the KPA and 
the National Defense Commission.  These included both a supposed Soviet-backed plot in April 
1992 that resulted in the purge and execution of a supposed 300+ officers, and a second plot among 
the 6th Corps in North Hamgyong province in 1995.119  
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Kim Jong Il’s rise to power in the 1970s was characterized not only “by a dramatic 
expansion and reorganization of the internal security apparatus,”120 but by institutional changes that 
one would expect to see from a regime suddenly more concerned about coup-proofing and elite 
threats. Kim Jong Il ruled differently than his father, personalizing and weakening the institutions 
that Kim Il Sung had constructed. 121  With respect to coercive institutions, this meant that he 
introduced fragmentation and competition. The two major developments in the coercive apparatus 
under Kim Jong Il were the creation of the State Security Department, and the rise in power of the 
Military Security Command. As a result, North Korea shifted from a relatively unitary internal 
security system to one that fragmented power among three security agencies, all of which reported 
not to the Cabinet (like other ministries), but directly to the head of state.122  Under Kim Jong Il, the 
social composition of North Korea’s ruling circle also narrowed, including only the descendants of 
the Kim family and a few families who fought with Kim Il Sung; to date, however, the regime 
maintains the inclusive (if non-voluntary) intelligence-gathering apparatus described above.   
Though North Korea under Kim Jong Il continued its emphasis on popular penetration and 
social control, it also narrowed the ruling elite and made that group more exclusive. Over time, 
power became vested in the Kim family and their relatives, as well as a handful of elite families who 
had fought with Kim Il Sung.  At the end of the 1960s, another purge removed a group of military 
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leaders who supported Pak Kum-Chol rather than Kim Yong-ju as heir apparent.123  Kim Il Sung 
replaced Minister of Public Security Sok San with a relative, Kim Pyong-ha, further strengthened the 
role of the KPA’s political commissars (now placing them at the regimental level), and allowed 
Kim’s Ministry of Public Security to monitor the military.  By the end of the 1960’s, North Korea’s 
inner circle only included those with whom Kim IL Sung shared either a family tie or a strong bond 
from the Manchurian guerilla campaign. Kang Song-san, Hwang Jang-yop, and a dozen others were 
among the relatives with prominent leadership positions; the use of familial metaphors to 
characterize the regime grew more prevalent.124  In the 1980 Politburo, the twelve former guerilla 
comrades of Kim’s formed the majority; as time passed, their posts were handed to their children, 
leading Andrei Lankov to characterize the North Korean elite as “closed and hereditary.”125  Lankov 
also directly attributes this narrowing of elites to Kim Il Sung’s need to protect Kim Jong Il from a 
potential elite/coup threat: “Kim hoped to safeguard his (and his son’s) position, to protect himself 
from the dangerous moves of the nomenklatura which toppled not one Communist leader.” 126 
There is little question that over time, the upper echelons of the North Korean regime have become 
more exclusive.   
The other methods of reorganization were structural rather than compositional; they 
gradually increased the level of fragmentation within the coercive apparatus. When a new 
constitution was adopted in 1972, the Ministry of Public Security became the Public Security 
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Department (PSD).127   More significant, however, was the February 1973 creation of the State 
Political Security Department (SPSD, Gukga Jeongchi Bowibu), formed by extracting four Bureaus 
from Public Security. Former Minister of Public Security Kim Pyong-ha became SPSD’s minister.128 
In October 1973, when Kim Jong Il became head of the KWP Secretariat for Organization and 
Guidance (OGD), he acquired appointment and inspection power, as well as authority over the 
internal security apparatus; the new SPSD reported to Kim Il Sung through the President’s Office, 
and to Kim Jong Il through the KWP.  
In this new capacity, Kim Jong Il altered the lines of reporting that provided him with 
information. Under the “monolithic guidance system,” all information was supposed to flow to him, 
and all decisions come from him.129  He sent out OGD inspection teams to party and government 
offices, and instituted a “three-line, three-day” reporting system in which the three lines – party, 
government, and secret police – each briefed him every three days. In 1975, when 
“Kimilsungization” was applied to the KPA, OGD inspection teams visited the military, and an 
additional three lines of reporting were established: the General Political Bureau (political commissar 
system), the General Staff, and the Military Security Command.  Drawing from a Soviet template, 
reporting within these organizations moved primarily along vertical lines, and was highly stovepiped.  
Where lateral relationships existed, they were carefully monitored, strictly limited in substance, and 
functioned differently from the comparable relationships in China or the Soviet Union. Ken Gause 
notes that North Korea has typically been “even more reluctant about forming lateral bonds than 
the Soviet Union under Stalin” because these relationships could turn into collusion that would 
                                                 
127 Gause, Coercion, p. 110.  
128 Gause, Coercion, p. 110; Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 12; Hyun, Study of Social Control, pp. 12-13.  
129 For a description of this system and its institutionalization, see Gause, Coercion, pp. 113-115.  
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threaten the Kim family.130  Unlike in China, North Korea’s MPS and SSD report to local party 
bosses, but do not take orders from them, and provide input to party committees at provincial, 
district, and city levels, rather than the other way around.   
Kim also began to shuffle personnel at a higher rate. In 1975-76, Oh Yong-pang took Han 
Yong-ok’s place as MPAF Security Bureau Director, former MND-GPD head Choe Won-sik 
replaced Ri Chin-su at the Department of Public Security, and Ri became Procurator General.  After 
an outbreak of conflict within the SPSD, that agency was renamed the State Security Department 
(SSD, Gukga Anjeon Bowibu).  Many of its personnel were purged and replaced by trusted people who 
had previously worked for Kim Jong Il in OGD.  In April 1982, the SSD and Public Security 
Department were moved under the KWP. 131   Neither individual appointments nor institutional 
structures were stable; two vice ministers of public security promoted to the Politburo in 1980 were 
demoted in 1985, the PSD was returned to the purview of the Administrative Council in 1986, and 
the SSD was made subordinate to the National Defense Commission (NDC) in 1992.  Kim Jong Il 
continued to assume not only informal but formal control, becoming Supreme Commander of the 
KPA in 1991 and chair of the NDC in 1993.    
The result of this restructuring and reshuffling was to create overlapping missions, multiple 
channels of command, and “layers of competing and conflicting responsibilities.”132  Each of these 
attributes was advantageous to Kim Jong Il – he could use whichever part of whichever organization 
he preferred, especially if he suspected disloyalty among one organization –but it also stoked 
incentives for competition.  The Political and Security Bureaus in MPS, for example, could report to 
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to their Minister, directly to Kim outside the normal chain of command, or through KWP OGD 
and the SSD, making it unclear whether the MPS was the SSD’s peer organization, or subordinate to 
it.133 The Military Security Command similarly reported both through MPAF and directly to Kim.  
Portfolios increasingly overlapped; for example, monitoring the military, a task previously delegated 
to the SSD, was done at times during the 1990s by the Military Security Command, whose 
responsibilities in turn overlapped with the General Political Bureau. An increase in MSC 
responsibilities in the 1990s also placed it in conflict with the MPS, as the MSC established its own 
offices at the provincial and city levels to conduct and support non-military operations and 
investigations.134  Kim Jong Il frequently changed missions and tasks between agencies – moving the 
supervision of border security posts, for example – depending on which agency he wanted to deal 
with a particular crisis, as well as to keep power balanced among different agencies.135  Intelligence 
gathering was compartmentalized, so that “different intelligence organizations [had] limited contact 
with each other,” 136 and the security agencies were encouraged to compete politically to accomplish 
feats that would honor Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. 137  
This fragmentation was associated with a higher level of conflict within the security 
apparatus. Although the causal relationship is not conclusive, Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig argue 
that fragmentation prevented “the emergence of a monolithic security force that could overthrow 
the regime,” but also made coordination of intelligence more difficult and created “the possibility of 
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competition and conflict among the security services.”138 Another expert noted, “competition is 
valued over cooperation… the MPS, SSD, and MSC have often competed and even had turf battles 
– many times because one did not know what the other was up to.”139 In the early 1980s, after SPSD 
head Kim Pyong-ha found himself in conflict with 15 veterans of the organization, he tried to arrest, 
try, and execute his opponents. The attempt backfired, Kim’s followers were purged, and he took 
his own life in custody.140 One former PSD agent recounted turf wars between the SSD and the 
PSD over what counted as an anti-regime case (subject to SSD authority) versus an economic or 
social crime (handled by MPS).141 Other, more recent reports have identified clashes between the 
SSD and the MPAF, as both sought to enlarge their roles at MPS expense; for example, MPAF 
reported information about the Youth League in 1997 that the SSD had failed to report, resulting in 
rewards for the MPAF’s Security Bureau and punishment for both the Youth League and SSD.142   
 
 
III.  Development of Internal Security in the People’s Republic of China, 1927-57  
Like the North Korean case, the case of China provides some support for the arguments 
made in previous chapters, as well as raising additional questions for future consideration.  First, the 
nature of the threats confronted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) early in its history 
decisively shaped its approach to internal security, and did so more than institutional inheritance or 
external influence. Where China is different, however, is that that early – and institutionally decisive 
– revolutionary history actually preceded the regime’s assumption of power, whereas social revolutions 
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in Taiwan and North Korea occurred afterward.143  Much of China’s coercive apparatus, therefore, 
evolved from CCP experiences in the two decades prior to assuming power in 1949. These 
institutions originally drew heavily on Soviet organizational structure and practice, with Chinese 
public security organs playing a functionally equivalent role to the state security agencies of the 
Soviet Union.144 Before even assuming power, however, Chinese leaders had rejected the Soviet 
Union’s foreign template in favor of a distinctively Chinese approach to intelligence, coercion, and 
social control, which they deemed more appropriate to the conditions facing the CCP at the time. 
Examining China’s experience thus confirms that threat management, rather than institutional path 
dependence or external influence, was the principal factor driving the design of coercive institutions.   
As in Taiwan and North Korea, the CCP’s internal security apparatus became primarily 
oriented toward popular control.  In the context of civil war against the Nationalists, the major 
threat to the CCP was popular defection and support for the KMT.  In order to win, the CCP 
needed good intelligence from the people and support from them; this, in turn, required not 
alienating them with excessive violence. After initially failing to construct this kind of apparatus and 
engaging in costly violence among the party and society – developments that helped precipitate the 
Long March and near-extinction of the CCP’s fortunes – CCP leaders addressed this need by 
altering their coercive institutions and their approach to internal security. China’s coercive 
organizations became distinct from their Soviet counterparts in that they were no longer simply 
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vertically controlled, but also responsible to and integrated horizontally with local party leadership: 
the tiao-kuai (条块) system.145 China’s use of an extensive network of agents and informants, as well 
as its use of rural and urban militias to mobilize and involve the population in security work, also 
played an important role in making the institutions relatively unfragmented and inclusive.  
The Chinese case also suggests that the CCP was able to retain this model after 1949 because 
their prior revolutionary experience – as happened in both Taiwan and North Korea after the KMT 
and KWP came to power – not only made public security institutions popularly inclusive at the 
ground level, but because, at the top level, the process weeded out elites who might otherwise have 
been a significant threat and created a need for organizational coup-proofing. (Joseph Fewsmith’s 
observation with respect to contemporary China that “the key to political stability was strong and 
stable relations at the top of the system and regularization of the party system below” seems equally 
applicable to the immediate post-1949 period; the elimination of elite rivals in the course of 
revolution seems to explain why the CCP avoided, at least temporarily, the organizational tradeoffs 
that other autocrats face between the priority of elite protection and popular management.146)  As a 
result, until the advent of the Cultural Revolution, China relied on a coercive apparatus that was 
both unitary and inclusive, and which recognized the imperative of obtaining intelligence from 
outside its immediate power base. As in North Korea, however, there is some evidence that 
awareness of an impending succession may have reactivated elite rivalries. And as in North Korea, 
there is also limited evidence – far from systematic – suggesting that where organizational 
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competition and social isolation have been present in the CCP’s history, their coercive institutions 
have engaged in heightened violence.   
 
Early Foundations: Pre-1949 Experiments with the Soviet Model  
The primary impetus for the Chinese Communist Party’s formation of intelligence and 
security organizations was the threat posed by the Nationalist government against which the CCP 
was struggling in civil conflict. Though security committees had existed inside the CCP-organized 
labor movement prior to 1927, the party first created a central organization for security purposes in 
spring of that year, after the collapse of the United Front with the Kuomintang led to violent 
Nationalist attacks against the Communists in both urban and rural areas.147  That year, the CCP 
Central Committee set up a Special Services Division (zhongyang teke, or SSD), and in 1929, they 
established in the Jiangxi Soviet (at the provincial level) the Commission for 
Suppressing/Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries.148  
The Commission was an ad hoc organization that emerged to cope with the urgent security 
crisis imposed by the collapse of the United Front. Unrestrained by legal status or structure, it 
assumed broad extralegal powers of investigation and summary justice, and was initially quite 
violent. Fear of infiltration prompted the Commission to engage in wide-scale anti-
counterrevolutionary (sufan) campaigns inside the base areas, which resulted in purges and killings of 
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thousands of suspected counterrevolutionaries.149  The purges were significant not only for the 
violence they caused, but because of what the justifications of violence revealed about the CCP’s 
understanding of the threats it faced.  First, the thinking of CCP leaders linked internal security and 
external defense in ways that analogized from the Soviet Union. Somewhat like the Soviet reasoning 
behind orders to punish soldiers who retreated during World War II, Commission member General 
Li Zhimin argued explicitly that a campaign of purges would incentivize military performance and 
lead to victory on the battlefield.150  The idea that fear, coupled with the need to prove loyalty – or 
simply innocence – would improve front-line units’ combat effectiveness therefore justified the 
extensive purges. Second, “army units at the level of battalion and above were reorganized so that 
officers and soldiers were not familiar with each other.”151 Social heterogeneity, it was believed, 
would prevent collusion, because soldiers who did not know each other would avoid any 
conversation that might lead to them being accused of participation in a counterrevolutionary clique.  
Both of these decisions de-prioritized the importance of unit cohesion, which Western militaries 
have long identified as a critical factor in combat effectiveness;152 no unit-level data on battlefield 
performance exists that could test General Li’s hypothesis. Though the measures were justified on 
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the grounds of external defense, however, they were also an early attempt to protect the CCP 
leadership from its own soldiers.   
When the CCP decided to formalize the Commission, they drew on Soviet models for 
institutional creation. In March 1931, the Commission was replaced by a Political Security 
Department (Zhengzhi Baowei Chu, PSD); local branches of the Commission became local branches 
of the PSD.  The PSD, renamed the State Political Security Bureau with the establishment of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic in late 1931, followed the organizational template of the Soviet 
GPU/NKVD.153  Under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, it recruited massive networks of informants 
throughout the base areas to spy on the population, the party, and the Red Army; within the military, 
it sent supervisory political officers  (tepai yuan) to every regiment and secretly recruited informants 
(wang yuan) at the company level and often even below.154  Perhaps most importantly, the early SPSB, 
like its Soviet template but unlike later incarnations of Chinese internal security organizations, did 
not answer to local governments or local party committees; it took orders and reported only 
vertically, to its own leadership.155   
The behavior of the Commission and its PSD/SPSB successor organization reflected the 
impact of leadership struggles in both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist movement; 
factionalism above led to violence below. In July 1929, after sidelining Bukharin, the Soviet 
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Comintern began to reflect Stalin’s harder line, and called for struggle against “right deviationists 
and rich peasants.”156  A parallel campaign unfolded in China.  As Guo Xuezhi writes:  
The SPSB carried out mass terror operations and purges, killing tens of thousands of 
people… the 1931 campaign against the [Nationalist Anti-Bolshevik] AB Corps in the 
Jiangxi base areas; the great suppression of counter-revolutionaries in the Hubei, Hunan, and 
Anhui base areas from 1932 to 1934; and the purges against the Reorganization Clique 
[Gaizu pai] in the Hunan and Western Hubei base areas from 1932 to 1934.157 
The logic of these purges had to do with both the strategy of revolution and internal elite politics. 
Revolutionary struggle linked external and internal security in the minds of the CCP’s leaders.  
Purging internal spies was necessary to break the external threat of Nationalist encirclement, and 
party leaders similarly credited the soldiers’ mutiny in the Futian/AB Corps incident to infiltration 
by a pro-Nationalist faction. The purges also, however, resulted from purely internal conflict 
between Mao and leading CCP figures in southwest Jiangxi, who disagreed with him over the extent 
of land seizure, Mao’s desire to appoint Liu Shiqi and Zeng Shan as party leaders, and the rejection 
at the October 1930 Luofang conference, of Mao’s military strategy against the Nationalist 
encirclement.158 Purging rivals on the grounds that they were members of the AB Corps helped to 
solidify Mao’s control, as well as that of Kang Sheng, who had aligned himself with Mao and taken 
charge of intelligence activities after returning from the Soviet Union in the late 1930’s.159   
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Soviet-style organization led to Soviet-style purges, marked by dramatic levels of violence.  
As a result of the Futian mutiny, a total of 4,400 soldiers and officers from the First Front Army 
were arrested (11% of its total fighting strength), and over two thousand killed. 160  The 1931 
campaign led by Zhang Guotao in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui led to purges of 2,500 soldiers and the 
death of 60-70% of the officers at or above the regimental level. 161  Purges in four large-scale 
campaigns mounted by Xia Xi in the Hunan and Hubei border base areas led to the death of over 
10,000 people between 1932 and 1934, and a decrease in the strength of the Third Army by over 
25%.162  Michael Dutton cites a figure of 46,000 people wrongfully arrested or executed in just three 
of the base camps.163  As in the Philippines, accounts of the time indicate that both a lack of real 
intelligence and political incentives for violence fed the rising wave of executions. Severe torture was 
used to extract false confessions (an interrogation practice called bigongxin), and confessions were 
generally considered insufficient unless they also implicated others – a process that led to ever 
widening spirals of violence based on false information and no concrete evidence.164 Party leaders in 
the different base areas also competed with each other to prove their commitment to the cause. 
Zealotry was success, measured in body counts: a question of who could flush out the most counter-
revolutionaries and promote the highest degree of loyalty-to-the-death among military units.  The 
consequences of this approach were deadly.  
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Internal Security with Chinese Characteristics: Moving Away from the Soviet Model  
Relatively quickly, China’s approach to internal security organization began to diverge from 
that of the Soviet Union. There appear to have been two reasons for this, the first of which was a 
growing awareness of the costs of political terror by members of the Communist leadership 
surrounding Mao.  As early as 1931, both Xiang Ying and Zhou Enlai, from their positions in the 
CCP’s Central Bureau in Jiangxi, wrote letters or reports critical of Mao’s behavior in the Futian 
Incident and the sufan campaign against the AB Corps. Zhou Enlai particularly emphasized the sufan 
campaign’s “development toward simplification and expansion,” and the costly excesses that had 
followed.165  Evidence of popular unrest and dissatisfaction with the campaign mounted, as village 
populations organized to hide or protect accused local officials from the SPSB’s persecutions.  CCP 
officials later credited this overreach with having tipped the balance in favor of the Nationalist 
military during the fifth encirclement campaign in 1933-34, precipitating the collapse of the base 
areas and the Long March to Yan’an.166   
This failure appears to have produced a change in CCP thinking about violence and control. 
Mao’s influence over internal security was diminished by the arrival of Zhou Enlai in the base area 
and his assumption of the leadership of SPSB in 1931. 167 The first check on SPSB power was 
created in spring of that year, separating the functions of investigation/interrogation from the 
powers of conviction and execution. The way that sufan campaigns were incentivized also changed; 
Zhang Guotao, for example, moved from focusing on the quantity of arrests and killings to defining 
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success in terms of quality cases of voluntary surrender, confession, and prosecution, before 
deciding to phase out the campaigns altogether.168  
The second reason was a change in the thinking of Mao himself; the Long March appears to 
have marked a transition in his thinking to focus on popular mobilization rather than terror.169  Mao 
admitted to mistakes during the sufan campaigns in 1956, but well before that, in Yan’an, he 
announced a principle of “killing none and arresting few,” and emphasized the role of evidence 
rather than forced false confessions. When Kang Sheng tried to rejuvenate Soviet-style 
investigations and purges in the Yan’an rectification and “rescue campaign” (qiangjiu yundong) of 
1942-43, including the use of false confessions and false accusations, Mao sided with those within 
the party who objected to these methods, and removed Kang Sheng. 170  Afterwards, in the 
counterrevolutionary campaigns of the 1950s, he directed MPS to ensure that it killed no more than 
0.1% of the population: enough to make a point, but not enough to antagonize the population.171  
Apparently sharing the communist preference for agricultural metaphor, he once observed, “Cutting 
off heads isn’t like cutting up chives.  Chives regrow.  Heads don't.”172  
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The result was a change in the organization and management of internal security. During the 
period of the Second United Front with the Nationalist government from 1937-45, the Central 
Special Work Commission and then the Central Security Commission (CSC, Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Baowei Weiyuanhui) handled party security and intelligence, commanding the impeccably named 
Department of Eliminating Traitors, Spies, and Trotskyites (DETST) to implement its directives in 
the 8th Route Army and elsewhere.173  Intelligence and counterespionage became key priorities for 
the CCP’s survival during the conflict with the Japanese, and for achieving an advantageous position 
vis-à-vis the Nationalist military as well.174  Under Kang Sheng, DETST and the Central Security 
Commission created local branches of the CSC as well as DETST-branch organizations (Chujian 
Baowei Weiyuanhui) and pervasive networks of local informers (wang yuan).  The instinct to resist 
excessive and indiscriminate campaigns of violence remained; when Wang Ming encouraged an 
unpopular anti-Trotskyite campaign, for example, he lost influence among a CCP leadership who 
still vividly remembered the costs of the sufan campaigns.175  
In 1939, the SPSB was abolished in favor of the Social Affairs Department (SAD), and the 
Central Security Commission was merged into SAD in October of that year.  SAD was led by Kang 
Sheng, who was also appointed head of the CCP Central Committee’s Intelligence Department in 
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July 1941, an organization that was also shortly thereafter merged into SAD.176 SAD was explicitly 
assigned both “external” and “internal” intelligence functions. It combined external espionage with 
internal surveillance of military, party, and government organizations; guarded the top leaders; and 
established schools for public security education and training.177  The Social Affairs Department was 
complemented by Bureaus of Public Security in CCP-controlled areas, where public security had to 
at least publicly reflect a united front rather than communist orientation, and so had to have a 
government face that was at least nominally separate from party security.  The Bureaus of Public 
Security also had a clear division of labor with DETST (the former handled the government, the 
latter the military), and operated on the principle of “respecting their respective independent work 
and organization.”178 As the civil war progressed, however, the Bureaus of Public Security and SAD 
essentially merged; by 1946, the CCP had established a General Bureau of Public Security in each 
regional bureau of its Central Committee, and operated corresponding local bureaus. During the 
civil war, public security also began to take responsibility for labor camps that held Nationalist 
prisoners of war and counterrevolutionaries sentenced to reform through labor (laogai).179  
The development of the Social Affairs Department marked a significant step in the evolution 
of Chinese public security organs, and a departure from both Soviet precedent and China’s own past 
practice.  Unlike the vertical chain of command that characterized the SPSB, SAD was governed 
through a two-tiered system.  Its officials reported both vertically, to the next-highest SAD agency, 
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and also horizontally, to the local area’s party committee. It both sought advice from the local party 
committee as it conducted its activities, and reported the results of investigations of any suspicious 
persons.180    
The effect of this structure was to constrain the SPSB, which had two advantages for Mao.  
First, the change addressed the previous problem of an unaccountable SPSB’s excessive violence by 
giving local officials oversight over investigations and punishment in their own areas. Party leaders 
believed that allowing local party organs a say in the operations of public security would prevent the 
costly excesses of the sufan campaigns and the backlash that followed.  Second, it satisfied Mao’s 
own desire to avoid having the SPSB become so powerful that it could threaten him.  In addition to 
vertical oversight, multiple horizontal checks on the activity of the security apparatus could keep the 
internal security apparatus from growing too powerful and independent; local party accountability 
served as a sort of Lilliputian tying down of Gulliver.181   
Militias, both urban and rural, played an important role in both the success of the Chinese 
revolution, and in making the institutions of public and internal security relatively inclusive.182  CCP 
leaders had organized the first Red Guards (chiweidui) during the Autumn Harvest uprising and the 
establishment of the Hailufeng Soviet in Guangdong in 1927, and charged them with community 
defense and with surveillance on behalf of the party.183 Red Guards and the related, more mobile 
guerilla organizations (youjidui) grew in size during the anti-Japanese resistance, so much so that by 
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1945, the People’s Anti-Japanese Defense Corps encompassed nearly 10 million people (10% of the 
population in liberated areas), of which the militias numbered around 2.2 million; during the civil 
war that followed, their strength was estimated to exceed 5.5 million. 184  Urban attempts at 
organization were generally less successful, since these areas were under KMT and then Japanese 
control, but throughout, underground party organizations clandestinely tried to recruit worker 
pickets. 185   These rural and urban militias, eventually incorporated into the army, constituted 
fundamental building-blocks of Chinese communist state-building efforts. As such, they were a 
major channel for recruiting and including large swathes of the population in revolutionary activity.  
That inclusiveness marked another way in which Chinese coercive institutions were distinct from 
their Soviet counterparts, who after 1945 incorporated the militias into the OGPU as full-time 
employees (rather than the army) – and who never achieved the level of popular participation in 
public security accomplished by China’s part time citizen militias.186 
Thus by the early 1940s, some of the distinguishing characteristics of Chinese coercive 
institutions were already in place. The instinct to make China’s security agencies subject to an 
overlapping web of both vertical and horizontal constraints was already in evidence, as a way to 
address both the need to avoid indiscriminate killing of the CCP’s popular base and to ensure that a 
powerful embedded security organization would not then be able to challenge the Chinese 
leadership. In keeping with the dissertation’s broader arguments about the origins of internal 
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security institutions, it is clear that threats exerted greater force on the shape of early coercive 
institutions than did foreign influence or simple institutional path dependence. Kang Sheng’s 
demotion in 1946 after the excesses of the Yan’an rectification was a personal story emblematic of 
this process; before even formally taking power, China had moved on to a model of internal security 
that in organization and practice was distinct from its Soviet predecessor.  
 
After the Revolution: Public Security and Intelligence Post-1949  
The Ministry of Public Security was formally created and assumed CSAD’s duties over 
intelligence and security in October 1949.  This work was overseen by Zhou Enlai and Mao, who 
insisted early on that the public security apparatus report directly to him and not just to Zhou’s 
cabinet.187  The informational and coercive architecture set up after 1949, largely continuous with 
what the CCP had established before, explicitly sought to be both unitary and socially inclusive.   
The Ministry of Public Security was the chief agency in charge of public and state security in 
the People’s Republic of China. Based on the similarly integrated SAD, the MPS was unitary in the 
sense that it was the only agency authorized to deploy operational agents (teqing renyuan) for 
intelligence gathering purposes; Schoenhals’ observation that it was referred to colloquially as the 
“Central” MPS (Zhongyang gonganbu, or Zhonggongbu), even after the word central had been formally 
removed from the organization’s title, suggests the coordinating and unifying role that it was 
intended to play for the CCP’s Central Committee.188 Boundaries and responsibilities were also 
clearly demarcated within the geographic and functional subdivisions of the Ministry; provincial 
officers were not allowed to run agents in other provinces, and the MPS was explicitly forbidden 
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from recruiting operatives inside the courts, party organizations, or public security organs.189 (This 
does not mean, however, that the organizational structure was static; MPS underwent a number of 
internal restructurings.)190  
As unitary as it was, China was still a large country, and the machinery of the new state did 
not always run smoothly. Schoenhals characterizes cooperation across the different bureaus of the 
Ministry, for example, as “an elusive goal,” and notes “a bare minimum of lateral information 
sharing.” He also, however, describes regional leaders complaining about lower levels not working 
hard enough to share information and exhorting their subordinates to “fight shoulder to shoulder” 
with each other, indicating that the goal of the MPS leadership was explicitly not fragmentation and 
informational stovepiping. Certain cases also testify to the presence of cross-bureau and cross-
regional collaboration: for example, one anti-sabotage case whose decade-long operations spanned 
the central ministry, fourteen provinces, and three municipalities, or another in December 1952 
against a “Trotskyite network” spread across eastern China.191  If anything, MPS officials’ complaints 
reflect that overly thorough coverage was leading in some cases to duplication of efforts and 
inefficiency.   
The early history of the MPS suggests that the Soviet experience was still a major basis for 
CCP security work, but also implies significant differences of opinion between the KGB and MPS.192 
(The Soviet Union’s role was, admittedly, likely to have been minimized in historical accounts 
written after the Sino-Soviet split, and differences between the two styles inflated. Equally unreliable, 
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however, are American media reports like the Time magazine cover story in 1956 that referred to 
Luo Ruiqing as China’s Beria and the MPS as a direct corollary to the NKVD.193) On the side of 
collaboration, Soviet tradecraft appears to have been disseminated in MPS textbooks; the USSR’s 
technical surveillance capabilities also appear to have been much admired (though because of 
resource constraints, more admired than actually duplicated). 194  Over time, however, Soviet 
experience was de-emphasized and China’s own knowledge and experience became the basis for 
training.  In contrast to Kang Sheng, Chen Long, one of the heads of the 1st Bureau of the MPS who 
had also studied in the Soviet Union during the purges of the 1930s, had returned in 1938 with a 
view of Soviet methods and their efficacy that was much more skeptical and less enthusiastic.195 One 
Chinese participant in the advising process complained that the Soviet advisors “did not understand 
the Chinese situation, were unfamiliar with their Chinese surroundings…. Hence much of the time 
their proposals were in appropriate, at times even laughable.”196  Differences appear to have been 
particularly acute in the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries (zhenfan) from 1950-53, 
where Soviet advisors favored a more jurisprudential approach and disliked Mao’s reliance on the 
mass line and (to Soviet thinking, unruly) popular participation – participation that was in part a 
lesson learned from the problems that had emerged with the previous sufan campaigns.197  Soviet 
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advisors departed as a group in 1958, and later CCP resolutions referred negatively to this 
experience, referencing the “problem of learning from foreign countries.”198  
Rather than draw blindly from foreign models, the MPS sought to understand the threat 
environment in which it operated and to adjust its policies and actions accordingly.  In 1950, its 
work report included an explicit threat assessment and identified priority targets within the 
population that should have resources allocated to their surveillance.199 The principal threat was 
popular: police sources estimated 2 million armed bandits, 600,000 spies, and 600,000 Nationalist 
elements at large in autumn of 1949. 200  Subsequent years’ reports included discussion of 
redistributing attention to coastal areas, for example, or industrial and mining regions, where the 
threat level was higher. Regional and provincial bureaus were allowed some latitude in determining 
what was necessary, and on that basis sometimes tried to recruit more agents, and sometimes 
reported that no new agents were necessary. 201  These reports are incomplete, but they clearly 
illustrate that the public security organs consciously assessed the threats that they faced, and assigned 
resources and personnel accordingly.   
Once the threats had been identified, obtaining and managing information on them was a 
priority of the CCP, and especially a priority of the first Vice Minister of the MPS, Yang Qiqing.202 
In 1948, SAD had issued an order to transfer all documents and archives to the public security 
departments, and prohibited the destruction of any records. 203  MPS officers also constructed 
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additional files of their own, both on the agents they recruited and on the information obtained 
through these agents. MPS officers who recruited agents did extensive research on a potential 
agent’s background, using archives, personal interviews, and conversations. They recorded this data 
in an “Agent Personal File” that summarized an agent’s name, sex, age, ancestral home, address, 
education, occupation, ethnicity, religion, status (shenfen, including both class background (chushen) 
and personal circumstance (chengfen)), organizational and political affiliations, personal and social 
relationships, political attitudes, behavior since recruitment, achievements during service, and any 
incriminating information that could later be used to control the agent if necessary; it sometimes also 
contained a photograph.204  Precise statistics on the number of agents and informants employed by 
the MPS are not available, but in 1956, the MPS stipulated that each of its officers should mange 15 
or more agents, with senior officers managing 3-5 higher-level agents.205 Agents in turn obtained 
information from an array of shehui ermu (“social eyes and ears,” or local activist-informants).206 
Although the MPS archival files appear to contained contradictory information, and archival 
record-keeping was especially weak in rural areas, they were still a major advantage in the eyes of 
public security officials, and were used accordingly. Extensive use of the files occurred across China; 
in 1955, for example, officials in Harbin examined the files of over 22,000 individuals, a Hunanese 
county-level archivist boasted in 1958 of having records on 85% of the township’s adult population 
and using them in the rural rectification movement, and an article that discussed operations in Fujian 
province asserted that “a public security archive is a substantial resource in the struggle against the 
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adversary and should be valued accordingly.”207 One of the main things that information permitted 
was precise targeting and pre-emptive action with regard to potentially threatening actors, as in a 
case in Harbin where archival resources allowed officials to find relatives of an arriving target; the 
officers reported that these resources allowed them to “control the premises where he was likely to 
attempt to take up residence, and had managed to grasp the initiative.”208   
MPS officials understood the importance of accurate intelligence enough to grapple seriously 
with several problems of how best that information could be obtained.  Agents were reminded to be 
scrupulously accurate in debriefing, and wherever possible, the MPS relied on two separate agents to 
verify all information passed to them by an agent – the second of whom was called a “duplicate line” 
(fuxian) – or verified information by using physical or technical surveillance. One Case Group 
explicitly records that having multiple sources of information helped confirm the truthfulness of the 
information supplied by an individual agent. 209  In contrast to the Philippines and Chun’s apparatus 
in South Korea, the MPS also cautioned against using agents in visible ways to simply intimidate 
people, rather than covertly for obtaining information.  As one official argued in 1950, “to merely 
position more guards and restrict people’s movements, that is to take a passive attitude and is of 
limited use.”210  
The Ministry also wrestled with whether the incentives it provided to lower-level officers 
would skew the information provided by them.  The initial quotas for numbers of agents reporting 
to each officer may have been reasonable at the beginning, when public security officers themselves 
were in short supply: less than 73,000 nationally in 1950, and 330,000 by 1953 for a population of 
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588 million people – a ratio of 1:1,781. 211  However, MPS officers quickly objected that this 
numerical emphasis was leading to recruitment practices that counted quantity more than quality. As 
early as 1952, a bureau expressed concern with the quota system, noting “mere numbers are enough; 
quality is not asked for.”212 A more formal 1967 document criticized the quota system as a wholesale 
adoption of inappropriate Soviet practice, arguing that it had led agents to create fictional success 
stories to avoid falling short.213  In response, the MPS stressed the need for agents to be recruited for 
a specific purpose; when an agent was thought to have exhausted his usefulness, the reasons for 
termination were outlined and approved, and the agent released from service.  
The MPS also debated whether setting targets for percentages of cases that should be 
cracked in a given year – for example, 60% nationwide in 1958 – would lead officers to act on cases 
before full intelligence could be obtained. In October 1950, first Minister of Public Security Luo 
Ruiqing delivered a report from a nationwide conference on public security operational work, in 
which he stated that for each case, “consideration should be given to other cases that tie in with it.  
Myopia as well as impetuosity are to be resisted.”214  To balance the quotas, the MPS emphasized the 
need to maintain a long-term view and avoid hasty arrests that might lead to incomplete 
neutralization of threats.   
The MPS also considered questions around how material rewards and physical coercion 
would play into the supply of intelligence. One textbook criticized the materially-motivated agents of 
the capitalist countries, while praising the patriotic purity of CCP agents; though this assessment is 
undoubtedly self-motivated, it does appear that officers were generally limited, at least on paper, to 
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making sure their agents did not suffer so much economic hardship that it would prevent them from 
reporting. Excessive generosity to agent sources, however, was considered “counterproductive.”215  
Information obtained through physical interrogation was also distrusted because of the incentives 
for falsification.216 Both of these policies stand in notable contrast to the ways in which information 
was obtained in places like the Philippines under Marcos, and limited the personal incentives that 
MPS officials might have had to increase the levels of violence.  
The MPS was also aware that social inclusivity would improve information provision. 
Officers in training at the Central People’s Public Security Academy, for example, were told in 1957 
that “agents are secretly recruited from all social strata” – including not just party members, but also 
backward elements and members of the hostile classes.217 Luo Ruiqing reminded his ministry in 1950 
that the officers could not limit themselves to working with Party and Youth League members; pure 
members of the revolutionary masses would stand out in the hostile environments from which the 
CCP most needed information. Nor was this mere rhetoric; a task force visiting Shanxi in 1954-55 
criticized plainclothes MPS officers because their dress and appearance didn’t blend with the local 
population.218  Backwards elements, though less reliable, were seen as critical “societal assets” (shehui 
liliang), and specific instructions were provided on how to handle agents from the different social 
strata.  In obtaining information and recruiting sources, MPS officials were also cautioned to be 
aware of the “power ladder” in Chinese society, and to send someone from the target’s own social 
strata to recruit him/her, rather than someone in an inferior position. Information was most 
effectively obtained, they advised, when “common soldiers approach other common soldiers and 
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generals approach other generals.”219  Social distance between the public security officials and their 
targets, in other words, would hamper intelligence collection, while a degree of social closeness and 
similarity would facilitate it.  For this reason, the MPS needed to be as inclusive as possible.   
The MPS’s emphasis on inclusion also covered ethnic minorities, where the CCP was aware 
that it lacked officers and informants. These populations were therefore subject to special attempts 
to recruit public security officials and agents. Recruitment instructions for ethnic minority areas 
issued in 1954 specifically stressed that the lessons from the interior might not be appropriate, that 
coercive recruitment practices were prohibited, that agents should pay attention to recruiting in 
culturally appropriate ways, and that public security work should focus on “a long term commitment 
to uniting with [ethnic minorities] so as to make them work for us.”220 As in other areas, long-term 
information gathering was the goal; in 1961, a report called for the need to “build up resources over 
a long period of time.”221 Public security academies gave preferential admittance to certain ethnic 
groups; starting in 1954, the Central People’s Public Security Academy (CPPSA) “organized special 
classes for officers from some of China’s larger ethnic minority groups,” including thirteen different 
minorities from Xinjiang.222 The CCP specifically believed that having public security officers from 
these regions would help to limit tensions, writing that Mongolians who were discontented with the 
CCP would object less if unappealing policies were implemented by Mongolian officers, thereby 
avoiding the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Some of the Tibetan students who received training from 
the MPS in 1955-57 were sent back to help calm Tibet when the 1959 revolt broke out.223  
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Household Registration, Dossiers, and Social Control  
Finally, CCP efforts at social control employed two different file systems: the household 
registry (户口, hukou) and personnel file (人事档案, renshi dang’an) systems. These systems have 
deep historical roots; in his work on the hukou, Fei-Ling Wang observes that Chinese rulers have 
sought to measure, organize, and register the population through census investigations, household 
registration projects, and files for centuries.224 The dang’an file has been called the basic socialist 
database by which the Chinese state keeps track of its citizens; the file is usually held at an 
individual’s work unit, and a copy placed with the local office of the Ministry of Public Security.225   
Contemporary China’s household registration system inherited its spatially oriented logic of 
social control from the historic baojia.226  Since Chapter 3 treats at some length the failed attempt of 
the Nationalist government to institutionalize the baojia system in the chaotic period from 1927 to 
1949, for the sake of brevity I will not recapitulate its origins here.227 The CCP, however, organized 
its own version of the baojia in areas under Communist control as early as 1939, using the system in 
Jiangxi as well as later on in northern Shanxi. Every five families formed a “connected assurance” 
(lianbao) group collectively responsible for ensuring the revolutionary fidelity of inhabitants and 
reporting the presence of any outsiders.  
When the CCP assumed control over major cities from the Japanese or Nationalist 
authorities, it also took over the registration and file systems, even inheriting the old baojia cadres at 
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the local level, as well as the clerks responsible for verifying and updating dang’an records.228  The 
CCP launched household registration drives beginning in the Northeast in April 1948, and also 
established special files for those deemed a potential political threat.  Various campaigns since 1949, 
as well as a nationwide cadre investigation project in 1956, helped party officials to cross-check and 
consolidate the personnel dossiers of party members.229   
Using household registration files for population control and internal security became one of 
the CCP’s earliest priorities, and thus hukou was almost immediately conceived of as something that 
would be operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).  As a 1994 MPS manual for officials 
explained about the period in 1949:  
On the one hand, [we] need to find out [hidden] enemies quickly, assist struggles against 
the enemy, and maintain the revolutionary order through the hukou management that 
controls the information on the population. On the other hand, we can provide data to 
the agencies of the state for their making policies and plans through hukou management 
that controls the population.230  
Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing stated in November 1950 that maintenance of the hukou 
system was “a major task.” By 1956, the MPS and its local offices had been given authority to 
manage the system in both rural and urban areas, and the formal Regulations on Household (Hukou) 
Registration in the People’s Republic of China were passed in January 1958.  In an estimate that actually 
seems somewhat conservative, MPS sources report that “our hukou system was not only widely 
established in both rural and urban areas but also basically completed and consolidated” by 1965.231 
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As with North Korea’s Resident Registration System, one of the primary advantages of 
household registration, as well as of the individual file system, is informational. In the 1990’s, 
China’s police-citizen ratio was between 2-4 police per thousand residents: more than the average of 
2:1,000 in developed countries, but far less than the intensive ratio found in either Taiwan or North 
Korea.232  Each police station is supposed to have at least one hukou official, at a ratio of one to 
every 500-700 households, but news reporting in China suggests that the ratio in practice is as low as 
one for every 800-1,000 households, or even, in one reported case, 2,100 households under 
supervision of a single “model officer” in Nanchang, Jiangxi.233  The officer in charge of overseeing 
these households is mandated to spend at least thirty hours a week in them.  Files contain 
information on an individual’s birth, death, personal data (unspecified), family relations, and 
migration in/out, and the ideal hukou officer is also expected to know each household’s financial 
status, social relationships, physical features, accent, and personal or familial habits and 
preferences.234   
 
 
IV.  Comparisons and Conclusions  
 
What do the examples of North Korea and China teach us about coercive institutions, 
internal security, and state violence under authoritarianism?   
Although the evidence is speculative, the cases in this chapter do provide some support for 
the theory advanced in Chapter One, most convincingly when it comes to the origins of 
authoritarian coercive institutions. In both China and North Korea, the exigencies of the threats the 
leaders faced became more important than either path dependence or external influence in 
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determining the structure and composition of the coercive apparatus.  The leaders of both countries 
initially adopted Soviet structures and accepted Soviet guidance; later, however, they each 
consciously rejected it in favor of institutional frameworks they found more appropriate for their 
own circumstances and the threats they faced. International institutional borrowing was undoubtedly 
present, and I suspect that internal security in these countries would have developed very differently 
without it, but it was the failure of foreign models, as much as their success, that created the 
eventual shape of North Korean and Chinese approaches to internal security.   
In both cases, threat perceptions appear to have deeply informed the structure and social 
composition of the coercive apparatus. Revolution-turned-civil-conflict linked external and internal 
threats, eliminated elite rivalries by violently selecting out rivals who opposed the dominant leader, 
and contributed to the creation of a unitary, inclusive coercive apparatus that relied on detailed 
social classification and extensive surveillance as tools of popular control. This popular focus 
appears to have been the combination of a Leninist predisposition toward cell-like penetration of 
society combined with the chief security demand of a popular revolution – to win support and 
information from society.  In both cases, the result was a coercive apparatus focused intensively not 
just on intelligence and popular surveillance, but on social investigation and organization at the 
household level.  And in both cases, the ossification of these categories has, over time, turned class 
into caste and made the two countries’ political systems much more exclusive.   
While historical debates on the success of the Chinese communist revolution often focus on 
the contributions of either the CCP’s anti-Japanese leadership or its socioeconomic program to 
popular legitimacy, this chapter identifies a third component of revolutionary success (or perhaps of 
stability): the contribution that revolution makes to elite politics. In both cases, the popular 
orientation of the coercive apparatus appears to have been made possible by the reduction of elite 
conflicts, which dampened the pressure to engage in coup-proofing devices such as institutional 
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fragmentation and social exclusion.  Elite conflict was eliminated during revolution, however, not 
simply because shared experience somehow produced an enlightened solidarity against outside 
threats, as some of the comparative literature has argued, but by violently weeding out of the group 
the rivals whom the dominant leader distrusted and suspected of wanting to take power.235   
In other significant ways, however, the two systems discussed in this chapter differ from 
each other.  Their revolutionary struggles occurred in different contexts, especially relative to the 
process of state-building. China’s revolution and civil war swept Mao and the CCP to power in 1949, 
while North Korea’s leaders were installed in power in 1945, and pressed on to revolution and civil 
conflict afterward. Though in both cases elite threats were eliminated violently during the course of 
revolution, this process took place before the CCP is typically considered a “regime,” while for the 
KWP it took place afterward. In terms of the timing and consolidation of the coercive apparatus, 
then, the experience of Kim Il Sung and the KWP is perhaps more similar to that of Chiang Kai-
shek and the (also-Leninist) KMT party in Taiwan. Interestingly, all three of these quasi-
revolutionary regimes (Taiwan, China, and North Korea) exhibit high violence early in their 
histories, but because of the timing of revolution relative to statehood, only the experiences in 
Taiwan and North Korea count formally as “state” violence.   
The arguments made by this dissertation also cannot explain everything about coercion and 
violence in the two cases in this chapter – or even some of the most interesting and important 
things.  Elite purges occurred at parallel points during the history of the regimes in China, Taiwan, 
and North Korea, but the exact relationship between revolution, communist organization, and elite 
threat remains puzzling, and many questions remain.  The parallel timing of the purges does not 
answer the question of why they all happened at similar times, nor does it explain why the extended 
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and violent revolutionary process of solidarity-by-selection seems to have dampened elite threats for 
at least a generation – something that did not happen in non-revolutionary authoritarian regimes like 
South Korea or the Philippines, which also had high rates of elite turnover in the first few years. 
Moreover, the history of both China and North Korea suggests that the onset of succession and 
generational transfer of power reactivates fears of elite threat – particularly for the successor, but 
potentially also for the aging incumbent autocrat – but does not explain why elite rivalry surfaced in 
the context of succession in North Korea and China, but not in Taiwan.  Finally, the argument 
advanced here also fails to fully explain the differential rates of coercive institutional adaptation 
observed across these five countries.  There is therefore a lot of future work that could be done to 
investigate the relationship between factors such as changing threats, coercive institutions, violence, 
and authoritarian stability.   
This chapter also does not address the question of how the coercive institutions created in 
China and North Korea shaped patterns of state violence under these regimes. (For reasons 
explained at the beginning of this chapter, it does not really even try.)  Readers will no doubt have 
noticed that this chapter omitted, and the theory advanced here fails to explain, the best-known 
episode of state-sponsored violence that occurred in either China or North Korea: China’s Cultural 
Revolution, which according to recent estimates based on county gazetteers, may have killed 
between 492,000 and 1,970,000 people.236  There are indications that some of the factors identified 
in this study as conducive to increased state violence – such as elite conflict and increased fear of a 
coup, 237  organizational and factional conflict, 238  and social cleavages 239  – all contributed to the 
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dynamics of violence during the Cultural Revolution. To argue that these factors caused the Cultural 
Revolution itself, however, strains credulity.  Moreover, even the predictions that we could make 
about the Cultural Revolution are not necessarily borne out by the limited data that exist: pre-
existing factional divisions do not appear to have determined student behavior, and rural violence 
appears to have fallen along lineage or other “communal” group lines, rather than along the 
boundaries of class-caste that the regime had so carefully constructed.240 One could argue that the 
theory is not meant to explain violence in which a mass movement targeted the public security 
organs rather than the other way around; one could also argue that because the Red Guards 
represent the construction of an alternate and competing security organization, the Cultural 
Revolution is in the broadest of senses consistent with my theory. Neither explanation is particularly 
satisfying.  
What the argument made here does purport to explain is routinized political violence under 
authoritarianism: variations in the everyday practice of repression carried out by the institutions of 
surveillance and coercion. Some striking examples suggest that the dynamics of intelligence, social 
exclusion, and incentives, identified as critical in previous chapters, also played an important role in 
driving state violence in China and North Korea – for example, Li Chengyu’s decription of how the 
need to fulfill Mao’s 0.1% quota put pressure on Shandong University to identify exactly 204 
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rightists within its ranks between 1956 and 1958, and led to the public execution of 300 individuals 
in a stadium in Shanghai in 1951.241  However, systematic data that capture this kind of routinized 
repressive violence is currently absent from the historical record on China and North Korea, and 
what we do know suggests a higher level of state violence than would have been predicted by this 
theory. Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of how state violence occurred in these countries, 
and rigorous comparison of communist internal security practices to the practices of anti-communist 
authoritarianism, must await the opening of archives and records in these two countries.  Given that 
scholarship on the Holocaust is still evolving today, sixty years after those events took place, even 
the opening of archives will likely be only the beginning of the process of discovery, documentation, 
and debate.242   
The theory proposed here suggests that the strength of the coercive apparatus in China and 
North Korea, and particularly their focus on popular control through inclusive intelligence, should 
have violence that was fairly targeted at specific sectors of the population.  In both systems, but 
particularly in North Korea, one would have expected state violence to rise over time with the 
increase in fragmentation that accompanied political succession, and in North Korea’s case, one 
would expect it to be increasingly severe over time against the individuals classified as having bad 
songbun.  Residents of North Korea’s prison camps (an estimated 1% of North Korea’s population) 
are indeed believed to be citizens with bad songbun.  In China, past observers have commented that 
political terror, despite its excesses and evils, seems to have taken a generally different form than its 
Soviet counterpart. The leaders of the Chinese intelligence and internal security apparatus did not 
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suffer the same consistently dismal fate as their Soviet counterparts,243 and state violence in China 
was also often “directed not against a hypothetically recalcitrant population in general, but only 
selected sectors in specific conjectural campaigns to suppress counter-revolutionaries, remold 
intellectuals, etc.”  In other words, it was more concentrated and targeted, both across time and 
within society, than Soviet terror seemed to have been.244  
Comparing China and North Korea to the three countries examined earlier in this 
dissertation, however, suggests a possible different way of thinking about political violence. Though 
it may have been targeted by design, state violence in China and North Korea seems to have relied 
on classifications for guiding violence that in the end encompassed a comparatively larger 
proportion of society. One percent may sound low, and it may even have been intended to be low, 
but it appears to have been higher than the percentage of individuals who were targeted in Taiwan, 
South Korea, and the Philippines. Moreover, rather than repression being the top-down work of a 
faceless bureaucracy, the greater role of mass movements in China meant that the regime depended 
on ordinary citizens to supply both violence on behalf of the state, and the information that directed 
that violence.245  In some ways, it is not only the scale of violence, but also the opportunity that the 
Chinese and North Korean regimes provided for ordinary citizens to participate in the work of 
surveillance and repression, that makes their violence all the more disturbing.  
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Chapter Six    
 








This project is a first cut at understanding the origins and operation of authoritarian coercive 
institutions.  Although the literature on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian political institutions 
has largely overlooked the set of institutions in charge of domestic surveillance, repression, and 
violence, I find that the design of these institutions fundamentally shapes the patterns of state 
violence experienced by citizens.  Authoritarian coercive institutions are not all alike, and neither is 
the violence that they produce.   
 
Main Findings  
The first part of each chapter in this manuscript examined the origins of coercive 
institutions, and the reasons for variations in their structure and social composition. The second part 
– with the exception of Chapter Five – examined the effect of these variations on patterns of state 
violence.  I find that autocrats face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security 
apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals. Coup-
proofing against elite threats calls for an internally fragmented security force, drawn exclusively from 
narrow segments of society. Managing popular unrest requires a unitary, non-fragmented apparatus 
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with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks. Autocrats construct coercive 
institutions based on whichever of these threats they perceive to be dominant at the time they come 
to power. Over time, however, the organizational tradeoffs outlined above, exacerbated by 
institutional stickiness, blunt these autocrats’ ability to adapt as new threats arise. Organizational 
characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, socially 
exclusive security apparatus – associated with a high initial threat from fellow elites – is likely to be 
more violent, both because it has stronger incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the 
intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression.   
The cases examined here conform to this theory.  Prior to 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s coercive 
apparatus was oriented toward protecting him from the elite rivals he faced on the mainland; it was 
fragmented and excluded native Taiwanese, and state violence on Taiwan was high. The move to 
Taiwan in 1949 caused Chiang to re-evaluate his threat environment, however, and in the early 
1950’s, the KMT instituted a series of reforms, reducing fragmentation and increasing the number of 
Taiwanese who were involved in the coercive apparatus and particularly its intelligence collection 
networks – with the result that violence dropped in the mid-1950s and remained low thereafter.  By 
contrast, Ferdinand Marcos, motivated by the elite threat from his own security forces and from the 
elite families that dominated the Philippines, fostered fragmentation among four different internal 
security agencies and decreased the inclusivity of his coercive apparatus by taking measures such as 
reducing the number of police and preferentially hiring people from his own ethnic Ilocano and clan 
networks.  These organizational measures gave Marcos’ coercive agents both social and material 
incentives for violence, and also handicapped the intelligence that they would have needed to deal 
with the population using a more pre-emptive, targeted, and discriminate approach. As a result, state 
violence against civilians rose steadily from the time Marcos declared martial law in 1972 to when he 
was ousted in 1986.   
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In Korea, the presence of an existential external threat gave operational control of the 
Republic of Korea military to the United States, and limited South Korean autocrats’ ability to 
manipulate the military itself. Outside of the military, however, the degree of coup-proofing they 
engaged in correlated with their beliefs about the dominant threat. Syngman Rhee, who was 
primarily concerned with marginalizing political rivals, created fragmentation in the form of 
competing agencies and rival regional factions, and staffed his exclusive security forces 
predominantly with those who had served under the Japanese. As a result, violence from inter-
agency feuding and against the excluded leftists was high. Park Chung Hee began with a more 
inclusive and less fragmented security apparatus (led by the KCIA), but after declaring Yushin in 
1972, fears of a coup increased. His coercive apparatus became increasingly fragmented and 
exclusive, as he relied on a trusted network of military-educated Kyongsang elites and on rivalry 
between the KCIA, Presidential Security Service, and Army Security Command to assure himself of 
power. Violence rose after 1972 under Park, and was particularly directed at Kyongsang’s rival 
region, Cholla, which had been almost entirely shut out of the internal security apparatus.  Chun 
Doo Hwan, who faced a major popular uprising in his first months in power and who saw popular 
resentment and assassination as the major threat, reduced fragmentation by coordinating internal 
security through Defense Security Command. He also made the riot police more inclusive by using 
conscripts to staff those units – a measure which reduced state violence, but placed a strain on his 
coercive apparatus that was ultimately untenable.  In all of these cases, elite threats correlated with 
fragmentation and social exclusivity in the coercive apparatus, creating incentives and intelligence 
handicaps that lead to less discriminate and higher state violence. Mass or popular threats on the 
other hand, correlated with a unitary and inclusive security apparatus with better intelligence on the 
population and incentives to avoid acting violently against it.   
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This project is the first comparative study of the origins, design, and operations of 
authoritarian coercive institutions. In each case, the theory presented here was tested against 
possible alternative explanations, both for the origins of coercive institutions, and for patterns of 
state violence. A theory based on coercive institutional design had more explanatory power than the 
plausible alternatives, particularly in predicting the timing, targets, and processes of violence, within 
a single case and across multiple cases.  
 
Project Contributions  
The project makes substantive contributions to our historical knowledge of East Asia and 
theoretical contributions to the study of authoritarianism and political violence. Substantively 
speaking, the project draws on new historical data on the processes and decisions that led to the 
creation of coercive institutions in the five countries mentioned in previous chapters.  The data also 
shows how authoritarian coercive institutions are linked to violence, and illustrates two key linking 
mechanisms: one grounded in the intelligence capacity of the institutions, and another in the 
incentives for or against violence that these institutions provide to coercive agents. Much of the 
documentary and interview evidence brought to bear in these chapters has not appeared before in 
English-language scholarship, and makes an original contribution to our historical understanding of 
the authoritarian periods in these countries.  
The primary theoretical contribution of the project is that it presents a novel theory about 
authoritarian coercive institutions and their importance for state violence.  First, it presents a new 
explanation for the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions, predicting the conditions and 
timing under which these institutions are most likely to be formed or re-formed, and explaining why 
an autocrat might select a particular organizational structure and pattern of social composition for 
the coercive apparatus. Second, it presents an original argument about how and why coercive 
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institutions matter for state violence: by shaping the incentives and intelligence capacity of the 
organizations that carry out that violence. It predicts when we should expect to see a rise in the level 
and indiscriminacy of state violence against civilians, and what mechanisms are most likely to drive 
that violence.  I hope that this framework will be of interest within and beyond the scholarly 
community.  
The argument advanced here challenges much of the existing theoretical work on the 
determinants of repression, which suggests that autocrats respond to increasing threats with 
increasing violence. (A fuller examination of that literature appeared in Chapter One.) As noted 
above, I agree that autocrats are driven to use violence by a sense of threat, but I further argue that 
they think more strategically about institutional creation, on a longer time frame – thereby producing 
a very different relationship between threat and violence than the one that currently dominates the 
literature. Paradoxically, and in contrast to the existing threat-based explanations of repression, the 
project demonstrates that autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence 
rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations that they have designed expressly 
for that purpose. In these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute for violence; citizens 
relinquish their privacy, but less often their lives. Thus this manuscript depicts a fundamentally 
different understanding of repression and why it varies – something that is central to authoritarian 
rule, and yet poorly understood and theorized.  
In addition, the project provides new empirical knowledge of several theoretical concepts 
that are important to the study of contentious politics, repression, and conflict. For example, though 
social and ethnic cleavages are commonly discussed in the literature on civil war, I show here that 
they can also be manipulated as part of authoritarian coalition-building and security force 
management strategies. The project identifies conditions under which an autocrat is likely either to 
exclude parts of society based on those cleavages, or to opt for a broader base of participation, and 
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unpacks some of the implications of that choice. I hope that this study is the first step in provoking 
scholars to think about how the relationship between state and society is constituted when inclusion 
means participation not just in self-governance, but in the processes of surveillance and violence, 
with consequences for repression and political violence.   
Second, I hope that scholars of both comparative politics and international relations will be 
interested in the role of intelligence in determining the scope and intensity of state violence.  
Information is a concept that is theoretically central to theories of conflict and violence, but 
empirically difficult to observe; our theories also presume that it is always desirable. I demonstrate 
here, however, that the priority placed on obtaining information – and information from whom, 
about whom – varies systematically with the political interests of the autocrat.  The fact that 
autocrats are sometimes willing to handicap their own domestic intelligence services because it 
serves their political ends vis-a-vis fellow elites should help us to identify which countries are going 
to be prone to internal conflict as a result of a lack of information or informational asymmetries.   
The project also has significant potential implications for policy. American foreign 
policymakers devote an enormous amount of time and attention to training overseas security forces; 
human rights advocates press for authoritarian governments to improve their treatment of particular 
dissidents; constructivists recommend policies designed to diffuse human rights norms worldwide.  
This project suggests that interventions at the level of policy are not likely to be especially fruitful, 
and that interventions to shape institutional structure – while difficult – are more promising. To the 
extent that the United States can signal that it will not support coup plots, direct its attention and 
assistance at reducing overlapping and competitive jurisdictions within the coercive apparatus, and 
push for broadly inclusive recruitment into the security forces, it may be able to reduce violence.  
Without question, these efforts are likely to be difficult; fundamental instincts for self-preservation 
drive coercive institutional creation, and threat perceptions may ultimately be hard to alter from 
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outside, especially once the window of initial institutional formation has passed.  Even if institutions 
are malleable, the reforms that might decrease violence within a particular regime (short of changing 
the regime itself) would involve taking steps toward a single powerful organization with a strong 
surveillance capacity directed at citizens – a course of action that, in turn, raises many moral 
questions. Yet absent institutional reform, systematic improvement in the treatment of citizens, and 
alleviation of human suffering at the hands of the government, will remain unlikely.   
 
Scope Conditions and Limitations  
This project’s research design, though it offered the many advantages outlined in Chapter 
One, also imposed certain limitations.  It focused on understanding causal mechanisms at a fine-
grained level of detail within a relatively small number of cases, and so prioritized historical accuracy 
at the expense of easy generalizability. Generalizing the theory advanced here will require detailed 
knowledge of many cases, something that can only be accumulated through significant expenditure 
of research time and resources. It will be difficult, for example, to use this theory to make falsifiable 
predictions about how an autocrat will construct coercive institutions unless we are able to obtain a 
fairly good understanding of how that autocrat sees the threats around him – information that was 
present to a reasonable degree in these cases, but which might be difficult to find for all 
authoritarian rulers, especially those for whom memoirs and primary source documentation and 
interviews are not available. Additionally, because the dominant social cleavage differs from country 
to country, defining whether or not the coercive apparatus of each country is “exclusive” will require 
detailed knowledge of that country’s social dynamics, cross-referenced with information on their 
coercive apparatus. That information has proven difficult to obtain and challenging to code 
consistently across almost a hundred countries, though efforts to do so are underway.  This both 
limits the present manuscript, and highlights one possible avenue for future research.  
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Other limitations have emerged from the findings of the project itself, and have helped to 
define its scope conditions. The argument here appears to be strongest in explaining variations in 
and dynamics of state violence in non-communist authoritarian regimes. (As discussed in Chapter 
One, there is some indication that similar mechanisms can produce violence in democracies, but that 
the mechanisms should be systematically less present than they are for authoritarian regimes.) 
Authoritarian regimes that are revolutionary communist regimes, however, may fall outside the 
scope of the argument. Based on the information gathered here, I cannot conclude this with 
certainty; the chapter on China and North Korea confirmed that threats shape institutional design in 
communist as well as anti-communist authoritarian regimes, but the chapter lacked the data on 
internal violence that would be necessary to test whether the effect of coercive institutions is similar 
across these regime types as well. The data that do exist suggest that my argument may explain some 
of the day-to-day rhythms of repression, but that it is unlikely to fully explain the comparatively 
higher levels of state violence in China and North Korea, or their most significant episodes of 
violence – events that produced some of history’s most extreme human suffering. There is no 
question that this is a significant and disappointing limitation of the project. Nevertheless, the 
majority of authoritarian regimes since 1945 have not been revolutionary communist regimes, and so 
the argument still explains much of the historical and current variation observed in authoritarianism 
and authoritarian state violence.   
 
Questions and Directions for Future Research  
The above discussion highlights several possible avenues for future research, in terms of 
both data collection and theoretical investigation.  On the data collection front, one possible way to 
proceed would be to further investigate the generalizability of the argument by compiling cross-
national comparative data on coercive institutions. Another would be to try to collect systematic, 
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detailed, and reliable data on state violence across time and space within countries like China and 
North Korea, where such information is currently absent.   
Several interesting theoretical questions also emerge. One, mentioned above, has to do with 
whether revolutionary communist regimes somehow handle coercion differently, and produce 
different patterns of violence. (As discussed in previous chapters, these regimes also seem to display 
a higher rate of institutional adaptation, so they are clearly different in some respects.) The exact 
mechanism that might lead to different patterns of violence is unclear – whether it is Marxist 
ideology, Leninist organization with its focus on the use of cell-like structures to penetrate society, 
or something about revolutionary experience that leaves a formative imprint on these regimes and 
makes them a distinct category or type. More broadly, it raises the question of whether the way a 
regime comes to power decisively influences the coercive institutions it creates and how they are 
used.  The ascent to power could shape how an authoritarian regime’s leaders see the world and its 
possible threats, how they might want to shape the institutions of coercion, and how constrained 
they would eventually be in doing so.  In examining the causal mechanisms at work, it would be 
useful to compare Asia’s communist revolutionary regimes to non-revolutionary communist regimes 
such as those in Eastern Europe and revolutionary non-communist regimes such as Iran.  
 This research also raises questions about how various factors shape the relative threat 
perceptions of autocrats. If the tradeoff posited in Chapter One actually exists, mass-oriented 
revolutionary communist regimes should be vulnerable to elite or coup threats, but this does not 
seem to have been the case.  Perhaps a coup is somehow perceived to be less of a threat in these 
regimes – but if so, why is that the case? Or perhaps these regimes have found a way to address 
coup threats without creating the fragmentation and exclusivity often observed in other authoritarian 
regimes – in which case we would want to know what that is.  An additional question about threat 
perceptions arises if the regime persists for long enough: in China and North Korea, but not in 
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Taiwan, succession appears to have re-activated fears of elite threat, and produced fragmentation as 
a coup-proofing device designed to secure the successor.  How does succession affect threat 
perceptions, particularly perceptions of a coup or elite threat – and what, then, is the likely effect of 
succession on coercive institutional structure?   
A final set of questions that bears further investigation emerges from debate on the effects 
of repression.  As Chapter One outlined, political science has often modelled violent repression as a 
linear and efficient response to increases in threat. Yet, although state repression sometimes works, 
it can also backfire and trigger more radical protest – an outcome that seems unlikely if repression is 
actually being efficiently calibrated. The framework in this dissertation suggests a possible 
explanation and prediction for when repression is likely to be effective versus when it will be 
counterproductive.  If repression is indiscriminate, then it is uncorrelated with the actual behavior of 
individuals; the probability of being repressed is essentially random.  There is then no reason for an 
individual not to engage in subversive activity; one might as well take the chance, however small, 
that subversive activity will result in a change of regime.  My interviews suggest that dissidents faced 
with the prospect of blindly indiscriminate violence eventually adopted exactly this line of thinking, 
and that this dynamic helped catalyze individual and collective action against the dictatorship.  
Additionally, if dissidents are from parts of society that are excluded from regime intelligence 
networks, they are more likely to be able to cooperate without being detected, leading to a greater 
chance of success.  Thus, if regimes with certain coercive institutional designs are more likely to 
engage in indiscriminate violence, and if it is indiscriminate violence that catalyzes opposition 
(especially opposition that can organize undetected), then understanding the creation and operation 
of coercive institutions may also provide new insight into the social and institutional factors that 
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   A Note on Sources  
 
Materials for this project were drawn from the following libraries, archives, and collections:  
 
United States  
 
Harvard University Libraries (Harvard Yenching Library, Fung Library, University Archives)  
National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD)  
National Security Archives, George Washington University (Washington, DC)  
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (Boston, MA)  
Harry S Truman Presidential Library (Independence, MO)  
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (Stanford, CA)  




Academia Sinica Libraries (especially Joint Library of Humanities and Social Sciences)    
Institute of Modern History Archives, Academia Sinica   
National Central Library  
National Taiwan University Library  
Academia Historica Archives  
Kuomintang Party History Archives  
National Archives Administration   
Compensation Foundation  




National Library  
Foreign Ministry Archives  
 
South Korea  
 
Seoul National University Library  
National Assembly Library  
Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library and Archives, Yonsei  University  
Woon Am Institute/Rhee Syngman Library, Yonsei University   




University of the Philippines (various libraries and University Archives)    
Lopez Museum and Library   
National Library of the Philippines  
Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines  
Commission on Human Rights  
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SELDA Archives, University of the Philippines  
 
